JANUARY 1956

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THE WORLD TODAY

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Notes of the Month

Election Year in the United States

FOUR months ago it was becoming increasingly certain that President Eisenhower would consent to try for a second four-year term in the White House. And in that case it was as certain as such things can ever be that the Republicans would win the presidential election, which will be decided on 6 November 1956. So long as he could still fight, as he could today, on the slogan of 'Peace and Prosperity'—'everything's booming but the guns'—Mr Eisenhower was believed to be unbeatable. It was, however, doubtful even in September whether the Republicans would be able to regain the control of Congress which they lost in 1954. The President's popularity is far greater than that of his party.

Mr Eisenhower's sudden illness struck at the heart of Republican confidence, for without him his party's hopes of victory are almost non-existent. After the first shock the Republican National Committee took the official line that there was every reason to suppose that he would in fact stand again. The election campaign now being planned for Mr Eisenhower is to be fought on television screens rather than on public platforms and railway trains, and emphasis is being put on the steps being taken to lighten the admittedly unnecessarily heavy load of the Presidency, by delegating unimportant duties, cutting down the number of hands to be shaken, and so on. But this in itself lays the Republicans open to the charge that they are not only weakening the President's constitutional authority, but are also so anxious to win that they do not care if they kill their candidate in the process. And if Mr Eisenhower does run, much more attention than usual will be concentrated on the vice-presidental candidate, for the Vice-President succeeds automatically should the President die in office.

But few, if any, members of the Republican National Committee can really believe that there is more than a slight chance that Mr Eisenhower will be a candidate in 1956, particularly since it is known that even before his illness personal considerations

made him reluctant to run. There are two reasons why the party organization is pretending to bury its head in the sand. In the first place, once it is known that the President is on the way out, his influence over Congress, and especially over the Republican members there, will be weakened; his hopes of getting his legislative programme through the next session, and of seeing that the Republicans make a good record on which to fight next autumn, will deteriorate. Secondly, the National Committee does not want the party to be divided by public controversy over who should be Mr Eisenhower's successor; the committee, which used to be of a conservative turn of mind, today follows the same middle road as the President and it wants to be sure that the next candidate will do the same. If Mr Eisenhower's decision is delayed long enough, potential rivals to the man chosen by the committee—or, possibly, by Mr Eisenhower himself—will have no chance to build up support before the nominating convention meets in San Francisco on 27 August

On the other hand, the lateness of the 1956 conventions—July has been the usual month—means that whoever finally becomes the Republican candidate for the Presidency will have little time to make a reputation and ought therefore to be well known already This makes it even less likely than usual, although not impossible, that a dark horse will come out in front, and points, if it is possible to point at all at this early date, to the present Vice-President, Mr Nixon, as the probable nominee. He has recently been following Mr Eisenhower's road very closely and seems to be more popular with the party officials than he used to be. But there are many Republicans, particularly on the liberal wing of the party, who would like the candidate to be Mr Warren, the Chief Justice of the United States, the only Republican, apart from the President, who has much chance of winning, according to the public opinion polls Mr Warren is nearly as non-partisan and as popular as Mr Eisenhower, and in California, where he was Governor, he has many times proved his ability to attract the Democratic and independent votes without which no Republican can gain the Presidency Mr Warren has stated categorically that he will not run, but it is still hoped that he might change his mind if the President appealed to him for the sake of the country. The President and Vice-President may not come from the same state and therefore, since Mr Nixon is also a Californian, Mr Warren would have to find another running mate.

Meanwhile, however, a number of Republicans are arguing, mainly in private, that the National Committee's calculated optimism about the President's health is unfair to the rank and file of the party, which should be given opportunities of expressing their opinions on his possible successors, and unfair on the possible successors who should be given opportunities of wooing the rank and file. Such opportunities are provided by the primary elections, held in a number of states, chiefly in March, April, and May. The detailed rules for these elections vary widely, but they all give the voters a chance to choose among those of their party's presidential candidates who care to enter what are in effect popularity contests. So long as Mr Eisenhower's intentions are unknown, other Republicans will be disinclined to run in these elections, and the voters will be too dazzled by their admiration for the President to show a significant preference for anyone else. So far the only Republican who has cared to challenge the National Committee openly is Senator Knowland, Senator Taft's heir, who is well aware that his views are too conservative to appeal to the party officials. If he wishes to be considered for the Presidency, as he does, he must go straight to the rank and file. This, he has indicated, he will do if Mr Eisenhower has not announced his decision by the beginning of February, when the primary campaigns begin.

On the Democratic side it is already certain that Mr Adlai Stevenson will be appearing in some of the primaries; he will, however, choose those where he is likely to make a good showing, since a candidate's chances can be completely ruined by a defeat in a primary election which suggests to the party officials that he may not be a good vote-getter in the national election. In 1952 Mr Stevenson did not campaign for the nomination, but waited to be drafted by the convention. This time, however, such a course was impossible for him; if he wants the nomination he has to show that he is ready to fight for it, and for the Presidency afterwards. This explains why he has become an active candidate so early; he announced his intention to run a year before the date of the election. To organize his campaign he has set up a group of devoted followers, well-laced with professional politicians. He is determined that this time there shall be no justification for charges that he is an intellectual 'egg-head', an amateur, or unenthusiastic about running.

Four months ago, he might well have been the latter, but Mr

Eisenhower's illness has made the Democratic nomination really worth having, instead of merely an invitation to be sacrificed for the sake of the party. It is not certain that Mr Stevenson will get it, although at present he is far ahead of the other potential candidates. Of these a number of names have been mentioned, and both Senator Kefauver of Tennessee and Governor Harriman of New York are already running hard. Mr Harriman's line is that the moderation which Mr Stevenson preaches is not practical politics for a Democrat. But moderation, in which Mr Stevenson genuinely believes, appeals to the southern branch of the party. It is hard for any Democrat to get nominated, and even harder for him to get elected, without the support of that branch; southerners disapprove strongly of Mr Harriman, not only in general because of his liberal views, but in particular because of his strong opposition to discrimination against Negroes.

Mr Harriman's pressure on Mr Stevenson to attack the Republican Administration more violently is to some extent backed by Mr Truman, who as an ex-President is still very influential in his party. This critical pressure is only one of many to which Mr Stevenson will be even more exposed than are most presidential candidates because he has entered the field so early. Between now and 20 August 1956, when the Democrats meet in Chicago, he will (unless in the meantime he withdraws from the race), be subjected to constant demands that he make concessions to particular sections of his party or to particular groups of voters in order to secure support. It will be interesting to see how Mr Stevenson's idealism and wit survive this test.

Berlin and the Soviet Recognition of East German Sovereignty

THE treaty signed in Moscow on 20 September 1955 between the U S S.R. and the German Democratic Republic recognized that the relations between the two Powers were on a basis of equality, mutual respect between sovereign Powers, and non-interference in domestic affairs, and stated also the consequent right of the G.D.R. to make decisions on matters of domestic and foreign policy including relations with the Federal Republic and with other States. Letters exchanged at the time affirmed that the G.D.R. would carry out guard duties and exercise control on its frontiers at the demarcation line between the G.D.R. and the Federal Republic, at the outer ring of Greater Berlin, and within Berlin, as well as along the lines of communication between the

Federal Republic and West Berlin passing through G.D.R. territory. The letters also declared that the G.D.R. should ensure with the appropriate authorities of the Federal Republic the settlement of all questions pertaining to rail, road, and water transport of the Federal Republic and West Berlin, their citizens or inhabitants, and foreign States and their citizens, with the exception of the personnel and cargoes of the U.S., British, and French troops in Berlin. The control, the letter continued, of the passage of troops and material for the garrisons of France, Britain, and the United States stationed in West Berlin between the Federal German Republic and West Berlin 'pending the conclusion of an appropriate agreement shall temporarily be carried out by the Soviet Command in Germany'.

By 1 December 1955, according to a G.D.R. announcement of the 9th, the transfer of functions formerly exercised by the Soviet Armies at the frontiers of the G.D.R. had been completed and German frontier police had now taken over guard and frontier duties at the G.D.R. State frontiers and the new outer ring of Greater Berlin including Berlin sector boundaries. This announcement underlined General Dibrova's statement, made a few days previously, that 'East Berlin is no longer an occupied sector but the capital of a sovereign State'. But the G.D.R. announcement was careful to say that these new functions of the German frontier police will be 'carried out with due consideration for the special provisions of the agreement on control of military personnel and goods of the French, British, and U.S. garrisons stationed in West Berlin.'[1]

The four-Power status of Berlin and free access to the city is based on the four-Power agreement reached in New York on 5 May 1949, on the lifting of the Berlin blockade by the removal of all the restrictions on communications, transportation, and trade between Berlin and the Western and Eastern zones of Germany, and also on the decision of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Paris on 20 June 1949. This declared that the New York four-Power agreement should be maintained and that the Occupation authorities, each in their own zone, would have 'an obligation to take the measures necessary to ensure the normal functioning and utilization of rail, water, and road transport' for the movement of persons and goods and for communications (by post, telephone, and telegraph) between the zones, and between the zones and Berlin.

[1] B.B.C. *Monitoring Reports*, Part IIA, No. 682, 12 December 1955, p. 29.

The East German Government has on various pretexts and at various times held up the passage of traffic and goods between the Federal Republic and West Berlin. In October 1951, for example, a tax was imposed on all West German vehicles using the autobahn, allegedly in order to contribute towards its upkeep. In the previous June and July goods traffic had been held up through delay in granting permits, and the Western Allies instituted a miniature civil air lift to move goods. It is interesting to note that, when in November of that year the Federal Republic proposed to abrogate or suspend an interzonal trade agreement signed in the previous September, the East German Government suddenly declared that the responsibility for free transit of persons and goods was a four-Power responsibility and thus not connected in any way with the East/West German trade agreement.

In April 1955 the G.D.R. imposed a heavy increase in road tolls on West German and West Berlin users of the autobahn. On this occasion the Soviet authorities declared that German traffic on the autobahn was within the competence of the G.D.R. and, as the Government of a sovereign State, the East German authorities could increase this particular form of taxation: the Soviet Government was not involved A four-Power discussion in Berlin on 20 May 1955 led to talks between officials of the Transport Ministries of the Federal and G.D. Republics, after which the toll rates were very slightly reduced.

The Federal German Government has naturally always been concerned at any further burdens, financial or otherwise, on the trade between its territory and West Berlin. It is, in addition, now particularly sensitive to developments based on the Soviet recognition of East German 'sovereignty'. A recent example of this has been the anxiety expressed in the Federal Republic following a temporary hold-up in barge traffic between West Berlin and Western Germany. This traffic is governed by an agreement of 1951 between the Soviet and British Governments, bilateral instead of four-Power because the canals flow into the then British zone. In the autumn of 1955 the procedure with regard to the issue of permits was changed at the request of the Soviet authorities so that counter-signatures by British and Soviet officials were no longer required. The British authorities, in agreeing to this, pointed out, however, that such administrative arrangements could not be taken as in any way affecting four-Power obligations under the 1949 agreement to ensure the normal working of water

transport in Germany.[1] This change involved direct East and West German contacts but only, as in the case of the road toll discussions earlier in the year, at the technical level.

The Federal Government is determined to avoid any discussions with the G.D.R. on any subject above this technical level, in order to avoid being manoeuvred into any form of *de facto* recognition of the G.D.R. Repeated Soviet statements, during the Federal Chancellor's visit to Moscow in September and again at the Geneva Conference in November, that German reunification is a matter to be settled between the two German Governments and not by the four Powers, as well as recent Soviet actions in Germany, have justified this vigilance on the part of the Federal Government. The Western Powers have shown, notably by the American Ambassador's statement in Berlin on 2 December as well as the British warning on barge permits, that they are determined to maintain four-Power access to and control over Berlin. For the moment the Soviet Government is taking care to carry out the letter of the agreement regarding four-Power access to the city, if only for the reason that Berlin remains no less vital to present Soviet policy—if for different reasons—than to the West and its allies.

Troubles on the Building Front in the U.S.S R

RUMBLINGS of discontent in the Russian press about the building programme in general, and about the quality of work in particular, culminated on 4 November in a full-scale order of the Central Committee of the Communist Party and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., signed by Bulganin and Khrushchev, dealing with the 'abolition of excesses' in building projects and construction. The main blast of this order was directed against wastefulness in architectural design. This, it was claimed, produced showy façades hiding inconvenient interiors, ill-suited to their purpose. Some fantastic figures of wasteful construction costs were quoted. Thus, in one block of flats the cost of a square metre of living space worked out at 3,400 roubles. In a hotel in Moscow bedroom space accounted for only 22 per cent of the total. Particularly glaring examples were given of the cost of rest-houses in the south, built, it was said, in 'show-palace' style; it may cost anything up to 200,000 roubles to provide accommodation for a single person there. Soviet architects seem to be particularly fond

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, 7 December 1955.

of spires and towers: three examples of these were mentioned, 50–70 metres high, and costing 2–3 million roubles each. Apparently costly and scarce materials, as well as plaster decorations of all shapes and kinds, were used indiscriminately in suitable and unsuitable places.

The order condemned all this unnecessary ornamentation as 'contrary to the Party line' and urged architects to concentrate on simplicity, functional usefulness, and good workmanship. They were encouraged to learn from the best examples both at home and abroad and, as a further incentive, a series of competitions was announced for the best 'type projects' for houses and industrial buildings, with prizes ranging from 50,000 roubles to consolation prizes of 5,000 roubles.

Even before public interest was directed to building and architecture by this order, Russian papers had frequently carried articles on the building industry, many of which were of a highly critical nature. They tell of flats begun three and four years ago and still not furnished, of blocks of flats already inhabited in which internal paintwork is not completed and gas stoves stand in kitchens unconnected, while bathrooms and w.c.s have their doors firmly nailed down as plumbing does not function. Instead water is brought by cart three times a day. Building is undertaken by a bewildering number of sub-contractors, and even water and gas supplies for a district are not co-ordinated. Quite frequently workmanship is so bad that plaster starts falling and the roof leaks before tenants move in A great effort is being made to mechanize the building industry Machines are provided on sites, but a high proportion of them stand idle, either because of mechanical breakdowns or because the materials provided are so poor that they have to be used by hand. A great cause of delay is the shortage and irregular delivery of materials.

At the other extreme, new construction can be very rapid and good, provided materials are available in time and work is fully mechanized. An example was given of a five-storey school built from large pre-fabricated reinforced concrete sections. This was a show project, scheduled to take seventy-six working days. After little more than a month the outside work was all but finished, and the builders were hoping to complete the school ahead of time.

Building is perhaps the most critical sector of Soviet industry. Indeed plan fulfilment in this sector lags far behind the rest of industry. By August 1955 fulfilment of the annual target for hous-

ing construction on State farms ranged from 15 to 80 per cent of the plan. It must be noted that the 15 per cent was for the Republic of Kazakhstan, where the bulk of virgin soil development is taking place in which hundreds of thousands of workers are engaged. The picture is no better in the important section of the building industry charged with the construction of 'tied houses', i.e. houses for the workers in specific factories, built either by the factories themselves or by Ministries in charge of a particular industry. One of the largest of these, the Ministry of Construction for Metallurgical and Chemical Industries, had fulfilled 37 per cent of its 1955 plan by the end of August.

At the beginning of December the Second All-Union Congress of Architects took place in Moscow. It discussed and fully endorsed the new Party line with regard to architecture, as well as all other recommendations and decisions mentioned in the Order. An interesting sidelight is given in a letter from an architect which mentions that although many different plans for blocks of flats have been drawn up, in practice the ones used specify large flats of '2, 3, or 4 rooms' designed for occupation by several families. He urges that small individual flats could be built at the same cost.

France Faces the General Election

The Situation at the End of the Second Parliamen

ON 25 October the French Prime Minister, M. Edgar Faure, table a Bill providing for the curtailment of the Assembly's mandate b six months and the holding of a General Election before Christ mas. The majority of the Assembly was not (to judge by its votes opposed to the principle of early elections, on condition that the were not held under the existing electoral law. That law had bee voted in May 1951, just before the last election, with the expres intention of reducing Gaullist and Communist representation i the Assembly, and it was generally criticized on the ground bot of its distortion of opinion and of its complexity.

For six weeks, therefore, the Assembly struggled ineffectivel to amend or change it. The merits and demerits of well over dozen electoral systems were debated and re-debated. The upsho was a decision, on 12 November, to end the life of the presen Assembly on 2 January and to hold elections before that date o the 1951 system of proportional representation, but without th addition of its most criticized provision, namely, the alliances known as '*apparentements*'. On 17 November, after the Council o the Republic had, for the second time, voted by an overwhelmin majority in favour of a return to the pre-war electoral system o single-member constituencies, with a second ballot in cases wher no candidate receives at least half plus one of the votes cast at th first, the Assembly reversed its decision and agreed, in principle to return to this system Since it had last been employed in 1936 this decision inevitably implied some postponement of the date o elections in order to allow of boundary readjustments. For no only has the number of Deputies increased considerably sinc 1936, but there have been great changes in the distribution o population. Before the boundary changes could be made, however the Government was defeated on a vote of confidence, in theor on the procedural issue of priority for the resumption of th electoral debate, in practice on the issue of early elections.

This vote created a quite unprecedented situation. For it wa the second defeat by the 'constitutional' majority within a perio of eighteen months, and therefore entitled the Government, fo the first time, to use the instrument of dissolution.[1]

[1] Article 51 of the Constitution provides for dissolution when, after the expir of the first eighteen months of the life of a Parliament, two Government defeat

M. Faure's decision to dissolve the Assembly meant that elections must be held within thirty days, and on the existing system. In the circumstances in which his Government had been defeated, this was tantamount to deciding in his favour an issue which the Assembly had just decided against him. The sense of the Assembly's most recent vote was quite clear. The majority of the Deputies had expressed a preference for a return to the pre-war system; and they had refused to be hurried in the matter of boundary readjustments. The immediate consequence was the creation of a situation in which electoral rivalries, and in particular the reaction of Opposition parties to the Government's decision, tended to drive more serious issues into the background, although these were, in M. Faure's submission, the primary justification for his proposal to advance the date of the elections. His opponents alleged other, more personal reasons. But, however much personal or party considerations may have weighed with him, there was no denying the accuracy of his contention that the present Assembly could provide no Government with a coherent and stable majority, and that such a majority was essential to Governments which, in the near future, were to be called on to make grave decisions, on North Africa, for example, on the Saar, on East-West relations, and on disarmament.

Looking back over the four and a half years of existence of the second Parliament, this lack of a clear majority for any firm policy does seem to be its outstanding characteristic. The 1951 Election was followed by a month's search for a Government, and almost the first act of the new Assembly was what the Left regarded, with some exaggeration, as a break with the traditional policy of State neutrality in religious matters. The Barangé law, granting a small degree of assistance to parents of children attending Catholic schools, revived the militant anti-clericalism of the Left and helped to poison relations between Socialists and M.R.P. for the rest of the Parliament. The estrangement between the two parties was intensified when the Socialist party split in two on the issue of E.D.C. In February 1952 the Assembly approved the principle of the European Defence Community Treaty, but the decision was so hedged about with provisos and mental reservations, and the

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take place within a period of eighteen months. In such circumstances, after consulting the President of the Assembly, the Prime Minister may, with the agreement of his Cabinet, dissolve the Assembly.

The defeat of M. Mendès-France on 5 February 1955 by the 'constitutional' majority, therefore, gave M. Faure the right to dissolve when similarly defeated.

parties were so profoundly divided both on the issue of German rearmament and on the conditions in which it would be safe for France to ratify the treaty, that no Prime Minister took the risk of submitting it to the Assembly for ratification for over two years. During that time, the cross-currents on internal and foreign policy were such that one Government after another found that inactivity was the price of survival, with the result that both European and French internal problems were at a standstill owing to the deadlock in the French Assembly. When M. Mayer's Government was defeated in May 1953, five weeks elapsed before the Assembly could agree on his successor; and M. Laniel would certainly not have survived, even for the customary six months that the Assembly usually grants a Government, had it not been for the Bermuda and Berlin Conferences and the loss of French prestige which resulted from the continual absences from international conferences of French representatives, owing to Government crises.

In 1954, when M. Mendès-France finally submitted the E.D.C. Treaty for ratification, it was rejected, though the Assembly had itself nothing positive to put in its place. This completed the estrangement between the M.R.P. and the majority of the non-Communist Left. The group had refused its support to M. Mendès-France, whom its members suspected of a desire to torpedo the treaty. He therefore had to rely on shifting majorities, whose composition varied with different issues. He was supported by Socialist votes, though not by Socialist Ministers; his Gaullist supporters were critical of his attempts to resolve the E.D.C. problem; his U.D.S.R. supporters were disillusioned by his failure to resolve it; the Assembly itself produced no policy to deal with the grave situation in Indo-China, but merely accepted M. Mendès-France's challenge to resign if he could not find a solution within a month. When the crisis atmosphere faded, and the Assembly got down to the mundane work of voting the Budget and taking up again the difficult task of Franco-Tunisian negotiations, M. Mendès-France was defeated in his turn. On 27 August 1954, 451 Deputies had voted in favour of his North African policy; on 12 November, 312 Deputies had voted for him at the conclusion of the debate on Algeria; on 11 December, his North African policy was again approved, after a debate, by a majority of the Deputies. Yet, less than two months later, 319 Deputies voted against him on the same issue.

Nor was it only on questions of policy-making that the Assembly proved itself incapable of firm or consistent decisions. In December 1953 the joint session of the Assembly and the Council of the Republic met to elect a new President of the Republic. Only at the thirteenth ballot was the required majority forthcoming. Where decisions had been taken—in the main by the Government, not by the Assembly—as, for instance, in M. Mendès-France's drive against alcoholism, and in his attempt to get rid of the financial burden constituted by the beetroot lobby, the decisions were reversed by the Assembly during the Government of his successor. And M. Faure's position as the head of a right of centre Government in an Assembly with a left of centre majority (if the Communists are included), made it impossible for him to resist these retrogressive decisions if he wanted to stay in office.

In spite of these facts, the record of the outgoing Assembly is not entirely negative, though M. Faure would claim the major share of the credit for an economic policy which has given France two years of industrial peace and an increase of production which has kept pace with successive and considerable increases of wages. Moreover the problem of instability has itself come to be considered more seriously by a growing number of statesmen and politicians. The conjunction of short-lived Ministries and an ungovernable Assembly had already given rise during the first Parliament to some 'self-criticism'. But in 1951 the threat to the regime necessarily took precedence. At that time, almost one elector in two voted either for the Gaullists or the Communists. But thanks to the working of the electoral law, the second Parliament had a 'Republican' majority, and the subsequent evolution of the Gaullists led to the disappearance of this movement's challenge to Parliamentary government. The reformers were, therefore, free to return to the charge, and the second Parliament saw a number of constitutional changes and of revisions of the Standing Orders of the Assembly, designed to improve the working of the Parliamentary machine. On 30 November 1954, 11 of the 106 articles of the Constitution were revised; on 24 May, the Assembly agreed to undertake the revision of another 27, including the whole section (articles 60–72) governing the organization of the French Union, though no further progress was made by the present Assembly; between March 1952 and July 1955, 76 of the Assembly's 117 Standing Orders were revised and 16 new articles added.

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All this did not add up to any very significant changes.[1] The constitutional reforms were rather slightingly dubbed by certain Deputies '*une réformette*'. They did, however, achieve three things. They restricted the opportunities of Communist Deputies to abuse Parliamentary institutions for party ends; they provided for greater participation of the Council of the Republic in the process of legislation and for a period of up to 100 days during which the two Houses could try to reach agreement on a Bill, before the Assembly decided to have the last word; and they abolished the 'investiture' procedure, restoring the custom of the Third Republic under which a Prime Minister asked the Assembly to express its confidence in himself and his Government at the same time. Article 51, which provides for dissolution in carefully defined circumstances, and article 13, which prohibits delegated legislation, were not changed, although these had come under heavy criticism from those who were anxious to increase the authority of Governments over the Assembly. In 1953 M. Reynaud had made it a condition of his acceptance of the Premiership that the Assembly should agree to automatic dissolution in cases where a Government was defeated within eighteen months of taking office. Both then and in 1955, when he put forward further proposals for the revision of the constitutional provisions governing dissolution, the Left-wing parties maintained their traditional opposition to measures designed to strengthen the executive at the expense of the legislature, which, equally traditionally in France, came from Right-wing groups or individuals, or from Gaullists.

Whatever the reasons for Left-wing hostility to any extension of the use of the instrument of dissolution, it is difficult to be convinced by the Right wing's case. For dissolution to be effective, something like the conditions prevailing in Great Britain would be required. In France, political divisions are both many and profound, and the system of election has never, up to now, permitted the elector to vote directly for the Government of his choice. It is hard to see how the consultation of the electorate could produce a clear-cut decision while there has to be an intermediary stage of parliamentary negotiation leading to the formation of coalition

[1] It is worth while mentioning the Assembly's decision, on 26 July 1955, to abolish the system of proxy voting in votes of confidence and censure. This may perhaps help to increase the Deputy's sense of individual responsibility for his votes, though it does not, of course, affect directly the major problem of Governmental instability.

Governments, and while there is no tradition of joint electoral programmes.

It is perhaps for reasons such as these that the Left has emphasised the need for political rather than institutional remedies for the disease of Governmental instability. Like the Socialists, M. Mendès-France has insisted on the desirability of fighting elections on a minimum programme which, if those accepting it were victorious, would then form the basis of their policy in office. The 1955 Radical Congress accepted him as the virtual leader of the party and agreed to his electoral programme, which is in general acceptable both to the Socialists and to those members of the Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance (U.D.S.R.) who are led by M. Mitterand. But M. Mendès-France has not won over the majority of the Parliamentary party, led by M. Faure, and the immediate result might well be merely a split in the Radical Party.

Ideological as well as electoral factors, together with the emergence of a number of new and so far incalculable factors in the political situation, led a number of parties to enter on the electoral campaign even more acutely divided than they were in 1951. The intensification of the bitterness between 'clericals' and 'anti-clericals' during the present Parliament, together with the M.R.P.'s participation in Right-wing Governments, while the Socialists remained in opposition, seem to have brought to an end the post-war experiment of collaboration between Socialists and M.R.P. The uncompromising electoral declarations of anti-clericalism made by the Mendès Radicals, and pressure by the Left-wing *Comité d'action laïque*, which calls for the repeal of all measures passed by the outgoing Parliament in aid of private educational establishments, and even for the abolition of the special conditions applicable to schools in Alsace and Lorraine, will certainly not make rapprochement between M.R.P. and other Left-wing parties easy in the next Parliament, whatever the result of the elections.

Among new and incalculable electoral factors, the most important is likely to be the changed position of the Gaullists. In 1951 the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (R.P.F.) had some 120 representatives in the Assembly. Now, they have split into two groups, and the rump of 69 Social Republicans, as the authentic Gaullists now call themselves, is also internally divided. The group's decision in January 1953 to participate in Govern-

ments instead of waiting for what General de Gaulle regards as the inevitable decay of the system has given the members political experience, but at the cost of losing the support of their leader, for General de Gaulle washed his hands of all parliamentary activities in May 1953. In September last the R.P.F. local organizations announced their intention of disbanding, as they no longer believed in any form of co-operation with the parliamentary system as it at present exists in France. Like the Radical parliamentary group, the Social Republicans have a right-ward looking element which could co-operate quite happily with Governments such as that of M. Faure, or even farther to the Right, and a left-ward looking element which agrees with much of the internal policy of M. Mendès-France.

The emergence of an extreme Right, in the form of two or three as yet small groupings, may present a problem to some members of M. Pinay's group in the new Assembly. The 'tax-revolt' movement associated with the name of M. Pierre Poujade, the *Rassemblement National* led by M. Tixier-Vignancour, the new peasant movement led by M. Dorgères, and the *Groupement d'action civique républicaine*, led by Senator Blondelle, are reactionary splinter groups, appealing either to authoritarian conservative opinion, or to small parochial-minded artisans and shopkeepers, or to both. They may not be dangerous in themselves, or not as yet. But in so far as they encroach on the fringes of the main body of *modérés*, which statesmen like M. Pinay and M. Reynaud have been doing their best to weld into a relatively coherent moderate conservative party (though only with moderate success!), they will tend to perpetuate the traditional indiscipline, incoherence, and small-mindedness of orthodox French conservatism.

At best, then, the new Assembly appears likely to include four distinct and in the main irreconcilable trends of opinion, of which two only could form Governments, and perhaps only then with support from members of opposition groups. There are the two extremes of Communism and the new anti-parliamentary and reactionary right-wing elements which are only now beginning to emerge; there are the centre-right groupings that formed the backbone of M. Pinay's and M. Faure's Governments; and there are the new centre-left non-Communist groupings led by M. Mollet, M. Mendès-France, M. Mitterand, and M. Chaban-Delmas.

This situation could well give rise to majorities in the new

Assembly that would be no more coherent or reliable than those on which Governments had to rely in the outgoing one. Yet, as M. Faure has pointed out, the new Assembly will have some hard nuts to crack in the very near future. And since French political memories are long, the circumstances of the dissolution may have added yet another cause of friction to the numerous existing ones.

D. M. P.

Indo-China: The Unfinished Struggle

THE Far Eastern conference held in Geneva in 1954 brought the Indo-China war to an end; but the struggle for control of the former Associated States has continued ever since. Only of Cambodia can it be said that a fair measure of peace and stability have returned. In Vietnam, and to a lesser extent in Laos, the war, partly translated to the political plane, goes on with undiminished bitterness. The independence of the three States was formally recognized by the Geneva conference and in December 1954 they signed separate agreements with France under which they obtained full financial and economic freedom.

In the case of Cambodia this nominal independence was rapidly transformed into reality by the energy and political acumen of ex-King Norodom Sihanouk, an unconventional sovereign whose highly publicized taste for Western dance music concealed an outstanding gift of leadership. Prince Sihanouk, as he is now known, startled his subjects in March 1955 by suddenly abdicating in favour of his father, now King Norodom Suramarit. This theatrical action, reminiscent of the young king's flight to Thailand in 1953 to shock the French into promising his country full independence, was based upon sound political motives. It was intended as a device to enable him to gain freedom of political action while surrendering none of the realities of power. The ostensible reason for the abdication was the refusal of the three-nation supervisory commission to permit him to proceed with a plan for electoral reform based on indirect voting through village councils. There is no doubt that he was infuriated by the commission's support for the protests of his rival for popular favour, Son Ngoc Thanh, who

had emerged from his self-chosen stay in the jungle as a guerrilla leader with Communist affiliations. But an important element in King Norodom's abdication was undoubtedly his opposition to American attempts to press increased military aid upon him.[1] For his part, King Norodom was firmly resolved on a neutralist course, and the military aid agreement which his country eventually concluded with the United States (in May 1955) was in no sense a deviation from his neutralist principles, for it merely provided for the transfer from France to the United States of the responsibility of equipping the Cambodian army at a level consistent with self-defence.

Shortly after his abdication Prince Sihanouk formed a political group called the Popular Socialist Community, which was described as an organization above parties on the lines of General de Gaulle's Rassemblement du Peuple Français. The Community swept into power in the General Election of June 1955, capturing all 91 seats in the National Assembly, and obliterating the traditional Democratic and Liberal parties. Prince Sihanouk later apologized for his 'too complete success', with some reason, as it is doubtful that so sweeping a victory would have been his if it had not been for certain examples of political intimidation recorded before the election. At first the Prince modestly insisted that he did not want office for himself; but he soon 'yielded to popular pressure' and became his own Prime Minister. Some observers have cast doubts on the wisdom of discouraging opposition parties to an extent that will probably drive many of their members back into the maquis. (Son Ngoc Thanh has, indeed, returned to the jungle.) But it is certain that Prince Sihanouk's tactics have conferred on his country a greater degree of political stability than it has known for a long time past, and that the support enjoyed by the Popular Socialist Community largely reflects the Prince's own popularity throughout Cambodia. The degree of his success can be assessed from the fact that in recent months the Viet Minh radio in Hanoi has discontinued its attacks on Prince Sihanouk and has called for the establishment of diplomatic relations.

THE PATHET LAO PROBLEM

In Laos, the situation is far from being as clear-cut or as satisfactory from a Western point of view. The Geneva agreement pro-

[1] See *The Struggle for Indo-China Continues*, by Ellen J. Hammer (Stanford U.P., 1954)—an authoritative survey of developments between the Geneva and Bandung conferences.

vided that the 'Pathet Lao' forces which had occupied the north-eastern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua under Viet Minh leadership should be allowed to regroup in those two provinces and that the provinces should be represented in the Royal Government pending the General Election, which was to be held in 1955. From the first, however, with the active support and encouragement of the Viet Minh, the Pathet Lao leader Prince Souphanna Vong (half-brother of the Laotian Premier at the time of the Geneva conference, Souphanna Phouma) set out to resist by force any attempt by the Royal Laotian army to assert authority in Phong Saly and Sam Neua, and to frustrate the work of the international supervisory commission. Katay Sasorith, the American-backed Premier now in office, was equally determined that the Royal Government's authority should extend over the whole country in advance of the General Election, which was scheduled to take place in August. Desultory talks between the two sides alternated with recurrences of fighting, but the supervisory commission was eventually successful in bringing the contestants to a formal conference in Rangoon in October 1955. The participants agreed to a military cease-fire in the contested provincial border regions (a country of thick jungle and towering mountains in which it is difficult, at all times, to determine where effective control is exercised) and agreed to meet in Vientiane, the administrative capital of Laos, for discussions on the General Election, which had been deferred until 25 December. The Vientiane conference was, however, abortive, and the Royal Government, faced with the refusal of the Pathet Lao delegation to abide by the existing electoral legislation, decided to proceed with the Election without Pathet Lao participation. The result was not known at the time of writing, but it is clear that it will have done nothing beyond settling the rival claims of political factions in the ten loyal provinces of Laos; the threat of the 5,000-strong, Viet Minh-officered Pathet Lao army remains active, and it is doubtful whether it can be settled without a prolonged and exhausting guerrilla campaign. The international dangers of this situation are evident from the fact that Laos, in common with Cambodia and Vietnam, is entitled if it wishes to request military assistance from the Manila Pact (SEATO) Powers if its security is considered to be threatened.

If the situation remains uncertain in Laos, it is still infinitely more dangerous in Vietnam, in spite of an improvement in the

stability of the Nationalist regime in the south in the past few months. Any attempt to understand developments in Vietnam must start from an examination of the set of documents somewhat loosely known as the 'Geneva agreements'. These documents fall into two ill-balanced categories: on the one hand, the practical and *binding* military truce agreements signed by representatives of the rival commands; and on the other, the 'final declaration' of the conference, from which the nationalist regime in southern Vietnam and the American delegation explicitly dissociated themselves, together with the unilateral declaration of the chief American delegate, Lt.-General Bedell Smith, under which the United States undertook to 'refrain from the threat or the use of force' to prevent the implementation of the 'agreements'. By and large, the military agreements were observed on both sides: the French Union forces were withdrawn from all positions north of the 17th parallel, and the Viet Minh forces were evacuated from the south. The Viet Minh, however, put many obstacles in the way of the free movement of Vietnamese who wished to be evacuated southwards, and almost certainly continued to receive arms from China—a traffic which the officials of the supervisory commission were insufficiently numerous to prevent.

The most controversial provision of the 'agreements' was, however, that clause of the final declaration which called for 'free elections' throughout Vietnam in July 1956, and which laid down that representatives of the northern (Communist) and southern (Nationalist) regimes were to meet from July 1955 to discuss the arrangements for the elections. Apart from this provision of the unsigned final declaration—which the Nationalist Government did not consider itself bound to observe—there was a passing reference to 'free elections' in article 14(a) of the military truce agreement between the French and Viet Minh high commands. The British Government, however, considered itself officially bound to press for complete observance of the provisions of the final declaration, as well as those of the military agreements (Mr Eden, as he then was, had shared with Mr Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, the chairmanship of the Geneva conference); in this it was supported not only by France but also by such non-Communist nations as Canada and India, which were members of the supervisory commission (Communist Poland being the third member). Full observance was likewise the official policy of Soviet Russia and, of course, of China and of the Democratic Republic of

Vietnam (popularly known as 'Viet Minh'). Against this, the policy of the United States Government, although it was never explicitly stated to be such, was one of opposition to the Geneva agreements, and in particular of the provision for free elections within a stated period. At no stage, on the other hand, could it be said that the American Administration resorted to 'the threat or the use of force' to prevent implementation of the agreements by the Nationalist Government.

American policy towards Indo-China did not crystallize into a definite shape until the autumn of 1954, after a visit to the three states by Senator Mike Mansfield on behalf of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Senator Mansfield recommended that American economic aid be extended to southern Vietnam, but added the proviso that such aid should be, in effect, conditional upon the continuance in office of the Nationalist Prime Minister, Ngo Dinh Diem. By accepting this recommendation, including the rider, the American Administration bound itself to a man rather than a programme and deprived itself of all flexibility in a rapidly changing situation.

CONTRAST IN VIETNAM

Internally, the northern and southern regimes provided a striking contrast during the eighteen months that followed the Geneva conference. Riding on the crest of a wave of prestige following the overwhelming military defeat of the French Union Army, the Viet Minh regime faced economic rather than political problems; it was catastrophically short of rice and in urgent need of technical aid, but its totalitarian character, backed by a tested organization, precluded political instability. The Nationalist regime, on the other hand, relieved of immediate economic problems by American economic aid, had to contend with chronic dissidence and political instability, and in the course of attempting to achieve unity succeeded in creating avoidable economic problems as well. There were, *a priori*, two possible alternative courses of action to be followed in the south after the Geneva conference. One was to attempt to unite all the non-Communist nationalist groups and personalities, including the dissident sects,[1] by means of political persuasion. The other method was that of coercion—the enforcement of political conformity by all means available to the State. It was perhaps inherent in Mr Diem's character that he should choose

[1] See 'Crisis Point in Indo-China', in *The World Today*, June 1954.

the second method. Authoritarian and uncompromising by nature, and imbued with a mystical belief in his own destiny, he lacked both the desire to accommodate himself to the views of other Nationalists who questioned his leadership, and the political experience to achieve unity by persuasion. It has been said with justice by his supporters that he found nothing but disloyalty among non-Diemist Nationalists; but his instinct was against any form of compromise, and after a half-hearted attempt to 'broaden' his Government by including Caodaist and Hoa Hao leaders,[1] he set out, with American backing, to crush his opponents.

The first eighteen months of the Diem regime can be divided into two phases: a first phase of physical chaos and administrative breakdown, and a second and more protracted phase, in which Mr Diem sought to consolidate his power by every means at his disposal. He is now emerging from this second phase, during which the diverse elements of opposition have been silenced, driven into exile, or forced back to the jungle; the third logical phase, that of constructive achievement, lies entirely in the future and remains, therefore, hypothetical. Coming to power in the 'lesser half' of a divided country, in an atmosphere of profound disillusionment and defeatism, Mr Diem was faced at the outset with the appalling problem of accommodating and resettling the hundreds of thousands of mainly Roman Catholic refugees who flooded into the south following the Geneva agreement. It is doubtful whether even today more than half of these unfortunates, who number about a million, have been resettled on land commandeered for their use.

The problem of absorbing so large a number of refugees would have tested the administrative skill of any Government; it was beyond the resources of Mr Diem's inexperienced team, even with the financial and material aid of the United States, France, and several other countries. Mr Diem's already shaky authority was, however, further challenged by a series of incidents provoked by his opponents. Among these the two most important were the 'rebellion' of the National Army Chief of Staff, General Nguyen Van Hinh, who defied the Prime Minister's order to take six months' leave in France, and was eventually dismissed by the absentee Chief of State, the ex-Emperor Bao Dai, on 29 November 1954; and the insurrection of the sects which began on the night of 29 March 1955 with a clash between the Binh Xuyen—a gang of

[1] See 'The Diem Regime', by Brian Crozier, in *Far Eastern Survey* (New York), April 1955.

bandits unembarrassed by religious ideology who were then in control of the Saigon police—and elements of the National Army. Early in May the National Army drove the Binh Xuyen rebels out of the Saigon-Cholon area after bitter and costly fighting in the streets. The victory, though spectacular, was not complete, for most of the Binh Xuyen forces remained intact; they soon effected liaison with dissident members of the Hoa Hao sects and succeeded for a time in blockading the roads into Saigon from the south-west. The immediate menace of the sects had, however, been removed, and Mr Diem turned his attention to the distant though ever-potent challenge of Bao Dai. It should be recalled that Ngo Dinh Diem had accepted the premiership from Bao Dai in the first instance only on condition that the Chief of State delegated full powers to him and remained in exile. Bao Dai, in turn, was reluctant to return to Vietnam or to dismiss his Prime Minister because of the American policy, frequently reiterated, of 'reconsidering' the programme of economic and military aid to Vietnam if Mr Diem were out of office. The American Secretary of State, Mr John Foster Dulles, persuaded his French and British opposite numbers, M. Pinay and Mr Macmillan, to support Mr Diem and to reject a plan of reform proposed by Bao Dai and involving his return to Vietnam. Meanwhile, in Saigon, a 'revolutionary committee' had proclaimed the deposition of Bao Dai as Chief of State.

Mr Diem, assured of international support, pushed ahead with a census of the population in the areas under his control, and on 23 October a referendum resulted in the replacement of Bao Dai by Diem as Chief of State, by a majority of 98 per cent. In the form in which it was presented, any other result would have been surprising;[1] within a few days, however, Mr Diem was recognized by Britain, France, and the United States as 'President of the Republic of Vietnam' which had been proclaimed on 26 October. Mr Diem then announced that his Government's first task would be the framing of a Constitution and that this would be followed by elections for a National Assembly.

VICTORY OVER VIET MINH

The referendum of October was valuable less as a victory for Diem over Bao Dai (who had lost his last shreds of prestige when Mr Dulles snubbed him in Paris) than as a victory over the Viet

[1] See *The Economist*, 29 October 1955.

Minh, who had been campaigning energetically against the referendum from the moment it was known that he intended to hold it. The fact that only a few thousand voters obeyed the orders of Viet Minh agents in the south to spoil their ballot papers was a demonstration of Diem's increasing hold on the people and of the failing authority of the distant Viet Minh leaders. In the north, however, there was no sign of failing authority, apart from the occasional junk laden with refugees which found its way to a southern harbour. By drastic purges of property owners in the villages and by the co-opting of the poorest peasants to the village councils, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam had ensured a basis of loyalty,[1] which was consolidated by the repressive methods made familiar by the practice of other Communist countries. President Ho Chi Minh's problems were economic rather than political. The rice deficit of the Tonking area, which in normal times amounted to 100,000 tons a year, was greatly aggravated by the disruption and devastation left by the war; in addition the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was catastrophically short of foreign exchange. For some months it looked as though the weak and disunited south would triumph in the end because it enjoyed a rice surplus and because American economic aid enabled it to fulfil its import needs. But Ho Chi Minh, during a journey to Peking and Moscow last July, obtained a Chinese grant of more than £115 million and Russian aid valued at £35,800,000; in addition, the Russians sent northern Vietnam 150,000 tons of rice bought from Burma. At the very moment when Polish ships laden with this rice were putting in at Haiphong, the price of rice was soaring in Saigon, where the grave shortage caused by a poor harvest was aggravated by the Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen blockade. The irony of this situation was illustrated when a southern Vietnamese purchasing mission turned up in Bangkok with orders to buy 25,000 tons of Siamese rice.

Internationally, the Geneva agreements have come increasingly to look like a dead letter. In Saigon, Mr Diem refused to meet representatives of the Viet Minh in July, as laid down by the agreements, to discuss the conditions for general elections. The western Big Three heads of Government, President Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden, and M. Edgar Faure, who were conferring with Marshal Bulganin in Geneva, sent Mr Diem notes couched in identical terms and calling upon him to observe the agreements;

[1] See *The Economist*, 29 October 1955.

but Mr Diem, perhaps to Mr Dulles's relief, refused to comply with their suggestion. Mr Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, who had raised the issue with Sir Anthony, his co-chairman of the Far Eastern Geneva conference, suggested that the Governments which had participated in that conference should be summoned once again to consider the failure of southern Vietnam to observe the agreements; but he raised no objections when the British Prime Minister opposed the suggestion. Nor, conscious of the Soviet policy favouring a continued division of Germany, did he show himself any less conciliatory over Indo-China when the Foreign Ministers met in Geneva in October and November. The Communist policy for divided countries was indeed the same for Vietnam as for Germany or Korea: until further orders, military action was excluded; reunification was to be accomplished by talks between representatives of each of the two Governments concerned. Meanwhile, every effort was to be made to undermine the authority of the non-Communist Government. In pursuance of this policy, the *Lien Viet*[1] announced in September its own dissolution and incorporation into a 'Fatherland Front' with the mission of unifying Vietnam.

The many imponderables of the situation in Vietnam make prediction particularly hazardous. By exiling or silencing all rivals, including the ex-Premiers Tran Van Huu and Nguyen Van Tam, by rigorously controlling the press and suppressing all opposition —and also, be it admitted, by an extraordinary display of courage and stubbornness—President Ngo Dinh Diem has made himself the only personality of consequence in southern Vietnam and created the beginnings of a popular following; his success will probably breed further success as more of the waverers jump on to his band-waggon. Despite his intention to hold general elections early in 1956 there is no sign that he intends to fulfil the 'mission', claimed by him at the time of the referendum, of introducing 'democracy' in his half of the country; nor is it necessarily expedient or desirable that he should do so at this stage. But his material achievements to date are, perhaps unavoidably, negligible; and though he may continue to extend his authority, he will not gain the full loyalty of his people until he improves their lot and gives them a stake in the survival of the regime. Meanwhile, the assets of the Viet Minh—the prestige of victory and the aid of

[1] The 'National Front', formed in 1946 and incorporating the League for the Independence of Vietnam (the 'Viet Minh'.)

China, a country better situated geographically to provide military support than the countries friendly towards the south—remain. There is no reason why Vietnam should not continue divided indefinitely; but short of military action or of an imposed international settlement, there are at present no grounds for believing that Mr Diem can extend his authority over the whole of Vietnam.

B. C.

Franco Looks to the Future

Monarchy to a Dictator's Pattern

PERHAPS the most striking feature of the political situation in Spain today is the continued apathy of most Spaniards towards their political future. In the last year events on this front have developed rapidly after a long period of comparative stagnation, and Spaniards are now confronted with a decision by Franco to restore the monarchy. But, judging by the present writer's experience, to ask a cross-section of Spaniards what they think of the prospect of a monarchy once Franco has departed from the scene is to be met with the same initial reaction in almost every case: that of a horse shying away from a suspicious object. The eventual answer will, of course, vary according to the point of view of the person questioned. Apart from those young people who have been brought up in monarchist families, no one in Spain under the age of thirty-five has any real knowledge of the monarchy, for it is now nearly twenty-five years since Alphonso XIII chose to leave Spain, in April 1931, rather than involve the country in bloodshed. Nor until very recently was anything allowed to be published which showed the monarchy in a favourable light (when indeed there was any mention of the subject); thus it is not altogether surprising to find this negative reaction. On the other hand, some people maintain that there are still too many living who did experience the monarchy and for that reason do not wish to see its return. More than a generation must pass, they say, before a restoration would be possible.

EARLY NEGOTIATIONS WITH DON JUAN

In view of Franco's present decision to restore the monarchy it may be of interest to examine some of the factors involved. The decision is the result of protracted negotiations between Franco and the Bourbon Pretender to the Spanish throne, Don Juan, Count of Barcelona. D. Juan is the third son of the late King Alphonso XIII, who died in exile in 1941. When he left Spain, the late king expressly stated that he renounced 'no single one' of his rights and spoke only of suspending his 'exercise of the royal powers'.[1] His eldest son, Don Alphonso, Prince of Asturias, was killed as the result of a car accident. His second son, Don Jaime, Duke of Segovia, was deaf and dumb, and in consequence, during his father's lifetime, renounced all rights to the throne for himself and his issue. D. Jaime married a French lady of noble blood by whom he had two sons, Alphonso and Gonzalo, now both in their late 'teens. He and his wife parted, and a Rumanian annulment of the marriage was obtained which is not recognized under Spanish law. D. Jaime subsequently married a German opera singer, but this marriage is not regarded as valid by Roman Catholics. Since this second marriage he has stated that he has now been cured and is able both to speak and to hear and as a result has tried to withdraw his previous renunciation of claims to the throne. Alphonso XIII's third son, D. Juan, claims to be king of Spain and is recognized as such by most monarchists. He has two sons; the elder is Juan Carlos, who is eighteen this month, and the younger is Alphonso. Those monarchists who do not give their allegiance to D. Juan, and they are comparatively few in number, support a rival branch of the royal house and are known as Carlists because the cause they sponsored was that of an earlier Don Carlos. The split dates from 1833 when the succession gave rise to civil strife which became known as the Carlist Wars. But here, again, allegiance is divided since some now give their support to Prince Xavier of Bourbon-Parma and others to Don Carlos IX, brother of Don Carlos VIII who died in 1953.

It will thus be seen that Franco in his negotiations with D. Juan has had the advantage of holding more than one rival claimant in reserve. During the Civil War which began in 1936 D. Juan offered his services to Franco in the Nationalist cause, but these were refused on the ground that his life might some day be invaluable to his country. D. Juan has always had a liking for England; his

[1] *The Times*, 16 April 1931.

mother, Queen Victoria Eugénie, is English, and he himself was once in the British Navy, so that it would not be altogether surprising if Franco's association with the Axis Powers during the second World War, and the opprobrium in which he was generally held at its end, should have influenced D. Juan's attitude towards him. Added to which, the victory of the Allies had raised the prestige of democratic institutions. On 22 March 1945, D. Juan issued a manifesto[1] to the Spanish people in which he referred to the regime established by Franco as modelled on the totalitarian systems of the Axis Powers 'so contrary to the character and traditions of the Spanish peoples'. He mentioned earlier occasions, after the death of his father and since, when he had expressed his complete disagreement with the regime. He then called upon Franco to relinquish power, and set out the principal reforms that he as monarch would undertake. These included the immediate adoption by popular vote of a political Constitution; the protection of the rights of the individual and corresponding political liberties; the establishment of a legislative assembly elected by the people; recognition of regional characteristics and autonomies within the framework of the national Government; more equitable distribution of the nation's wealth; and suppression of unjust social differences 'which not only are inconsistent with the precepts of Christianity, but are in flagrant and dangerous contradiction to the political and economic conditions of our time'. He ended by saying that he wished to remind those who supported the regime of the tremendous responsibility they incurred by contributing to the prolongation of a situation that would inevitably bring the country to irreparable ruin

So tenuous was Franco's hold on power at this time that, despite the condemnatory wording of the manifesto, he publicly promised only a few months later to restore the 'traditional Spanish monarchy', albeit mentioning that it would guarantee his 'glorious national movement' and would be the 'monarchy of Spain's greatest days'. At the beginning of 1946, on the eve of talks which were to take place between France, Great Britain, and the U.S.A. on the question of Spain, Franco made D. Juan an offer that he should return as king, while Franco would be C.-in-C. of the Armed Forces, and the Falange, modelled on the Fascist Party, would remain in existence. D. Juan refused, making it clear that he would only return if he were given a free

[1] Text in *New York Times*, 23 March 1945.

hand. February proved the crucial month. It began with Franco still wooing D. Juan. When the latter arrived in Lisbon to take up residence in Portugal he was met by Nicolas Franco, the Caudillo's brother, who was Spanish Ambassador there, and Franco is said to have sent D. Juan a birthday gift, which he refused. Rumours that negotiations were on foot between the monarchists and socialists were quickly followed by action against the monarchists in Spain, who were refused permission to leave the country, some being arrested. D. Juan then let it be known that all negotiations with Franco were ended since the Caudillo was not now prepared to consider a restoration of the monarchy because of D. Juan's wish to conciliate the anti-Franco political parties and eventually to restore political liberties. Unsuccessful efforts were at this time made by Franco to have D. Juan removed from Portugal. A lull followed until in December 1946 it was reported that the Caudillo had made an offer to D. Juan to take over his elder son, Juan Carlos, and to bring him up in the principles of the new order.

The following year saw Franco's Law of Succession[1] voted in a referendum carried out under the auspices of the State. This law declared Spain to be a kingdom and made provision, in the event of the office of Chief of State falling vacant, for a Regency Council to take over. This Regency Council was to consist of the President of the Cortes, the highest prelate of the Church, and the highest ranking Army officer. The President of the Cortes was also to be President of the Council, the decisions of which must have the affirmative vote of the President and one other of its three members. A Council of the Kingdom was also formed, consisting of representatives from the principal institutions of the State, to advise the Chief of State. Franco was entitled to submit to the Cortes the name of a successor, to be either king or regent; he might also submit the repeal of any previous proposal regarding the succession, even if it had already been accepted by the Cortes. Detailed procedure was laid down for action by the Regency Council in the event of Franco's death or incapacity. If no suitable person of royal blood were available to be made king, the Council might choose as Regent any person with the necessary qualifications. These included the proviso that he must be male, Spanish, at least thirty years of age, a Roman Catholic, and must swear to uphold

[1] Translation of text in A. J. Peaslee, *Constitutions of Nations* (Rumford Press, 1950, 3 vols.), Vol. III, p. 83.

the principles of the 'national movement'.[1] A further article entitled Franco to submit to the Cortes the exclusion from the succession of those persons of royal blood who 'because of their noted indifference to the basic principles of the State, or because of their actions, have forfeited their rights to succession'.

Having thus provided himself with a constitutional weapon and weathered the worst of the international storm, Franco was from now on in a position to negotiate from increasing strength. Despite denunciation of the succession law by D. Juan, who at this point still insisted on an unconditional transfer of authority, the two protagonists met in a yacht off Vigo in August 1948. As a result of this meeting, it was agreed that D. Juan's elder son, Juan Carlos, should start his studies in Madrid. The following year Franco paid a visit to Lisbon when it was generally expected that he would meet D. Juan. But the two did not meet because, for reasons of prestige, each insisted that the other should make the first advance. A coolness ensued and Juan Carlos was withdrawn from Madrid, but not for long. In 1950, after rumours of a rapprochement, he was sent back accompanied by his younger brother. When monarchists in Madrid who had publicly demonstrated in his favour were ordered to pay a fine, the order was countermanded by Franco, and the following year he included several monarchists in his Cabinet. Another lull followed, punctuated by many rumours, of which the most persistent was that Franco was unsuccessfully trying to persuade D. Juan to resign in favour of Juan Carlos in exchange for allowing the latter to take over at the age of twenty-one instead of thirty.

FRANCO'S PLANS FOR JUAN CARLOS

In 1954 it became known that D. Juan intended sending Juan Carlos to Louvain University; last June he and his brother had paid a visit to Franco in order, in the words of the official communiqué,[2] 'to thank him in the name of their distinguished father for his assistance over their education in Spain'. Franco, however, had other plans for Juan Carlos. These were that he should complete his education in Spain, spending two years in military service, two years at Madrid University, and two years acquiring technical

[1] When Franco uses the term 'national movement', he is referring to the combined efforts of all those elements who co-operated against the Republic. When the term is used by the Falange, it refers to themselves.

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 23 June 1954.

knowledge, and that he should then work in close co-operation with the Caudillo himself. Franco made it perfectly plain that unless D. Juan was prepared to give way Juan Carlos would forfeit all chance of one day gaining the throne. Once again D. Juan was forced to give in and Franco got his way, but not to the extent of persuading D. Juan to abdicate in his son's favour. There had meanwhile been a coming-out party for D. Juan's daughter at which, in the presence of a vast concourse of monarchists who had travelled from Spain especially for the occasion, their acknowledged king assured them that he would not desert his post or his duties but added that personal interests must be sacrificed. Conciliatory gestures by Franco at this period included a coming-out gift for the young Infanta and permission, granted for the first time, for monarchist opposition candidates to stand in Madrid in the municipal election. This they did, but with very unsatisfactory results, thanks to their Falange opponents.

At the end of December 1954 Franco and D. Juan met in Spain at a monarchist's estate, Las Cabezas, near the Portuguese frontier. Although no official information was released on what transpired, it appears that among the matters settled were details regarding Juan Carlos's education. It is generally accepted that the meeting sealed the bargain already reached that, in exchange for Juan Carlos being allowed to complete his education in Spain, Franco should commit himself to the restoration of the monarchy. It is said that the two men got on extremely well on this occasion, and there are those who think that some form of understanding was reached about the eventual return of D. Juan himself.

It was only to be expected that such a major decision would arouse strong opposition from the Falange, which ever since its formation had consistently opposed the monarchy. Nor was it possible for Franco to settle the matter behind closed doors, since it was perhaps more particularly the fears of the rank-and-file Falangists which needed to be allayed. In the circumstances he took the unusual step of granting an interview to a home newspaper. On 23 January 1955 *Arriba*, which is the organ of the Falange, published an interview with one of their correspondents in which the Caudillo defended the institution of monarchy and was at pains to make clear that its revival would in no way impair the work of the Falange. It was evident, however, that Falange fears were not so easily to be laid to rest, even by assurances from Franco himself, for the following month a further interview with

the Caudillo was published,[1] in which he again defendec monarchy and gave an assurance that any dynasty that woul sure the continuity of the regime must identify itself absol with the movement. Notwithstanding these measures, there reports of incidents, such as Falangist leaflets distribute Madrid University which said: 'No King: no Franco: we w syndicalist State', and other Falangist leaflets circulated in M which stated: 'We reject all types of aristocracy except acquired through work.'

The next major development was the publication in June i monarchist newspaper *ABC* of an interview given by D. J This was generally recognized to be in reply to a speech mac Fernández Cuesta, Secretary-General of the Falange, in whic had defined the basis of the 'movement', which was open, he to all men of good will. In the course of this interview D. said that the monarchy had always favoured the ideals of 'movement' and that all Spaniards who were inspired by ideals should unite. He repeatedly referred to these ideals of 'movement' in terms propitiatory to the Falange, and wa praised Franco and prayed God to protect him. D. Juan stated his claim to the throne, and the fact that this was allc to be published led some to regard it as an indication of acceptance by Franco. D. Juan's supporters in Spain ca divided into two main groups, those who wish him to co-op with Franco and those who do not; though individual interp tions in each group have varied considerably. The publicatic the *ABC* interview came as an unpleasant shock to the latter g and was said to have caused the resignation of the Count of Andes, who was D. Juan's official representative in Spain. believed that D. Juan asked Don Julio Dánvila, who arrange publication, first to show the text of the interview to the Cc which he failed to do.

The feeling among these monarchists who oppose Franco is by compromising with the Caudillo and with the Falangists king will have forfeited a large measure of support from those look to the monarchy as an alternative to the present regime. T monarchists are, however, sadly out of touch with reality s Franco was never more firmly entrenched than he is today. He survived the displeasure of the United Nations, a series of drou which brought the Spanish economy perilously near to ruin

[1] *Arriba*, 27 February 1955.

this was achieved without United States aid), and has now lived to see himself courted by the United States and visited by Mr Foster Dulles, while Spain has recently been elected to membership of the United Nations. Such success in restoring the country's prestige has naturally raised Franco's own standing and is fully appreciated by most Spaniards even when they disapprove of other aspects of the regime. Moreover, although there are many who question the soundness of Spain's economy, it is plain to see that the economic situation has considerably improved over the last few years, particularly in the towns. And since the conclusion, in September 1953, of the agreement with the United States, Franco now has the Americans to call on in case of need, for they are unlikely to allow a strategic base to go by default. Franco is sixty-three years old and, despite occasional rumours to the contrary, appears to be in good health. As long as he is there, the stability he has brought to the country is likely to continue; but what will happen when he dies? It will have been seen that he himself has tried to make provision for this eventuality in the Law of Succession of 1947 and by the reintroduction of the monarchy, tailored to his own specifications. But what are the chances of its acceptance when he goes?

DETERMINING FACTORS IN THE POLITICAL SCENE

Generalizations about Spain are perhaps even more dangerous than about most countries, but space does not allow here of more than a brief outline of the main controlling factors of the Spanish political scene. These are Franco himself, the Army, the Church, the Falange, and the economic situation. For the purposes of answering our question, it will not be necessary to consider the first and the last of these. The Army has always had ultimate control of the political situation, and although at one time it was reputed to be monarchist in sympathy it is probable that at present the monarchy's staunch supporters form only a small minority. It must be remembered that until quite recently to be too ardent a monarchist was to be against Franco. Although some of the Army's younger generation appear to show scant enthusiasm for the idea of a monarchy and even contempt at the mention of D. Juan's name, the more responsible of its members would be likely to view favourably any institution or measure designed to introduce an element of stability into what is certain to be a perilous situation after Franco's departure. The Minister for the

Army, General Muñoz Grandes, who led Spain's Blue Division against Russia, is reputed to be a monarchist, but he is also regarded by some as one of two possible contenders for Franco's vacant seat as Caudillo. The other is General Garcia Valiño, a younger man who is at present Spanish High Commissioner in Morocco, where some say that he was sent to be kept out of mischief at a time when Franco felt himself less secure than he does now.

The Church, like the Army, has its monarchist adherents and would in any case probably welcome an institution likely to maintain the *status quo* since it has greatly benefited under the Franco regime. The Concordat with the Vatican, signed in August 1953, confirmed an already existing situation which included the obligatory teaching of religion in all schools. One of the many different factions of which the Church in Spain is composed, and potentially the most powerful, has come out strongly in support of the monarchy. This is Opus Dei, a lay order founded by Msgr. José Maria Escrivá de Balaguer, who is its present head. The order aims at gaining control of the intellectual life of the country by obtaining for its members key posts in the universities and other intellectual and educational institutions, and also in the Government. A certain amount of secrecy surrounds Opus Dei because its members do not always make themselves known, but its influence is widely held to be steadily increasing. A member of the order, Professor Calvo Serer, in 1953 wrote an article in a Paris journal, and more recently has written a pamphlet, in both of which he advocated the setting up of a monarchy as an institution capable of carrying on after Franco Both the pamphlet and a translation of the article failed to pass the censorship but had a wide clandestine circulation in Spain. The Jesuits, possibly fearing for their own influence, are said to be strongly opposed to Opus Dei.

Another powerful faction of the Church is Acción Católica, led by the Bishop of Malaga, Msgr. Angel Herrera, which supports the monarchy. The Bishop is well known for his energetic support of social reform, for the special courses, which include social welfare, introduced by him for young priests, and for his outspoken articles in *Ecclesia*, the organ of Acción Católica and the only paper in Spain that is not censored. Much fine social work is being done by the Church, which is believed to be seriously concerned at the lack of support it is receiving among the working classes (one worker assured the writer that although he was a good Catholic he would not attend Mass because he strongly dis-

approved of some of the Church's grasping practices). There have also been tentative efforts to start Catholic trade unions, which have met with strong opposition from the Falange.

The Falange is responsible for the trade unions, or *sindicatos*, which in their vertical structure follow the pattern of Mussolini's corporative unions. It is very hard to tell how much support they have among the workers since elections of Falange representatives are free in theory but not in practice, the candidates being nominated. Because the Falange is associated with the Government, it has earned much of the opprobrium in which the regime is widely held by the working classes. Nevertheless, the Falange is largely responsible for the substantial advances in social welfare that have been made under Franco. Spaniards often boast that theirs are the most advanced social insurance schemes in the world—which, since they have no provision for normal unemployment, is certainly not the case. In industrial areas workers' conditions have improved considerably, since employers are not allowed to dismiss their employees without substantial compensation and have to pay bonuses supplementary to the weekly wage, reckoned on a system of points based on the size of the employee's family. In most country districts, however, these provisions are not enforced, and in consequence there has been little or no comparable improvement in the standard of living. There are areas of the country where there is much dissatisfaction; for example, a landowner in Estremadura informed the writer that the peasants on his estates were seething with discontent.

The social work achieved by the Falange is perhaps the chief reason why Franco has all along insisted that the monarchy must accept the existing political structure of the State, in which the Falange plays an important part through control of posts such as those of the provincial governors, and of the *sindicatos*, which are not only trade unions but also act as the administrative centre of each individual industry. The Falange has always contained strongly radical, anti-clerical, and anti-monarchical elements, and the hard core of the party is probably the only entity in Spain that would be prepared to take to the streets gun in hand tomorrow. Moreover this hard core, which includes many in the Falange youth movement, is strongly against the return of the monarchy.[1] It is said that Franco has succeeded in winning over the Falange

[1] Last November demonstrations even took place in Franco's presence when Falange youths shouted anti-monarchist slogans.

leaders to the idea of a monarchy, a truly staggering feat, and many strange stories about fraternization between leading monarchists and Falangists have been circulating in Madrid. But the hard core of the rank and file still remains to be won over, and the task will indeed be a difficult one. Since Franco has already achieved so many seemingly impossible feats, such as raising Spain from international outcast to courted U.S. ally and persuading the Falange leaders to accept the monarchy, he may well succeed in this also provided he is given sufficient time. Paradoxically, in view of what has just been said, one is often told that the Falange, which seems to be almost universally unpopular, now cuts very little ice in the country; but it nevertheless remains a somewhat unknown quantity.

POPULAR REACTIONS AND PROSPECTS

Such, then, in briefest outline, is the attitude of those who form the main controlling factors of the political scene. But what of the mass of ordinary people who have no means of voicing their views, since the press is not free to print their letters on the subject and they have no truly representative institutions? For there has been no General Election under Franco, and the Cortes is by and large a nominated body. The basis of suffrage for the two municipal elections that have been held was that the electors should be heads of households fulfilling certain qualifications.

The efficacy of a one-man Gallup poll is open to serious doubt, but the following is the impression gained by the writer after questioning as wide a cross section of people as possible on the subject of the monarchy. Working-class people shrugged their shoulders when asked how they regarded Juan Carlos as a future monarch, as if it were no concern of theirs since the matter was out of their control. But in more than one instance, when pressed, they were completely convinced that Franco had no choice in the matter and that the monarchy was being 'forced on the country by the United States'. They also thought that were Franco to die there would be a clash with the Falange. For D. Juan they had no use at all. Nor, except for convinced monarchists, had a single one of those questioned. An ardent supporter of Franco almost had mild apoplexy when D. Juan's name was mentioned and would not contemplate the prospect of Juan Carlos either. More moderate middle-class supporters of Franco in general showed a strong distaste for having to think about the subject at all, but when the

necessity for it was pointed out they in most cases expressed grave doubts. Emphasis was laid on the need for Juan Carlos to undergo a long period of training by Franco and on the possibility that even then he might not prove suitable. Others suggested that because of his youth, even were he to take over only at thirty, he would not be able to deal wisely with the various personalities and pressure groups around him nor to provide 'the firm hand without which we kill each other'. An underlying fear seemed to be that fundamental changes might be introduced in the existing regime. It was generally held that should the monarchy be introduced it must be on a popular basis, in the sense that the monarch should go about among the people, as in Britain, and not hold himself aloof.[1] Liberal-minded opponents of Franco who in earlier years were prepared to look to the monarchy as a possible means of getting rid of him now regard the prospect of its introduction with cynicism.

If Franco were to die tomorrow the general opinion seems to be that a clash would be likely between the Falange and the Army in which the Falange would be crushed and possibly a struggle for power between rival Generals would follow. But if Franco were to live for another ten to fifteen years he would have time gradually to prepare the way for the monarchy by educating public opinion towards its acceptance. The latest step in this direction has been the revival by the Cortes of an earlier law which made provision of an annual payment of 250,000 pesetas to Queen Victoria Eugénie on the death of her husband. This has been made retrospective to 1941, when Alphonso XIII died. The educative process, which is bound to be arduous, has already begun, as we have seen in Franco's defence of the monarchy in published interviews and also in speeches. It is said that Franco frequently consults a particular nun gifted with second sight and that she has told him that he has another ten years to live. If this proves to be true, it seems likely, provided the monarchical copybook is not blotted in the interval, that a king will again occupy the throne of Spain; but it is almost certain that the Army will call the tune.

D. K. M. K.

[1] This view of the necessity for the monarchy to be on a popular basis was also expressed by Franco in a recent interview given to U.S journalists and published in *Arriba* (4 December 1955).

Soviet-Yugoslav Economic Relations 1945—1955

THE decade of Soviet-Yugoslav economic relations between 1945 and 1955 appears, when seen in retrospect, as one of most startling changes. During that period four distinct phases emerge, of which the fourth and latest is the so-called 'normalization' of mutual relations now in progress.

The first of these phases covered the immediate post-war years, before Soviet economic policy crystallized in relation to the newly-acquired sphere of influence. The general tendency at that time was to infiltrate as deeply as possible into the economies of the countries of that sphere, and in the first place to secure to the Soviet Union ready access to their natural resources. In the case of Yugoslavia this meant gaining a firm grip on her raw materials, whether non-ferrous metals or other materials.

While undoubtedly an intensive industrialization was the paramount objective of the Tito regime since its inception, in consonance with the nation's aspirations, this hardly accorded with the Soviet designs on the country. True, the Moscow treaty of June 1946, concluded after personal negotiations between Stalin and Tito, proclaimed a full agreement 'reached on all questions concerning economic co-operation',[1] but later developments were to prove how widely the two partners' intentions differed. Those of the Soviet Union were perhaps best summed up in the frank exclamation of Yatrov, the Soviet negotiator: 'What do you (Yugoslavs) need heavy industries for? In the Urals we (the U.S.S.R.) have everything you need.'[2]

It was also during those negotiations that the establishment on Yugoslav soil of joint Soviet-Yugoslav enterprises was decided upon in principle,[3] although as late as March 1947 Stalin himself was to admit that they were not quite in keeping with a relationship between allies.[4] The Soviet representatives made no bones about their orders, which were to secure for their country a monopoly in the key branches of Yugoslav economy. Yugoslavia,

[1] *Soviet Monitor*, 11 June 1946, as quoted by Margaret Dewar, *Soviet Trade with Eastern Europe 1945–9*, London 1951, p. 89.

[2] Vladimir Dedijer, *Tito Speaks*, London 1953, p. 286.

[3] The final agreement on this was signed on 2 February 1947, but the principles were agreed upon in the basic treaty of economic co-operation of 6 June 1946.

[4] Dedijer, *op. cit*, p. 288.

it was envisaged, should serve as a source of raw materials, with little chance of developing her manufacturing 'superstructure'.[1] While the Yugoslavs eventually managed to resist Soviet pressure in other fields—for example raw material extraction, banking—ıir and river transport was vested in two joint controlling enter-ırises of this kind. Their short history—they were wound up ı 1949—was long enough to reveal the Soviet attitude. So too 'as that of the negotiations which preceded the creation of joint ɔmpanies. Thus there was a curious flavour about the Soviet Tnion's invocation, in all seriousness, of Marx when discussing a rospective oil company, in order to prove that Yugoslav land ɔntaining mineral deposits had no more value than ordinary land -this, apparently, because in Marx's theory such deposits, not eing 'embodied labour', had no social value.[2] Those Yugoslav Iarxians who in earlier days were preoccupied with finding a lueprint solution for an equitable relationship between two ɔcialist countries at different levels of economic development had very rude awakening.[3]

The management of these nominally joint enterprises was ɛcurely placed in the hands of Soviet directors. The 'Juspad'—a)anube shipping company—was equipped with the best Yugo-lav boats, yet Yugoslavia had to pay for its services freight rates ɔughly double those charged per ton-kilometre to the Soviet Jnion.[4] The U.S.S.R. went so far as to demand for the com-anies such privileges as exemption from the jurisdiction of the ational courts of the country and from the general provisions of ɔcial insurance legislation.[5] Perhaps most illuminating for her esigns in Eastern Europe was the attempt to link up similar nterprises throughout the whole bloc—in the U.S.S.R., in Iungary, in Rumania, and in the Soviet zone of Austria—into a ngle cartel.[6] It could not escape the notice of the Yugoslavs that ıe Soviet Union was assuming the role of a ruthless foreign con-ɛssionnaire of the anachronistic type, in a country destined to be semi-colonial appendage of the controlling Power.

[1] Dedijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 285, 286, 289.
[2] *Ibidem*, p 286.
[3] Milintje Popović, *Economic Relations among Socialist States*, London 1950, *ussim*
[4] Yugoslavia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *White Book on Aggressive Activities ' the Governments of the U.S S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, ulgaria, and Albania towards Yugoslavia*, Belgrade 1951, p. 331.
[5] Dedijer, *op. cit.*, pp. 287, 288.
[6] *White Book, op. cit.*, p 321.

The second phase began when Russia was compelled by events to reformulate the basic objectives in her sphere of domination. Faced by a determined effort on the part of the West to thwart her expansion into the industrial heart of Europe, she embarked on a large industrialization programme in the area under her control. Yugoslavia must have been assigned an important place in that programme. The treaty of July 1947 stipulated Soviet help both for Yugoslavia's armaments and for her five-year plan of economic development. Like similar agreements concluded around that time with Central and East European countries, it was envisaged also as a political riposte to America's assistance to her Western allies. It provided for Soviet technical aid as well as equipment supplies for key industries, in particular for the metal, oil, chemical, and timber industries, and for supplies of rolling stock to the Yugoslav railways. Its essential point was an investment credit granted to Yugoslavia to the amount of 135 million dollars.

But within a year of its conclusion the agreement came to a near standstill following on Yugoslavia's quarrel with the Cominform which initiated phase no. 3. By that time (mid-1948) only a little over one-half of 1 per cent of the supplies of capital goods provided for under the treaty had actually been delivered.[1] There was some unintentional irony in the fact that the U.S.S.R., which had opposed the Marshall Plan on the ground of the inadmissibility of political strings in economic aid agreements, was so soon to nullify her own Marshall Plan counterpart precisely because of its underlying political assumptions. When asked by the Yugoslav Minister for Foreign Trade about the reasons for suspending fulfilment of the economic agreements, Mr Mikoyan thought it a sufficient justification to say: 'Because conditions have changed.'[2]

Trade arrangements between the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia were duly revised, and at the end of 1948 the turnover was cut to a mere ninth. The satellites followed suit. Even at this stage the Soviet bloc tried hard to extract as much as possible of the important non-ferrous metals from Yugoslavia. But by mid-1949 all economic relations between her and the bloc had broken down, and rigid economic sanctions were enforced.

The blow thus dealt to Yugoslavia's very ambitious long-term plan, drawn up in 1947, was clearly meant to be fatal, since the plan had been formulated on the assumption that Yugoslavia

[1] *White Book*, *op. cit.*, p. 294.
[2] *Ibidem*.

vould be receiving from the Soviet bloc capital goods in exchange, rimarily, for raw materials, and also that commodity credits rom the same source would prevent an undue pressure on urrent production. It is not our intention to enlarge upon the rocess of drastic reorientation of Yugoslav trade which, in combination with large-scale Western aid, enabled the country to alvage the important parts of its expansion programme, if in nodified form. The dangers in which Yugoslavia stood at the time f her expulsion from the Soviet bloc may be inferred from the act that she was dependent on it for most of her fuel imports practically all coal and coke and three-fifths of oil imports), about our-fifths of her fertilizer needs, and roughly the same proportion f pig iron imports, in addition to rolling stock and various equipnent.[1]

After Russia stretched out her hand to Yugoslavia phase four vas inaugurated with a resumption of economic relations in 1954. Again the satellites faithfully followed suit. The five-year blockade vas called off, and to begin with some modest barter deals were rranged. In 1955 trade and payment agreements were already in peration with most of the members of the bloc, and by the end of he year trade with the Soviet Union was running at a level of bout 40 million dollars, and about 130 million dollars with the loc as a whole—an amount which in both cases equals rather less han half the pre-expulsion volume.[2] But since that time, thanks o extensive Western aid, Yugoslavia's total foreign trade has rown considerably, and this has meant a substantial fall in the roportionate share of the Eastern bloc in her trade, especially s to imports, as can be seen from the following table:[3]

[1] E C E., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1953*, p 111.

[2] Trade under the first barter agreement between Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. fter the resumption of economic relations (October 1954) amounted to 5 nillion dollars each way. An agreement of January 1955 provided for exchange f goods to a value of 10 million dollars each way This minimum was increased wice during 1955, and total trade in that year was expected to reach 20 million ollars each way

The estimate of the current level of trade with the whole Soviet bloc is based n E C E *Economic Bulletin for Europe, Vol 7, No 2*, Table D.

In 1947 and 1948 Yugoslav exports to the U.S S.R. amounted to $28·4 and 45·5 million respectively, and imports from the U.S.S.R to $37·6 and 34 1 million respectively. The figures for the trade with the whole bloc Eastern Germany not included) in these years are: exports $84 9 and $149·9 nillion respectively, and imports $88 0 and $135·3 million respectively. *Ibidem*, Table A.)

[3] Figures for 1947 and 1948 from E.C.E., *Economic Survey . . . op. cit*, p. 112; hose for 1955 from *Statistics of Foreign Trade of the F.R.P. Yugoslavia, First alf 1955*, p. 14. Import percentages refer to totals which include (for 1955) oreign aid deliveries.

Share of the Soviet Bloc Countries in Yugoslav Trade
(per cent)

	Imports			*Exports*		
	1947	1948	1955 (*first half*)	1947	1948	1955 (*first half*)
U.S.S.R.	22·2	10·8	1·46	16·8	15·0	4·35
Czechoslovakia	17·6	17·1	1·57	18·8	15·9	3·01
Hungary	5·0	4·4	0·01	8·3	9·0	0·65
Poland	3·2	7·4	0·04	3·4	7·8	1·47
Bulgaria	3·2	1·7	0·15	1·8	1·0	0·32
Rumania	0·6	1·7	0·05	0·9	0·6	0·02
Albania	0·2	—	—	—	—	—
E.Germany	4·1	2·6	0·37	2·7	1·4	0·63
	56·1	45·7	3·65	52·7	50·7	10·45

From a glance at this table it is easy to see how much Yugoslavia's trade with the Soviet bloc countries would have to grow in order to attain a role comparable to that which it used to play in the 'forties.

Nevertheless, a step in this direction was made with the signature of a comprehensive long-term Soviet-Yugoslav agreement in September 1955, under which trade between the two countries is to reach a minimum of 35 million dollars per annum each way—i.e., roughly speaking, the pre-expulsion level—in the next three years. The most relevant point is that the Soviet Union reverts to her pre-expulsion role of an eager promoter of Yugoslav industrialization: a treaty on technical co-operation is to be concluded, this time with a significant proviso that the laws of the land be respected. Once again the U.S.S.R. undertakes to aid Yugoslavia in the designing, building, and equipment of industrial projects; she also declares herself ready to assist her partner in the field of atomic energy. Once again Soviet credits are placed at Yugoslavia's disposal, and in fact on a larger scale than on the previous occasion. These credits are on three lines: (*a*) a 54-million-dollar credit has been granted to finance the purchase of coal, petroleum, cotton, and some other raw materials during the next three years; (*b*) an appropriate credit has been stipulated to cover Soviet technical assistance in the construction and equipment of a nitrate fertilizer factory of an annual capacity of 220,000 tons with a power plant of an adequate electricity output, and of a phosphate factory with a fertilizer plant of 250,000 tons and a sulphuric acid plant of 90,000 tons capacity respectively, as well as the reconstruction of three ore mines (some credits are also envisaged to finance Soviet deliveries of complete projects, to be repaid out of their future output); and (*c*) a loan of 30 million dollars in gold

ınd convertible currency has been granted, to be utilized over the ıext two to three years.[1] An estimate of the 'appropriate' investnent credit seems to suggest that the total loans would be around 170 million dollars.[2]

True, Yugoslavia's disappointment at the trend of her balance of ›ayments, and the country's tight currency position, make the ›pening of this renewed source of credit very welcome, particuarly at a time when the Government is trying to make the life of he population easier. But the 170 million dollars credit promised ›y the U.S.S.R., assuming that this time promises will be kept, is ery modest if compared with the trade deficit of the past five ears (shown in the table below) which between 1950 and 1955 nclusive totalled about 1,000 million dollars. The large import urplus became possible only through Western loans and grants.)f the latter those extended by the U.S.A. alone amount to three imes the total of the Soviet credits which are to materialize over a ›eriod of years.[3]

Yugoslav Foreign Trade 1950–55
(*in million dollars*)

	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955[4]
mports	236	390	373	495	330	450
xports	159	184	247	186	249	225
Deficit	77	206	126	309	81	225

For understandable reasons, Marshal Tito is playing up the mportance of the credit facilities which have been offered to him y the Russians. He has described the conditions governing the Russian credits as 'much more favourable than those on which Yugoslavia has) previously received credit and on which credit is t present being offered elsewhere'.[5] Naturally, such words of raise for the Russian terms serve him well when he advances omplaints, eagerly echoed by Soviet commentators, of the heavy

[1] Terms of the agreement have been compiled from Vl. Sajcic, *Review of nternational Affaires*, Belgrade, vol 5, 1 October 1955, p. 10, and from *'neshnaya Torgovlya*, No. 10, 1955.

[2] cf *Financial Times*, 7 September 1955.

[3] Trade figures for 1950–3 from *Statisticki Godisnjak FNJR*, 1955, p. 447; or 1954 derived from *ibid.*, p. 209, by adding aid deliveries and converting total inar figures into dollars at official rate of exchange. The amount of U.S.A. rants has been estimated at $500 million (cf. *The Economist*, 10 September 955).

[4] Computed on basis of figures for first ten months (cf. *Financial Times*, 1 October 1955).

[5] As quoted by *The Times*, 11 November 1955.

burden imposed on his country's economy by the service of debts contracted in the West.[1]

However, when allowance has been made for the somewhat crude overstatement, and when the magnitudes are seen in their actual proportions, one cannot help being impressed by the most remarkable change in the Soviet past and present behaviour *vis-à-vis* Yugoslavia. The U.S.S.R. has made a payment of penance for the wrongs inflicted on that country by writing off a debt of 90 million dollars accumulated before the break.[2] She has carefully avoided doing anything which might suggest any intention of regaining her grip over the Yugoslav economy: much understanding has been displayed for Yugoslavia's susceptibilities about keeping a free hand in economic relations with her Western partners (it must have been a very difficult thing indeed for the Russians in their dealings with Yugoslavia to accept the validity of Western embargoes on strategic materials). And she has shown commendable moderation in the terms of repayment of credit demanded[3] and the very low rate of interest charged.

In a word, from the ruthless exploiter of the past she has turned into a respectable banker and an enlightened investor. The high economic dividends attendant on regaining political independence from the Soviet Union certainly cannot have escaped the notice of the U.S.S R.'s satellites—the more so since the generosity shown towards Yugoslavia coincides with a period of credit restrictions in relation to the dependent area. There is another truth which the recent developments are bound to bring home to the dependent

[1] The total foreign indebtedness of Yugoslavia amounts to some 400 million dollars, of which about a fourth (93 million dollars) arose from compensation claims for foreign national property (cf. *Borba*, 28 July 1955) This, when set against the size of the deficit in foreign trade, points of course to the enormous help the country has received in foreign grants. Soviet commentators, however, make much of the country's 'unfavourable' balance of trade and show every sympathy to Yugoslav complaints that the service of foreign loans amounts to 25 per cent of the value of exports. *Cf.* V. Fedorov and A. Feoktistov, in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, No 10, 1955, p 105

Yugoslavia is now seeking a reduction of her loan burden. During his visit to Britain Mr Kardelj was reported to have met with understanding for his request that the terms for the repayment of British credits (amounting to £17 million) might be alleviated (see *The Times*, 19 November 1955).

[2] This has not been mentioned by Soviet sources, but it is referred to by Vl. Sajcic, *loc. cit*

[3] The rate of interest for all the Soviet credits is 2 per cent per annum. There are some conflicting reports as to the repayment terms. According to the official communiqué on the agreement of 1 September 1955 (*Izvestia*, 2 September 1955) all credits are repayable over a period of ten years, but according to Vl. Sajcic (*loc. cit*), who is a high official of the Foreign Trade administration, the raw material credit is to be repaid over nineteen years, the first instalment being due after three years.

egimes. The 'normalization' of economic relationships with Yugoslavia offered even greater difficulties for some of them than t did for Russia. Now, when it comes to settling the accounts from he troubled past, Tito insists on dealing with each of them as if hey were independent Powers, and this results in a situation which is curiously embarrassing to them.

Talks about normalization with Hungary have collapsed altogether. The Yugoslavs estimate that war damage incurred by them is a result of the Hungarian invasion of their country amounts to ibout $1,280 million;[1] under the peace treaty Hungary was made o pay about a tenth of this sum—$140 million, and of this $98 million is claimed to be still outstanding. Rather more than this imount is claimed by the Yugoslavs under the heading of the effects of the 1949-54 sanctions: it is maintained that at the time vhen economic relations were broken off Hungary owed Yugoslavia about $25 million dollars which she had received in advance vithout making the arranged counter deliveries of investment goods.[2] Hungary, who is also in a tight corner, could hardly be expected to shoulder the bill presented, and apparently offered omething like a fifth of what was asked.[3] The gap proved too wide o be bridged in the negotiations, and a breakdown ensued. Yugolav official quarters were not slow to accuse the Hungarians of showing no readiness to seek a positive solution' and to point out hat the dispute must have an influence on relations between the wo countries 'primarily in the economic field'.[4]

On the other hand, accounts from the past have been settled uccessfully with two other Cominform countries. One of these is Bulgaria, with whom agreement was reached to use the Bulgarian xport surplus of approximately $5 million to cover, during 1955–6, n outstanding debt for transport services rendered over a period of ears by the Yugoslav railways.

A more important case in point is that of Poland. Yugoslavs laim that in 1948–9 Poland, anticipating that sanctions would be mposed, deliberately delayed delivery of goods, and by the time he break actually came she owed the Yugoslavs some $8 million.[5] This debt was settled when a comprehensive economic agreement

[1] *White Book, op. cit.*, p. 316.
[2] *Ibidem*, p. 292.
[3] *Manchester Guardian*, 10 October 1955.
[4] Tanjug statement, as quoted in the *Manchester Guardian*, 29 September 1955.
[5] *White Book*, p. 301.

was signed in November 1955 covering, as in the case of Russia, a three-year period. It also stipulates equipment deliveries from Poland to Yugoslavia on credit of an undisclosed size, repayable in instalments, and bearing a very low rate of interest (2 per cent).[1]

These facilities offered by a capital-starved country such as Poland are an eloquent indication of Yugoslavia's politically strong bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Soviet bloc. It is of course arguable that it was much easier to reach an agreement with Poland than with Hungary because of the differences in sums involved. Eager though Russia was to see the quarrel with Hungary settled, she could hardly herself, in her capacity as guardian of the bloc's currency pool, approve of its being mortgaged by one of the members to an amount larger than all the credits offered by the U.S.S.R. taken together. However, it is more than probable that political issues also bedevilled the negotiations between Yugoslavia and Hungary. There is a boundary dispute between the two countries, and, what is even more serious, there is Tito's well known resentment against the leaders of the Hungarian regime, originating from memories of their especial zeal in fomenting the feud with the Cominform.

It was therefore interesting to watch what would be the impact of the collapse of the Yugoslav-Hungarian talks on relations with the U.S S.R. It was soon clear that, far from demonstrating her displeasure, the U.S S R. was ready to go out of her way to keep Yugoslavia contented. Shortly after the break with Hungary letters were exchanged between the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia establishing new quotas of mutual trade in accordance with the latest agreement.[2]

Clearly, Russia has accepted the discrimination which Tito has intentionally exercised between herself and her satellites. But it must have been a very bitter pill indeed for the faithful of the Communist camp to swallow—to see how little they can rely on Soviet support when they are penalized for their zeal in fighting a heretic.

A.Z.

[1] Cf *Trybuna Ludu*, 15 November 1955 Poland is to deliver equipment for mines, food processing factories, and railways.

[2] *Financial Times*, 12 October 1955.

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Note of the Month

The Soviet Budget for 1956

THE first point to note about this Budget is the date of its presentation to the Supreme Soviet. While in the past the Budget was 'debated' several months after the beginning of the calendar —and financial—year, on this occasion it was passed into law in December. This, and the publication of the sixth five-year plan in its first month, are evidence of a greater concern for the observance of formalities, though the actual amendments made by the Supreme Soviet to the Budget proposals are quite insignificant in character.

The essential figures are set out below, in thousand million rubles (they are, however, liable to give a misleading impression, for reasons to be explained):

REVENUE

	1954 *Plan*	1954 *Actual*	1955 *Plan*	1955 *Actual*	1956 *Plan*
Turnover tax	234·4	224 3	233 8	n a.	271·2
Direct taxes	45 7	n a	48 7	n a.	50 3
Mass loan	15 9	n a.	30 5	n.a.	32·3
Profits tax	92 8	83 5	117 6	n a.	107 4
All other revenue	183·7	n a.	159·6	n a.	131·6
TOTAL	572 5	558 6	590·2	561 5	592 8

EXPENDITURE

	1954 *Plan*	1954 *Actual*	1955 *Plan*	1955 *Actual*	1956 *Plan*
National economy	216 3	213·4	222 4	230 1	237 3
Social and cultural	141 4	141 9	146 9	147 0	161 5
Military	100 3	n a	112·1	n a.	102·5
Loan service	10 5	10·2	12·2	n a	14·0
Administration	13·9	n a	12 6	n a.	12 5
All other expenditure	80·4	n a	57 3	n.a.	41·8
TOTAL	562 8	553 9	563 5	537·8	569·6
Surplus	9 7	4 5	26·7	23 7	23 2

(n a =not available)

It is important to bear in mind that there was a reduction *unknown magnitude in wholesale prices of nearly all products heavy industry, and in freight, on 1 July 1955, while the plan fo 1955 was made up in the old prices. This affects all comparisons. So does the apparent elimination from the Budget of the accounting items which have caused so much confusion in the 1953-5 period. For example, the 1955 Budget plan included (in 'other expenditure') a sum of over 22,000 million rubles ostensibly devoted to paying higher prices to farmers than would have been paid in 1952, and a balancing item appeared in 'other revenue'.* The reduction in wholesale prices and the elimination of accounting items both tend, of course, to make the Budget smaller than would otherwise be the case.

The principal change on the revenue side is a sharp reversal of a trend. In recent years, turnover tax revenue was falling slowly, while profits tax receipts were rising. But in 1956 profits tax falls, this being a natural consequence of the effect of the price cuts on profits, but turnover tax receipts are to rise greatly to the highest figure on record. Part of the rise in turnover tax is no doubt due simply to increased turnover at unchanged retail prices—there seems to be no provision for retail price cuts. However, there may also be actual tax increases. It is known that factory prices of many products of light industry were altered, presumably downward, on 1 July 1955; if the tax-free prices at which factories sell goods to wholesalers are reduced, while the final retail price remains unaltered, the difference—of which tax forms the major part—naturally increases. There may be other reasons for the rise in turnover tax revenue, but the two mentioned above might well constitute the whole explanation.

The Soviet Government is well aware of the existence of an inflationary gap. In the recently published second edition of the official economic textbook it is roundly stated that purchasing power in the hands of the people exceeds substantially the value of consumer goods available. Thus it is not surprising that there should be no fiscal concessions envisaged in this Budget, either to urban or rural citizens. The quasi-compulsory mass loan stands at a figure more than double that to which the Malenkov Government reduced it in the years 1953 and 1954. There is a large Budget surplus, used mainly to provide short-term credits to enterprises through the State bank.

The expenditure side presents more difficult problems of inter-

pretation. Thus, whereas 'allocations to the national economy' are up by nearly 15,000 million rubles compared with the 1955 plan, *the sum of the sub-items named (industry, agriculture, transport) is **down** by 8,000 million, the biggest reduction being in agriculture, possibly connected with the hoped-for completion of the bulk of the virgin lands campaign. But this means that the unspecified* portion of 'allocations to the national economy' has risen by almost 23,000 million. What is this? Could it be in some obscure way the 'cost' of the recent wholesale price cuts? Or has it a more sinister explanation? Until this large amount is accounted for, it is hard indeed to comment adequately on the expenditure side of the Budget.

The volume of investment is to rise by 15 per cent and its value appears to fall from 167,000 to 161,000 million rubles. The reason for this apparent contradiction is that the 1955 investment plan was made up in the base prices of 1950, while the 1956 figure is in the considerably lower prices at present current.

The military vote is down by nearly 10 per cent, but this must be qualified by the following considerations: price cuts have affected the value of the 'military ruble'; there has been a reduction in personnel, so that actual volume of equipment may even have risen; and, finally, until the large and mysterious rise in unspecified 'allocations to the national economy' is explained, there is always the possibility that some expenditures of military significance are concealed there.

Finally, social and cultural expenditures show an unusually large increase, due partly to higher salaries for medical staff, partly to educational expansion; a sharp rise in social security expenditure may be connected with improved pensions or with some change in the pension or relief regulations.

The pattern of output for 1956 is following orthodox lines: the plan envisages increases of 10·5 per cent in gross industrial output, with producer goods rising by 11 per cent and consumer goods by 9·5 per cent. This is very much the pattern for the sixth five-year plan. The Budget shows no sign of any drastic change in policies compared with 1955. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the announced figure for new investment in the light and food industries (7,800 million) is much below the plan for 1954 (about 14,000 million).

The Waning Power of France in Vietnam

THE announcement in Saigon on 21 December that the Vietnamese piastre would henceforth belong to the dollar bloc marked a decisive stage in the decline of French influence in Vietnam. Conversely, it confirmed the continually growing ascendancy of the United States over the non-Communist South of the divided country. From the standpoint of international power, these developments—the decline of French, and the corresponding growth of American, influence—constitute two of the three most salient features of the Vietnamese scene since the Geneva agreements of July 1954; the third is the growth of Chinese, and to a lesser extent of Soviet, influence over northern Vietnam. There are indeed grounds for considering that the defeat of France in the Indo-China war has not brought 'independence', in the full sense of the word, to either northern or southern Vietnam. This view acquires particular force if one concedes the validity of the classification of international power into the three categories of military power, economic power, and power over opinion.[1] By and large, the political power exerted by the French in all three categories has been replaced by Sino-Russian power in the North and by American power in the South; and in both cases the new external power has taken a mainly economic form. The economic domination of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam by means of the Sino-Viet Minh and Russo-Viet Minh aid agreements was discussed in an article in last month's issue of *The World Today.*[2] The purpose of the present article is to place these agreements in their proper context, which is that of French relations with northern and southern Vietnam, and American relations with the South.

French policy towards Vietnam since the partition of the country has been marked by a dualism which the State Department has found it hard to tolerate. On the one hand, France has given exclusive recognition to the anti-French regime of Mr Ngo Dinh Diem in southern Vietnam; and on the other, both the Mendès-France and the Edgar Faure Governments have maintained a

[1] See B Russell, *Power*, p 11, and E H Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, chapter 8

[2] See 'Indo-China The Unfinished Struggle', in *The World Today*, January 1956

negotiating mission in northern Vietnam[1] in circumstances which have appeared at times to suggest that the long-term policy of France was in favour of relations with the Communist rather than the Nationalist authorities in Vietnam. It is not, however, difficult to explain French policy towards Vietnam. M. Mendès-France, who dominated the final stages of the Geneva Conference of 1954, was guided by considerations of the purest realism in terms of power. Recognizing France's defeat by the Viet Minh forces, he was ready to come to terms with the Viet Minh delegates; by the same token, he was not prepared to take into account the views of the Nationalist delegates, whom he completely ignored. His analysis of the power situation in Vietnam appeared to be that the South could be written off and that any chances of safeguarding French interests should be explored in the North, which would eventually dominate all Vietnam. In accordance with this view, M. Jean Sainteny, who had been French Commissioner in Tonking and North Annam in 1945–7, was appointed Delegate-General in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 7 August 1954—only a few days after the conclusion of the Geneva agreements.

But circumstances did not allow M. Mendès-France to devote close or continuous attention to Indo-China. He was soon forced to divert his energies towards more pressing problems, such as Tunisia and the European Defence Community project. These preoccupations, together with the French Prime Minister's realization that France was unable to continue to meet the expenses of the French Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam or to bear the full burden of economic aid to the South, made M. Mendès-France decide to give the Americans a free hand in southern Vietnam. This point of view was put by M Faure, then M. Mendès-France's Finance Minister, and M. Guy La Chambre, Minister for the Associated States, when they visited Washington in September 1954. On the 29th of that month an agreement was reached between the two countries under which the United States would meet an unspecified proportion of the expenses of the French Expeditionary Corps while it remained in Vietnam; the Corps was, however, to be gradually reduced in numbers. It is probable that the French tried to persuade the Americans to abandon their

[1] The American Government also, of course, maintained a consulate in Hanoi until as recently as last December, when it was closed down because of obstructive measures by the Viet Minh authorities

original plan of building up a large Vietnamese National Army, of at least a quarter of a million men, which would have been theoretically capable of dealing with a Viet Minh military attack, if the Viet Minh decided to resume the fight by military means. The French view was that a large army in the South would constitute a provocation to the Viet Minh and that it would be more useful to have a smaller but efficient army capable of restoring law and order in Cochinchina and southern Annam. This view happened to coincide with the desire of the Eisenhower Administration to effect economies in the foreign aid programme, and it was therefore adopted. It was decided to streamline the Vietnamese National Army, reducing it from its post-war peak of 270,000 to 100,000, with reserves enabling 150,000 men to be put into the field at short notice. But the point that is relevant to this survey is that the training and organization of the new Army were to be undertaken by Americans under the overall, but largely nominal, direction of General Paul Ely, then High Commissioner and Commander-in-Chief of the French Expeditionary Corps. In fact, control of training was from the start vested in the head of the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group, then General John W. O'Daniel. The number of French instructors was gradually reduced; at the time of writing, only two high French officers are still charged with training responsibilities in Vietnam.[1]

On the financial and economic side, the most important development since Geneva has been the signature, on 29 December 1954, of a series of agreements between France and the three former Associated States, bringing to an end the Indo-China Customs union set up in December 1950. Under the new agreements, the Vietnamese, Laotian, and Cambodian Governments gained the right to issue their own currencies. Southern Vietnam acquired the right to receive American aid direct in dollars, instead of in francs through France; conversely, the French lost the benefit of the dollars made available to them through American aid to Vietnam. We shall deal later with the far-reaching consequences of this development.

The agreements of 29 September and 29 December 1954 prepared the way for the replacement of French influence by American influence in southern Vietnam. In the North, the disaster of Dien Bien Phu and the Geneva agreements respectively marked the defeat and ensured the retirement of the French Expeditionary

[1] See *France Observateur*, 15 December 1955

Corps. There remained, however, important French industrial and commercial interests in northern Vietnam, such as the Société des Charbonnages du Tonkin and the Société des Ciments Portland Artificiels. In addition, there were the various 'cultural' institutions, such as the Institut Pasteur, the University of Hanoi, and the Lycée Albert Sarrault, which symbolized the remnants of the *présence française* in Tongking. The Sainteny mission in Hanoi may be said to have had two broad objectives. On the one hand, it was intended to provide safeguards for such French enterprises as desired to remain in the North, and to obtain compensation for those that did not; the safeguarding of cultural institutions comes under this heading. On the other hand, the Sainteny mission also had certain long-term political objectives. It is probable that these were the fruit of M. Sainteny's own experiences with the Viet Minh in the immediate post-war period, including the Franco-Viet Minh negotiations at Fontainebleau in 1946 and the outbreak of fighting on 19 December of that year, and of his subsequent thinking on the future of Vietnam; but it is clear that M. Sainteny had converted M. Mendès-France to his views.

On the political plane, M. Sainteny believed that there was at least a possibility of turning President Ho Chi Minh into a Vietnamese 'Tito' and of persuading Vietnam (a Vietnam reunited under Ho's leadership) to remain within a revised French Union. He based this belief on two further beliefs: first, that Ho Chi Minh (who once called himself 'Nguyen Ai Quoc', or 'Nguyen the Patriot') was a patriot first and only secondarily a Communist; and secondly, that the hereditary enmity between the Vietnamese and the Chinese, together with the French cultural 'formation' of the Viet Minh *élite*, would lead the Viet Minh leaders to orientate their policy, if possible, towards France rather than towards China. Believing in the necessity for a strict adherence to the Geneva agreements, M. Sainteny considered, not without reason, that the Viet Minh would win the general elections that are supposed to take place throughout Vietnam by next July, and that the most that could be hoped for in the South was a fair measure of local autonomy. It should be clear to anyone who has met M. Sainteny or who has read his book *Histoire d'une Paix Manquée* that he is himself very far from being a Communist; it is clear that he is profoundly impressed by the personality of Ho Chi Minh, but that does not imply approval of his regime. On the other hand, he was apparently convinced when he took up his post that it was in the

higher interests of France—and indeed of the West as a whole—that the Viet Minh regime should be encouraged to take a neutralist path, and that it was possible to persuade it to do so. To this end, he favoured a programme of economic aid for the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (V.D.R.) to forestall what he otherwise rightly considered to be the inevitable time when the Viet Minh would turn to China and Russia for help.

From the outset various factors conspired to limit the success of the Sainteny mission. M. Mendès-France's European and African preoccupations, together with his policy of a free hand for the Americans in the South, made him unable or unwilling to give M. Sainteny too open a support. As regards French enterprises, most of the smaller traders remained in Hanoi, and later in Haiphong, only so long as the French Expeditionary Corps remained; but the major industrialists, remembering the unfortunate experience of British interests in Communist China, were equally unwilling to commit their future to co-operation with the Viet Minh. As regards economic aid, France's own economic difficulties, together with strong American opposition to any form of help to a Communist regime, placed stringent limits upon M. Sainteny's plans.

In the circumstances it is not surprising that the results of the Sainteny mission were meagre. In December 1954 he concluded a somewhat vague agreement with the Viet Minh providing general safeguards for French business interests which, however, were required to negotiate individual accords if they decided to remain in the North. Few French business men, if any, thought the risk worth while. This reluctance is the background of two further, and more specific, agreements between the Sainteny mission and the Viet Minh. Under the first of these, signed on 9 April 1955, the Société Française des Charbonnages du Tonkin was transferred to the Viet Minh against an indemnity of 1 million tons of coal to be delivered over a period of fifteen years.[1] Under the second agreement, signed on 2 June, the equipment of the French public transport company in Hanoi was transferred to the Hanoi municipal authorities against compensation in kind valued at 300 million francs (about £300,000). Finally, on 14 October a trade and payments agreement was signed between France and the V.D.R. providing for trade exchanges worth 1 milliard francs (about £1 million) each way. Under this agreement, the purpose of which was officially described as being to enable French firms to

[1] See *The Economist*, 30 April 1955

maintain ties with northern Vietnam, France is to deliver machinery, spare parts and accessories, textiles, motor cars, bicycles, foodstuffs, chemicals, building materials, books, newspapers, and periodicals, in return for Viet Minh exports of anthracite, raw silk, agricultural products, timber, embroideries, lacework, and lacquer objects. In conformity with American wishes, and with the United Nations embargo on the export of strategic materials to China (the V.D.R. being considered as an entrepôt of trade with China), such materials were excluded from French commitments under the agreement.

In the cultural field M. Sainteny's successes were perhaps of greater value. Under an agreement signed on 3 December 1954, the Pasteur Institute in Hanoi has continued to function under the general supervision of the V.D.R. Ministry of Health and with the help of a Viet Minh subsidy. The University has remained open and so has the Lycée Albert Sarrault. The interesting aspects of this Communist tolerance are that the Viet Minh have not insisted on any changes in the teaching curriculum in the Lycée, apart from making the reasonable request that the pupils should be taught less about French and more about Vietnamese history and geography—a request which has been met; and that while they persuaded the French to change the name of the finishing examination from *Baccalauréat* to 'Certificate of Studies', they insisted that the new examination should be of 'equivalent' standard—clearly implying that they wished successful candidates to continue to be eligible for admission to French universities and other centres of higher studies. Nobody—not even M. Sainteny—is under the illusion that this state of affairs will continue indefinitely. In the meantime, many Frenchmen welcome this continuing opportunity of educating the youth of the V.D.R. on non-Communist lines.

Paradoxically, then, French relations with the Viet Minh have greatly improved since the end of the Indo-China war—a situation which was illustrated last autumn when the V.D.R. Government requested the French not to withdraw the remnants of the Expeditionary Corps, in order that the Geneva agreements be safeguarded. In contrast, French relations with the South have continued to deteriorate, in the economic field as well as in those of personal and inter-governmental contacts. Five principal causes of this deterioration may be listed: the general anti-French bias of the Diem Government; the support given by individual French-

men to the Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao sects during the fighting in and around Saigon last spring; the activities of the American advisers of Mr Ngo Dinh Diem;[1] southern Vietnam's unfavourable trade balance with France and dwindling reserves of francs; and the French policy towards the V.D.R. The American authorities have never, to the knowledge of the writer of this article, denied the charges repeatedly made by French journalists that Mr Diem's American advisers were responsible for the drafting of some of the anti-French tracts disseminated in Saigon during the sectarian rebellion, and inciting the population to violence against French residents.

The deterioration of Franco-Vietnamese commerce has a more rational explanation than misguided nationalism. In principle commercial relations between the two countries are based on a one-year preferential tariff agreement signed on 30 December 1954. This allowed for free monetary transfers and unlimited trade between the two countries. In practice, the fall in rice production in the South, together with southern Vietnam's shortage of francs, has made the agreement partly inoperative. In 1954 the expenses of the French Expeditionary Corps in Vietnam totalled between 170 and 180 milliard francs (£170 to £180 million); this sum more than sufficed to bridge the gap between the 10 milliards' worth of Vietnamese exports to France and the 90 milliards' worth of imports from France.[2] During 1955, however, the expenditures of the Expeditionary Corps have been reduced by more than two-thirds. It is true that the American dollar aid available to Vietnam has been more than sufficient—in theory—to enable the Vietnamese to maintain their trade with France at a high level. In 1954–5 this aid amounted to $320 million, and in 1955–6 it will total about $195 million. But the Americans, although they raised no objection to the Vietnamese purchasing franc zone products, insisted that such purchases could take place only if French prices were internationally competitive. This was far from being the case French exporters, who traditionally regarded the Vietnamese market as a 'colonial' outlet for luxury or semi-luxury goods, have found themselves unable to compete with the Japanese or the West Germans in the field of essential materials and capital equipment which southern Vietnam requires if it is to become financially independent of the United States. As a result, the French share of

[1] See *France Observateur*, 15 December 1955

[2] See Max Clos in *Le Monde*, 14 December 1955.

Vietnamese imports, which used to be 70 per cent, will amount to no more than 35 per cent this year, while Vietnamese imports from Germany and Japan are soaring.

At the beginning of last July a southern Vietnamese mission under Mr Diem's ablest minister, Mr Nguyen Huu Chau (who has no portfolio), arrived in Paris to discuss Franco-Vietnamese differences. Mr Chau's mandate did not include economic affairs: he asked the Faure Government to remove two anomalies—the fact that France was represented in Vietnam by a High Commissioner and not by an ambassador, and the fact that the Vietnamese Army was still nominally under French command. Agreement in principle was rapidly reached. On 18 July it was announced in Paris that the transfer of the military command would take place on the completion of the agreements that were to settle the details of the withdrawal of the French Expeditionary Corps; and on 28 July it was announced that Mr Hoppenot, the new French representative in Saigon, would bear the title of 'ambassador' as well as that of High Commissioner. But the negotiations on the military details failed to get under way after M. Faure's return to Paris from the 'summit' conference in Geneva, his preoccupations with North Africa and with domestic politics making it impossible for him to devote much time to the Chau mission. In the meantime, relations between the two countries had again sharply deteriorated with the Vietnamese refusal to release two French officers arrested on 20 August for being allegedly in possession of high explosive. On 13 October Mr Diem suddenly recalled the Chau mission to Saigon, and on 29 October he denounced the Franco-Vietnamese monetary agreement. Ever since then the Vietnamese authorities have responded to French inquiries on the subject with two arguments: one is the reasonable one that Franco-Vietnamese commercial relations need to be placed on a more practical basis than hitherto, and the other, for which less justification can be found, is that the Vietnamese Government does not wish to negotiate a new agreement with France unless the French Government withdraws the Sainteny mission from Hanoi.

For France, the need for fresh negotiations is urgent, as Mr Diem has granted an extension of the expiring agreement only until the end of February. Failure to conclude a new agreement would place France in a position of inferiority, as regards Customs dues, as compared with countries such as Japan, with which the Vietnamese Republic has commercial accords.

It is in any case highly unlikely that France will ever regain the preponderant share of Vietnamese trade, even if French prices become more competitive than they are at present. It is certain, on the other hand, that so long as Mr Diem remains in office southern Vietnam will continue, for an indefinite time, to be an economic—and therefore, to some extent, a political—dependency of the United States. How long this state of dependency continues depends partly on the continuance of American aid, and on the use that is made of it. Senator Mike Mansfield, the 'creator' of the Diem regime, in a report published in Washington on 6 October 1955, after a visit to Vietnam, criticized the importation of luxury goods under the aid programme in order to generate counterpart funds. He recommended the appointment of a special American mission to Vietnam 'to speed the economic recovery and development of South Vietnam by a more effective and co-ordinated use of American assistance, and to redesign the aid programme with a view to creating over a set period of time a self-sustaining Vietnam free from further direct reliance on United States assistance'. It is too early to forecast how long it would take for the second of these aims to yield results.

B. C.

Church and State in Argentina

Factors in Perón's Downfall

THE fall of President Perón in September 1955 was precipitated by his quarrel with the Roman Catholic Church, which aroused more widespread and stubborn opposition than he had expected. A few weeks after Perón's overthrow, however, the revolutionary leader who replaced him in the Presidency—General Lonardi—was himself deposed by officers of the armed forces who considered that the Catholic Church had become too influential in Government House. To understand these two seemingly contradictory events it is necessary to have some knowledge of the manner in which the relationship between Church and State has developed during the course of Argentine history.

In Buenos Aires—as elsewhere in Latin America—the move-

ment for emancipation from Spain in the early nineteenth century was fostered by men of education who had absorbed the ideas of the French Encyclopaedists and desired intellectual, as well as political, independence. It was natural, therefore, that these writers and politicians should come into conflict with the Catholic clergy (especially in the interior of the country, where the people had little or no contact with the outside world and the power of the clergy was correspondingly greater than in Buenos Aires, which was already becoming a cosmopolitan port); and so, from the days of the emancipation, anti-clericalism always existed among Argentine liberals. But, whatever their political and religious beliefs, astute leaders such as San Martín and Rosas contrived to use the Church as an instrument of their policy; and Perón managed to do so almost until the last months of his rule.

Maria Graham, who met General San Martín at Valparaíso in 1822, accurately interpreted the Liberator's attitude. She wrote that he 'seemed to think that philosophy consisted in leaving religion to the priests and to the vulgar, as a state-machine, while the wise man would laugh alike at the monk, the protestant, and the deist.'[1] At Mendoza in 1815, when he was preparing the expedition that was to cross the Andes to attack the Spaniards in Chile, San Martín had issued a kind of pastoral letter to the local clergy, instructing them to preach in favour of popular government and threatening punishment to any who failed to carry out 'this sacred duty'.[2] A few months later he ordered that several priests who were opposed to his 'sacred cause' were to be deprived of the right of the confessional and of preaching, and were to be 'confined to their cloisters until further notice'.[3] When he was in exile in Europe, San Martín drew up a list of maxims for the guidance of his young daughter wherein the only reference to religion was: 'She is to be inspired with a feeling of respect for all religions'.[4] The Church in Argentina was usually willing to give its support to a ruler who firmly maintained order. Thus during the tyranny of Rosas (1835–52)—which was welcomed as a reaction against the previous liberal tendencies—the clergy put the dictator's portrait on their altars and celebrated masses in his honour. Rosas, for his part, appropriated funds to restore religious houses and churches,

[1] Maria Graham, *Journal of a Residence in Chile*, London, Longman etc., 1824, p 281

[2] Ricardo Rojas, *El Santo de la Espada*, Buenos Aires, Editorial Losada, 1940, p 160

[3] *Ibid*   [4] *Ibid*, p 371

while allowing the schools to fall into neglect and close down.[1]

With the overthrow of Rosas, the liberals reasserted their influence. Alberdi, the father of the Constitution of 1853, wrote that if Argentina were to attract immigrants and to prosper she must guarantee freedom of religion: 'Spanish America, reduced to Catholicism to the exclusion of other religions, represents a solitary and silent convent of monks.'[2] Therefore, although in Article 2 of the Constitution it was declared that 'The Federal Government supports the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church,' in Article 20 immigrants were assured the right 'freely to practise their religion'. In reality, Church and State were kept as separate as possible. Nevertheless, the clergy, especially in the interior of the country, resisted the liberal reformers with some success. In the 1860s when he was Governor of the Province of San Juan, Sarmiento, the liberal statesman and educator who later was President of the Republic, attempted to introduce changes for which the local people were not yet ready, and his removal from the governorship was made necessary largely because of the opposition that he aroused by deciding to establish a school in a building which many years before had been a convent (though in the meantime it had been the town's military headquarters) and by his appropriation of the income from confiscated ecclesiastical funds for public works, education, and an experimental farm. Sarmiento was denounced as an atheist, and one priest charged him from the pulpit with being a Mason and therefore a disciple of the devil, adding that all Masons must have tails like the devil. 'One day (Sarmiento) met the priest on the street. Holding out his hand as if to greet him amiably, he seized the arm of the religious man and put his hand on that part of his body where a tail should be. "Come, come, Father," said the Governor, "touch it and assure yourself well so that afterwards you will be able to preach a new gospel." In such a way, Sarmiento passed the situation off as a joke, but the hidden opposition remained And it was no joke'.[3]

After 1880, however, an enormous number of immigrants of many diverse races entered Argentina, and although the majority of these newcomers were Italians and therefore Catholics, the influx to some extent swamped the clergy. The Roman Catholic

[1] Ysabel F Rennie, *The Argentine Republic*, New York, Macmillan, 1945, p. 52

[2] Rennie, *op. cit.*, p. 90

[3] Allison Williams Bunkley, *The Life of Sarmiento*, Princeton University Press, 1952, pp 402–3

Church and Spanish culture ceased to have the importance which they had had in earlier times. From 1884 it was illegal to give religious instruction in State schools during school hours,, and in 1904 it was made a punishable offence to give it to children whose parents had not previously requested it.[1]

Sarmiento's anti-clericalism was inherited by the Radical Party, which came into existence at the end of the nineteenth century; but anti-clericalism was not confined to Argentina. On the other side of the River Plate, in Uruguay, the social reformer José Batlle y Ordóñez from 1911 onwards introduced a quantity of un-Catholic legislation. Laws were passed permitting divorce at the will of the wife, and for the protection of illegitimate children. The Catholic Church was disestablished in 1919. The calendar was purged of Church festivals: Christmas Day became 'Family Day', while Holy Week became an official seven days' holiday called 'Criollo Week', and subsequently re-named 'Tourist Week'. Religion was not taught in the schools. Nevertheless, the Uruguayans have never been intolerant in religious matters, and this gradual whittling of clerical influence was effected without much bitterness and entirely without violence. Until quite recently it seemed that events would develop similarly in Argentina. Lloyd Mecham wrote, little more than twenty years ago: 'The statesmen of Argentina displayed great acumen in avoiding a sudden and radical break with the religious past. They adopted, instead, the wise policy of disestablishing the Church gradually; of gradually releasing the bonds. When complete separation comes, it will find the State, the Church, and the people prepared for, and willing to accept, the change.'[2] That prophecy has not yet been fulfilled.

In Argentina a period of Radical rule ended in 1930, to be followed by a series of reactionary Governments, controlled by Army officers and Conservative landowners. The clergy, of course, were delighted by the defeat of the Radicals. But with the military revolution of 1943 (wherein Perón was the most dynamic figure, though at first not in the limelight) the role of the Church became a political issue, because the revolutionary officers, to strengthen their own position, at once sought a more practical and effective alliance of the clergy with the regime. For this purpose a Government decree was issued on 31 December 1943 declaring religious

[1] Rennie, *op. cit.*, p. 374

[2] J Lloyd Mecham, *Church and State in Latin America*, University of North Carolina Press, 1934, p 304

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instruction to be compulsory in State schools. The majority of th Catholic hierarchy—including Cardinal Copello of Buenos Aires—expressed pleasure and gratitude. Pope Pius XII himself announc ed: 'We are pleased by this recognition of the rights of the Churc in the field of Christian education.'[1] Some Argentine priests, how ever, recognized the danger of the close association that wa developing between the Church and a political regime, for this wa contrary to local tradition since 1852 and a reversal of the trend o a whole century. Certain priests, too, held democratic convictior and were shocked by Perón's demagogy. The leader of this cleric left wing was Bishop Miguel de Andrea, who openly denounce the undemocratic features of the Peronista creed. Neverthelesı the clerical right wing prevailed, and in the election campaign o 1945-6 the Church publicly urged the faithful to vote for th Peronista candidates.

Thus, while the Radical opposition became increasingly ant clerical, Perón's working-class supporters—though they did nc particularly like the link between the Church and their ow Party—had reason to grow rather less antagonistic to the clergy Priests were invited to Peronista Party and trade union meeting to give their blessing to the proceedings, and for a while the alli ance appeared to be running smoothly. By about 1950, however, rift was opening, for Perón's movement contained many keen ad herents who considered that Catholicism was an anachronism i the syndicalist, industrialized State that they were creating. Thes Peronista diehards demanded social reforms which, necessarily were unacceptable to the Catholic Church, such as the legalizatio of divorce and prostitution. By organizing a women's branch of th Peronista Party and obtaining enfranchisement for women, th President's wife had weakened the influence of the clergy on th minds of the female population, at least in the urban centres of th republic. And in the schools there occurred a shift in emphasi from the teaching of Catholicism to the inculcation of Peronism which was so marked that it caused anxiety in clerical quarters.

In November 1954 Perón decided that he would never again b able to rely on the backing of the Church, and that therefore h had no alternative but to crush Catholic dissidents before the became a threat to his authority. The aggressive anti-Catholi campaign which he then launched was—like the Church-Stat

[1] George I. Blanksten, *Perón's Argentina*, University of Chicago Press, 1953 p 190

alliance that preceded it—contrary to the well-defined but gentle tendency towards disestablishment which Mecham had observed as being generally and wisely favoured by earlier Argentine statesmen.

The successive stages of Perón's quarrel with the Church were more or less adequately reported in the British and United States Press and consequently do not require to be described in detail here. Between November 1954 and 16 June 1955 a number of priests were imprisoned for short periods for having meddled in politics or for having tried to suborn the trade unions; in the old university city of Córdoba (which, from the beginning, was the main seat of Catholic reaction) the entire provincial judiciary was suspended; Catholic newspapers were charged with various abuses, and some (notably *El Pueblo* of Buenos Aires) were closed down; Catholic students' clubs at the universities were raided by the police; religious processions in the street were prohibited, and demonstrators who defied this regulation were arrested; religious teachers were dismissed. In December 1954 Congress passed a Bill legalizing divorce. A fortnight later President Perón signed a decree authorizing the provincial governments and the municipality of Buenos Aires to re-establish brothels. In March 1955 most of the religious festivals were removed from the list of public holidays. In April religious teaching in schools was cancelled. In May a Bill was passed by Congress providing for the disestablishment of the Church and for a plebiscite to elect a constituent assembly to make the corresponding alteration to the national Constitution. In the preamble to this Bill it was explained that the General Confederation of Labour and the Peronista Party had expressed the opinion that the Argentine Government should not have a religious dogma of its own but that the State should guarantee freedom to all religions that were 'compatible with our level of civilization and with public morals'. Indeed, the granting of privileges to any one religious creed was now declared to be contrary to the principle of equality prescribed by the Constitution of the Republic. In spite of the constant intimidation, Catholic Action (a militant and mainly lay organization) continued to marshal anti-Peronista processions in the streets of Buenos Aires. On 15 June two senior prelates were deported, on the ground that they had encouraged resistance to the Government. Thereupon the Vatican announced that all those who had been engaged in the persecution of the Church had been excommunicated. In this

atmosphere of tension, the Navy started a revolution on 16 June which was quickly crushed by the military authorities in Buenos Aires. During that night parties of hooligans, by way of retaliation, set fire to several of the finest churches in the capital.

The insurrection of 16 June, although abortive, convinced Perón and his advisers that nothing would be gained by a continuation of the hastily conceived and too violently conducted anti-Catholic campaign, and the moment was deemed opportune for its suspension. The President therefore proclaimed a new policy of 'pacification'. Members of the Cabinet who had been closely associated with the Government's most extreme measures were dismissed. Catholic prisoners were released. In July a group of Catholics, taking advantage of the official pronouncements regarding conciliation and the lifting of the censorship, founded an Argentine Christian Democratic Party. The clerical hierarchy tactfully and promptly renounced any connection with this political organization in a document wherein they stated: 'We can declare that the Argentine Episcopate has not accepted, nor can it ever accept, any understanding with any political party to defend the liberties and rights of the Church against the legitimate Government of the nation in any case, even if persecution and oppression continued. . . Firm in the consciousness of our responsibilities before God and man . . . we do not want any other arms or any other force than the force of truth with which Jesus Christ armed us against earthly powers to defend the rights and liberties of the Church.'[1]

But it was a precarious truce, and renewed street demonstrations led to more arrests. On 27 July the Radical leader, Dr Arturo Frondizi, was allowed to broadcast to the nation. In his address, Dr Frondizi indicated that the traditional anti-clericalism of his party had not diminished—he only mentioned the religious question to say that there should be freedom of religion, and he made no reference to the recent sufferings of the Catholics. On 15 August the police announced the discovery of a plot, in which Catholics were said to be implicated, to assassinate President Perón. Clashes between the police and Catholic demonstrators occurred in Buenos Aires and several provincial cities, including Córdoba.

It was by now evident that even the slight relaxation of Government control permitted since the June revolt was resulting in an increase in political disorder. Neither side in the religious quarrel

[1] *New York Times*, 14 July 1955.

was willing to compromise on the basic issue: the Catholics would be satisfied with nothing less than the repeal of all the anti-Church legislation of previous months, but the Government would not—and could not—contemplate so complete a surrender. Effective pacification was obviously out of the question, and on 31 August Perón authorized his *descamisado* supporters to suppress the enemies of the regime by force if necessary. On 16 September, to forestall the forming of the trade unions into a virtual Peronista militia, General Lonardi led the garrison of the Catholic city of Córdoba in rebellion. Other provincial garrisons quickly joined the revolutionary movement, in which the Navy also participated. Thus encircled in his stronghold of Buenos Aires, Perón was obliged to resign the Presidency.

Of course the downfall of Perón was the result of many factors besides the antagonism that he had provoked in Catholic quarters; but the subject of the present article is the relations between Church and State; and the overthrow of Perón was looked upon as being just as much a victory for the Church as for Democracy. The Catholics were jubilant. Córdoba was now referred to as 'the Heroic City'. When General Lonardi entered Buenos Aires in triumph on 23 September, the Papal flag was much in evidence, and the aircraft flying over Government House took the form of the Cross followed by the letter V. Lonardi's slogan was *Christus vincit*. In his first speech as Provisional President he promised to sign a concordat with the Vatican. The majority of the Ministers whom he appointed were Catholic Nationalists, and his personal entourage consisted largely of Catholic laymen from Córdoba, military officers, and priests.

Indeed, according to liberals and democrats generally, President Lonardi laid too great a stress on the Catholic aspect of the revolution, and his Government was too reactionary. Radicals and Socialists recalled that, while they themselves had persistently opposed Peronismo throughout the whole course of the regime—and had suffered the consequences during the ten years that it lasted—the Church, on the contrary, had collaborated with Perón until he began his anti-Catholic campaign in November 1954. It was unjust, in their opinion, that the Catholics should now try to annex the revolution, which they had joined only at the eleventh hour. Furthermore, in the opinion of the Radicals and Socialists, the Catholics had no real enthusiasm for democracy, whereas the principal object of the anti-Perón movement had always been to

establish genuinely democratic methods of government in Argentina. On 13 November General Lonardi was deposed by a group of more liberal-minded officers. Catholics in various parts of the country protested against this *coup d'état*, and some of them were arrested by the new Government as a precautionary measure.

Thus, as far as religious matters were concerned, the events of 1930–55 proved the wisdom of the earlier Argentine statesmen who, while they maintained the separation of Church and State, had not hastened to deprive the clergy of their traditional privileges. Furthermore, the unhappy consequences of the clergy's sponsorship, first, of Perón and, second, of Lonardi, showed that the earlier leaders of the Church had judged rightly in avoiding a close association with any political regime.

G. P.

The Tenth Assembly of the United Nations

THE tenth anniversary year of the United Nations, 1955, was a golden year by comparison with others in its history. A sudden change in the international political climate had thrown light into many dark corners of the political scene and thawed the joints of many of the controversies which had long been frozen stiff by the cold war. The San Francisco anniversary meeting, the Summit Conference, and the International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy had, in quick succession, during the summer raised hopes for the future and had given the illusion of the dawn of a new era in East–West relations.

The tenth session of the General Assembly thus met in September in an atmosphere of unusual optimism and goodwill. But the sixty-six items on the Assembly's agenda mostly deal with specific problems rather than general attitudes, and they are not therefore, suitable vehicles for preserving illusions of agreement where none exists. Thus the session proved disappointing to the summer optimists. It can, of course, also be regarded as a merciful return to realism and a descent, none too soon, from the sunlit mists of the summit to the harsher realities of the plain.

The General Assembly elected as its President Señor Maza of Chile, who proved a resourceful and tough presiding officer, and proceeded at once to its general debate. This general debate, conducted this year by forty-five representatives including nineteen Foreign Ministers, provided a mild afterglow of the Geneva spirit and covered most of the issues on the agenda without much controversy. The strident tones of the East-West struggle were strangely muted during these opening debates, and the tenth session can claim at least one advance in that it is the first where abuse and vilification were almost abandoned as debating weapons by the Soviet Union. The new personalities in the Soviet Delegation, Mr Kuznetsov, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and Mr Sobolev, Mr Vyshinsky's successor, have much to do with this welcome change. Their more temperate method of debate is both more agreeable and more effective than the extravagances of their predecessors.

THE COLONIAL ISSUE

Perhaps as a result of the Geneva afterglow and of the temporary slackening of East-West tension, the first disturbances of the Assembly arose from the United Nations' other basic conflict, the colonial issue. There was much activity before the session on both sides concerning the inscription of the Cyprus question on the agenda, and its inscription was rejected without much difficulty by 28 votes to 22 with 10 abstentions, and with less ill-feeling than might have been expected. On the other hand, and perhaps partly because so much energy had been put into the shelving of Cyprus, the Assembly decided to consider the question of West New Guinea in spite of the protests of the Netherlands delegation, although the question was finally disposed of without debate amid happy laughter by a resolution expressing the hope that the negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands would bear fruit.

Much worse was to follow, and the Assembly was visibly shaken and surprised by itself when, against the recommendation of its steering committee, it voted by 28 votes to 27 to include the Algerian question in its agenda, thus causing France to withdraw from the session. This unhappy result was due in part to the exuberance of the post-Bandung spirit of Asian-African nationalism and perhaps also to the feeling of relaxation—one might almost say carelessness—which the Geneva spirit had induced among some members of the usual Western majority, who would nor-

mally have co-operated in preventing a crisis that could only be of value to their opponents, and which was inevitable when the Assembly decided to discuss an area which is legally part of metropolitan France. But in this unguarded moment a number of nations were distracted from the obvious necessity of avoiding this crisis—Greece voted against France in anger at France's position on the question of Cyprus, six Latin-American States voted against France in an effort to please the Arabs, while Siam, the Philippines, and Liberia (all participants at Bandung) joined the Arabs and their Asian allies. A number of abstentions completed the sorry score and reversed the decision of the steering committee by one vote.

As M. François Mauriac has remarked, 'The French nation measures its greatness by the void which its absence leaves', and the withdrawal of France was a severe blow to the Assembly. It was more than that, as M. Spaak pointed out in a brilliant speech in defence of the French position; for the decision to debate Algeria made a precedent which might in future face many other members with 'a most anguishing question' on how to remain in an Assembly which violated the terms of the contract governing the relations of its members and which, after admitting nations to membership, might suddenly at a later date question their domestic arrangements and legislation. This danger and the consequent harm done to the United Nations system both as a forum for the discussion of international disputes and as a shield for weaker nations (both of which functions are perhaps potentially more useful to the Arab and Asian nations than to any other group) was belatedly recognized when, nearly two months later, after herculean efforts at conciliation behind the scenes, the Assembly adopted unanimously and with relief a procedural motion proposed by Mr Krishna Menon that it would not 'consider further the item entitled "The question of Algeria", and is therefore no longer seized of this item on the agenda of the Tenth Session'. Although the motive for their acceptance of this move was explained by the Arab States as a desire to provide a 'breathing space' for the Assembly and for France and to allow France time to take remedial steps in Algeria, and though the motion is worded in such a way as to commit no one for the future, it must be taken primarily as a belated recognition that the preservation of the prestige of the United Nations is sometimes of more importance than a propaganda victory. The passing over of the Moroccan question without debate tends to confirm this view.

Another walk-out, this time by South Africa, occurred on the passage of a resolution deploring her policies of *apartheid* and asking her to co-operate with the United Nations three-man commission on the racial situation in South Africa. This move was characterized by the South African delegate as 'the most flagrant of all examples of the transgression of Article II (vii) of the Charter' (the domestic jurisdiction clause), but the vote of 37 in favour, 7 against, and 13 abstentions is a reflection of a much more important current of opinion in the Assembly than was expressed over Algeria, and perhaps for this reason the walk-out was accepted with the minimum of comment or effort at conciliation.

Since colonial issues provided some of the least edifying episodes of the tenth session, it is refreshing to report one where colonial policy appears to be ahead of nationalistic feeling. The General Assembly endorsed the recommendations of the United Nations Mission to Togoland that there should now be a plebiscite in British Togoland to determine whether it should join the Gold Coast when that country becomes independent, whether it should remain a British Trust Territory, whether it should be unified with French Togoland, or whether it might have some other self-governing or independent status. This plebiscite will be organized by the Administering Authority (the United Kingdom) in consultation with a United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner and will take place without delay under the supervision of the United Nations, the results to be reported to the eleventh session of the Assembly. While these results may present the United Kingdom with a dilemma *vis-à-vis* the Gold Coast, especially if North and South Togoland vote differently, at least this question provides a case where the accusation of colonialism cannot be made.

ATOMIC ENERGY

After the opening colonial fireworks, the Assembly turned with some relief to the peaceful uses of atomic energy, a subject still novel enough to command enthusiasm and constructive debate. The three major topics of discussion in this field are international scientific conferences, the proposed International Atomic Energy Agency, and the effects of atomic radiation. On the first of these there is complete unanimity. The 1955 Atomic Conference in Geneva was probably the most interesting and successful, as well as one of the largest, events ever sponsored by the United Nations. Of all of the manifestations of the Geneva spirit it is perhaps the

only one which is destined to have a lasting value and effect. As the President of the Conference, Dr Bhabha, said, 'Knowledge once given cannot be taken back', and the stimulus given by it to the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes was undoubtedly very great. It also provided, incidentally, a remarkable example of the capacity of groups of highly qualified professional intellectuals to co-operate regardless of national origins, and the total objectivity and lack of political bias which characterized its proceedings was extremely encouraging. The conference was, in fact, such an unqualified and, in some quarters, unexpected, success that delegates of all countries could only compete in praising it and in agreeing that a second conference, perhaps of more restricted scope, should be held in two or three years' time.

The proposals to set up a permanent International Atomic Energy Agency do not provide any such plain sailing, and afford grounds for grievances and disagreements to all sides. The original proposal by President Eisenhower in 1953 for an atomic pool has gone through many changes since its announcement to the General Assembly two years ago. In 1954 the idea appeared to have been whittled down to a clearing house for information and for bilateral arrangements. The outcry against this development was such that the proposal has again been given most of its original imaginative features, but, in the meanwhile, with the creation of bilateral and regional arrangements all over the world and with the sudden declassification of a vast body of knowledge which took place at the Geneva Conference, much of the sense of urgency of 1953 has been lost, and its place has been taken by serious disagreements on the nature, functions, and constitution of the Agency.

The draft statute circulated in August to the 84 States Members of the United Nations and Specialized Agencies gives to the Agency three principal functions: to encourage by mutual assistance research on and the development of the peaceful uses of atomic energy; to receive and allocate fissionable materials and fuels for peaceful purposes; and to promote the interchange of scientific information. It also provides that the Agency shall ensure that its assistance is used only for peaceful purposes. According to the draft statute, the Agency would be directed by a Board of Governors of sixteen, representing the five major atomic Powers (Canada, France, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and the U.S.S.R.), the five leading producers of uranium

and thorium (Australia, Belgium, Czechoslovakia, Portugal, and South Africa), and six countries to give geographical balance. There would be no veto power in the Board of Governors.

The first source of disagreement lies in this constitutional arrangement. India, representing the atomically less advanced Powers, feels that the proposal gives unfair weight and initial advantage to the Western atomic Powers who drafted the Charter, even in spite of a complicated provision for changing the composition of the Board after the first year. The draft statute would, in fact, give a permanent majority on the Board to the atomically most advanced States, leaving only six places to be competed for by the Asian, African, and Latin-American countries.

It is for this reason that these countries want the Agency to have a close relationship with the United Nations where they can command a majority. These particular difficulties have been temporarily side-stepped by the General Assembly by adding to the group of countries negotiating the text of the statute Brazil, Czechoslovakia, India, and the Soviet Union, and providing that a conference of all the 84 States Members of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies will be held to decide on the final text of the statute. These represent considerable concessions by the sponsoring Powers, but the process of negotiation will inevitably be long drawn out, for the draft statute contains other grounds for grievance, such as its provisions for inspection and control, and the conditions upon which assistance will be given. These provisions inevitably discriminate to some extent against small countries, even the more advanced ones, while tending to perpetuate the dominance of the major atomic Powers, and it is hardly surprising that they are not universally welcome.

The Soviet position presents further difficulties. It is still uncertain whether the Russians will eventually join the Agency, although they have submitted surprisingly moderate comments on the draft statute and will take part in the negotiations. Their main objection at present, apart from the absence of the People's Republic of China, is to the looseness of the provisions for the relationship of the United Nations to the Agency. They consider that the Agency should be 'within the framework of the United Nations', and, specifically, should be closely tied to the Security Council, in view of the possible dangers to peace and security arising out of the Agency's activities. The power of veto was not mentioned by the Russians in this connection this year, but it must

inevitably be assumed that any responsibility of the Agency to the Security Council would involve the veto. The problem of the relationship therefore remains to be worked out and has been passed to the Secretary-General for study. The production of a solution acceptable to all sides will tax to the utmost his very considerable ingenuity.

Since most of the problems have been deferred, it is difficult to forecast the usefulness of the Agency, if and when it comes into existence. It would seem at the moment that much of its usefulness has already been lost by the delay which has allowed bilateral arrangements to take over one very important aspect of its functions. It also seems likely that its system of control and inspection will not be very effective, since it will cover only material supplied by the Agency, which, in the present situation, is likely to be a very small part of all the fissionable materials being provided to countries around the world.

In surveying the needs and special requirements of various countries for atomic energy, in giving technical assistance and training facilities, and in promoting the exchange of scientific information, it might play a useful secondary role. The complication of the statute itself in its present form may well give rise to the suspicion that yet another international bureaucracy is being set up for political reasons to pretend to do a job which is, in fact, being done elsewhere and by other means. On the other hand some system of international check and balance is essential if peaceful atomic development is to remain peaceful.

The third atomic topic under consideration was the effects of radiation, which has been the subject of much ill-informed and alarmist speculation and publicity in the last few years. This item was inscribed on the agenda by the United States and also in somewhat different terms by India, the United States proposal being that the United Nations should set up a scientific body to study both short- and long-term effects of atomic radiation of all kinds upon man and his environment, while the Indian suggestion was more specifically entitled 'The dissemination of information on the effects of experimental explosions of thermo-nuclear bombs'. The two items were considered together under the general heading of 'The Effects of Atomic Radiation'. The subject is obviously an extremely delicate one, and it is probable that only the inevitability of its being raised by someone else in an undesirable form prompted the United States to put it on the agenda. The fact of the matter

is that, although much is known of the effects of direct exposure to strong radioactivity—the very high safety standards of existing atomic plants being based upon this knowledge—very little is known of the long-term effects upon man and his environment of the rise in the atmospheric level of radioactivity as a result of both peaceful and warlike uses of atomic energy, and there is considerable disagreement among scientists as to the conclusions that have been drawn from what is known of the subject, especially as regards safety levels and genetic effects. The main aim of the General Assembly was to set up under United Nations auspices a radiation fact-collecting and evaluating system on a world-wide basis.

Before the unanimous passage of a resolution establishing a fifteen-nation Scientific Committee, a Latin-American amendment to enlarge the Committee and an Indian amendment asking 'all concerned' to co-operate (rather than simply the members of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies) were adopted with some misgivings, and the Soviet amendments appealing for the banning of nuclear weapons and the cessation of bomb tests, expanding the Committee's task to include a study of prevention against and treatment of radiation diseases, and adding the People's Republic of China and Rumania to the Committee were rejected. None the less the Soviet delegate in voting for the resolution expressed himself confident that the committee's shortcomings would be remedied as its work progressed. The Committee has a long and hard job before it, but its findings may well be of importance for the future safety of the human race and for the development of atomic energy.

DISARMAMENT

The disarmament question, the most difficult as well as the most fundamental of all United Nations problems, has had an unusually active year, and it is necessary to recapitulate briefly the developments which have occurred in order to understand the deliberations of the Assembly on this subject. During the ninth session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union announced that it was willing to accept the Anglo-French proposals of June 1954 as a basis for future negotiations, and this was heralded as a first step in breaking the eight-year-old deadlock, in spite of the fact that subsequent debate revealed large differences on a number of questions, especially on the timing of the various phases of disarmament, on the functioning of the control organ, and on the balancing of atomic

with conventional disarmament. The Sub-Committee of the Disarmament Commission was therefore instructed by the Assembly's ninth session in 1954 to make a further effort to reach agreement on a draft international convention providing for (*a*) the regulation, limitation, and major reduction of all armed forces and international armaments, (*b*) the total prohibition of the use and manufacture of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction, and (*c*) the establishment of effective international control through a control organ with adequate powers to guarantee the effective observance of agreed reductions and prohibitions. Modified French proposals were put to the Sub-Committee in April 1955, and in May it suspended its meetings to await the outcome of the Summit Conference.

At the Summit meetings, various striking proposals were put forward by the heads of the four Governments in the optimistic and benevolent spirit prevailing at that time. President Eisenhower suggested the exchange of blueprints of military information between the United Nations and the Soviet Union to be verified by mutual aerial reconnaissance (the 'open sky' plan), the object of this proposal being to make a start on an effective system of inspection and disarmament which would also provide against the possibility of a great surprise attack Marshal Bulganin presented various previously made Soviet proposals, which included the establishment of control posts at strategic centres, and in addition two new ideas, namely that the armed forces of all States other than the great Powers should be fixed at not more than 150,000 to 200,000 men and that pending the conclusion of the Disarmament Convention the four great Powers should declare that they would not be the first to use atomic or hydrogen weapons. Sir Anthony Eden in his turn proposed that mutual confidence might be increased by a system of joint inspection of the forces now confronting each other in Europe and that such a joint inspection might provide a practical test on a limited scale of methods of international inspection. Not to be outdone, M. Faure proposed that States should agree to a reduction in military expenditure and pledge the money thus made available, in full or in part, to international programmes for economic development and mutual assistance, a special fund being set up for this purpose.

The Disarmament Sub-Committee thus found itself confronted with an abundance of suggestions from above, all of which required detailed expert study, as well as with its own unfinished considera-

tion of the more orderly Anglo-French and Soviet proposals. Having waited in vain for guidance from the Geneva meeting of the four Foreign Ministers in November, it eventually presented through the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly the records of all its meetings and annexes giving the positions taken by its members. These records, to no one's surprise, revealed continuing differences on several vital aspects of the problem.

Faced with this unpromising situation the Assembly adopted, without Soviet support, a resolution recalling the hopes and aspirations of the current year and urging the Sub-Committee to continue its search for agreement on a comprehensive disarmament plan, at the same time paying special attention to such possible initial measures as General Eisenhower's 'open sky' plan and Marshal Bulganin's proposals for the establishment of control posts at strategic points. It also urged individual States to continue the search for technical and scientific methods of ensuring adequate inspection and control. The Assembly rejected a proposal to add India and Poland to the Disarmament Commission and its Sub-Committee.

The original draft of this resolution was much amended in favour of more emphasis on the regular and methodical work of the Sub-Committee, as opposed to the more striking proposals of the four heads of State. Its principal sponsors, the United States and the United Kingdom, hailed it as a new step forward from the endless and sterile discussions of the past after ten years of stagnation. They stated that the resolution maintained the search for a comprehensive formula while opening up possibilities of making a start on the actual process of disarmament through measures, such as the 'open sky' plan, designed to build confidence amongst States. Its critics, and especially Mr Menon (who voted for it), felt that there was a tendency to bury the fundamental problem in ingenious superficial suggestions, and recalled a similar process which had rendered futile the disarmament meetings of the 1930s. The Soviet Union, in opposing it in favour of their own more optimistically worded resolution, maintained that it had brought the United Nations back to the 1946 position, but none the less expressed confidence that the necessary measures would eventually be taken. At least the resolution, by providing new approaches to the problem, will keep the search for a solution on disarmament alive.

SECURITY COUNCIL; CHARTER REVISION; U.N. MEMBERSHIP

The rival candidacies of the Philippines and Yugoslavia for a seat on the Security Council, which consumed an inordinate amount of the General Assembly's time and ran to thirty-six ballots, was finally settled after some unseemly procedural wrangling by a gentlemen's agreement to elect Yugoslavia on the understanding that she would retire after one year to permit election of the Philippines. This episode showed the United Nations at its very public worst. The Assembly deferred the convening of a general conference to review the Charter by setting up a committee to consult with the Secretary-General on the appropriate time, place, and organization of such a conference, the general view being that a review at the present time could only serve to weaken the Charter.

By far the most dramatic item of the session was the question of new members and the ultimate admission of sixteen out of the eighteen of the applicants (Japan and Outer Mongolia were not admitted). The deadlock over new members has for many years been a ridiculous feature of the United Nations and one which has considerably damaged the organization's prestige. As Mr Paul Martin, the author of the 'package deal' resolution for the admission of all eighteen applicants, said, the problem was primarily a political one and the only possibility of a solution therefore lay in a compromise. In this long controversy the principle of universality had been opposed in practice by a number of States, and especially the United States, on the ground that some of the new members, for example Outer Mongolia, were unsuitable for membership because of their status, form of government, or foreign policies, and could not be accepted even if this meant the indefinite exclusion of a number of important countries, such as Italy, Austria, Finland, Ceylon, etc. Against this view it has been strongly argued that, even at the price of accepting Outer Mongolia, whose independent status is strongly in doubt, a United Nations embracing all contemporary philosophies of government and almost all nations on earth would be more valuable than one confined to nations unlikely to quarrel with each other. To the charge of gross expediency, it can be replied that even the present membership of the United Nations contains a number of States about whom many other members have strong reservations, and there is no doubt that a universal association of sovereign States, even including one or two

loubtful cases, has greater possibilities of dealing with world
problems than a more selective body sitting in ineffective moral
udgment on other sovereign States excluded as unsuitable.

As a result of much hard work by Mr Martin and a number of
other delegates, the Assembly adopted the 'package deal' by 52
votes with 5 abstentions (including the United States), and 2
against (China and Cuba). The matter was then referred to the
Security Council where the United States had undertaken not to
use the veto. It was here that the real drama occurred, for it was
known that China would almost certainly veto the admission of
Outer Mongolia, thereby wrecking any possibility of the Soviet
Union accepting the remainder of the 'package'. This prospect put
he friends of Formosa, and especially the United States who had
pleaded in vain with Chiang, in a difficult position since, if the
Chinese wrecked the 'package deal', it was extremely likely that
hey themselves would be ejected from the United Nations, and
he People's Republic of China seated there, early in 1956, thereby
posing a serious internal problem for the Republican Administra-
ion of the United States in an election year. Despite the eloquent
appeals of Sir Leslie Monroe of New Zealand, the very impressive
President of the Security Council, the Chinese representative,
having skilfully manoeuvered the Soviet delegate into casting the
irst veto by suddenly requesting the inclusion of South Korea and
Vietnam in the 'package', vetoed Outer Mongolia, amid audible
gasps of dismay from a very large audience. The Soviet delegate
hen proceeded to veto all the rest of the applicants, and the first
meeting of the Council ended in angry accusation and counter-
ccusation between the Soviet and American delegates, the
ndependent role of the Chinese being virtually ignored by both.
The Council was unexpectedly recalled on the following day at
ery short notice on the request of the Soviet delegate, who
eclared that as a temporary expedient he was prepared to accept
he exclusion of Outer Mongolia if Japan also was dropped from
he list. This solution was accepted with both protest and relief, and
ixteen of the applicants were thus admitted.

While this is a more or less happy outcome of a somewhat
qualid proceeding, it leaves Japan as a hostage of the Soviet
Union in the effort that it will undoubtedly make in 1956 to
btain the exclusion of the Chinese Nationalists and the entry of
he People's Republic of China into the U.N. The cost to the U.S.
f supporting Chiang may thus prove to be heavier in 1956.

C

The increase in membership will undoubtedly have far-reaching consequences in the United Nations itself. Quite apart from the practical effects upon the length and complexity of meetings and upon the constitution of the various organs, it will change the whole voting balance in the General Assembly and will strengthen the Asian-African bloc considerably at the expense of the West, and it is probable that on many issues, especially on colonial problems, the West will no longer be able to command the easy majority which it has had in the past. This will radically affect both the results and the atmosphere of future meetings.

There is no space here to deal with the more routine issues which form the bulk of the Assembly's work. These issues cover in detail many aspects of economic and social development, the emergency programmes for refugees in the Middle East and in Europe and for reconstruction in Korea, problems of international law and finance, and the housekeeping affairs of the United Nations itself. The Assembly in considering these problems sets out the lines upon which the secretariat and other organs of the United Nations will work in the coming year. Nearly all these issues reflect to a greater or lesser degree the basic political problems described above.

One characteristic of the tenth session may be especially noted, namely the growing influence in United Nations affairs of countries other than the great Powers, such as India, Canada, and New Zealand (all Commonwealth countries) and the Scandinavian countries. It is encouraging that this influence has usually tended to work in the interests of moderation and common sense, for it will become greater and more important as the changing balance of power in the Assembly (and in the world) gives less weight to the Western countries who were formerly the leaders and arbiters of the Assembly on most important issues. Perhaps one of the greatest services the Assembly can render to the United Nations as a whole is to give a real influence to nations on the basis of their wisdom rather than of their size and wealth, for with the changing balance of power, common sense, moderation, and persuasion will have to be relied on more and more to avert confusion and frustration. In this context the effectiveness of the independent efforts of smaller countries is a good omen for the future and may help to relieve the continuing stresses and strains of great Power relations.

E. B.

Trieste under Italian Administration

TILL sixteen months ago the Trieste problem was a recurrent subject in international discussions and in the world press. Then in October 1954 a settlement was at last reached[1] between Italy and Yugoslavia, the two countries chiefly concerned, together with Britain and the United States, who since the war had been in joint occupation of Zone A of the Trieste territory. After the settlement Trieste appeared to have dropped right out of the news, until attention was once more drawn to this corner of the Adriatic by reports of an international conference held in Rome last November to discuss the port's future.

For if the settlement achieved by the Memorandum of Understanding of 5 October 1954 brought to an end an unhappy chapter in Trieste's history, it also marked the beginning of a new phase. Trieste had thereby gained what a large proportion of her inhabitants had repeatedly declared that they wanted—reunion with Italy. But now, with responsibility no longer shared or disputed, the provision of means for improving the port's economy, disrupted by the vicissitudes of the past fifteen years, devolved on Italy alone.

POPULATION AND FRONTIERS

The settlement involved only minor frontier changes. Trieste and the surrounding area, known since the war as Zone A and hitherto under U.K./U.S. military occupation, reverted to Italian administration, while Zone B, since the war under Yugoslav occupation, now came under Yugoslav civil administration with the addition of a small area of land on its northern (Zone A/Zone B) frontier. Persons resident in either area were given the right for one year (subsequently extended to fifteen months) of opting to remove, taking with them their property and transferring their funds. In the event, several thousand Italians of Zone B so opted to return to Italy;[2] but apparently very few Slavs chose to leave Zone A for Yugoslavia. The situation was complicated by the considerable delay which took place in negotiating a frontier traffic

[1] Text in *Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Italy, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia regarding the Free Territory of Trieste, London, 5 October* 1954 (Cmd 9288).

[2] The figure of 14,454 Italians leaving Zone B in the period since October 1954 was given just before the right to opt expired, on 5 January 1956 (see *Il Messaggero*, 8 January 1956)

agreement between Italy and Yugoslavia, which was to restore normal conditions after the October 1954 settlement. This agreement, which provided for resumption of inter-zonal and frontier traffic, for the granting of passes, and for the re-establishment of bus and shipping lines connecting the hitherto estranged areas, was in fact only concluded on 20 August 1955. In the intervening months many Italians, accustomed in the past to travel freely to Trieste for work, had decided to leave the Yugoslav zone because of the seeming uncertainty as to when travel restrictions would be lifted.

In the absence of precise figures it is difficult to calculate how many Italians now remain in the Zone B area (reckoned at 199 square miles). Statistics of 1940 gave that area's population as 73,500, and at the end of the war it was generally estimated that it was roughly about evenly divided between Italians and Slovenes. But given the very considerable exodus of Italians which took place during the succeeding ten years, their numbers must by now be greatly reduced. Estimates of refugees reaching Trieste in the past ten years from Istria as a whole (i.e. including, as well as Zone B, all the rest of the peninsula, which was ceded to Yugoslavia under the peace treaty) put their numbers at some 35,000, of whom 15,000 are believed to have left Zone B merely during the two years following the period of acute tension in the autumn of 1953.[1]

The exodus took place in waves, intensified at different times when the political situation gave rise to renewed fears as to the future. Italians leaving Zone B, apart from their desire to remain within Italy, no doubt did so chiefly because they wished to be in or near Trieste, the main centre of work and the place where many of them still had relatives. As far as the small farmers who formed a large part of the Italian population, whether in Zone B or in Istria as a whole, were concerned, dislike of the Yugoslav collectivization policy undoubtedly played a considerable part in the early years; and by the time Yugoslavia began gradually to move away from that policy and revert to small ownership of land many of the best Italian small farmers had already left, while uncertainty as to the future made others unwilling to stay on. It is interesting to note the change in tone among some Italian writers on this subject since the settlement of October 1954. Whereas till then the

[1] Figures given by a well-known Triestine authority, Professor Carlo Schiffrer (*Mondo Economico*, 3 September 1955)

refugees were acclaimed as victims of oppression and almost as heroes (and indeed their wish to escape from Yugoslav control was tacitly and sometimes overtly encouraged by the Italian authorities and by the Church), it is now sometimes implied that it was unfortunate that so many left instead of remaining to testify to 'italianità'.[1] This is of course the same perpetually controversial story that has so often arisen in similar connections elsewhere—among resistance groups during the war, or in Eastern Germany today: is it more heroic, and also more ultimately useful, to stay and 'testify' under a disliked regime, or to bear witness to one's convictions by departing from it?

LABOUR AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Be that as it may, such ethical and long-term considerations could hardly enter into the calculations of the simple Italian peasant in Istria, harassed by fears of losing his customary day-to-day method of livelihood. The refugees left, and their numbers, for the most part, went to swell the already overflowing population of Trieste, which could not provide sufficient work, housing accommodation, or schools even for its own citizens. In the summer of 1955 the number of refugees in Trieste receiving financial assistance was still around 6,000, while a further 6,500 were receiving daily free meals; total aid to refugees was then estimated to be costing the State some 87 million lire a month.[2]

The unemployment situation was of course greatly aggravated by the departure of the Allied forces from Trieste, for besides the 4,500 Triestini who had been working with A.M.G. and were now discharged, and the Venezia Giulia Police Force (numbering 6,000) now disbanded and only partially absorbed into the carabinieri, shopkeepers, hotels, restaurants, and small handicraft and repair concerns all suffered a heavy loss of custom from the troops' withdrawal. Trieste has, in addition to the port, considerable industrial resources, many of them centred in the new industrial port of Zaule (they include, for example, one of the largest oil refineries in Europe); but these did not suffice to provide work for the many new unemployed now thrown on the labour market. The number of unemployed early in 1955, including con-

[1] See, e.g., articles by Aurelia Gruber Benco and Carlo Schiffrer in the interesting special number of *Il Ponte* on 'Jugoslavia d'oggi' (*Il Ponte*, Florence, August-September 1955).

[2] Carlo Schiffrer in *Mondo Economico*, *loc. cit*

cealed unemployment, was in fact put as high as around 25,000, or one in twelve out of the population of 300,000.[1]

Some improvement took place in the employment situation during the year, and when making a reassessment in October, one year after the return of Trieste to Italy, the Italian Government Commissioner Palamara was able to show that the number of registered employed had actually increased by about 5,000, largely as a result of the public works (principally house and school building) initiated by the Government. Despite the influx of refugees from Zone B following the settlement, unemployment was reckoned by then to have fallen to around 17,000; but a good deal of this decrease was due to emigration, for in the meantime some 7,000, mainly skilled workers, had left for Australia under Government-sponsored schemes. Their departure gave rise to some bitter comments, especially in Left-wing quarters: 'La madre Italia è arrivata—i figli partono,' said *Unità* (14 July 1955)

THE ECONOMIC SITUATION

When Trieste returned to Italy it was realized that both immediate and long-term aid for the city would be needed—the first to tide over the inevitable dislocation following on the withdrawal of A.M.G., and the second to assist Trieste to resume, if in greatly changed conditions, at least some part of her former role as an important international port. As far as immediate aid is concerned, the Government has during the past year spent some 9 milliard lire on initiating public works schemes and on assistance to the unemployed. For long-term purposes a special fund of 32 milliard lire was voted at the end of October 1954. This sum, made up from various sources including the residue of E.R.P. credits and the interest from A.M.G. loans, was to form a revolving fund to be expended on improvements to port and railway installations, credits to shipbuilding and industry, etc. But disagreements soon arose as to how the fund should be distributed. The Triestini had their own views on the subject which did not always coincide with those held in Rome; moreover when the draft decree concerning the use of the fund was published it was found that the province of Gorizia, whose economy had suffered as a result of the peace treaty, was to benefit from it too—whereupon nearby Udine also demanded a share. Thus almost a whole year went by before the

[1] Figures given by Diego De Castro, formerly Italian political adviser to A.M.G. in Trieste, in *La Stampa*, 28 April 1955.

law establishing the fund was passed by the Italian Parliament on 6 October 1955; and further delays seemed likely during the planning stage before the Trieste economy would feel the benefit of this much-needed injection. In the meantime the cost of living rose, bankruptcies increased, and inactivity in the investment market reflected the general lack of confidence.

At the time of Trieste's return to Italy certain factors severely hampered her prospects of resuming her former position. The great days of her prosperity, when, as the main outlet to the sea for the Austro-Hungarian Empire, she was the centre of a flourishing entrepôt trade, could not of course be expected to return. The problems attendant on the break-up of that empire, her natural hinterland, had already been encountered under the Fascist regime, which established new industries in Trieste to compensate for the loss of some of her traditional trade. After the second World War political conditions brought about a further reduction in trade over Trieste from two of her former Central European customers—Hungary and Czechoslovakia; while during the years of dissension traffic with Yugoslavia also dwindled,[1] and competition with Fiume (Rijeka) increased. Throughout the post-war years, in fact, the mainstay of trade over the port of Trieste was that with Austria, which at the height of E.R.P. deliveries actually kept the port working to capacity. But even here Trieste was faced with severe competition from the North German ports, served by many more shipping lines than Trieste and offering the advantage of low freight rates on the German railways. Bremen, in particular, nearly quadrupled its Austrian traffic between 1951 and 1953. Moreover, Fiume, though by no means so serious a competitor as those ports, was by 1955 attracting a certain amount of Austrian, as well as Hungarian and Czechoslovak, trade by means of its very low port and transit tariffs, calculated at a special exchange rate of 620 dinars to the dollar instead of the normal 300.[2]

[1] Trade with Yugoslavia has never formed a high proportion of total Italian trade. in 1937 it represented 1 82 per cent of imports and 2 12 per cent of exports, corresponding figures for 1954 (first five months) were 1 14 and 1·80 per cent. The main import from Yugoslavia has always been timber, Italy's main export to Yugoslavia today is machinery, which now represents more than half the total exports, as compared with 11·2 per cent before the war (see *Italian Affairs*, January 1955)

[2] Transit trade over Fiume during the first six months of 1955 was 285,000 tons, of which 55 per cent was with Austria, followed by Hungary and Czechoslovakia During roughly the same period (one month shorter—January/May 1955) rail transit traffic to and from the free port of Trieste totalled 1,141,000 tons, of which Austria accounted for 81·8 per cent (percentages for other

In addition, during the post-war decade many Italian shipping lines formerly based on Trieste inevitably transferred their home port elsewhere, notably to Genoa. And whereas in 1937 the Lloyd Triestino numbered ninety-two ships, in 1955 it had twenty-five. Trieste possesses a magnificent port with very fine equipment for loading and unloading, warehousing, grain silos, etc.; but it is impossible to make the most of these facilities if an insufficient number of shipping lines use the port. The return to Trieste, in the autumn of 1955, of two ships of the Italia line to North America, the *Saturnia* and *Vulcania*, was greatly welcomed as a portent.

After the city's return to Italian administration the continuation of the facilities offered by the Free Port (which covers two extensive areas on either side of the central basin) was formally confirmed by a decree of 19 January 1955. The bonded areas are open to the merchant vessels and goods of all countries, and all loading and unloading operations can be carried out there completely free of Customs dues. No special zones are reserved in the Free Port for any one country. There is nothing against an extension of the existing limits of the Free Port areas to cover the whole port, and such a move has some strong advocates in Trieste, though others feel it would serve no useful purpose. Trade over the Free Port at present represents two-thirds of the total trade of Trieste.

THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF NOVEMBER 1955

The conference of interested countries which met in Rome from 14 to 19 November 1955 had as its main object the discussion of ways and means for expanding the port's usefulness and thus placing its economy on a sounder basis. It had been long awaited, for such a conference was foreshadowed in the letter from the Italian representative, Manlio Brosio, to the Yugoslav representative, Vladimir Velebit, which was appended to the Memorandum of Understanding of 5 October 1954. Under Article 5 of the Memorandum Italy undertook to 'maintain the Free Port of Trieste in general accordance with the provisions of Articles 4–20 of Annex VIII of the Italian Peace Treaty', and Signor Brosio in his letter had suggested that an international conference should be called in the near future to discuss the port's situation, now that the idea of an international Free Port regime, envisaged in the

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countries were: Italy 8, Czechoslovakia 5, Western Germany 2, Hungary 1·4, Yugoslavia 0·9).

eace treaty under the Trieste Free Territory provisions, had been uperseded. The countries taking part in the conference, in ddition to Italy, were Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia, with an observer from Western Germany.

Shortly before the conference met a bilateral agreement had een concluded between Italy and the port's main user, Austria, which had a considerable influence on the proceedings. This greement, signed in Rome on 22 October, provided for the stablishment of an Austro-Italian joint committee to deal with all uestions concerning Austrian traffic over Trieste. Italy underook to abolish all extra freight rates (i.e. rates hitherto charged on oreign merchandise over and above those normally paid for talian goods) on the Italian railways for goods in transit between Austria and Trieste or vice versa (including goods passing through Austria from countries beyond); the port authorities were to harge lower rates for all services for Austria, while warehousing nd storage accommodation was to be placed at Austria's disposal t reduced rent. Moreover, Austrian ships could now be registered t Trieste. Austria was also to grant Italy special facilities as to rail ariffs for goods in transit to or from Trieste. This agreement was enerally regarded as highly satisfactory, and likely to go a long vay towards countering the growing tendency of Austrian busiess men to use the North German ports, which had arisen to a reat extent because of lower transport costs.

The conference had a purely consultative character, as was made lain from the outset by its chairman, Count Nicolò Carandini: he views of representatives would be conveyed for consideration o the Italian Government, but it could reach no binding decisions. t soon became clear that the other countries also wished to enjoy acilities of reduced rail and port tariffs, etc., similar to those ranted to Austria, and here Count Carandini stressed that the talo-Austrian agreement was not concerned with the question of ccess to the Free Port, which was open equally to all countries. The Czechoslovak delegate stated the view that the absence of a learing agreement with Italy, and the consequent difficulties of ayment, went a long way to account for the decline in Czecholovak trade over Trieste. Both he and the Hungarian delegate xpressed the hope that more shipping lines could be brought to Trieste: in particular, lines to the Middle and Far East, and specially to China, were mentioned. The Yugoslav and Hun-

garian delegates both proposed the setting up of a permanent international organization to supervise the port's development, while the Czechoslovak representative suggested periodical meetings of the countries concerned. Count Carandini in reply said that to institute an international regime would be in contrast with the spirit and the letter of the Memorandum of Understanding, which excluded those articles of the peace treaty's Annex VIII which had envisaged such a regime. Subsequently the Yugoslav delegate expressed his recognition of the fact that there was no obligation whatever upon Italy to institute an international regime.

Comment on the conference stressed the usefulness of this frank exchange of views between the countries chiefly concerned. The main points which emerged—the need for more shipping lines serving Trieste, reduction of rail and port tariffs, and payments facilities for Czechoslovakia and Hungary—all suggest ways by which more trade could be attracted to the port, and the first two have indeed been frequently urged in the past by Trieste business circles. As to shipping services, some extensions were already announced at the conference, notably in services to South America, Egypt, the Middle East, and the Congo, while the Lloyd Triestino is at present negotiating for the reopening of its Shanghai office. The extension to other countries of the facilities already agreed upon with Austria would be particularly helpful in the cases of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The trade of these two countries, accounting now for only 6 per cent of the total traffic over Trieste, in the past represented as much as 32 per cent.

CONCLUSION

Thus at the end of the year following the return of Trieste to Italy there seemed to be some grounds for moderate optimism. The delays in the application of the revolving fund to aid the city's economy, and in summoning the conference on the port, have undoubtedly been harmful both materially and psychologically. But if action is taken now those ill effects might yet be checked. Trade over the port improved considerably during the year, reaching 3,668,000 tons in the first nine months—a record figure surpassing even the best pre-war years, largely to be accounted for by the expansion of Austrian economy attendant on the conclusion of the State Treaty. The shipyards, too, have plenty of work—not, it is true, on large passenger vessels which provide employment for many hands, but on merchant ships and tankers (for example, the

Monfalcone yards recently received orders for a number of oil tankers for Esso-Standard).

On the administrative side, the suggestion has often been made that Trieste, in view of her special situation, should combine with the nearby provinces to become an autonomous region, on the lines of Sicily or the Trentino-Alto Adige. Such a solution has some strong advocates, notably Professor De Castro, but, like the question of the all-embracing Free Port, it has proved highly controversial. Argument, especially, it seems, in Triestini matters, breeds delay. And delay in seeking the best ways of improving her economic situation is what Trieste can least afford at this juncture in her fortunes.

M. K. G.

ERRATUM

In last month's Note on 'Election Year in the United States' (*The World Today*, January 1956) the opening dates of the Republican and Democratic Conventions were incorrectly given as, respectively, 27 August (v p.2, line 17) and 20 August (v.p.4, line 22); these dates should instead be 20 August for the Republican and 13 August for the Democratic Convention

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Notes of the Month

Divided Dixie

THE revolutionary decision of the United States Supreme Court in May 1954, that it was unconstitutional to separate Negro children from white in publicly-financed schools, was received with surprising calm in the southern quarter of the country where such segregation was required not only by custom but by state law. It is therefore both unexpected and depressing that the Court's conciliatory ruling, a year later, on how its decision was to be implemented should have been followed by outbreaks of violence against Negroes on a scale that had been unknown in the South for years. The Court gave local communities time to integrate their schools as they thought best, merely insisting that educational discrimination must be abolished 'with all deliberate speed'. What that means will almost certainly have to be clarified eventually by the Court. Meanwhile, as far as the South is concerned, it is only in the border states, such as Missouri, Kentucky, and Delaware, where racial segregation was already on the way out, in a few communities elsewhere in the region, and in the national capital, where an excellent example has been set, that Negro children are doing lessons with whites.

But in the United States the school is the social centre of the community and many Southerners genuinely believe that mixed schools inevitably mean the dreaded mixed marriages. These people were just recovering from the stunned shock of the Supreme Court's original decision when the subsequent ruling, by its very moderation, made it clear that the Court had really meant what it said. The reaction was sharp, particularly in those parts of the region where the Negroes form a substantial—in some rural areas it is an overwhelming—proportion of the population, and where poverty encourages the pride and prejudice of the whites. These conditions are found particularly in the so-called Deep South—Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and South Carolina—which has so far not shared fully in the new prosperity of South as a whole

and where many ill-educated 'poor whites' have only their skins to prove their superiority to their Negro neighbours.

Not even in these states do the authorities advocate violence, although they generate an atmosphere in which it flourishes by their outspoken condemnation of the Supreme Court. The official defiance is taking legalistic forms. The most complicated of these is the revival of the doctrine of 'interposition' which, in simplified terms, asserts that the Supreme Court has exceeded its constitutional powers and that state governments are therefore free to ignore it. Of more practical importance are the various attempts to circumvent the Supreme Court's decision by making it unnecessary for children to attend publicly-financed schools at all. The immediate pressure, however, is on the Negroes themselves and is organised through the White Citizens' Councils whose members claim that the councils are the modern and non-violent alternative to the old Ku Klux Klan. So far this type of pressure is confined mainly to the Deep South. Tradespeople refuse to serve Negroes who petition for their children to be admitted to white schools, such petitions enable the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People to bring cases to the courts and thus to insist that the Supreme Court's ruling be enforced. Negroes who register to vote may lose their jobs.

The growing bitterness is already affecting Congress; for example, the much-needed federal subsidies for school building may well be refused, because a Negro Representative from New York is insisting that they must be denied to states which have not integrated their schools and southern Congressmen will not accept this condition. The bitterness accentuates the perennial dilemma of Democratic candidates for the Presidency: the nomination cannot be obtained without the support of Southerners, but victory over the Republican candidate cannot be obtained without the support of Negroes in northern cities. The election campaign must inevitably deepen the lines which have been drawn with increasing clarity in recent months between North and South, between Negro and white, over this question of integrated schools The Supreme Court's decision can hardly fail in the long run to prove a great forward step towards racial equality, but unfortunately its immediate effect has been to generate fears which have set back the recently flourishing growth of racial toleration This is a matter of serious concern to many in the South, as well as in the rest of the country.

Rival Claims in Antarctica

The Antarctic Continent, if indeed it is a continent and not a couple of large islands, is a land mass larger than Australia, larger even than the United States. Though explorers have touched upon its coastline at many points, have made rapid expeditions inland, and have even spent a few months at a time on its shores, the interior is largely unknown. Vast expanses have been trodden by no human foot, perhaps have not even been flown over. Yet four-fifths of the whole is conventionally divided on the maps into sectors over which territorial sovereignty was claimed by several European Powers between 1908 and 1939. The United States has neither claimed a share of Antarctica nor admitted the validity of other claims. In 1948 the United States put forward a scheme for referring the whole problem to the United Nations, a scheme which the British were prepared to discuss, but which fell through for lack of support.

There seems little doubt that Graham Land, a part of the continental land-mass, was sighted by Lieutenant E. Bransfield, R.N., on 30 January 1820. This first discovery was followed only a few days later by another sighting, in what is now the Norwegian sector, by the Russian Admiral Bellingshausen The Frenchman d'Urville sighted Adélie Land in 1839, and the American Wilkes sighted what is now the Australian sector in 1841. The British territorial claim was first asserted by Ross, who explored the sea that bears his name, in 1839–42; the Norwegian claim derives from Borchgrevink who on 23 January 1895 was the first man to set foot ashore in Antarctica. The Ross Sea was the line of approach by which Scott and Shackleton made their celebrated expeditions from New Zealand, early in this century Between the wars much exploration was done in the Australian sector by Sir Douglas Mawson and his colleagues, and from the base called 'Little America' on the west shore of the Ross Sea by Admiral Byrd. Yet these and other exploring expeditions rarely penetrated the interior

Whereas all the other claims to Antarctic territory are somewhat flimsily founded upon discovery without occupation, the British claim to the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies has a stronger basis. In so far as Britain's title to the Falkland Islands or 'Malvinas' is based upon occupation, settlement, and undisturbed administration since 1843, it is incontrovertible. It will however be wise to admit that if founded upon eighteenth-century

diplomatic arrangements the title would be less secure. Though the Argentine has not seen fit to accede to Britain's proposal that the question should be referred to the International Court, their counter-claim has some substance and might have great nuisance-value. The Chilean counter-claim seems to be based merely upon geographical fantasy. In the Dependencies, including Graham Land, the British claim is much stronger, since these islands and coasts were utterly unknown at the time of the eighteenth-century disputes. They were discovered, used for commercial purposes (whaling and sealing), and administered by the British, before any Argentine or Chilean claim was filed. The peninsula of Graham Land is, however, the only part of the continent which has thus been effectively occupied.

When Australia, the only other empty or almost empty island-continent, was discovered, the numerous navigators who visited the coast made no claims upon the unknown hinterland. It was not until 1839 when five flourishing colonies had been established that sovereignty was claimed over the whole continent The partition of Africa offers an interesting parallel, though the coastline had long been known and had largely been annexed by various Powers, when Bismarck summoned the Berlin Conference in 1885 the interior was largely unknown and its future wealth was unsuspected. The interested Powers agreed upon their existing territorial rights, repudiated 'paper' annexations, and set up international organs for developing the hinterland Their intentions were admirable, and the signatories to the Congo Treaties were not responsible for the mismanagement of the Congo State.

At the present time eight Argentine and three Chilean bases are established in the British sector and a Soviet base in the Australian sector. Several other expeditions, notably from the U.S.A., are to operate in Antarctica during the Geophysical Year without, as it seems, much reference to territorial claims. It is hardly to be expected that conflicts of interest will not arise.

Berlin Revisited

Impressions after Three Years

To return to Berlin at the beginning of 1956 after an absence of nearly three years is a stimulating experience. Signs of material progress are immediately visible. Buildings of one storey on the Kurfurstendamm have added two or three more to their stature; new and striking office blocks and bank buildings, such as those of the Alliance Insurance Company, the Berliner Bank, and the Industrie- und Handelskammer have multiplied: big stores are not only growing upwards but extending to new sites. The number of new hotels and restaurants[1] and plans for the new Hilton Hotel tell the same tale. The building of new blocks of flats and private houses has now begun in earnest and on an increasing scale, as visits to residential areas such as Charlottenburg, Roseneck, or Lankwitz, to give a few random examples, bear witness. The removal of tramlines makes it possible to park cars in the centre of the roadway down the length of the Kurfurstendamm, thus demonstrating the enormous increase in the number of car-owners in the city which is, unhappily, also shown by the steady rise in the number of road deaths.

These superficial impressions of increasing prosperity are confirmed by statistics, and the press is full of the city's new five-year development project. West Berliners are proud of the achievements of a reconstruction which began three years later than in Western Germany, and 1955 has proved their most successful year, taken all round. In that year the value of the gross national product in West Berlin reached 7,400 million DM, an increase of almost 1,000 million DM over that of 1954; industrial production was up by 24 per cent, though it has still barely reached the level of 1936 whereas in the Federal Republic it has been doubled; during last year 60,000 new jobs were created and the average number of unemployed had fallen to 145,000, compared with 190,000 in 1954. Lastly, 20,000 new dwelling units (*Wohnungen*) were built during the year.[2] The State (city government) proposes that in the next five years 75,000 new dwelling units should be built and 100,000 new jobs created. There are plans to spend large sums on

[1] One sign of the lack of solidity behind this mushroom growth is the high birth and death rate among restaurants

[2] Berliner Bank. *Wirtschaftsbericht*, December 1955

rebuilding and development, on roads and transport, and on market gardens and orchards.[1] These new projects are still under discussion by the Federal Government, since their financing must naturally depend to an overwhelming degree on contributions from the Federal Budget and on American aid in one form or another. In present circumstances West Berlin cannot become self-supporting; it faces, and must obviously continue to face, special handicaps. The absence of an 'economic hinterland' and the unwillingness of many West German firms to place orders in a divided city surrounded by Soviet-controlled territory make its trading position difficult; the average age of the population in Berlin is forty-three, against thirty-four in the Federal Republic, and 37 per cent of all West Berliners are in receipt of some kind of pension,[2] as compared with 18 per cent in the Federal Republic. Since Berlin was before the war a capital city and centre of government, almost 40 per cent of its present unemployed are 'white collar' workers (i.e., salary earners).[3] It must not be forgotten, also, that there are now 40,000 refugees who are not formally recognized as such and who for this reason cannot be flown to the West but must be permanently maintained in the city.

Not three minutes' walk from the prosperity of the Kurfurstendamm with its flashing neon signs and closely ranged motorcars, one comes upon the ordered desolation of the Kurfurstenstrasse stretching to the Lutzow Platz and along the Tiergartenstrasse; further away in Grunewald ruined villas still stand as the bombs left them, and in other residential districts houses are still pitted with shellfire; these latter are habitable and inhabited, but it is obvious that only essential repairs have been done. The former two wealthy residential areas have no doubt remained in their present state largely because of problems of compensation and of absent owners, but a sharp reminder of difficulties elsewhere has come in the dispute which at the beginning of February nearly caused the fall of the Senate, the governing coalition. This dispute was about the Federal law on the raising of rents on pre-war houses and flats

[1] This last item of expenditure, though small by comparison with the other sums involved, is presumably intended to allow for more intensive cultivation, since the total cultivable land available within the Western city limits has already been decreased by 10 per cent through the demand for building land and green zones (see *Der Tag*, 20 January 1956)

[2] Excluding war victim compensation

[3] At the end of 1955 almost half of the unemployed were 'white collar' workers and two-thirds were women, and of this total, 50 per cent of both sexes were over forty-five. (*Tagesspiegel*, 21 January 1956.)

by 10 per cent, constitutionally applicable also to West Berlin. That rents should be increased to enable property owners to carry out repairs might seem reasonable enough, but the Social Democrat members of the Senate argued that the figures just quoted of unemployed, of pensioners, and others in receipt of some form of social assistance make it impracticable to introduce such a measure in West Berlin.[1]

In view of the fact that West Berlin cannot hope to be self-supporting, the city's development plans for the next five years might seem a trifle grandiose; but these rest upon two assumptions. So long as Germany is divided, West Berlin remains in a key position which cannot be abandoned and which, because it is a window to the East, must remain prosperous and in good heart. In the second place, when Germany is reunited Berlin will again become a capital city and must therefore be re-equipped in the intervening years with the civic, cultural, and commercial amenities it has lost as the result of the war. The proposals are nonetheless ambitious and include the building of an opera house, museums, and a conference hall for 15,000 people (which will be completed by 1957 with United States money). There are also plans for an international building exhibition in 1957 which will, it is hoped, interest architects of international repute in the projects for the reconstruction of the bombed-out Hansa quarter west of the Tiergarten, and of the Zoo area. The Federal Government has already approved the city's plan to build 75,000 new dwelling units in the next four or five years.

Changes are also to be observed in the East sector of Berlin in comparison with three years ago. There are, for example, fewer slogans to be seen, and more motorcars, and some rebuilding has been done; but there are also new 'controls' both for those who enter by car whether through the Brandenburger Tor or across the Potsdamer Platz, and for those who go in and out by underground or S-Bahn On the latter, rucksacks, parcels, and handbags are carefully searched even down to the thumbing through of diaries, letters, or any other papers. But the operation of these controls is by no means regular, early morning trains tend to be more thoroughly searched than those running later in the day since would-be refugees try to escape in the early morning. During the

[1] A compromise was reached on 6 February under which the law should be put into operation together with a new law granting subsidies to needy tenants. (*The Times*, 7 February 1956)

four days before Christmas, for example, and again after January an especial effort was made by the G.D.R. authorities stop refugees and in particular young men, and many of them w hauled out of the trains.

At the moment the East Berlin authorities are staging 'attraction'—in addition to that normally exercised by its regul opera and stage performances—in the form of an exhibition of th collection of pictures formerly in the Zwinger in Dresden whicl contains Raphael's Sistine Madonna as well as many other Italian and Dutch pictures. The collection is now on view in the National Gallery just behind the ruined Kaiser Friedrich Museum and opposite the huge Marx-Engels Platz. The galleries, many of them small, are filled to overflowing with schoolchildren and other organized groups, and with individual Germans of all sorts and conditions. A recent visitor noticed that the majority carried round with them in addition to the catalogue a reddish-brown and yellow pamphlet. This proved to be a reprint of an article on the Sistine Madonna, taken from the periodical *Sowjetwissenschaft: Kunst und Literatur*, issued by the Society for German-Soviet Friendship The essay contains little if anything which differs from the usual Soviet thesis that modern bourgeois art critics have lost all interest in the great paintings of the past and have conspicuously failed to appreciate the 'powerful human content' of Raphael's masterpiece Indeed it is possible that many of the visitors to the pictures purchased and carried the pamphlet round as a necessary gesture rather than out of any particular desire to read it.

The inhabitants of East Berlin, and still more those of the eastern zone, apart from party officials, *Kulturtrager*, or youth leaders, can unhappily find little comfort in the intellectual and aesthetic pleasures afforded by picture galleries, opera, or bookshops. Neither the passage of time nor the much publicized achievements of the regime have brought alleviation from material shortages or freedom from the anxiety of living in an atmosphere in which an unguarded critical remark overhead by a neighbour may bring denunciation. More serious today from the standpoint of the West is the increasing weariness, exasperation, and indeed hopelessness to be found in the G.D.R.

With the failure of the Geneva conferences, prospects of reunification within any foreseeable future have almost been extinguished. There seems no point in continuing any longer the sham of '*mitmachen*', in enduring the annihilation of family life

through the demands of the organizations to which each member of the family must belong, involving constant attendance at meetings, demonstrations, week-end marches, and so forth. 'I hardly ever see my own wife' was one schoolmaster's comment. The teaching profession has till now succeeded to a remarkable extent in following the letter but not the spirit of the law. From the purely technical standpoint this, incidentally, is quite an achievement, since the history and current affairs syllabuses now in use differ considerably from those issued five years ago in laying tremendous emphasis on patriotism and what may be termed national bolshevism, in addition of course to Marxist Socialism. But in another five years' time the majority of teachers will inevitably be people who have grown up and been educated under a Communist regime. It is true, in practice as well as in theory, that the majority of all university places go to the children of workers. To take only one example: the son of a minor official (and grandson of a worker) is at present studying medicine at the Free University in West Berlin because he is debarred from entry to the University in his home city in the Zone. This young man intends to return home to practise when he has qualified, as other young medical men trained in the West have done before him, since there is a marked shortage of doctors in East Germany.

The announcement in January 1956 of the creation of a people's army in the G.D.R. changed little or nothing in the effective military organization there but was one more proof of the evaporation of the 'Geneva spirit', and of the Soviet attitude towards reunification. The last few months of 1955 had already seen a sharp increase in the number of refugees arriving at the reception camp at Marienfelde in West Berlin; recent figures have been higher than at any time since the six months before June 1953, and the total for January 1956 was 15,500, an increase of 25 per cent over the previous month. On the day after the announcement of the creation of a people's army (19 January) 400 refugees arrived in Marienfelde, 82 of them under the age of twenty-one; but this was a normal average and involved no special increase in the steady stream of young men who have recently been coming to avoid being recruited for the people's police and to seek work and better pay in Western Germany. Apart from them, the type of refugee has gradually been changing, according to an official at Marienfelde. The former category of 'persecuted for political opinions' (*politisch verfolgt*) is much less often used. Men and women come

in the belief that conditions will not improve in the zone and that there will be better pay for the same work in the West, though some of them in fact risk having to remain among the 40,000 'unrecognized' refugees who are not flown to West Germany and must stay in camp in Berlin.

It may be asked what is the evidence for these statements about a changing outlook in the G.D.R. and its probable consequences. In the first place, of course, there is still, as there has always been, contact within Berlin itself: contact between families, contact through the Evangelical Church, contact maintained between friends and professional colleagues. The two broadcasting stations in West Berlin, the American RIAS and the German Sender Freies Berlin, receive letters and visits from men and women from the zone. RIAS, which has put out excellent programmes, particularly in the way of entertainment and information, has the advantage over the Sender Freies Berlin from every point of view except that it is not a German station. This at least was the opinion of an official of the latter organization. The SFB is only able to use a shared channel and thus cannot be heard throughout the zone; but, thanks to correspondence and visitors, it knows the places where it is heard and the needs and conditions of its listeners

Apprehension about the future of Germany was the recurring theme of conversations in West Berlin with newspaper men, radio officials, politicians, and private individuals. The particular point of view naturally varied with political party, job, or background; but there was a surprising degree of unanimity on some points. If there cannot be reunification within the next few years, then German youth in *Mitteldeutschland* is bound to become effectively Communised. Of those young East Germans who are now coming to the West to find work and to escape from *Vopo* (the People's Police) and *Volksarmee*, perhaps 15–20 per cent are said to be returning disillusioned to the zone[1] despite the fact that they obtain well-paid jobs: it is hardly too much to say that they return because they find it hard to live in a free world. Their lives have been

[1] Only a rough estimate is, of course, possible, and the percentage may well be too high There was a consensus of opinion that if the figure were higher propaganda use would be made of the fact and statistics would be published by the G D R At present the only references are found in pamphlets on sale in the bookshops of the East sector under such titles as 'Why I Returned from the Golden West' It is also undeniably true that some young men go and return out of a spirit of adventure, and one at least is reported to have admitted that he went for the plane ride

so organized from childhood upwards that they cannot accustom themselves to the normal individualism of the West. It is ironical, but perhaps not incomprehensible, that the materialist outlook and the visible signs of wealth (and its uneven distribution) in the Federal Republic were suggested as a factor influencing some young refugees and making for good propaganda in the G.D.R. (one must in fairness add that this outlook is also to be found in West Berlin). The need, especially of youth, for 'an ideal' was perhaps the reason why several serious-minded Germans, who were most vehement in their insistence that a reunited Germany must belong to the West, believed that progress towards European Union was today essential. Such people scouted the suggestion that to divert enthusiasm towards the European idea might be to encourage support for the mirage of a 'third force' as some kind of a European alternative to N.A.T.O. It must, however, be put on record that the European-minded among those with whom the present writer spoke are those who support most strongly the present policies of the Federal Government and the Western Powers.

There was agreement also on certain points across party lines. A member of the CDU and of the SPD each deplored the effects on opinion in the zone of the materialism of the West. There was also a common insistence that the Western Powers must think again about their policy towards Europe and towards a divided Germany, at least after the U.S. presidential election is over; though the reasons given for this insistence differed. One editor argued that the formation of the People's Army in the east zone might have worse effects than national service in that it might lead to the creation of a 'Red SS', even more unpleasant than its Nazi predecessor. A Social Democrat whose work brings him into contact with Germans from the zone feared that the new army might be the first stage in the recreation of a Prussian State in Eastern Germany, to which might be added as a bait 'a small portion of territory to the east of the Oder/Neisse'. He expressed the belief that even such a National Bolshevist 'rump' Prussia might find support among Right Radicals in the Federal Republic. An economic editor closely concerned with providing factual information for, and checking that received from, the zone described himself as a neutralist. It seemed to him that the only solution of the German problem must be a neutralized Germany created on the basis of free elections in return for a security pact—nor could he understand the fears of the Western Powers at such a prospect.

Lack of comprehension on this point seemed fairly common: guarantees could surely be devised—so ran the argument—against German misuse of neutrality, whether in a military or an economic sense. It was conceded that strategic considerations—defence in depth, radar screens, and so on—must finally determine the attitude of the N.A.T.O. Powers on a German military contribution, and by some that Germany could perhaps not claim all the advantages of being part of the West, to which Germans by history and tradition feel they belong, without contributing to its defence. But almost every conversation sooner or later came back to the phrase 'a way must be found'. The reasons for this anxiety have already been mentioned: at the moment the balance in the zone is held against Communism, in the schools, by the Church, by the workers; but the scales must tip towards Communism in the next five or ten years. Even before that length of time, it is said, especially if the diagnosis of resentment and hopelessness among the older generation in the zone is correct and if a steady stream of refugees continues, there may be a danger to the Federal Republic from infiltration which could undermine any Government under a less strong and single-minded Chancellor than Dr Adenauer.

It is both improper and unfair to generalize on the basis of sample opinions only; and in any case it must be added that those who seemed to put the attainment of German reunification before every other consideration, and even at the price of some form of neutralization, are yet greatly outnumbered by those others who, with their eyes fixed equally on the eastern zone and on the need to help fellow-countrymen there, have no such simple solution to offer. Berliners frequently say with wry pride that they know the Russians better than more fortunate people who live further to the West. They do not believe that the Soviets are likely to give up *Mitteldeutschland* except at a price; but they also do not believe that the Soviet Government holds all the cards and so can make that price prohibitive for the Western Powers. They admittedly lay themselves open to a retort from the West that Berlin is not the best place from which to get an overall view of Soviet strength and strategy and on this basis to make a correct appreciation of Western policy. That policy is nevertheless closely scrutinized from Berlin for any sign that those who control it are—because of the need to use German manpower and German territory as a military base for N.A.T.O. forces in the common cause of the free world—proclaiming their determination to do all in their power to

achieve a reunification which they would in reality prefer to see postponed to the Greek Kalends

H. G. L.

The New Soviet Five-Year Plan

AT first sight the Sixth Soviet Five-Year Plan might seem to present 'the mixture as before'. But a close scrutiny of the details contained in the Draft Directives of the Twentieth Congress does not bear out this contention. The mixture is rather stronger. In 1946 Stalin forecast that it would require three new Five-Year Plans, if not more, to raise production to fifty million tons of pig iron, sixty million tons of steel, five hundred million tons of coal, and sixty million tons of oil.[1] The new Plan is a timely reminder that all those targets, considered over-optimistic at the time, are likely to be surpassed substantially in 1960, i.e. at the end of the third post-war Plan. The oil target mentioned by Stalin in 1946 was, in fact, surpassed early in 1955. In these circumstances it would seem dangerous to regard what the new Directives reveal as merely a continuation of traditional production patterns. To put Soviet industrial trends into their proper perspective, it is worth recalling that the Soviet Union was producing less than half the primary energy then produced in Britain when it entered the era of the Five-Year Plans in 1928, today it produces more than half as much again as this country. The rise in steel output is even more formidable. In the next five years it is to increase by more than the total amount of Britain's annual steel production.

The momentous rise of Soviet industrial power would not have been possible without the almost uninterrupted preference accorded to the output of industrial raw materials and capital goods. The controversy about the place of consumer goods in society that pre-occupied Soviet planners and economists last year was highly relevant to Soviet plans and achievements, past and present. The second edition, just published, of the standard Soviet text-book on political economy throws some light on the change that has come over the Soviet economy since Malenkov was relegated from his position as Chairman of the Council of

[1] *Pravda*, 10 February 1946.

Ministers. The first edition of the text-book referred (p. 417) to 'a vast programme for the rapid development of the light and food industries and of agriculture in order to solve in a short time the task of achieving a steep rise in the production of consumer goods' In the new edition no reference can be found to 'a steep rise in a short time'. On the contrary, the emphasis is once again on the first priority to be given to the expansion of heavy industries (p. 430) The statement in the first edition that the output of light industry in 1953 increased faster than that of heavy industry has been eliminated from the second edition.

Perhaps too much was made at the time of the clash between such personalities as Malenkov and Khrushchev whose differences seem, in retrospect, to be a matter of degree rather than of principle. It was Malenkov, after all, who prefaced his famous request in 1953, for a sharp rise in the production of consumer goods, by words which have been the *leit-motiv* of Soviet planning for the last twenty-five years· 'We shall continue in every way to develop heavy industry. . . . We must always remember that heavy industry is the foundation of foundations.'[1]

Some eighteen months later, Shepilov, writing in *Pravda*, destroyed any illusion of a preference being given to consumer goods in Soviet society: 'In some years (he emphasised) it may prove necessary to overcome a lag in the production of consumer goods and to give particular attention to the light and consumer goods industries.'[2] A little earlier, Professor Strumilin had similarly stressed, in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, that the policy of priority for producer goods must be a permanent characteristic of the Soviet economic system. These views received their most authoritative backing from Khrushchev when, addressing the building workers in December 1954, he said: 'We must continue to develop heavy industry by every means. Heavy industry is the foundation of the national economy, the source of the economic might of the Socialist State and of its defence capacity '[3] Those who had expected some signs of a shift in favour of relaxations at home and abroad may be excused a measure of disappointment.

THE PREVIOUS PLANS

These are more than historical reminiscences. As the achievements of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, as well as the Directives for the

[1] *Pravda*, 9 August 1953
[2] *Ibid*, 24 January 1955
[3] *Ibid*, 28 December 1954

Sixth, are now available, it is advisable to analyse the results of the previous Plans before passing judgement on the targets for the new Plan and their chances of being fulfilled.

The first post-war Plan, inaugurated in 1946, was concerned with rehabilitation rather than expansion. When post-war planning began the extent of war-time civilian losses was not known. No labour budget had been drawn up, no inventory was taken of either industrial plants, material resources, or stocks. In these circumstances the Plan could hardly be expected to be more than a list of loosely connected goals in some important sectors of industry. It had been the intention of the planners to rehabilitate the war-damaged economy and to raise the nation's output and income beyond pre-war levels. As it turned out, the Plan did succeed in restoring the Soviet Union to its former economic position, but this was achieved at the expense of urban and rural living standards. While the Plan implied a rise in the standard of living by approximately 50 per cent, in fact by 1950 it was no higher than in 1940 and considerably lower than in 1928. Industrial productivity lagged badly behind the Plan's targets. The failure to increase output per man was compensated for by the influx into industry, beyond what the Plan had contemplated, of millions of peasants and soldiers, who preferred life in overcrowded industrial towns to work in the collectives.

The second post-war Plan was to add expansion to recovery. Once again the main emphasis was on capital goods. The increases contemplated amounted to 90 per cent in the case of capital construction, 80 per cent for producer goods, and 65 per cent for consumer goods The share of capital goods in the total volume of industrial production, which before the war had accounted for three-fifths and had in the meantime risen to two-thirds, was to increase further to almost three-quarters. It is significant that this ratio between the two main sectors of the economy was not altered when Malenkov introduced his New Economic Policy a few months after Stalin's death. What was intended by the new Soviet leaders was obviously an increase of consumer goods in addition to, rather than in place of, the products of basic and heavy industries. Much progress was expected from increases in production per man and from reductions in waste along the assembly line. Thus a marginal shift of resources was to result in substantial changes in the composition of the national product. To put the new policy into effect, expenditure for investment and working capital was increased in

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the farming and consumer goods industries. No correspondin downward adjustments were made, however, in the allocations fo heavy industry.

Since little room was left for manœuvre, strains and stresses occurred throughout the economy. Bottlenecks could not be avoided until the traditional pattern of Soviet economics was restored. Early in 1955 Bulganin re-asserted that 'Heavy industry is the foundation of the indestructible defence capacity of our country and the strength of our gallant armed forces.'[1] And in its 1955 mid-year report the Central Committee was able to state that 'The output of the means of production will account, at the end of 1955, for more than 70 per cent of the entire industrial production of the Soviet Union.'[2] The short intermezzo of the New Economic Policy had been brought to a close and the *status quo ante* restored.

As the results of the Plan are now available, it is possible to gauge the extent to which the New Economic Policy affected its outcome. Since so much has been written in recent years about Soviet statistics, it is hardly necessary to stress the danger of possible traps in any quantitative analysis of Soviet planning. It is true that the unrealistic prices of 1926/27, in which all composite indices of the first post-war Plan had been calculated, were replaced by 1951 prices when the second post-war Plan was drawn up Even so the possibility of certain distortions cannot be ruled out in the case of indices relating to gross industrial output, capital investment, and retail trade turnover. It is noteworthy that the output of producer as well as consumer goods is claimed to have exceeded the original targets by approximately 6 per cent, whilst the volume of investment seems to have lagged behind the Plan in three consecutive years. Another unexplained discrepancy appears when the rise in retail trade turnover of 90 per cent is compared with increases in real wages and national income, amounting to less than 40 and 70 per cent respectively. The bias caused by double counting in the construction of industrial production indices is too well known to need elaborating, but as industrialisation brings in its wake the output of more and more goods that pass through more and more stages of manufacture, the upward bias is likely to grow in the course of time. The retail trade index, which covers State and co-operative trading, is likely to be inflated to the extent of transfers from free to State-controlled marketing.

This is not to say that industrial achievements have not been

[1] *Pravda*, 10 February 1955 [2] *Ibid*, 14 July 1955.

momentous during the last five years. This is borne out by the increase registered in the output of individual commodities, the records of which are generally believed to be more trustworthy than those of composite indices. Annual increases of 26 million tons of coal, 16,000 million kwh. of electric power, 6.5 million tons of oil, and 3.5 million tons of steel would be formidable achievements even in more advanced industrial countries than the Soviet Union. The overall annual increase of industrial production by 11 per cent, as originally planned, would have been impressive enough. But in fact it was raised to 13 per cent. The increase is said to have been achieved to the extent of one-third by the expansion of the industrial labour force, and of two-thirds by improvements in productivity. The emphasis on producer goods, though not quite as pronounced as during former Plan periods, prevailed throughout the last five years. The extent to which the New Economic Policy was reversed after Malenkov's demotion is demonstrated by the index of consumer goods. This was set in the original Plan at 165 for 1955 (1950=100), but was raised to 185 after Stalin's death. In fact, it went up to 176. Whilst important raw materials and producer goods almost invariably surpassed the original targets, vital consumer goods, such as textiles, remained behind the original targets. Even where these were surpassed, as in the case of such a semi-luxury as silk fabrics, the targets set at the time of the New Economic Policy were not reached. The output of durable household goods, though impressive, also fell behind the Plan targets in almost every instance. The most serious failure of all occurred in farming, where production increased at best by some 6 per cent over five years, compared with a target of 50 per cent or more. 'This has held up development in branches of the light and food industries and the output of consumer goods.'[1]

THE NEW PLAN

So much for the last five of twenty-five years of economic planning during which the Soviet Union grew, in spite of the damage caused by collectivisation and war, from a lesser European to a major world Power.

The second quarter-century of industrial planning is being approached by the Soviet Union's political leaders in full confidence at home and in readiness to challenge the one remaining

[1] *Pravda*, 15 January 1956.

world Power overseas. Their confidence is disclosed by the timing of the new Plan as well as by its contents. The first Plan had taken four years to prepare and its publication was delayed six months beyond the date of its official start. The second and third Plans were approved after delays of twenty-two and fourteen months respectively. After the war the fourth Plan was prepared in less than six months; when it appeared it showed all the signs of make-shift. The fifth Plan, though probably prepared in good time, was published eighteen months behind schedule. For the first time in the history of Soviet planning, the Directives on the new Plan have been issued within a month of the date at which it was to start.

This is not its only notable feature. It is precise and informative. The Plan of 1928 took up four printed volumes, but by 1946 all that was considered worth publishing was compressed into a booklet of a little over a hundred pages. The Draft Directives on the fifth Plan were briefer still: everything was said in 10,000 words and little space was reserved for such matters as the contribution to be made by the individual Republics of the Soviet Union. All this has now been changed. The space devoted to the Directives has been doubled, so have the number of chapters dealing with the general outline of the Plan. Mechanisation, automation and specialisation in industry, capital construction, and labour productivity have been given their own chapters. In addition there is greater precision in the presentation of much of the information contained in the Directives. Whilst Voznesensky gave his first post-war Directives in absolute figures, his successor, Saburov, expressed the goals for 1955 merely in terms of indices, often related to a base unknown. Bulganin gives many of the targets for 1960 both in absolute and in relative terms. The information is not supplied quite so freely in the case of certain products of strategic importance, and the secrecy is almost complete when it comes to the lamentable record of Soviet achievements in agriculture.

Whilst the public at home and abroad are allowed to become acquainted with the main features of Soviet economic design, the Plan is no more subject than its predecessors were to public control. The Budget relating to the first year of the new Plan era was debated and passed by the Supreme Soviet before the Plan was issued, and two months later we are invited to watch the spectacle of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party accepting the Plan, the first year's portion of which had, in fact, been determined by the Budget. So much for public control in

the Communist State. But whilst the acceptance of so vital a document does not depend upon preliminary debate, its outline is more clearly discernible than on some previous occasions. Its main features may be gauged from a summary set out in tabulated form.

U S S R INDEX OF RATES OF ECONOMIC GROWTH[1]

	1950 *Base Year*	1955 *Original Plan*	1955 *Revised Plan*	1955 *Actual (Prelim)*	1960 *Plan (Prelim)*	1960 *Plan (Prelim)*
	1950=100					1955=100
Gross Industrial Output	100	170	n.a	185	305	165
Producers' Goods	100	180	n a	191	325	170
Consumers' Goods	100	165	185	176	280	160
National Income	100	160	n a	168	270	160
Capital Investment	100	200*	n a	190*	335**	167**
Labour Force (non-agric)	100	115***	n a	118***	135***	115
Productivity (industrial)	100	150	n a	145	220	150
Real Wages (industrial)	100	135	n a	139	180	130
Agric Incomes (collectives)	100	140	n a	150	210	140
Retail Trade	100	170	200	190	285	150

[1] Based on official Soviet statements
n a Not available
* *1951/55 in per cent of 1946/50*
** 1956/60 in per cent of 1951/55
*** excl M T S workers transferred to non-agricultural labour force

Whilst the rate of growth contemplated in the Plan is slightly retarded compared with the post-war years of rehabilitation and consolidation, it still remains formidable indeed An average annual increase of 40 million tons of coal, 30,000 million kwh. of electric power, 13 million tons of oil, and 4.5 million tons of steel goes beyond anything ever planned before in the Soviet Union. The balance between producer and consumer goods is of the traditional Soviet pattern which Malenkov described in the presence of Stalin at the Nineteenth Congress, and which he failed to alter after Stalin's death. The gross output of producer goods accounts for more than 70 per cent of the total output of industry. Although some of this clearly provides the raw material for the manufacture of consumer goods, the emphasis in favour of capital goods is unmistakable. Special priority is given to the development of mineral oils and hydro-electric projects, but in the aggregate the supply of primary energy is unlikely to increase substantially faster than other basic industries. In the long run, power will be provided to an increasing extent in the form of electricity produced in the hydro-electric plants of Soviet Central Asia and the Eastern territories; but during the life-time of this Plan no more than the foundations will be laid of these great projects.

Heavy industries are closely geared to the supply of fuel and

power, but some sectors, such as the manufacture of turbines, electric engines, and instruments, are to advance faster than others The output of cement is related to an ambitious programme of State building which includes, this time, housing projects on State farms and machine tractor stations and thus resists any comparison with past performance. The programme of the engineering industries is slowed down and emphasis is given to the fullest use possible of existing plant capacity. In this connexion it is worth noting that the rate of investment also appears to be slowed down substantially. Transport, as measured in terms of railway freight haulage and output of lorries, appears to be neglected once again, but a formidable programme of modernisation providing for a change of the railways to electric and diesel power will improve efficiency.

By comparison, the rise in the standard of living, as visualised by the Plan, is not too impressive, especially since underfulfilment is customary in this sphere. This applies most of all to the products of farming, which, in spite of many manifestations to the contrary, remains the Cinderella of Soviet planning. Although a substantial increase is planned in the output of farm requisites, such as fertilisers and equipment, foodstuffs will not be produced in anything like the quantities planned. This, in turn, will affect internal trade, farm income, and industrial purchasing power. It may well be in recognition of the impossibility of realising the farm programme that the growth of retail trade turnover is calculated at the low rate of 50 per cent during the next five years, compared with 90 per cent during the previous Plan period. The textile programme is more than modest. An increase in the output of cotton fabrics by 23 per cent over the next five years compares with a Plan figure of 61 per cent during the previous period. The targets for other textile goods hold out no hope of a substantial improvement in the unsatisfactory clothing situation. Against this, durable household goods are planned on a generous scale. By 1960 every workman and soldier may be expected to have his own watch, but there will still be many families without a bicycle or a sewing machine, let alone a refrigerator or washing machine; these will remain the attributes of the upper classes of Soviet society.

As in the past, the Plan is reticent on the subject of foreign trade. Once again it is the work of men who think in terms of domestic production. The bias in favour of autarky has not disappeared from Soviet planning. This does not exclude the possibility of intensified

Soviet efforts to infiltrate into foreign markets. Economic as well as political considerations may commend these activities. The need to import foodstuffs will probably continue, whilst increasing quantities of industrial raw materials and equipment are likely to become available for export. This position will lead to Soviet commercial expansion in Asia, Africa, and Latin America rather than in the industrialised parts of Europe.

Once again the Plan throws some interesting light on the motives underlying Soviet planning. The most highly developed capitalist countries are taken as the yardstick by which the Soviet leaders measure their own progress. Having succeeded in outgrowing industrialised Europe, the Soviet Union is unwilling to rest until it has caught up with the United States, the last remaining competitor in the drive for economic supremacy. But unless the United States enters upon a period of recessions, in the 'historically very short period of the next Plan' the target of Soviet world supremacy will not be reached. By 1960 the Soviet Union will not even be within sight of American output of fuel and power, of steel or machine production, let alone the supply of consumer goods. In what measure the Plan will succeed will, of course, depend upon many factors the weight of which obviously cannot be gauged at this stage. At home, labour is likely to become a bottleneck and agriculture is bound to remain a child of sorrow. Abroad, the extent to which the Plan will leave its mark will depend upon the political climate it makes and meets. In the uncommitted parts of the world the odds will be in its favour unless the West discovers an effective answer to it.

W. U. K.

Communism in Jordan

For many years past Jordan has been regarded as a quiet country. Here at least there seemed to be an element of stability and effective government in the Middle Eastern whirlpool of *coup d'états*, student demonstrations, and worsening general confusion. Jordan was, in effect, for many years one of the Arab countries least affected by Western civilisation; interest in politics was low, a

paternal, authoritarian regime functioned tolerably well— Middle Eastern standards exceedingly well, or so it appeare Here, it was believed, horsemanship, piety, chivalry, and the oth traditional virtues were still the criteria according to which a ma was to be judged. New-fangled ideas could not possibly make mucl headway in these conditions.

These views may have been correct in so far as the Amirate of Transjordan of 1926 was concerned. But they were quite definitely out of date in relation to the Jordan of 1956, as recent events have shown in a fairly drastic manner. The merger with Arab Palestine caused a great many changes, and as a result the population of the country has more than doubled. But there were equally important developments in Transjordan proper. To give only one illustration, when the Amirate of Transjordan was founded a generation ago Amman was a small Beduin village of perhaps 2,000 inhabitants: today it is a modern city of about 160,000.

Among the more important recent developments in Jordan is, as the disorders of the last months have shown, the emergence of a Communist movement as a major political factor in the life of the country. In the following article the history of this party in recent years will be described in broad outline.

The story begins with Dr Subhi Abu Ghanima, a member of the Istiqlal party in Palestine (courted at that time—the middle nineteen-thirties—by the Communists) who founded in Amman the 'Ittihadu'l Ummal al Urduniyin' (Union of Jordan Workers) This union, which existed for several months, had less than two thousand members, but among them were several Communist militants. A new abortive attempt to organise Transjordan workers was made in 1936 by Qasim Milhim. During the second World War the Communist press in the countries adjacent to Jordan published occasional appeals made by groups with various fancy names (such as, for instance, the 'Conscious Young Transjordanians') but of obviously Communist inspiration, calling for the abolition of 'British rule' and for free elections.

But up to the merger of 1949 the number of active opponents of the regime was small, and the Communists among them even fewer. From the Communist point of view Jordan was simply too small and unimportant: the peasants showed no signs of revolting, industrial workers were few and far between, and there was no urban intelligentsia to spearhead the movement. The change came with the merger, when several leading Palestine Arab Communists

headed by Fuad Nasir and Rushdi Shahin were delegated to work in Jordan.[1]

Many *outside observers thought at that time that the most* favourable conditions for the spread of Communist influence had been created in the refugee camps. They expected, therefore, that the Communists would regard these camps as their main field of activity—just as the Greek Communist party had developed in the late nineteen-twenties mainly in the refugee camps of the repatriates from Turkey. 'The most threatening hotbed of Communism is found among the Palestine refugees,' wrote Najla Izzadin in her book[2]—a typical quotation out of a hundred that could be given.

The refugee issue is undoubtedly a tremendous and a very tragic problem for Jordan, and one that, for many reasons, should be solved as soon as possible. But closer scrutiny shows that there may be less direct correlation than is generally supposed between the refugee problem and the growth of Communism. Nasir, Shahin, and the other Communist leaders had well learned the lessons of the Palestine 'League for National Liberation' (the Arab equivalent of a Communist party in Palestine during the second World War): that the organising and manipulating of the masses was something that could be done comparatively easily through special channels such as the trade unions. But the first and foremost task was to find reliable cadres. Such cadres would be found, according to past experience, mainly among the intelligentsia. Teachers, lawyers, journalists, physicians were consequently approached, and cells established in the colleges and upper forms of the secondary schools of the country: these became the backbone of the party As in all the other Middle Eastern countries, the main stress was not on a revolutionary mass struggle. Instead, an entirely different approach prevailed: the West was denounced, the feudal regime attacked, and democratic reforms demanded. Why was power to be found in the hands of a few big landowners in Amman and not in the hands of the people predestined by education and calling to give the people a lead, i.e. the intelligentsia? The main appeal was based on the realisation (shared by most) of the need to develop the country rapidly, to industrial-

[1] Another leading Communist active in Jordan after 1948 was Ridwan al Hilou ('Musa'), secretary-general of the Palestinian party from 1933–43 But he had somehow fallen from grace and was eventually excluded (in 1951) as a 'traitor and enemy of the working class'

[2] *The Arab World*, Chicago, 1953

ise it, to modernise it. And what more shining example could possibly be found than that of the Soviet Union? What could the West offer apart from some—highly suspect—economic help, coupled with phrases about the desirability of democratic values and the wickedness of totalitarian regimes? And what meaning could all this have in Jordan conditions, when the main problem was to overcome the state of general backwardness?

The central organ of the League for National Liberation (as it continued to be called), *Al Muqawama ash Sha'biya* (Popular Resistance), was first published in the summer of 1949; one of its main tasks was apparently to clarify the position of the party on Palestinian affairs. Like the Israeli and all other Middle Eastern Communist parties, it took as the basis of its programme the U.N resolution of 29 November 1947 which provided for the establishment of a Jewish State and an independent Arab State in Palestine. But the vacillations in Soviet foreign policy (for which the Palestine issue was at that time a fairly unimportant one) occasionally caused the League serious difficulties At one time, in 1949, the Soviet Union supported the internationalisation of Jerusalem in accordance with the original U.N. resolution. The League therefore published articles demonstrating that 'the U.N. resolution for the internationalisation of Jerusalem was a victory of our cause.'[1] A few weeks later the Soviet Union reconsidered its stand and the League had now to explain that internationalisation was impractical and that the U.N. resolution had not been a victory but a defeat for the cause. The party attacked Zionism sharply and consistently, but its main attacks were directed against the 'Anglo-Hashemite rulers'.

The year 1949 was devoted to the education of cadres, mainly in the old strongholds of the Palestinian League—the Old City of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, and Nablus—where some members of leading families such as the Bandaks and the Tukans supported them. They tried to infiltrate into the Arab Palestine Workers' Association in Jerusalem, but without much success. Early in 1950 the party leaders believed themselves strong enough to appear in public (illegally, of course) and to try to reach wider circles with their propaganda They protested against the Western proposals for a Middle Eastern command and against the establishment of Jordan 'National Guards' in the border regions with Israel, and called on the population of Arab Palestine to boycott the elections

[1] *Al Muqawama*, December 1949.

of April 1950. At a Communist-inspired meeting in Nablus anti-Jordan speeches were made and the meeting ended with a demonstration in front of the local District Commissioner's building, which was dispersed by Arab Legion forces. About thirty people were arrested and marched off on foot to some desert prison. One of the arrested, of the Sa'id Qilani family, died on the way from exhaustion. This incident caused considerable resentment and the Communists gained much sympathy in the country. Naturally it was exploited by party propaganda to denounce the 'Abdullah-Bevin-Ben Gurion conspiracy against the establishment of an independent Arab State'.[1]

New elections were held in Jordan after the murder of King Abdullah in August 1951. Only three months earlier the League had solemnly announced that the Communists would again boycott the 'pseudo-elections'.[2] But a few weeks later the Central Committee announced, with many quotations from Lenin and Stalin, that the previous course had been mistaken and the correct tactic now was to take part in the elections: the party 'had been led astray by opportunists who had lost contact with the masses'.[3] The party appeared in the election campaign on a popular front platform with the usual 'democratic', 'progressive', and 'anti-imperialist' demands which, taken at their face value, practically everybody could accept. Its leaders were at great pains, however, to point out the differences between the 'Popular Bloc' (their 'front' in the elections) and other opposition parties, such as the 'Al Ba'ath' (Renaissance) group, a left-of-centre party consisting mainly of Jerusalem and Ramalla intellectuals, which had been, and was to remain for some time, both the main ally and the main competitor of the League. The performance of the League in the elections was not unsuccessful: its two candidates in Nablus, Rushdi Shahin and Dr Abdul Majid Abu Hajla, polled about 25 per cent of the total vote in that area, while the candidate in Amman, Mahmud Mutlag, a lawyer, polled about 15 per cent.

In June 1951 the Communist executive was convened and decided to change the name of the League to that of the 'Jordan Communist Party'. This signified a change in tactics: the party had put up with the fact that an 'independent Arab State in Palestine' was not to emerge in the foreseeable future, and it adjusted itself to realities. At the same time a purge of 'Titoist'

[1] *Al Muqawama*, May 1950 [2] *Ibid*, May 1951.
[3] *Ibid*, August 1951

elements, as well as of 'Government spies' who had allegedly infiltrated into the party, was carried out. The party was by now standing on its own feet: if in 1949/50 it had still needed the advice and material help of the comrades in Lebanon and Israel, it had by now both the necessary cadres (numbering 700 members by the end of 1951) and a fairly wide fringe of supporters willing to give both their names and money to help the party. The manner in which the 1951/52 'peace campaign' was carried out testified to the ability of the Jordan Communists to attract public figures, such as Sulaiman Haj Farouki or Sulaiman an Nabulsi (former ambassador to London and at present leader of the Nationalist-Socialist party in Amman). Since the party continued to be illegal many of its functions were taken over by the 'peace movement', which attracted considerable support chiefly among the intelligentsia.

Party activities were temporarily interrupted by the arrest in December 1951 of Fuad Nasir, the party secretary-general, which was effected, after a long search by the police, at the printing press of the party Once identified, Nasir did not deny the charges against him and attempted by sharp attacks against the political regime of the country to make the court sessions a platform for party propaganda. This attempt was, however, cut short by the decision to hold the sessions behind closed doors. In the end, Fuad Nasir was given a ten years' sentence.[1] But by that time the party apparatus was already working smoothly again: on the very day the verdict against him was proclaimed, the Jordan police announced that Communist cells had been discovered in the Amman girls' high school—an unheard-of thing in the country's political history.

During 1952 and 1953 the party continued to develop, mainly among the intelligentsia, but serious attempts were now made to reach the masses too. A large number of leaflets were distributed on May Day, 1953, and again on the occasion of Mr Dulles's visit to Jordan later in the same month. Police attempts to combat Communism were on the whole ineffectual: party militants were arrested and again released at frequent intervals; the damage done

[1] Fuad Nasir, born in 1910, is a Christian Arab by origin He was a leader of an armed band in the Jerusalem-Hebron-Bethlehem triangle in the 1936–39 Palestine rebellion Nasir later escaped to Iraq and took some minor part in the Rashid Ali revolt He returned to Palestine in 1943, was detained for some time, and subsequently became one of the leaders of the League for National Liberation He was arrested in July 1948 by the Egyptian occupation authorities, but was later released Nasir went to Jordan in the same year, and in due course became the secretary-general of the Communist party there

to the party as a result was probably less than the sympathy which the arrested gained among the public. The last resort of the Government was to adopt, in December 1953, a law to combat Communism, according to which every member of a Communist organisation would be arrested for an indefinite period, while those contributing money or distributing party literature would be given prison sentences of from one to three years.

Ironically enough, Communist influence in Jordan was never higher than in the months after the adoption of this law. New Communist semi-legal magazines appeared (such as *Al Jabha*, *Al Ra'i*, and several others), and the first successful attempt to establish a popular front, known as 'Al Jabha al Wataniya', was made. This movement appeared in the open in the spring of 1954. Among its sponsors were members of parliament, such as Qadri Tukan, Abdul Qadir Salih, several well-known physicians and lawyers, a feudal landowner, and the equivalent of a Jordanian Robin Hood, Fakhri Maraka, a highwayman with political pretensions, from the Hebron region.[1] The signatures under an 'Al Jabha' appeal of Jordan girl students some time ago makes interesting reading. Almost all the leading families of the country are represented: Bettina Husaini, Istiqlal Husaini, Hiyam Dajani, Raja Dajani, Iqram Dajani, Aida Abdul Hadi, Janib Abdul Latif, *et al.* It reads like the Jordan social register, certainly not like the list of inmates of a refugee camp.

Several 'Al Jabha' candidates contested the elections of October 1954 in Jordan, and two of them, Abdul Qadir Salih (a nephew of Abdul Latif Salih, a leader of the Palestine Arabs under the British Mandate) and Rashad Maswada, were returned in Nablus and Hebron respectively. Several who failed to be elected had only narrowly missed entrance into Parliament. Jordan Government restrictions in the election campaign affected the left-wing and nationalist extremist elements in the country not much less than the Communists: most of their magazines, for instance, were banned two months before the elections. These actions on the part of the Government caused the 'Ba'ath' and other opposition elements to make common cause with the Communists in the struggle against the Government. Several candidates declared on election day that they would withdraw since, they said, a free election campaign had been impossible. This declaration was the sign for

[1] The full list of sponsor members of 'Al Jabha' was published in *Al Jihad*, 23 May 1954.

demonstrations by students in Amman which were joined by others who took over the centre of the capital for several hours, pillaging and burning. The Arab Legion had to intervene, and in the clashes that followed at least twelve people were killed and several dozen wounded. Martial law was imposed, but the riots spread to Irbid, as-Salt, Nablus, Ramalla, and other towns of the kingdom. These disorders in which the Communists took a leading part were the prelude to the even more spectacular events of December 1955 and January 1956, which forced one Jordan Government to abdicate and another to modify its foreign policy.

The success of the Communists—for they have now emerged as the leading, if not yet the most conspicuous, force of the opposition—has lain in the establishment of several effective 'front' organisations, of which 'Al Jabha' was only the beginning. They found it surprisingly easy to outmanœuvre their competitors Up to about 1952 the Communists had been at daggers drawn with the other 'bourgeois' opposition groups, among whom 'Ba'ath' then took the leading part. The leaders of 'Ba'ath' were denounced by the Communists for their 'reformist approach' (several of them had agreed for a time to serve as cabinet ministers).

After 1952, however, the Communists went out of their way to be friendly to other opposition parties and they met with a large measure of success. Meanwhile a mixed Jordan/Arab-Palestine opposition group had been established, the Nationalist-Socialist party, headed by Sulaiman an Naboulsi, which cooperated, among other things, with the Communist 'partisans of peace'.[1] To begin with, the Communists appeared as junior partners in these alliances. The others were the respectable groups who had merely condescended to cooperate with the Communists. But in view of the superior organisation and the larger resources of the Communists, they soon emerged as the leaders of the opposition. The others, who had intended to use the Communists for their own ends, soon found themselves outmanœuvred by their 'junior partners'. The 'respectable groups' were composed mainly of intellectuals and men of property who, as a rule, are not inclined to demonstrate in the streets, and even less to throw stones and burn

[1] Which did not, however, prevent the rioters in January 1956 from burning Naboulsi's car too He complained in an interview with a *Daily Telegraph* correspondent that 'we had started the demonstrations in an orderly way, but then persons unknown took over ' They cannot have been entirely unknown to him, for Dr Shukeir, Abdul Qadir Salih, and Qadri Tukan, the leaders of the Communist 'Front', had collaborated in organising the combined opposition.

buildings and cars. But the Communists had their following of young students in the colleges and secondary schools (many, perhaps most of them, scholars between the ripe ages of fourteen and sixteen) who did not at all mind participating in what appeared to them as a more strenuous and slightly more risky form of outdoor sports.

Communist reports in years past about 'bloody repression and persecution' under King Abdullah have been grossly exaggerated: his was on the whole a benevolent and paternal rule as authoritarian governments go. King Abdullah's successors gradually introduced some liberal reforms. But it is true that this regime has not succeeded at all in enlisting the support of the new middle class in the cities, and especially its younger generation and the intelligentsia. These critics of the regime continued to believe that nothing was really changing in Jordan, that foreigners continued to be the masters in their country, that the ruling circles at home were not prepared to share power with the people (or rather the intelligentsia, appearing on behalf of the people). Many believed, as Abdullah Rimawi, one of the 'Ba'ath' leaders, put it in a widely read article some time ago, that there were 'heads in Amman that need chopping off'. In these conditions, and in view of the absence of strong independent reform groups, the Communists could indeed appear to large sections of the middle class as the party of social change and national revolution. Discrimination, real or imaginary, against the leading Palestinian Arab families brought not a few of their members into the camp of the Communists and their fellow travellers. It should not be forgotten, moreover, that the education given to the younger generation, supposed to make them faithful subjects of his Hashemite Majesty—if not active citizens—was hopelessly irrelevant to the real issues occupying them.[1]

Islam, as far as they are concerned, is no longer the vital spiritual force that it used to be. Nor can they possibly think in terms of exclusive Jordan nationalism. A void has thus been

[1] According to recent reports the Amman Government has been much concerned about the leading role of the students in the recent disorders It has been realised that 'above all the school system must be purged and discipline restored' (*The Times*, 21 January 1956) But is a *basic* new approach in education envisaged—is it indeed possible at all in present conditions? The leading schools of Jordan (the Husain School, Raghdan's boys' school, Queen Za'in girls' school in Amman, the Ma'omuniye and Rashidiye High Schools in Arab Jerusalem) continued to be in open rebellion even after the riots of January 1956 were over, and some of them had to be temporarily closed

created which could be filled by the most plausible creed, and the one most easy to understand and to practise. Some of the causes of this discontent lie, of course, very deep. They are not peculiar to Jordan but form part of a general malaise common to most Arab and other Asian countries. Nor is the predominant role of students in opposition and revolutionary movements in backward countries a new and startling phenomenon in the eyes of the observer of the international scene. (It was the same, for instance, in Tsarist Russia and pre-Communist China.) All this may very well be only a transient phase in the social and political development of these countries. But for the time being it is a political factor that cannot be disregarded, in Jordan now perhaps less than anywhere else The Jordan Communist Party, to sum up, is almost exclusively a middle class movement of the intelligentsia, like the Communist movement elsewhere in the Middle East. It masters the technique of manipulating the 'masses' (which, in Jordan conditions, means mainly the refugees), but it is by no means a movement of the masses. The reason for the success of the party has lain in giving direction to the outburst of pent-up frustration and discontent among the 'technical intelligentsia'. Nationalist passions, cleverly exploited, and the social struggle are thus very closely intertwined: frequently it is impossible to distinguish between the various ingredients in the process of political qualitative analysis

The present policy of the Jordan Communist Party, which is still illegal, is to work for the neutralisation of the country, to prevent at any cost a defensive alliance with the West. On the domestic front its members see as their main task the undermining of the King's authority and infiltration into the Arab Legion, the immediate obstacle to further Communist progress It is doubtful whether they envisage for the time being anything more than a strong opposition movement whose aim is to paralyse Government action. In this they have however succeeded to some extent, mainly because of the ease with which they have been able to outmanœuvre their opposition partners. Their obvious aim is to create conditions in Jordan as near as possible to those prevailing in Syria, where continued instability bordering frequently on near-anarchy is now highly conducive to a further growth of Communist influence. The 'national front' tactics used in Jordan are scheduled to dictate to the Government the policy of the Communist Party, to weaken the State apparatus and discredit it. But Communists in Jordan are not yet ready, according to all available evidence, for any decisive

bid for power, which is envisaged, most probably, only after years of anarchy or in the wake of a war.

W. Z. L.

The Chilean Inflation

In September 1952 the Chilean electorate returned the septuagenarian General Carlos Ibáñez as their President in the firm conviction that he alone could grapple with the inflation which afflicted their country. Now, half-way through his six-year term of office there are signs that even his most enthusiastic supporters are disillusioned with the results he has achieved.

Although for long an endemic feature of Chile's economy, the inflationary pace has mounted at an ever-increasing rate, until today only in Bolivia, Paraguay, or war-wracked Korea is it more uncontrolled. Taking the 1949 cost-of-living index as 100, that of 1955 exceeded 700, and 75 per cent of this increase has occurred in the last three years. Price levels in 1952, the last year of the pre-Ibáñez regime, rose by 25 per cent over those of 1951, but the corresponding annual increases in the Ibáñez period were 56 per cent, 71 per cent, and 76 per cent. Budget expenditure last year was double that of 1954, while the paper currency in circulation reaches new records every month. A 100 peso gold coin now realises 15,000 paper pesos, and the Government in September last suppressed the use of centavos for they were virtually worthless.

The inevitable economic consequences of such a state of affairs have been a continuous wages-prices spiral of vertiginous intensity, constant taxation increases, and budgetary revenue chasing leaps in expenditure. Nor has the process been a smooth one but rather a series of irregular leap-frogging movements, punctuated by strikes, financial crises, and political upheavals.

THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND LABOUR

It would be foolish to heap all the blame for the situation on the shoulders of the President. Perhaps the largest single political cause lies in the failure of the electorate to provide their President with a Congressional majority in the March 1953 elections which

followed his own election. The result has been that whatever measures he has proposed to arrest or halt the inflation have met the opposition of one or other of the permutations of groupings of the nineteen political parties, even including his own Agrarian Labour party[1] in association with which he came to power. Within the three years of his term of office that have already expired there have been at least a dozen major Cabinet reconstructions, and in these, eight Finance Ministers, each with different plans to hold the inflation, have been forced out of office in the bitter strife between Executive and Congress.

The President is also haunted by his past record when, during the 1927–31 period, he ruled the country dictatorially without Congress Conscious of the error implicit in this easy path to action, he has at every opportunity disclaimed such intentions, but every appeal to Congress for special and extraordinary powers meets with suspicion of his motives. He is thus perhaps more handicapped in taking strong executive action than other holders of the Presidency have been.

The delicate path which General Ibáñez has to tread in this respect was never better exemplified than in the recent affair of the Straight Line (Linea Recta) Movement Although all the details were never revealed the implications were clear enough. Based on a group of officers in the Army and the Air Force, the Movement advocated direct action by the establishment of the President as a dictator. With the increasingly difficult conditions resulting from inflation the situation was more favourable to this remedy, and the Movement's influence on the President seemed to be growing.

There was open talk of an imminent conspiracy in March when four generals, including the Commander-in-Chief Enrique Franco, were retired at their own request. Two months later the Chief of Staff of the Second Division, Colonel Rául Silva, was arrested and his commanding officer was asked to resign, and this was followed in August by further arrests, a secret investigation of other high-ranking officials, and the court martial of 22 members of the Movement.

Political entanglements are forbidden to members of the armed forces, and when the news burst on the Chilean people there was an immediate appeal by senators, deputies, and professional leaders for the maintenance of the democratic regime. On 1 April the President reassured the nation that he had no intention of dis-

[1] Numbering only 25 of the 147 members of the Chamber of Deputies

solving Congress, and whatever his attitude had been there is little doubt that his actions in suppressing the Linea Recta seemed to confirm his loyalty to democratic methods.

Indeed some responsible critics urged that the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of parliamentary irresponsibility and that the great fault of the President was not the danger of too strong action but his general ineffectiveness and lack of leadership. The vacillating alternation of vigorous and weak measures devised by the succession of Finance Ministers revealed little coherent and fixed administrative policy, and there were many who urged constitutional reform to strengthen the powers of the Executive.

That the Government seemed the victim of events rather than the master of the situation appeared to be the conclusion drawn from its handling of the crises of last July and September, when discontent with the rising cost-of-living developed into mass labour action. The fundamental genesis of these troubles lay in the disparity between the salaries, social benefits, and wage adjustments of the black-coated civil servants and similar financial incomes of the so-called industrial branches, who had no escalator clauses to protect them from constantly rising living costs.

Demanding a 60 per cent bonus to meet the situation, some 60,000 employees of land transport, postal, and telegraph services started a strike on 1 July, and with the support of the Central Federation of Workers this expanded to a one-day general strike on 9 July, involving considerably more than a million workers. This was a mass but orderly demonstration which was effective and partially successful in its immediate objectives,[1] but which gave rise to acute popular inconvenience, exacerbated in Santiago by one of the coldest spells of many years, three days registering temperatures below freezing point. Tanks and armoured cars near La Moneda, the Presidential palace, were an indication both of the Government's awareness of the tension involved and of their readiness to maintain order.

The apparent surrender of the Administration to this demonstration encouraged a similar series of developments leading to the threat of another general strike on 7 September, but the Government's attitude on this occasion was in direct contrast to that followed two months earlier. Invoking laws which prohibit strikes against public services, at least 1,000 strikers were arrested. Some

[1] In November 1955 the Government granted a 35 per cent bonus retroactive to 1 July.

reports placed the figure at five times that number. Military measures were again taken in the capital; Congress approved emergency powers; and the Government refused to negotiate until the strikers returned to work. In the face of this reaction the Central Federation of Workers capitulated and called off the threatened strike.

Although the President in this demonstration of strength spoke of a seditious plot conceived by extremists to bring Chile to a state of chaos, it is noticeable how the Communists were not blamed as the prime movers. Indeed one of the interesting features of both dislocations was the opposition of Communist leaders to a prolonged general strike, fearing the consequences to themselves of a strong military dictatorship. The very considerable support for the idea that Cardinal José Maria Caro, head of the Roman Catholic Church in Chile, should mediate in the strike (a proposal finding greater favour among the workers than in Government circles) seemed to confirm the lack of Communist direction.

The Government's firmer handling of the second strike crisis was interpreted as a response to the severe press criticism of its earlier weakness One newspaper declared that the Administration had been forced to capitulate by labour on all economic questions, and that it was at the mercy of the vacillations and pressures of every group. In the Government's defence it can be argued that in July it had enlisted the support of the Central Federation of Workers in a search for a solution to Chile's economic ills. Finding instead an uncooperative reluctance to face realities, the Administration resorted to the alternative policy of firm restraint of industrial dislocation for its own sake.

THE PARADOX OF POPULAR REACTION

There is no doubt, however, that the general strike of July reflected the discontent of the people with the inevitable consequences of inflation, no matter how fast wages may keep pace with living costs. By-election results had similarly shown by anti-Government gains the popular dissatisfaction. Yet all these protests were against no specific policy or measure, nor in favour of any clear alternative, and it is difficult to see any crystallisation of opinion either to Left or Right, for those who protest shrink from the disciplinary restraints which any deflationary policy must involve. This largely explains the attitude of Congress in its refusal to face the economic situation and support legislation designed to

reduce inflation, for in March 1957 the Congressional elections occur and few deputies and senators are willing to support unpopular measures at this juncture.

This is the paradox of the situation. In spite of grumbles over inflation, every measure of austerity designed to check it is resisted. There is no great urge or even willingness to face the realities of a deflationary antidote, for Chile seems to flourish in its own financial chaos. Many hale the inflation as a sign of progress; even the President on occasion has minimised its importance; and the Finance Minister recently stated that drastic methods might do more harm than good. Instead it has increasingly become a part of Chile's normal way of life, and rigorous measures would enlist no unified support amongst the people.

In an economic climate such as this, each sector of the population reacts to defend its own position. Nor is this true only of the proletariat. Last October judges resigned in protest at the withdrawal of a measure to raise their salaries, and on another occasion the Valparaiso and Santiago stock exchanges shut down for three days in protest against deflationary measures to reduce speculation. In like manner the Banks oppose credit restriction, arguing that the volume of credit is already insufficient to provide for the expanding needs of the country's economic development. It was small wonder, therefore, that the reaction of the trades unions this January to a partial wages-prices freeze was one of bitter hostility leading to another attempt at a complete industrial paralysis of the country. While it is true that the Government had proposed in October to reduce expenditure by a radical reorganisation of governmental institutions involving a reduction of staff by 20 per cent, few believed this would materialise. Similarly it was taken for granted that the proposals of the Klein-Saks mission of American experts engaged to suggest plans for fighting inflation would also be pigeon-holed, as was the International Monetary Fund's scheme for a wages-prices freeze and compulsory savings in 1950.

In spite of the worsening situation, the sudden decision of the Government to act so vigorously came as a surprise. The third general strike, called by the Central Federation of Workers for 9 January, in protest against the deflationary measures, received less support than that of the previous July. By another demonstration of military strength the Administration maintained its authority in the same way as in September.

There were, however, two important differences. On this occa-

sion the Communists were accused of being the instigators of strike, and, apart from the strikers' leaders, a wide group of ot critics of the Government were arrested. These ranged from all ed Communists to responsible newspaper editors and politi commentators, and even included previous members of Gene Ibáñez's cabinets. The most notable person was Señor Jorge Pr considered by many to have been the most able Finance Minisl the President had appointed, who in 1954 had formulated realis anti-inflationary policies of considerable merit.

These rather dubiously efficacious expedients reflect the A ministration's growing nervousness and sensitivity to criticis and the undercurrent of tension despite the otherwise appare calm which reigns in the country.

A COPPER BOOM AND INDUSTRIAL GROWTH

This attitude of resigned tolerance is in large measure due a booming industrialisation, supported by considerable capit investment from North American and European sources,[1] tl resulting full employment, an expanding market for copper wi ever-mounting prices for Chile's increased output, high busine profits, and the adjustment of wages and social services to me increased living costs.

First and foremost in this prosperous picture comes the boomir copper industry Technically more easily able to increase her pr duction than other copper-producing countries, Chile has take full advantage of the almost insatiable demand and recent recor prices, so that 1955 was the most flourishing year since the war This prosperity has enabled wage demands in the industry to b met, and there has been far less loss of production through strik than in recent years. Output in 1955 soared 30 per cent over that the previous year, and before 1956 dawned half of this year production had been earmarked before it was mined. At the sam time Chile has regained a certain independence in the direction sales of her copper. Previously exported almost entirely to th U.S., the higher prices quoted in European markets have led t more than half the output crossing the Atlantic, mainly to th United Kingdom.

More favourable conditions created by the new Copper Lav

[1] Estimated to be about £10 million, invested in some sixty undertaking since the new investment law of 1953

[2] Increased output and higher prices benefited the Chilean Government by least £20 million during 1955

which reduces taxation as output increases, have also resulted in many new capital investments and the opening-up of the considerable additional reserves the country possesses. So successful has this policy been that the Government is now attempting parallel encouragement to the nitrate industry which has suffered from the curtailment of the Egyptian market consequent upon that country's erection of a synthetic nitrate plant, and from a similar development in Brazil, 50 per cent of whose imports from Chile have been nitrate.

Industrial prosperity has also been sustained by the fruition of many plans of the Development Corporation, and nowhere is this better exemplified than in the triple foundations of steel, oil, and electricity. Formerly Chile was regarded as too small a country to support an integrated iron and steel plant, but the increasing output of Huachipato (now to be reinforced by a continuous rolling mill) has more than justified its inception. Not only does it support a growing variety of dependent industries and so free Chile of a considerable import strain, but its exports to Argentina, Bolivia, and elsewhere yield a useful quantity of foreign exchange. The steady development of the Tierra del Fuego oilfield and the completion of the Concón refinery near Valparaíso now enable Chile to produce a third of all her petroleum needs, and so provide welcome additional relief to her import demands. The inauguration of Los Cipreses, the largest single stage in the country's national electrification grid, marks yet another achievement in the race to maintain sufficient power for the growing number of factories

These important steps towards a stronger industrial fabric reflect the continuity of Chilean domestic policy, in which priority is given to every tendency which will aid the process. The encouragement of foreign capital, always a difficult matter under inflationary conditions, is one such factor, and the Government has been moderately successful in this respect. Under the previous González administration the Export-Import and International Banks were the main sources of investment.[1] More recently an increasing amount has been provided by North American and Western European industrial firms, and now Chile has taken the lead among nine Latin-American republics to form an Inter Latin-American Development Bank, to enable Latin-American countries to obtain development capital from the continent's own

[1] 1945–53, Export-Import Bank, U S $121 million; International Bank, U S $37 million.

resources.[1] While obviously limited in its capacity to supply such capital, the step is an interesting one of continental self-help, and demonstrates another facet of Chile's determination to emancipate herself from undue dependence on the United States both for capital and for a market for her raw material exports.

The considerably enlarged Argentine-Chilean trade falls into the same pattern, and a new development has been the increasing friendship between Chile and Bolivia, again stemming from important aspects of economic interdependence. This is based on the fact that on the one hand Bolivia is glad to receive surplus Chilean steel, nitrate, fruit, and consumer goods and is dependent on Chile for her principal transport links with the outside world, while on the other hand Bolivia produces more petroleum than her limited transport and industries can use. Last year economic agreements were signed facilitating these exchanges, and further steps were planned to link the two countries more closely. One such scheme envisages a new road from Iquique to Oruro, and another the new oil pipe-line from Oruro to Arica.

It is thus fairly obvious that there is much to encourage the optimists who minimize the effects of the Chilean inflation. More and more industries, increased agricultural mechanization and diversification, a sounder basis of international trade, and a buoyant internal economy all support a future prospect of prosperous expansion. The pessimists underline the folly of squandering the sudden rush of wealth arising from the copper boom, emphasize the fickle nature of the world's metal markets, and even suggest that very high copper prices may lead to a recession in the consumption of copper by encouraging the use of aluminium.

Where the path of future events will lead it is difficult to prophesy. Next year's elections may begin to point to the possibility of an alternative Government in 1958. The patience of the Chilean people may not survive the daily spiral of wage-price increases. The inflation itself may break through the weak barrier of control and become a runaway one. Whatever the next phase will be, recent events have shown to a remarkable degree the continuous respect for democratic principles and processes, which for long has been a distinguishing trait of the Chilean republic.

G. J. B.

[1] These are estimated to be of the order of U S $1,600 million, excluding their gold reserves

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Notes of the Month

The President Decides

MR EISENHOWER'S announcement that he would accept re-nomination, if it were offered to him, as Republican candidate for the Presidency in next November's election has settled the major uncertainty on the American political scene, but it has stirred up a number of minor ones. There is no doubt that the Republicans will nominate Mr Eisenhower, provided his health remains satisfactory, but there has been a renewal of last autumn's discussion of the doubtful constitutional provisions regarding the point at which a President becomes unable to do his job through illness. Congress is once more thinking of clarifying the situation by legislation. There has also been an outbreak of arguments over what happens if a presidential nominee dies before the election, if a successful presidential candidate dies before the electoral college has met to confirm him, or if a President-elect dies before taking office.

But the most immediate result of Mr Eisenhower's decision has been to concentrate attention on the question of who will be the Republican candidate for Vice-President, the official who automatically succeeds should the President die or retire from office. The chances that Mr Eisenhower will do this during his second term are unusually high for, quite apart from his health, he will, if he serves the full four years from next January, be the first President to reach the age of seventy in office. If Mr Eisenhower is re-elected, which seems as certain as anything political can be, then the Republican vice-presidential candidate will also be elected, since they run in double harness. In these circumstances it is more important than usual that the candidate should be a man who will not only make a good President but will also appeal to the voters.

On both these points there is some doubt about the present Vice-President, Mr Richard Nixon. Mr Eisenhower picked this young man from California as a running mate four years ago largely for his ability and experience as a politician, something which Mr

Eisenhower himself lacked. Mr Nixon has filled this gap admirably and has developed in other directions while in office, but it is still uncertain whether he yet has, or ever will have, presidential stature. Even Mr Eisenhower, always loyal to his friends, is insisting that the decision (provided Mr Nixon wants the nomination) must be left for the Republican convention to make next August Although Mr Nixon has many critics within the party organization, at the moment it seems probable that he will be chosen again, partly because there is no agreed alternative candidate as yet, and even more because of the remarkable spontaneous demonstration of popular support for him in the recent primary election in New Hampshire.

The Democrats will be delighted if Mr Nixon is chosen, for they believe that he is vulnerable to attack and can lose the Republicans much support, particularly among the independent voters who are attracted by Mr Eisenhower. The President himself is such a hero that direct attacks on him personally have been judged bad politics, but his frankness about his health has given the Democrats a needed weapon. They can charge that the Republican party, in its desperation, is putting a killing strain on the nation's hero by forcing him to serve again. More important, since the President himself has said that he must delegate his less essential duties if he is to be fit for the main job, his opponents can claim that he is in fact unable to do that job, that he is a 'part-time President', that the country is being run by a 'Regency' of unelected officials and that this will continue if Mr Eisenhower is re-elected. And the Democrats can cite, as examples of what this will mean, the recent uncertainties and delays in the handling of American foreign policy.

The fact that Mr Eisenhower is to run also threatens the Democrats' hope of retaining the control of Congress which they gained in 1954. All the polls show that at present he would win by a landslide over any Democratic candidate and, if that remains the case, it is unbelievable, even though the polls now suggest the contrary, that he could fail to bring back to Washington with him a Republican majority in the House of Representatives; all of its seats are at stake this year. With Mr Eisenhower running, and with his progressive type of Republicanism therefore still dominating the party, liberal Republicans who, like him, appeal to independent voters will be encouraged to become candidates for Congress. This is particularly true of the Senate, where just over one-third of the

seats have to be filled. Many of these are in the South and safely Democratic, but the Republican chances have been improved in the marginal seats—Oregon and New York, for example—which could give the party a majority in the Senate.

Independence for Morocco

THE group of documents signed and published in Paris on 2 March 1956 set a formal end to a phase of history which began on 30 March 1912 when France, by treaty with Moulay Hafid, the reigning Sultan, assumed a protectorate over Morocco. In a joint Declaration and a joint Protocol, accompanied by unilateral declarations of intentions, the French and the Moroccan Governments, speaking as equals, acknowledge a new, *de facto*, relationship and agree to administrative changes restoring absolute authority to the Sultan, pending *de jure* ratification by the French Parliament of this agreement and of a new treaty of 'inter-dependence' between the two Powers the terms of which are being negotiated. Morocco is to have her own national army and foreign service, she joins the Committee determining the monetary policy of the franc zone, the French Resident-General becomes a High Commissioner and his influence is restricted to observations on draft legislation concerning the interests of France, or of French and foreign citizens in Morocco. No French controls or reserved powers remain. The status of the French army in Morocco and the rights of French officials and residents remain unaffected until the conclusion of the new treaty.

Not surprisingly, the Sultan, Mohamed V, was greeted by enthusiastic crowds when, bringing independence to his people, he made his triumphal entry in Rabat on 5 March. A fortnight earlier it had looked as though the progress of the conversations in Paris would be blocked by intransigence on an important point of procedure: in order to avoid what was termed 'a vacuum' in the relations of the two countries the French Government wished to negotiate a new treaty first, and only to abrogate the Protectorate treaty of 1912 after this new treaty had been accepted and, presumably, ratified. The Sultan was ready to negotiate the new treaty, but only as a sovereign equal, not as a 'protected' ruler; he therefore demanded an unequivocal declaration of independence first, which he was willing to match with a promise to accept the principle of 'inter-dependence' as a guide in Morocco's future relations with France.

His view prevailed since his position was much the stronger of the two. French weakness had three main reasons. First, the old social and political order of Morocco had collapsed. What Marshal Lyautey and the French administration after him had carefully preserved and utilized as the support of an autocratic system of government had been steadily undermined by the effects of Western education, the prosperity and ambition of the middle class, the spread of modern Islamic nationalism, and the latter's alliance with the ruler; following the Pasha of Marrakesh's act of submission to the returned Sultan last October, a general stampede of traditional chieftains and *ancien régime* office-holders, away from the French and into the Sultan's camp, took place, and the French had no political friends left in Morocco.

Secondly, the Independence Party (Hizb el Istiqlal), by far the best organized, the most active, and the most efficiently led of the four Moroccan nationalist parties, had seized the opportunity of being declared illegal and had, during the last three years, been able to perfect its technique of working under cover, through cells. The result was that on the Sultan's return from exile innumerable party offices opened their doors even in remote places all over the Berber-speaking mountain districts, where hitherto no centralized organization or new ideas had stood a chance of gaining acceptance since the days when Islam penetrated there, over a thousand years ago The Party officials wear a uniform and act as a kind of auxiliary police, especially on market days and other occasions when crowds assemble. They are much respected and readily obeyed, and have an irresistible attraction for the young who flock to and imitate their physical training exercises and their marching drill (carried out in Party uniform) and who compete to become members of their youth movement (in boy-scout uniform). Their meetings are conducted with evangelist fervour, with much singing of songs and shouting of responses to the leaders' slogans. The Party has succeeded in creating cadres of an almost para-military character and a disciplined mass movement against which any French administrative measures or military action would have been worse than useless; luckily, it was not attempted.

The third and gravest cause of French weakness, not only in Morocco, is the war in Algeria which has crossed over the border into the Moroccan Riff and keeps flickering up in many parts of the Middle-Atlas region. The hope that the Sultan might be able to stop the war, at least on his own territory, appears to have in-

fluenced the French Government when it transferred the reserved power of internal security and conceded a national army to Morocco.

So far, the Sultan's exhortations to his people to respect life and property, keep order, and obey the Sherifian authorities have gone unheeded by the Moroccan units of the 'Moghreb Liberation Army' who evidently consider that their allegiance belongs not to Morocco's Sovereign, but elsewhere, nor have acts of terrorism and violence against French as well as Moroccan subjects ceased. Until he disposes of his own armed forces the Sultan, vested with full authority but without power, remains in a vulnerable position. Much must depend on the direction in which the leader of the Independence Party, Allal el Fassi, exercises his influence when he returns to his country after years of exile, mostly spent in Cairo. A word from him should go a long way beyond Morocco's frontiers and might be more efficacious than that of the legitimate ruler.

Formosa and the Sino-American Discussions

ON 1 August 1955 preliminary discussions opened in Geneva between the United States and China, the representatives of the two countries being the U.S. Ambassador in Prague, Mr U. Alexis Johnson, and the Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw, Mr Wang Ping-nan. At their first meeting the two Ambassadors 'agreed upon the following Agenda of the talks: (1) the return of civilians of both sides to their respective countries; (2) other practical matters at issue between the two sides'.

At the thirteenth meeting, on 6 September, Mr Wang announced the names of a number of American citizens who were to be permitted to leave China, and at the next meeting on 10 September the two Ambassadors issued the text of an agreement under which civilians of both nationalities were to be free to return home. Under this agreement American citizens in China might make use of the services of the British Chargé d'Affaires in Peking if need arose, while Chinese citizens in the United States might make use of the services of the Indian Ambassador in Washington.

After the fifteenth meeting, on 14 September, Mr Wang issued a statement in which he announced that he had proposed that the two Ambassadors should discuss Item (2) of the Agenda, dealing first with the lifting of trade barriers and then with preparatory work for talks on a higher level. Mr Johnson subsequently expressed the view that such talks would be premature until the

agreement on the release of civilians had been implemented, but nevertheless on 20 September the two Ambassadors 'exchanged views' regarding Item (2). They have continued to do so ever since without coming to a discussion of the substance of the subjects to be considered under this item.

On 8 October, at the twentieth meeting, Mr Johnson proposed that, without prejudice to its own claims or those of third parties, each country should declare that it would not resort to the use of force in the Formosan area except defensively. He made it clear that he regarded it as pointless to come to the discussion of Item (2) without such an agreement. He also continued to press for the release of U.S. civilians held in China, many of them in prison. During the subsequent meetings a number of drafts were put forward by the two sides On 27 October the Chinese proposed the renunciation of the use of force in general terms but without specifically relating it to Formosa, and they pressed for a conference of Foreign Ministers of the two countries, 'to settle through negotiations the question of relaxing and eliminating the tension' in the Formosan area. On 10 November Mr Johnson proposed a draft declaration by which both sides were to state that 'in general, and with particular reference to the Taiwan area,' they renounced 'the use of force, except in individual and collective self-defence' Mr Wang put forward a second draft on 1 December by which the two parties were to state that they were determined to 'settle disputes between their two countries through peaceful negotiations without resorting to the threat or use of force'. The draft made no mention of Formosa but did not press for a meeting of the Foreign Ministers. After the thirty-first meeting, on 22 December, the meetings were adjourned until 12 January 1956. At that time there were still thirteen American civilians detained in China. On 12 January Mr Johnson put forward a draft which added to Mr Wang's draft of 1 December two phrases which spoke of the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence and referred the agreement not to use force specifically to 'the Taiwan area or elsewhere'.

The Chinese had, meanwhile, become increasingly impatient at the slow progress of the negotiations and on 18 January issued a statement complaining that the talks were held up by the insistence of the United States that Americans imprisoned in China must be released before progress could be made and that before a meeting of the Foreign Ministers could be held there must be a

declaration by both parties renouncing the use of force in the Formosan area without prejudice to the inherent right of individual and collective self-defence. They also claimed that the American Government was impeding the Chinese in the United States who wished to return to China. On 21 January the State Department issued a reply refuting the charge about Chinese in the United States and claiming that the Chinese acceptance of the principle of the renunciation of force was valueless unless they would agree that it was without prejudice to the right of individual and collective self-defence, and was applicable to the Formosan area. Further meetings continued in Geneva during February but without apparent progress being made, and on 4 March the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement in the course of which they stated that 'the liberation by China of Taiwan and the coastal islands by whatever means' was entirely a domestic matter which could not possibly be covered by a Sino-American announcement.

It seems clear that the United States is determined not to negotiate with the People's Republic of China unless it can secure a guarantee that the Chinese will not try to gain their ends in Formosa by force, and that the Chinese are quite unwilling to admit that the United States can have any right of self-defence or any other right in the Formosan area, though they evidently are anxious to negotiate with the American Government on a number of other matters. After the Bandung Conference and during the early stages of the Sino-American discussions there was a lull in hostilities in the Formosan Straits. Recently Chinese Communist activity in the area has begun to increase again.

The Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress

THE Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was the culminating moment of a series of conferences held by every Party organization in the country, the most momentous event for them since the death of Stalin. It marked a stage in the hesitant evolution of post-Stalin policies—in social and administrative reforms, industrial and agricultural reorganization, and in ideological revision. It provided a platform for the announcement of the final targets of the new Five-Year Plan and a statement of the current aims of Soviet foreign policy. It threw the gage of competitive coexistence into the face of the Western world. The challenge, with its massive potentials and its record of no mean achievement, is formidable indeed.

The gathering was dominated by the personality of the Party First Secretary, N. S Khrushchev, and his opening Central Committee report which determined the limits of later discussion [1] Prime Minister N. A Bulganin delivered the report on the Sixth Five-Year Plan which was the second feature of the agenda Both speeches displayed a coherent vision of the future, an integrated ideological outlook (in spite of several logical contradictions which will be pointed out later), realism and caution in the face of acknowledged present difficulties, and an optimism which is inevitably exaggerated on occasions like this and frequently confuses promise with accomplished fact. The mood of the Congress was mainly practical.

A few of the major speakers gave an individual flavour to their remarks. Khrushchev steered a practical middle course without excessive vehemence or invective and left Marshal Zhukov to do the sabre-rattling. Mikoyan and Shepilov were especially caustic on foreign policy, while Molotov offered only platitudes Mikoyan, more than most speakers, showed resentment of Stalin. Saburov and Pervukhin, like Kaganovich, expounded serious analyses of the economic situation, and Voroshilov described reforms in constitutional practice. Sholokhov poured out some of the bile which has been stewing in the livers of the better Soviet writers during

[1] A detailed analysis of this speech, with comment, will be found in *Current Soviet Policies An Appraisal of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, a Memorandum issued by the Information Department of Chatham House in March 1956, price 2s 6d

some twenty years of enforced conformity. Leading ministerial and regional administrators described the progress and problems in their individual fields. Delegates of fifty-five foreign Communist Parties, including Mr Pollitt, gave the Congress something of the aspect of a meeting of the old Comintern, read their stale tributes, and came away with the new Party line in their pockets and perhaps some misgivings in their hearts.

LEADERSHIP AND THE PARTY

Most of the principal speakers at the Congress extolled the virtues of collective government and repudiated its converse, the 'cult of personality'—by which was meant the arbitrary rule of Stalin. Collective leadership is now advocated at all levels, central and local, and is held to signify free and critical discussion of policies for the purpose of avoiding mistakes and encouraging initiative. In this respect rule has become somewhat more democratic. It is sometimes supposed that the collective principle determines what questions shall be discussed, and by whom. This is not so, and here the system remains every bit as autocratic. Khrushchev said that all important questions come within the purview of the Party Presidium. This may be true, but no institutions or procedures seem to have evolved yet which might guarantee the principle. It is true, too, that many important developments of policy have been referred to the 120-strong Central Committee for approval. However, the identities between the Congress resolutions and the main speeches are too great for it to be supposed that even the fringe of the leadership is able to exercise much direct influence on the making of policy.

Great stress was laid on the unity of the Party which clearly remains the chief political force in the country. It has been argued abroad with some conviction that the Party leadership is split between lefts and rights, hards and moderates, sectarians and opportunists. The speeches of the main leaders contained no suggestion of the schisms and spasms which strained the Congresses after Lenin's death. Discrepancies of personality and style certainly revealed themselves, but differences of opinion seem now to relate to relatively slighter problems of priorities and methods, not to fundamental issues. Profound political changes in the leadership have indeed occurred since 1952, and Malenkov and Molotov suffered serious losses of prestige in 1955. Nevertheless they occupied their rightful places at the Congress from which the

eleven-man Party Presidium emerged unchanged. Khrushchev, Bulganin, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich appear now to be the most influential of its members. The candidate members of the Presidium, who exercise no vote, are mainly new and are more picturesque in their variety than hitherto. They include Marshal Zhukov, in recognition of the importance of military counsels and his personal prestige, a Central Asian Party leader (a fact which will not be overlooked in propaganda to the East), and Mme. Furtseva, the Moscow Party Secretary. Thus a woman is included for the first time.

Over a third of the members of the old Central Committee failed to retain their seats Many of these came from Leningrad, the Caucasus, or the police, and may be presumed to have had connections with the executed Beria; others were favourites of Stalin; a third group had been criticized by Khrushchev for administrative incompetence. The new Central Committee is somewhat larger than before, although the representation of the military and the police has decreased. The growth is accounted for mainly by regional representatives; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also increased the number of its places, and no fewer than eleven Ambassadors now have a seat on one of the central organs. If it be true that Khrushchev commands the votes of all officials who have been associated with him in Moscow or the Ukraine or who have expressed public sympathy with his policies, then he has an absolute majority on the Central Committee and his political predominance is more or less assured.

The Party has recruited a third of a million new members since 1952 and has now a total strength of 7,215,505, or 3½ per cent of the population. The Young Communist League has increased by 8 million to a present total of 18½ million. *Komsomols* have provided the majority of the labour for the development of virgin lands, and their youthful enthusiasm is evidently to be exploited in many new schemes such as industrial expansion in the Far East

The educational level of the Party continues to rise and likewise its identity with the managerial strata of society. It is not surprising therefore that the problems of over-centralization and bureaucracy, which have long been endemic and peculiarly acute in Russia, have once again attracted special attention, both in Party and Government. More than half of 3 million Communists in the countryside sit at desks in spite of persistent pressure to bring them down to earth. Better success has been gained in the central

Party machine which has been cut by a quarter. The disciplinary supervision hitherto exercised by Moscow through local control committee representatives has been somewhat relaxed, and small changes in the Party statutes have been designed to disperse responsibility downwards and reduce the time wasted in meetings. The concentration of political control and agriculture in the district Party Committee which was ordered in 1953 has not proved entirely successful owing to a shortage of competent officials.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL REFORM

The parliamentary system of Soviets and Supreme Soviets has long been regarded as a sham. At the Congress it received some timely criticism. Deputies were told to engage in discussion of practical questions instead of making empty propaganda, and electors were told to recall deputies who did not carry out their duties. Whether a germ of more genuine political life can be created in present conditions remains to be seen.

The judicial system has been improved, effective Party control over the police and security system was said to have been established, some falsely accused persons have been rehabilitated, and the Public Attorney's department has been instructed to prevent abuse of authority by police and administrative organs. New criminal codes have been prepared and labour legislation is to be revised. It was not said that the ends of justice have ceased to be political or that political crimes are no longer the most heinous in the statute book. No figures were given for the number of prisoners released by amnesty or the number of victims of Stalin and Beria who have been rehabilitated. Nevertheless, such admissions and resolves as were offered should help the ordinary citizen to sleep more securely now.

Large economies are being carried through in the civil service in the face of strong bureaucratic vested interests. Some decentralization has been undertaken for the sake of efficiency, flexibility, and greater incentive; many less important factories have been transferred to the control of the Republics, and the Prime Minister of the Russian Republic pressed for still more and for the abolition of some central Ministries. The factory and collective farm have been allowed greater say in the management of their affairs. Nevertheless the principle of central planning control, reinforced by fiscal and administrative sanctions, remains untouched; production, investment, and other targets are still

determined in Moscow. Only the methods of achieving them left rather more to the discretion of the producing unit.

The wage system has not changed since 1932, and at least h the industrial wage packet now consists of bonuses and premiun therefore the structure is to be completely overhauled. The re income of industrial workers should have risen by 30 per cent ar that of peasants by 40 per cent by 1960. The lowest wage leve will be raised; the rates for foremen and technicians, which ar often lower than those of the shockworkers in their charge, will b improved; some differentials were to be increased. The bonu system will probably be simplified and several wage tariffs will b reduced in the light of technological developments. Special in centives will be offered to attract labour to priority industries an areas of development such as the Far East. The revision has bee entrusted to Kaganovich and is proceeding more slowly than wa hoped.

Mikoyan admitted the seriousness of the inflationary situatio created by lagging consumer production, reflected as it has been in long queues and poor service. A concentrated effort will be made to remedy the most serious deficiencies; however the principle that production must lag behind demand was asserted, and con- sumption will remain the Cinderella of the economy. Many faults in consumer supply flow from excessive centralization and this is to be remedied by placing trade in the hands of local authorities Bulganin and Kosygin announced increases in food targets which will allow about 1½ lb. of sugar for all purposes, 1 lb. of fish, and 1 lb. of State-supplied meat per week per head of population by 1960. Such improvements should provide a welcome addition to the average diet. In 1960 each person should be able to buy two items of footwear from current production. There will be more, though still insufficient, textiles and durable goods. Housing will long remain an acute problem. If promises are fulfilled the citizen will soon be able to live in modest comfort by West Euro- pean standards, though his living standard will still not be more than 60 per cent of that of his English counterpart.

Ten-year secondary education up to the age of seventeen should be usual in both town and countryside by 1960. To assist parents secondary schools fees will be abolished next autumn. Three million children left school in the last five years, and of these nearly 1,400,000 passed on to some form of higher or specialized education. It was hoped in 1952 to give a more practical orienta-

tion to the school syllabus but the promise has not been fulfilled through shortages of buildings and teachers of the right kind. Only 7 per cent of the child's time is spent in practical work, and complaints were made that habits of work are not inculcated at school and that many children are unwilling to look for jobs. Khrushchev lent his support to an interesting proposal (made in almost identical terms as early as 1924) for the creation of what in effect will become a public school system for the education of future rulers. His pretext was the fact that even in many better families both parents are employed; such schools might indeed help to remedy the present aimlessness of the *jeunesse dorée*.

The number of college-trained specialists at present exceeds requirements although their allocation has been badly planned and their training leaves much to be desired. Nevertheless output is to be increased by half in the next few years and to be doubled in priority industries, construction, and agriculture. Colleges will be built in several provincial towns. The President of the Academy claimed that in the production of scientists and technicians the Soviet Union has outstripped America and Britain together. Their average age has decreased from forty-one to thirty-eight. A co-ordinated drive is being made in applied science, with special efforts directed to thermo-nuclear and atomic problems, use of isotopes, semi-conductors, and calculating machines, automation, the chemistry of transuranium elements, organic compounds, and chemical poisons for agriculture. Some alarm was shown at the difficulty of fitting the unplanned discoveries of science into a planned economy (which is one of the tasks of a new Technological Committee) and also at the neglect which has long been shown as to pure science.

INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE

It would be impossible to review in a short space the Soviet claims for industrial and agricultural progress, to say nothing of controversial foreign estimates of their veracity. The remarkable annual rate of increase of production of 13·1 per cent is claimed. It is intended that in 1960 total industrial production shall be three times as great as it was in 1950. In several branches Soviet total production has already well outstripped Western Europe and in some of them bids fair to overtake the United States. But the level of production *per capita* of population still lags far behind and no little effort will still be required, Khrushchev said, to solve 'the

basic economic task' of catching up with more advanced countrie by this standard.

The most ambitious prospect is a complex ten-year scheme o industrial development in eastern Siberia where the main re sources of coal, hydro-electric power, timber, and non-ferrou metals are situated, all largely unexploited, and where minin costs are two-thirds cheaper. The development of atomic energy i commanding major attention. Ten types of reactor will be built i the next five years, and total power output should be greater tha the published figures for the United States and Britain. Work i going ahead on an atomic ice-breaker and on atomic engines fo aeroplanes and other transport.

Industry is affected by serious bottlenecks. Malenkov said tha although Soviet hydro-electric capacity was greater than that of th United States and some of it would soon be tapped on the gian Angara and Yenissei rivers of Siberia, increases in productivit were hindered by present shortages of electric power. The gri cannot take the growing output of some of the hydro-electri stations which are coming into operation at Kuibyshev and else where. Although 53 million tons of iron and 68·3 million tons o steel will be produced in 1960, at present a shortage of ferrou metals, caused partly by extravagance, is limiting expansion. Th railway system is operating under severe strain in industrial region and a fifteen-year electrification plan has been adopted which wil bring substantial economies. Steam locomotives will be replaced b diesel, and heavier track will be laid to take new hundred-ton wagons and higher speeds. Forty per cent of passenger cars are o obsolete type and need replacement. Conservatism and lethargy in adopting new designs, absence of specialization in factories, unrealistic costing and investment are some of the chief faults which must be overcome if new plans are to be successful. At present one-fifth of working time is wasted in the building industries through breakdown of administration and supplies. Many factories could double or treble production with little extra investment. It is hoped that more than half of development under the new Plan will derive from higher productivity and efficiency, but this optimism is excessive.

The ploughing of some 80 million acres of derelict land has allowed wheat supplies to be maintained, while something like 45 million acres have been placed under maize with benefit to the meat and dairy industries. The improvement of livestock is

recognized as one of the most urgent tasks. A 70 per cent increase in gross agricultural production is contemplated by 1960 but the expectation appears wildly unrealistic. An important reorganization has been carried through; the chairmen of nearly a quarter of collective farms have been replaced by urban Communists, and agronomists and engineers have been drafted to machine tractor stations; incentives to the peasants have been increased. The industry remains bedevilled by local shortages of machinery, uneven distribution of resources (which produces even greater unevenness in results), a distorted and clumsy price system, and the consequences of years of neglect. Productivity is low; nearly four times as many man-hours are required to produce a bushel of grain as in Britain. Experiments in organizing a regular agricultural working week, in attracting the main effort of the peasant from his private plot, and in improving rural amenities continue. Great improvements should not be difficult with time. Whether they will come up to the anticipations of most speakers at the Congress is a very different matter.

IDEOLOGY

Much of the ideological junk of Stalinism which has stultified Communists at home and abroad for so long—the official Party history, the leadership cult, inconvenient economic and political prognostications—was thrown overboard by the Congress. New histories of the Party and the Revolution will be written which will rehabilitate Stalin's minor victims, though not his major opponents. Historians will use the archives instead of the falsified press, and economists will be given wider access to statistics. The philosophers and writers were not greatly goaded on this occasion, nor were they given wider terms of reference. The new ideas contain much promise of intellectual freedom but they may lead also to ideological confusion requiring new regulation.

The Soviet leaders have not repudiated many of the internal policies associated with Stalin's ideas—forced collectivization, urbanization, excessive priority for heavy industry. Nor have they abandoned much of his grotesque view of the decaying capitalist encirclement with its panorama of impending crises, contracting markets, cut-throat competition, businessmen fattening on perpetually impoverished workers, anti-labour legislation and strikes, colonial strife, and the rest. Instead, research into these phenomena is to be expanded to provide a more persuasive justification for

their existence. Some classic notions have been adapted to the thermo-nuclear age, the lure of popular fronts, and the psychology of post-colonial neurosis.

Thus Lenin's idea of the inevitability of war under capitalism, which was confirmed by Stalin as recently as 1952, has been modified to state that war is no longer *fatally* inevitable since the Soviet bloc and the world-wide movement of partisans of peace are now strong enough to prevent it. Khrushchev and several other speakers amplified the current theory of 'transition to socialism' to admit the parliamentary path in addition to the other concrete forms envisaged in the declaration which followed his visit to Belgrade. This time, no doubt, he has former colonies, as well as Italy and France, in mind. Communist Parties are thereby authorized to co-operate with socialists in legal action until they can achieve the free election which will end all free elections. The third innovation was directed primarily at former colonies which have acquired political independence and are now fighting for full, i.e. economic, independence They are now recruited automatically into a *zone* of peace, the policies of which are identified in most agile double-talk with those of the Soviet Union.

FOREIGN POLICY

The capitalist encirclement is envisaged now primarily in terms of Western defence agreements and containment bases, and these occupy a central place in Soviet thinking on foreign policy. The major questions of German unity, European security, and disarmament are evidently regarded as intractable at present. Soviet leaders have vacillated in their estimate of atomic warfare; they now seem to treat the hydrogen bomb as a deterrent in spite of propaganda protestations to the contrary. Marshal Zhukov was careful to imply that no difference exists between tactical and strategical applications of atomic weapons. Cultural contacts are regarded as desirable, and Mikoyan argued that it was ridiculous to suppose that they could threaten Soviet internal security However it looks as though they will not be greatly encouraged except for purposes of propaganda and the acquisition of technical know-how. Mikoyan advocated trade as an essential condition of peaceful co-existence but no doubt he had the alleviation of Soviet bottle-necks and strategic materials mainly in mind. Thus formal Soviet foreign policy continues on familiar lines.

An admission by Molotov to the effect that his Ministry had

underestimated the importance of such factors as the growth of the socialist camp, colonial liberation movements, and front organizations sympathetic to Soviet policy suggests that the centre of gravity in foreign policy is shifting from the more formal aspects. It was no accident that important remarks on foreign policy were made by several members of the Presidium and by Kuusinen, the *rapporteur* on the colonial question at the Sixth Comintern Congress It may be expected that diplomatic action and foreign trade will be used increasingly to create a climate for more subtle and subversive techniques. Economic and cultural baits will be used to bribe or manœuvre backward areas into political commitments, and there are already signs of closer co-ordination within the bloc for this purpose. The subversive business of Communist infiltration and colonial liberation may be directed increasingly, under cover of honeyed gestures, to weakening the social and economic rear of the potential adversary.

The future directions of Soviet foreign policy were given by Khrushchev in the following order of priority: (1) Peaceful coexistence and relaxation of tension. This is important because the Soviet record is quite impressive to the forgetful or ill-informed, and emotion is stronger than reason today in many parts of the world (2) Consolidation of the Soviet bloc—with Yugoslavia mentioned in the same breath. (3) Strengthening of friendly relations with the uncommitted nations of the East and neutrals of the West; improvement of relations with the West through trade and cultural contacts. (4) A vigilant watch on the intrigues of circles which are not interested in relaxation of tension and the further strengthening of Soviet defensive might.

CONCLUSION

The challenge of 'competitive coexistence' presented in these terms is quite serious enough to deserve careful study of each of its many forms. It cannot go by default, but the best response will not be easy to determine. The economic foundations of Soviet policies are no less solid than the Western ones, though they may be narrower. This defect is less important when the target is undeveloped areas whose appetites are undiscriminating and whose capacity to digest may be a more important limiting factor than the capacity of others to supply.

The West has met the challenge of Communists in Parliament before and found it stimulating. But the holding techniques of

'peaceful coexistence' have proved a powerful embarrassment determined action against subversion. They will now be reinforc by firmer tokens of social progress and reform real enough capture the imagination of the uncommitted. Ideological revisi has removed serious weaknesses. Nevertheless, the present Sov leaders may fail if they try to have too much of the best of bo worlds, laying claims to the new while preserving the old an placing Lenin on the pedestal from which Stalin has been knock with such force. They show themselves concerned, and ev anxious, about the epiphenomena but seem to lack the ability, an perhaps the courage as well, to look for deeper causes and r think their positions. Their position contains many inconsiste cies. Why advocate trade with capitalism if a quicker end is serv by diminishing its markets? Why advocate autarky and separatis for backward areas while forcing specialization and interdepe dence on the European satellites? This is political cynicism at i worst. Why condemn the West for exploiting colonies with o voice and with another complain, as a Central Asian speaker di that all but a few per cent of much needed agricultural machine produced in his Republic is pumped to other areas? The bre with the past has not been clean enough to convince the dubio and is perhaps too sharp for the peace of mind of the faithful.

The Twentieth Congress admitted that many of the shibbolet of cold war are out of date; it looked for more facts and less fictio The Russians are not well placed in such a competition whi poses, nevertheless, hazards for all the runners.

R. D.

Restoring Order in Cyprus

PATIENT negotiations over the past five months for a politic settlement in Cyprus have ended in failure with an air of finalit The Government has again stated that the first objective British policy is to restore law and order. The words have a famili ring, and the magnitude of the task can best be judged from even over the past twelve months. It is exactly a year since the Righ

wing terrorist organization E.O.K.A.[1] made its first appearance on the Cypriot scene with acts of sabotage in the districts of Nicosia, Larnaca, and Limassol. The occasion heralded a period of continuous disturbances which culminated in the destruction of the British Institute in Nicosia by fire after rioting on 18 September 1955.

Many factors indicate that the campaign of violence was a carefully conceived long-term plan. Ethnarchy spokesmen when propagating the cause of Enosis abroad had long hinted in ominous tones that unless Britain gave way to Cypriot national aspirations violence was inevitable. The State-controlled Athens Radio had from the summer of 1954 onwards repeatedly advocated violence in its broadcasts to Cyprus. Recent discoveries have shown that arms dumps were being built up in the island over many years.

E.O.K.A.

The link between the Cypriot terrorists and Greece has been proved. A caique from Greece manned by Greek nationals was caught off Paphos in January 1955 trying to smuggle arms and 10,000 sticks of dynamite into the island. Eleven months later a large quantity of arms consigned from Piraeus as 'books' to a Limassol bookseller was discovered by the security forces after the Greek boat which transported them had left the Cypriot port. The continuous political warfare broadcast by Athens Radio has been well co-ordinated with outbursts of terrorism in the island. The authorities and many Cypriots suspect that Greek Army officers are directing the terrorists. And last November the photograph of Colonel Grivas was posted up among those of other wanted men. Grivas was the leader of the extreme Right-wing organization 'X' which came into existence in Greece at the end of the Axis war.

E.O.K.A.'s pursuit of the struggle for 'Liberty' has certainly been marked by the ruthless totalitarianism which characterized the methods of 'X'. Cypriot Greeks known to be opposed to Enosis are threatened with death. In some cases the threat has been carried out. Gunmen have attacked ambulances; and a Cypriot woman recovering in hospital from an earlier attempt on her life was shot up again by a masked assailant. E.O.K.A.'s first target was the police: eight have been killed. Casualties among British servicemen by 15 March totalled seventeen dead and 100

[1] *Ethniki Organosis Kyprion Agoniston*, or National Organization of Cypriot Fighters.

wounded.[1] Most of the deaths were due to shots in the back (grenades thrown from safe range. Bombs are frequently thrown ; the houses of service families. By such tactics E.O.K.A. has sougl to provoke the British into the use of repressive measures. Troor angered by cowardly and cold-blooded attacks against their con rades, and their wives and children, are inevitably tempted to fore go restraint in their attitude towards the local population. In th way the terrorists hope that hatred of the British, previousl limited to certain sectors of the people, will become island-wid(

Much has still to be learnt about E.O.K.A. There are indication that in Cyprus the organization divides into three main groups: political committee chiefly made up of fanatically anti-British an rich Cypriot business men; small mobile units of trained gunmer and large numbers of part-time terrorists equipped by the leadeı for hit-and-run tactics in the towns. In the opinion of the authori ties, cover for E.O.K.A. activities has been provided by th religious organization O Kh.E.N ,[2] the Pan-Agrarian Union (Cyprus (P.E K.), and the extreme Right-wing youth organizatio P.E.O.N. which was banned in 1953. The terrorists have been abl to draw on a vast reserve of permanently mobilized trouble-makeı in the shape of the island's Greek secondary school boys. Terroris propaganda has been specifically directed to the island's youth an many students are believed to have taken the E.O.K.A. oath:

I swear in the name of the Holy Trinity that.

1. I shall work with all my power for the liberation of Cyprus fror the British yoke, sacrificing for this even my life,

2. I shall perform without objection all the instructions of th organization which may be entrusted to me and I shall not raise an objection, however difficult and dangerous these may be,

3. I shall not abandon the struggle unless I receive instructions fror the leader of the organization and after our aim has been accomplished

4. I shall never reveal to anyone any secret of our organization, neithe the names of my chiefs nor those of the other members of the organiza tion, even if I am caught and tortured;

[1] CASUALTIES UP TO 15 MARCH 1956

	Killed	*Wounded*
Due to Terrorist Action		
British forces	17	100
Cyprus police*	8	27
Civilians	20	55
Due to Action by Security Forces		
(*Cypriot casualties*)	11	15

*including 1 Englishman serving with them

[2] Union of Orthodox Christian Youth.

5. I shall not reveal any of the instructions which may be given me, even to my fellow combatants.

If I disobey my oath, I shall be worthy of every punishment as a traitor and may eternal contempt cover me.

E.O.K.A.

For the Greek youth of Cyprus E.O.K.A. has the appeal of a militant revolutionary movement. And the doctrines of Hellenic nationalism taught in the island's Greek secondary[1] and commercial schools since the beginning of the British occupation provided fertile soil for terrorist propaganda. A monster problem of juvenile delinquency has now been created. Even if Enosis should be granted tomorrow future administrators might well find themselves unable to bring the schoolboys under control.

Wide use is made of leaflets by the terrorists. The content of these ranges from operational instructions to political propaganda. The following is an example of the first type:

E O.K A.

ORDER

All the men of the shock groups must be in a position to prepare refills for sabotage by petards, mines, etc , as well as bottles of petrol.

This measure is taken so that there may not be an interruption to the activities of the groups due to ignorance on the preparation of refills owing to the fact that the instructor cannot be any longer occupied with the above tasks

If any group finds difficulties in the above matter it must report them now so that it may be given the necessary information and if necessary be sent the instructor

28 3 55

The Chief
DIGENIS

Leaflets are usually cyclostyled or stencilled and there is often no means of establishing their authenticity. A recent leaflet attributed to Digenis telling the school children to ignore their teachers' instructions was believed to have originated with the pupils and to have been produced by them on the school typewriter.

MEASURES AGAINST TERRORISM

By the time the Cyprus Government woke up to the danger E.O.K.A. was well established, its agents had penetrated Government departments and the police; its methods of intimidation had driven the Cypriot Greeks into silence. On 3 October Field

[1] Cypriot Greek secondary education is under the direction of the Ministry of Education in Athens.

Marshal Sir John Harding arrived to take up the post of Governo
He was given wider powers than his predecessor Sir Robe
Armitage in relation to security. Sir John Harding faced the majc
problem of having to build up an intelligence service almost fron
scratch. At this late stage Cypriot Greeks were not prepared to giv
the information which could have helped to expose E.O.K.A. anc
its wide ramifications. Moreover they had for so long been used tc
strong measures which existed only on paper that they were
psychologically unprepared for their enforcement. Resentment was
for this reason all the greater.

The new Governor was prompt to reorganize the security services. And after terrorists captured a large consignment of arms transferred from Suez to Famagusta he became personally responsible for the direction of all security operations. Troops were trained in riot-breaking by police methods; and outlying police posts were given military protection. The drain on military man-power was substantial; and at an early stage in his appointment Sir John Harding requested reinforcements. In Cyprus today there are more than 15,000 troops. According to one officer troops in Cyprus have had to take on police work on a scale hitherto unknown in any British territory. Many of their duties have been distasteful. But most have shown restraint and good nature in the face of immense provocation. The National Servicemen engaged in riot-breaking are often younger than the schoolboy ringleaders, whose ages may go up to twenty-one in the senior forms. Girls and small boys who assist the big boys by carrying stones are specially difficult to handle

Road-blocks and house-to-house searches had started before Sir John Harding arrived. These operations were progressively intensified. Troops after travelling all night without lights along narrow mountain roads surround suspect villages at dawn. The male population over twelve years of age is taken outside for questioning while the houses are searched in the presence of wives and children. After many fruitless ventures vast quantities of arms, ammunition, and army uniforms were eventually discovered. By December a few terrorists had been killed or captured in action. And with the help of police dogs Commandos found a network of caves in the Troodos range. These had been skilfully constructed as a hideout for terrorists, and were equipped for twenty men or more. Prospects for defeating terrorists based on villages and mountain hideouts became increasingly encouraging. But the

problem of the town terrorists who are re-absorbed into the normal life of the community remained as intractable as ever. Even the successes outside the towns must be weighed up against the risk of alienating sectors of the population which as yet have played no active part in the conflict. Security operations have often been based on insufficient or wrong information. The inconvenience they cause is deeply resented by the innocent. In house searches the troops seldom have time to put away the contents of drawers and cupboards. In the hunt for arms flour bags are upset and floor boards sometimes pulled up. Wages are sometimes lost as the result of curfews which prevent men working outside the villages from leaving in time.

The intensification of security operations has not been matched by any corresponding decrease in lawlessness and terrorism. By November the 'schoolboys' war' was in full swing. And the policy of closing Greek schools as a measure against 'mass absenteeism' and other forms of indiscipline was initiated on 16 November with the closing of the Samuel School, a large privately-owned concern with a long record of unruliness. But this step was the signal for disturbances in other schools. And towards the end of the month the chaos was such that even teachers and parents, irrespective of their support for Enosis, became alarmed. Consultations were held between headmasters and parents on the problem of restoring order. But an appeal from Archbishop Makarios that pupils should return to their classes and leave the national struggle to the Nationalist leaders was ignored. A Government order provided yet another gain for the promoters of unrest. This gave the committees of elementary schools the option of either removing the Greek flag from their buildings or of closing the schools. The official view was that since elementary schools were the responsibility of the British Administration they could not be permitted to function under a 'foreign flag'. Agitators followed a deliberate policy of hoisting the Greek flag overnight. Incidents usually occurred when attempts were made to take the flag down; so many of the committees closed the schools. The children, moreover, realized that by raising the Greek flag they could be sure of an indefinite holiday. By February thousands of younger children were idle. Many joined the older boys and girls in disturbances.

The death of a sergeant from a time bomb in the sergeants' mess at Kykko Camp on 9 November marked the start of an intensive campaign against British servicemen. Seven servicemen were

killed in one week. On 26 November Sir John Harding proclaimed a State of Emergency which, in the view of the authorities, had now become necessary owing to 'the increase in terrorist outrages and widespread disorders leading to serious injuries to life and property . . .' Under the new regulations the unauthorized possession of firearms and explosives carried a maximum penalty of death. Provision was also made for deportation, censorship, and collective punishment For the first time since the riots of 1931 a communal fine was imposed when on 4 December the Governor personally informed a group of elders at Lefkoniko that a fine of £2,000 would be levied. This was the penalty for the wanton destruction of the local post office by fire the day before. The villagers paid up without resistance and the money was used for a new post office

Measures taken on the night of 13 December were more drastic still. Security forces arrested 130 alleged Communists and removed them to a detention camp near Larnaca. A.K.E.L. (the Reform Party of the Working People), which replaces the Cypriot Communist Party, was proscribed; and the offices of the Communist newspaper *Neos Demokratis* were closed Communist organizations in Cyprus have attracted anti-clerical groups who dislike the reactionary politics of the Church. In the minds of the young, Communism has stood for progress. Communists dominate the municipalities of three leading towns; and the Communist-led Pancyprian Federation of Labour is at least five times as strong as the Right-wing confederation. Widely varying estimates of Communist strength have been given in the island. Archbishop Makarios has consistently maintained that true adherents to the party number about 200, thus dismissing any suggestion that the danger of Communism is a barrier to Enosis. The Bishop of Kyrenia, probably in order to disagree with his rival has estimated their strength at 40 per cent of the Cypriot Greek population. The Turks, in their anxiety to stress the dangers of Enosis, argue that 60 per cent of the Cypriot Greeks are Communist. Mr Ezekiel Papaioannou, Secretary General of A.K.E.L., recently claimed a party membership of 6,000. But so long as Cyprus is without self-government, and so long as no centre party exists, any assessment of true Communist strength is largely guesswork.

During the past year the Communist leaders have stepped up the pressure for 'immediate self-determination'. They are believed

ave lost ground since the creation of E.O.K.A.; and in some ·ters it was feared that they might form rival terrorist bands in :r to destroy the Right wing's monopoly of militant revolution. ther quarters a link between the Communists and E.O.K.A. been suspected. In a community as close knit as that of the riots contact must exist at low level. But at policy level the two es are ideologically incompatible and doomed to destroy each ·r. The Cyprus Government took the view in December that Communists constituted a menace to security and an obstacle settlement with the Archbishop.

n extract from a commentary given by the Government broad-ing station (C.B.S) which reflects the official view reads as ›ws:

was they [the Communists] who developed the whole paraphernalia ,truggle' against established authority—the mass demonstrations, ical strikes, daubing of slogans, seditious propaganda, and monster ions. That a large section of the public now accepts violence and ition as a substitute for normal democratic processes is largely their g

Cyprus Government, however, has not been able to produce ificant evidence of recent date to support such accusations. The s suggest that the Communists have, on the whole, been a lrance to E.O.K.A. Manifestos issued by E.O.K.A. and its runner E M.A.K [1] have attacked the Communists. An .K.A. leaflet distributed last April severely criticized A.K.E.L.'s :eful tactics. The denunciation of violence by Communist ors in Limassol and Larnaca has indirectly helped the British iorities in the past to restore order. A rare if not unique ex-le of intervention by a Greek private citizen against a terrorist provided by a member of the Pancyprian Federation of our who had just left an A.K.E.L. rally. He flung his bicycle ont of an armed man who was trying to escape after the murder policeman.

lthough the Cypriot Communist leaders have consistently osed the creation of war bases in the island, the bulk of the ur engaged on military construction has been drawn from imunist-led unions. The long-term objectives of the hard core Moscow-trained Cypriot Communists are not questioned. The ning of A.K.E.L. and kindred organizations was criticized fly on the ground of its timing and its treatment of Left-wing

[1] National Front for the Liberation of Cyprus.

suspects. There has been no improvement in security as the result of their arrest and a political solution seems as remote as ever. Cypriot confidence in the elementary principles of British justice has been shaken. Strikes and go-slow tactics for the first time threaten to delay the construction of bases which are already behind schedule. And there is the serious danger that borderline sympathizers may out of resentment become irrevocably committed to Communism.

The full powers granted under the Emergency Regulations were not brought into use until the recent negotiations with the Cypriot Ethnarch, Archbishop Makarios, ended. Earlier this year the Governor obtained authority to jam Athens Radio should need arise. In political hysteria Athens Radio has exceeded even Dr Goebbels. It has also been one of the main instruments of intimidation. As an incitement to violence and juvenile delinquency the Athens transmissions to Cyprus are unparalleled in the history of broadcasting. Since E.O.K.A. has been able to use Athens Radio for transmitting operational instructions to terrorists British officers could argue with logic that for security reasons alone jamming was essential. The policy of removing 'obstacles to a settlement' reached its peak on 9 March with the deportation of Archbishop Makarios and the Bishop of Kyrenia. Few doubt that Makarios was closely associated with E.O.K.A., but there are signs that the control of the terrorists rests in other hands. The removal of the Archbishop may drive greater numbers of Cypriots into active or passive hostility against the British, thus making an eventual political solution impossible.

N. C.

Water Power and Irrigation in the U.S.S.R.

Plans for Hydro-Technical Development

THE Soviet press is constantly featuring reports and articles about the new hydro-technical schemes, especially the power stations, now being undertaken or projected in the Soviet Union. Mr Kaganovich in his speech on the thirty-eighth anniversary of the

Russian Revolution stated that the U.S.S.R. had moved up to second place in the world in regard to power production. Whilst in 1913 Russia produced only about 2,000 million kilowatt/hours, output in 1953 was 133,000 million (compared with 514,100 million in the U.S.A., and 67,300 million in the U.K.); in 1955 it was about 170,000 million. Three hundred large and medium-sized power stations have been built since the Revolution, including ninety hydro-electric plants. The new Five-Year Plan orders the 'stepping-up' of the process of electrification. Total output of energy in 1960 is contemplated at 320,000 million kwh, i.e. an increase of 88 per cent over 1955. Total capacity of steam-driven power stations is to increase by about 2·2 times, that of hydro-electric power stations by 2·7 times. Preference, according to Mr Khrushchev, is to be given to large stations which are considered more economical. During the next two to three years the basic hydro-electric power grids and large sub-stations are to be converted to remote control.

Russia is on the whole extraordinarily rich in rivers; and though the country is for the greater part flat the stream flow, especially in spring, is very strong. Unchecked by any control schemes, much of the waters was hitherto wasted, leaving many of even the largest rivers, particularly in the southern parts of European Russia, almost dry in the summer months. In addition, many rivers are interrupted by rapids, making them unsuitable for shipping throughout their length. Yet, as transport ways, they have always played a considerable part in Russia's history. In the ancient Rus obstacles such as rapids and the short distances between the rivers were overcome by dragging the boats over land. Later attempts were made to build canals, but their systematic construction did not begin till the end of the seventeenth century under Peter the Great. Many of his and subsequent far-sighted plans are at the basis of today's schemes. In fact, by the end of the nineteenth century there existed, apart from a number of smaller canals, nine water transport systems, mostly in the western part of European Russia, except for the Ob-Yenissei system in Siberia. Nevertheless the country's water resources were hardly used for producing electric power, the capacity of the few existing hydro-electric plants totalling in 1913 a mere 7,000 kilowatts.

During the civil war of 1918–20 special measures were needed to keep both river and railway transport moving. At the same time the vital need for the electrification of the country was recognized,

and Lenin coined the phrase: 'Soviets plus electrification equals Socialism'. It was in those years of utter economic ruin that the planning of multi-purpose hydro-technical schemes began, in order to utilize the vast water resources for electrification, irrigation, and transport. To this end various organizations were set up in the 1920s. Their research and planning activities were later incorporated in the work of Gosplan, the State Planning Commission, which in 1931 ordered the drawing up of a river register based on all data available since 1875.

THE FIRST PROJECTS

The first hydro-technical project to be tackled was that of the river Volkhov It presented considerable difficulties, but electric power was so vital for Leningrad that preliminary work was begun on it in 1918 in spite of the civil war. The power station had a capacity of about 82,800 kw, its initial output was in subsequent years increased to 360 million kwh. A dam and a canal greatly improved shipping between the Volga and Leningrad, via Lake Ilmen and the already existing Tikhvinsk canal. This costly project was completed in 1926. It served as a training ground for many a technician and engineer later employed on bigger projects. During the second World War the eight main turbo-generators were transferred east; the plant was reconstructed, and probably extended, during 1942-4

Apart from a few smaller installations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, attention was then directed to the river Svir, where a stretch of 140 miles of rapids had to be tackled to improve shipping to the Neva. (This canal links up with the old Mariinsk system.) Work on the Lower Svir, begun in 1926, was carried out against the advice of the American consultant Cooper who considered the shifty sand and clay soil unsuitable But at the suggestion of the Soviet Professor Graftio the installations were erected at an angle, the idea being that as construction proceeded their weight would consolidate the ground and they would eventually settle in a vertical position. This was said to have more or less taken place by 1935. But later references to complications due to land slides, and a divergence of views as to the final year of completion of the project (ranging from 1933 to 1937), seem to indicate that repairs and/or reconstructions had to be carried out straight away. The plant's capacity was planned at 116,000 kw, and the annual output at 600 million kwh. The installation was damaged during

the war and the output of the reconstructed plant is not known. The upper Svir installation was projected for 1937, but its erection was delayed. Whilst still under construction it was damaged by enemy action and was not completed until some time between 1952 and 1954.

The construction of the 1930s that was most widely discussed outside Russia—notorious because of the large-scale and officially admitted use of prison labour—was the 'Stalin canal' which links the White Sea with the Baltic. It runs via the Neva, Lake Ladoga, the Svir, and Lake Onega to the White Sea—Onega Isthmus. It was here that the 142-mile-long canal was built, in extremely harsh climatic and geological conditions and largely by manual labour, in just over twenty months. The 'first range' of installations was completed in August 1933. The system comprises nineteen locks, fifteen dams, twelve flush weirs, forty-nine smaller dams, and thirty-three canals. It is not known whether the planned power station has been erected. The primary importance of this 'deep waterway for sea-going vessels', as it was first planned in 1919–20, is not so much economic as strategic. Contemporary Soviet sources say that it is used to transport apatite (an indigenous crystallized phosphate of lime) from Kirovsk to Leningrad and to further the cultural and economic development of the Karelian S S R , a purpose for which the Murmansk railway would seem adequate and which is hardly commensurate with the cost in human lives and suffering that went to the building of the canal. Nothing is known about a 'second range' of constructions, though there was some talk before the war of a parallel (Murmansk) canal and/or an extension across the Kola peninsula. Three power stations were built in that area in the mid-1930s, and two turbines of a new plant (Knyazhya Guba near the Gulf of Kandalaksha) started operation not long ago. Last November, too, an agreement was concluded with Norway on the utilization of the water resources in the frontier area.

Simultaneously with the White Sea—Baltic canal, the Dniepr, in the Ukraine, was made navigable over a stretch of rapids between Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozhye. Attempts to overcome this obstacle in the third largest river in Europe (after the Danube and the Volga) date from the times of Peter the Great. In 1919 the inclusion of a hydro-electric power station was contemplated there as part of the general electrification plan under 'Goelro' (the State Electrification Commission set up in 1921). Eventually an

enlarged scheme, providing for full shipping facilities on the Dniepr and the conversion of its lower reaches, between Zaporozhye and Kherson, into a deep waterway for sea-going vessels, was incorporated into the first Five-Year Plan. The final blueprints envisaged two locks and two power stations, at Zaporozhye and at Kakhovka. Of these only the first project was then carried out, from plans drawn up by Professor Alexandrov, with the American firm of Hugh and Cooper and the German firm Siemens Bau Union acting as consultants The installation consisted of a curved dam, 760 metres long and 60 metres high; a reservoir, the 'Lenin Lake', with a volume of 1,500 million cu. metres (whose construction necessitated the flooding of 40,000 acres of land and the resettlement of about 4,000 farmsteads); a shipping canal with three locks, which raised the water level by 37 metres; and, finally, a power station, whose present annual output is 2,970 million kwh Its first turbo-generator began to turn in 1932 and the whole installation was hailed as one of the great achievements of the first Five-Year Plan. Prison labour was apparently little used. The bulk of the workers consisted of skilled workers directed to the site by the State, and of unskilled labour recruited locally and trained on the spot. This induced Engineer Cooper, in charge of purchases of machinery, to buy double quantities of everything, to allow for breakage and standstills. When the project was finished it transpired that the site for the dam, thought to be particularly well chosen between narrow granite banks, did not provide sufficient space for the reservoir to store more than 5 per cent of the spring waters. The question of water control of the middle reaches of the Dniepr therefore remained only partially solved. During construction the plans for the dam were altered to include a tunnel which, however, was kept secret until the war. It was then opened for motor traffic. During the Soviet retreat the dam was blown up and the installations were further damaged by the Germans Reconstruction, combined with extension, began early in 1944 The work involved must have been considerable for the first turbine did not begin turning until March 1947. Shipping was resumed in the following June.

THE GREATER DNIEPR

The subsequent scale of the Soviet hydro-technical constructions and plans makes it practically impossible to distinguish whether their primary importance lies in the production of electric

power or in the creation of cheap transport facilities to relieve the enormously overtaxed and relatively poor Soviet railway network. The Soviet press itself lays the main stress on the first aspect and on the greater irrigation possibilities resulting from water control. The shipping aspect is less emphasized, and then, of course, only in regard to its economic importance.[1] Yet it cannot be overlooked that, except during the winter months, when most of the rivers are frozen, such developments can equally well serve strategic purposes, especially as large parts of the rivers and many reservoirs are being made suitable for deep sea-going vessels and the canal systems are widely interlinked.

The Zaporozhye project described above was only part of the 'Greater Dniepr system', itself only a part of the single water transport system of the European U.S.S.R. This idea, first evolved in 1920, was formulated in general terms at the seventeenth Party Congress in 1934. The next Congress, in 1939, was more specific, resolving 'to begin with the reconstruction of the Volga-Baltic waterways' and 'to draw up plans for the construction of multi-purpose projects on the rivers Volga, Don, and Dniepr'. The Finnish war and, more particularly, the second World War caused the suspension of the work and subsequent modification of the plans to meet new strategic requirements. The nineteenth Congress of the party, in 1952, now spoke of 'a single deep water transport system'. And although this referred only to the European part of the U.S.S.R., there is evidence that the linking up of rivers and seas is being extended to the Asian U.S.S.R. as well.

In 1952 many of the projects were, in fact, already in progress. Some were begun as part of post-war reconstruction, especially when the terrible drought of 1946 once more brought home the necessity for better irrigation. (In 1948 the grandiose plan for 'changing nature' by a vast afforestation scheme was made public. Little has been heard of it since, and it would appear that it has largely been dropped for the more realistic and immediate job of irrigation.) Other projects were begun after the autumn and winter decrees of 1950 to which great publicity was given in the Soviet press, and to a certain extent abroad. Propaganda at home was

[1] The directives of the new Five-Year Plan are not particularly specific on this aspect either They state in a general way that 'new deep waterways on the Volga, Kama, Dniepr, and other rivers' should be brought into operation; that 'a more powerful fleet (be built) suitable for use on the inland seas'; that the lagging behind of harbour and port construction be remedied, especially 'on the Volga, the Kama, and the Siberian rivers', that installations be mechanized; and that the volume of goods carried by inland waterways be increased by about 80 per cent

aimed mainly at boosting the vitality of the Soviet State which alone could contemplate schemes of this magnitude so soon after the war. Abroad it was pointed out that the U.S.S.R. was now embarking upon a period of peaceful construction, with no thoughts of war. This was true up to a point; and it was little remarked in the West that the contemplated deep water transport system could, if need be, carry troops and equipment as well, and that power is equally needed for the defence industry.

One of the decrees of 1950 reverted to the Kakhovka project This power station, where the first three turbo-generators began turning last December, will supply local needs at a rate of 1,200 million kwh per year. The reservoir will feed an irrigation and shipping canal extending to Askania Nova. There it will join the 'South Ukrainian canal' which, coming from Zaporozhye, will flow along the rivers Molochnaya and Konskaya. At Askania Nova the canal will turn southwards, cut across the Sivash (the coastal part of the Azov Sea) and continue as the 'North Crimean Canal' to Djankoi, and then flow through the Crimean steppes towards Kerch, with a branch to Feodosia. The total length of the two canals will be 355 miles, that of the distributing canals about 188 miles. When completed, probably in 1957, this network will irrigate about 8 million acres of land for vegetable and fruit growing and, above all, for cotton growing in the Southern Ukraine and the Northern Crimea.

The trunk canals will be navigable for sea-going vessels. They will link the Dniepr with the Don and—via the Volga-Don canal—with the Volga and the Caspian Sea. It is believed that another deep waterway to the Azov Sea will branch off at the Molochny reservoir near Melitopol, where a small power station will be erected, and run southwards to the Molochny Lake close to the shores of the Azov Sea Another canal may branch off from Djankoi and lead north-east across the Sivash and the Arbat Isthmus into the open sea.

The Greater Dniepr system is to include a few more projects. Some are completed; but the majority are still in varying stages of planning or construction—for example, the Kremenchug hydro-electric power station, whose eight turbines will supply power to Kiev, Kharkov, Dniepropetrovsk, and Kirovograd. The high voltage transmission line is already commissioned; a road from Kremenchug to 'Khrushchev' (a place not marked on the 1955 maps) and a railway to the Kharkov-Odessa line have already been

built. Another plant, at Kanev, is also projected. Then there are the Upper and Lower Ingulets and the Trubezh projects; the planned irrigation canal for the Kamensk-Kherson region; and a reservoir on the river Salgir near Simferopol. A new Dniepr-Bug canal from Kiev to Pervomaisk is contemplated, which would shorten the Baltic-Black Sea route by over 200 miles. A reservoir (volume 3,000 million cu. metres) is to feed a deep-water route to Kherson; its dam, 670 miles long, will carry a railway line and a motor road; the power station, capacity 250,000 kw, is to be erected in the vicinity of Dnieprodzerzhinsk. The old Dniepr-Bug canal was rebuilt in 1939–40 after the occupation of Poland. As a canal for sea-going vessels it will eventually become part of the 'East-West waterways' now under construction in Poland, which will link her most important industrial centres with both the Soviet and the East German waterways. Another plan is to provide an alternative way out into the Baltic, in addition to the Volkhov system, i.e. via the Western Dvina, which would give easy access to the North Sea. A project of long standing, the Oka-Don link-up, seems now to be under way with the reported construction of a canal from the Northern Donets (the metallurgical regions of Dniepropetrovsk) to Stalino in the Don coal basin, and should be completed in 1958.

THE GREATER VOLGA

The extensive system of the Dniepr canals and waterways, which will link the Black and Azov Seas by different routes with the Baltic and the White Sea, will be connected with a parallel system in the Eastern part of European Russia, the 'Greater Volga system'. This idea originated in the early 1930s as a plan for the irrigation of the Southern Trans-Volga regions. It embraces at present a series of different hydro-technical projects, of which the project of water control of the Volga itself includes a chain of large power stations. The first construction, the Moscow-Don canal, eighty miles long, with seven locks, was completed in 1937; seven medium-sized power stations, of which Ivankovo and Shkodnensk are the largest, were erected along the canal, with a total capacity of 90,000 kw. A special reservoir at Akulovo provides the capital with drinking water.

The other big Volga projects were deferred until after the war, some to be begun only after the special decrees of 1950. Two years later the completion of the Volga-Don canal between Stalingrad and Kalach was hailed with much publicity. It is about sixty-three

miles long and, fed mainly by the Don, elevates the water through four locks to 44 metres above the level of this river, and then drops it 88 metres (through nine locks) to the level of the Volga. Its two entries are marked by pompous monumental gates like triumphal arches (lately criticized in Moscow). Several reservoirs store and distribute the spring waters which hitherto flowed into the Azov Sea and were wasted. A power station with a generating capacity of 160,000 kw has been erected for local needs. The project necessitated the excavation of 152,100 million cu. metres of soil and the sinking of 2,960 million cu. metres of concrete. It is claimed that 97 per cent of all the work was mechanized. New ports, docks, railway lines, and motor roads have been and are being built in connection with this project. The canal, linking as it does five Russian seas, will play an important part in the transport system of the country. A network of distributive canals will, if and when completed in 1957, irrigate 6·8 million acres of arable and pasture land in the triangle of the rivers Volga-Don-Manych.

Of the projected Volga power stations, each connected with a system of water control, two came into operation between 1940 and 1949: Uglich, with a capacity of 100,000 kw; and Shcherbakov, with a capacity of 330,000 kw, which seems to have been the first to be equipped with turbines with rotating blades. Next, in geographical order, come the Gorki plant, the first four generators of which started turning before the end of 1955 (its final capacity is estimated at 500,000 kw); and the Cheboksary plant (capacity 800,000 kw) which was to be completed in 1955, but which the new Plan mentions among those only to be started.

By far the largest plants will be those of Kuibyshev and Stalingrad, both begun before the war, but deferred until after 1950. The first generating unit of Kuibyshev was switched into the grid at the end of 1955; two more generators have since been put into operation. Final generating capacity of the plant will be 2·1 million kw (compared with 1·25 million kw for the Boulder Dam, the largest in the world so far); its planned annual output of 10,000 million kwh has already been increased to 11,400 million. Its twenty hydro-turbines are being manufactured in Leningrad. Of the power generated, 6,100 million kwh will be supplied to Moscow by high-tension overhead cables of 400,000 volt. This project is the first of its kind in the U.S.S.R. The cables, over a stretch of 560 miles, will be supported by 3,600 pylons, each 29·8 metres high and weighing 18 tons, placed at distances of 450 to 500 metres.

The areas of Kuibyshev and Saratov will receive 2,400 million kwh, and 1,500 million will be used to irrigate 2½ million acres of land in the Trans-Volga plains. The 'Kuibyshev Sea', created by a ferro-concrete curved dam just under a mile long, with an earthen extension of about three miles, will cover an area of 3,100 sq. miles. It will feed a short shipping canal, and the dam will carry a railway line and a road. Several towns, including Stavropol, had to be transplanted to make its construction possible. Kazan will become a seaport, since the Volga up to that point will be navigable for sea-going vessels.

The next biggest project, that of Stalingrad, is intended primarily for the irrigation and improvement of the southern Trans-Volga and the Central black soil regions, the Nogaisk steppes, and the desert and semi-desert Caspian and Sarpinsk plains, a total of 30 million acres, to be used mainly for cotton, sugar beet, rice, fruit, and vegetables. Completion of the power station was earmarked for 1956 but has, like that of Kuibyshev, been deferred for the new Five-Year Plan period 1956–60. Its originally planned capacity has been increased to 2 3 million kw and its annual output to 11,000 million kwh

The new Plan directives also speak of a Saratov GES (hydro-electric station) on the Volga half-way between Kuibyshev and Stalingrad, with a capacity of 1 million kw, it further stipulates the start of a Lower Kama GES (capacity 900,000 kw), and the completion of the Votkinsk project on the Kama (540,000 kw). Mr Bulganin also spoke of the completion of the Molotov project (originally planned for 1932–7). This seems to comprise, or to be identical with, the Kama project, of which Radio Moscow reported just before the Party Congress that generators Nos. 11 and 12 are about to be switched into the 'Molotov grid'.

But the launching of all these projects has aggravated the old problem of the Caspian Sea, whose water level between 1910 and 1939 sank by 2 metres. The waters of the Volga were not sufficient to make up for the loss through evaporation. Now the storing of waters in huge reservoirs will further diminish the flow into the Caspian. Other sources of supply are therefore under consideration, one of the two possibilities being a diversion of waters from the rivers Pechora, Kama, and Vychegda.

According to the new Plan directives, all power stations of Central and Southern Russia and of the Urals are to be linked with Kuibyshev and Stalingrad by transmission lines of 400

kilovolt to form a unified power grid in the European part of the U.S.S.R.

There are also a number of other, independent, projects completed since the war, such as the Narva GES; the Manych shipping canal between the Caspian and the Black Sea; the Mingechaur power station and reservoir on the river Kura in Azerbaidjan (now used as an experimental site for the testing of a new type of remote control equipment). Another power station on the Kura is planned, as is a chain of power stations in Georgia, Moldavia, Transcarpathia, and other parts of the U.S.S.R. The Georgian, Azerbaidjan, and Armenian power grids will also be linked. Reconstruction of the river Nieman from Kaunas (Lithuania) to Kaliningrad (the former Koenigsberg) is in hand, as well as other, less known, undertakings.

CENTRAL ASIA

The largest of the Central Asian projects was to be the Main Turkmen shipping and irrigation canal scheduled for completion in 1957. Fed by the Amu-Darya, it would have started at the new town of Takhia-Tash near the Aral Sea and flowed through the Kara-Kum desert and the Caspian plains to Krasnovodsk on the Caspian Its distributive canals were earmarked for the irrigation of 2·6 million acres of land for cotton growing and 9 million acres for pasture A pipe-line would have brought drinking water to new industrial enterprises and workers' settlements But nothing has been heard of the Turkmen canal since mid-1953, nor does the new Plan mention this project There are, however, frequent reports of progress on the Kara-Kum canal, 600 miles long and 4 to 4½ metres deep, a south-eastern project, which will link the Amu-Darya near Kerki with the Murgab river, via Mary—Tedzhen—Ashkhabad to Bakharden. Discussed as early as 1925, work on it should have started in 1947 but was apparently deferred Other projects under construction are those of Bukhtarma and Kapchagai in Kazakhstan, Kairak-Kum in Tadjikistan, and a number of others. Among those already completed are the Great Fergana Canal in the Altai mountains and the Ust-Kamenogorsk project on the upper reaches of the Irtysh (the only Soviet canal with a one-chamber drop of 40 metres; by comparison, the Donzère-Mondragon lock on the Rhône has a drop of 80 metres) These projects will greatly enhance the industrial development of the rich ore-bearing Altai region.

SIBERIAN PROJECTS

According to recent statements by Mr Khrushchev and Mr Malenkov, the hydro-power resources of the U.S.S.R. are somewhere in the region of 1,200,000 million kwh, almost as much, it was stated, as those of Europe (without the U.S.S.R.), the U.S.A., and Canada combined. About 80 per cent of these potentialities are in Eastern Siberia, still practically untapped. A start has now been made to utilize the waters of the Angara and Yenissei; the Lena, Vitima, and other rivers will follow. Near Bratsk on the Angara another enormous lake is being created and the 'largest hydro-electric power station in the world' erected. The first of its sixteen radial-axle turbines is to begin generating power before the end of the present Plan period. Eventual total capacity of the plant will be 3·2 million kw, and annual production 22,000 million kwh. The 'Bratsk Lake' will cover an area of about 2,300 sq. miles and will be up to 100 metres deep. The Irkutsk GES, with a capacity of 660,000 kw, will come into operation this year. Total capacity of the Angara chain (including the Ust-Ilim and Boguchansk GES) will be over 10 million kw and annual output about 70,000 million kwh. Under the new Five-Year Plan the Novosibirsk GES will be put into operation, and a start will be made with the Kamen GES, both on the river Ob, and each with a capacity of 500,000 kw. The Krasnoyarsk GES, with a capacity of 3·2 million kw, the same as Bratsk, will be taken in hand on the Yenissei (the waters of which could, according to Mr Malenkov, generate 130,000 million kwh). Instead of the customary locks this project will have a ship lift suspended on 300 cables and calculated to raise a chamber containing the water and the ship to a height of 100 metres. All power stations will eventually (in fifteen to twenty years' time) be linked into a Central Siberian grid supplying all industrial regions in the Angara-Yenisseisk basin and the Kuzbass area with electricity which will work out two or three times cheaper than in other parts of the U.S.S.R., and will save the country about 120 million tons of coal a year. A number of rivers will be made navigable, in the first place the Angara; this river will be converted into a deep waterway stretching from Lake Baikal to the Yenissei and the Karsk Sea.

An extension, or rather shortening, of the Northern Sea route eastwards across Siberia itself has for long occupied Soviet explorers and engineers. But this would appear to be a plan for the distant future. The same applies to the gigantic Davydov plan, first submitted in 1949, for the re-distribution of the waters of

some of the Siberian rivers. The first stage of this almost utopi scheme would provide for the utilization of the waters of the (and its tributary, the Irtysh, and the creation of the 'first Siberi Sea' of 150,000 sq. miles in the Western plains of Siberia. A can 625 miles long, flowing along the course of the Tobol river ir the Aral Sea, would supply water to the Caspian Sea via t Turkmen canal. The second stage would comprise the formation the 'second Siberian Sea', of about 115,000 sq. miles, which wou be connected with both the first Siberian Sea and Lake Baik A South-Siberian canal, to link the rivers Tobol, Ishym, Irtys and Ob, was also at one time under discussion. Irrigation can would serve a total of 63 million acres of land in Western Sibe and Kazakhstan.

All these plans, if not utopian, are certainly of amazing magr tude. Even the constructions already in hand are gigantic, and a leading to the creation of new industrial and agricultural are Cost and immediate profitability—rarely revealed—seem to play secondary role, but much is made, as has been seen, of the propaganda value

M. D

The main hydro-technical projects of the U S.S.R. are :

Volkhov completed in 1926
Lower Svir completed 1933–7
Upper Svir completed 1952–4
Stalin Canal (White Sea-Baltic canal) completed 1933

GREATER DNIEPR SCHEME

Zaporozhye (Dniepropetrovsk) began operating in 1932
Kakhovka began operating in 1955
Kremenchug under construction
Kanev planned
Upper and Lower Ingulets under construction
Old Dniepr-Bug Canal reconstructed 1939–40
New Dniepr-Bug canal planned
Dnieprodzerzhinsk project planned
Western Dvina canal planned
Oka-Don canal apparently under construction

GREATER VOLGA SCHEME

Moscow-Don canal completed 1937
Volga-Don canal completed 1952
Uglich plant. began operation 1940
Shcherbakov plant began operation in 1941–2, reconstructed 1949
Kuibyshev began operation 1955
Gorki began operation 1955
To be completed 1956–60 Stalingr Votkinsk, Molotovsk
To begin operation 1956–60 Sarat Cheboksary, Lower Kama
Northern Dvina-Vychegda plann

OTHER PROJECTS

Narva completed
Manych canal completed
Mingechaur GES completed

CENTRAL ASIAN PROJECTS

Main Turkmen canal suspended
Kara-Kum canal under constructi
Ust-Kamenogorsk GES completed
Great Fergana canal completed
Under construction Bukhtarn Kapchagai, and Kairak-Ki projects

SIBERIAN PROJECTS

Bratsk to begin operation in 1956–
Irkutsk to begin operation in 1956
Novosibirsk to begin operation b tween 1956–60
Planned Krasnoyarsk, Kamen
Davydov plan · under discussion

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INCREASE IN PRICE

It is regretted that, owing to increases in printing and postal charges, the annual subscription to THE WORLD TODAY will have to be raised to 30s. ($6.00) and the price per copy to 2s 6d (50 cents) from the issue for July 1956.

Members of Chatham House have already been notified of the coming increase in their concession rate.

Notes of the Month

Farm Politics in the United States

THE economic story behind President Eisenhower's veto of the Farm Bill, passed last month as an election year measure by the Democratic Congress, goes back to the depression of the nineteen-thirties. Many of the efforts made at that time to encourage an upswing in the economic cycle by increasing purchasing power were concentrated on the rural areas, where nearly half the population lived and where much of the deepest and most long-standing poverty was to be found. Out of these efforts came the parity concept, under which the farmer is guaranteed an income, in terms of things he buys, equal to his income in an earlier period, originally 1910–14, when his economic position compared favourably with that of other groups in the community. Out of these efforts also came the price support system, under which the Government puts a floor beneath the prices of the more important crops at a percentage of the parity price for that crop. This is done either by direct purchases when the price falls below the support level, or by loans. The latter are usually only paid off in cash if the market price of the commodity makes it worth the farmer's while to do so; otherwise the Government takes over his crop.

During the last World War, and again during the Korean crisis,

this system was developed and extended to a far wider range of commodities, including perishables, in order to provide guaranteed markets which would encourage farmers to produce the maximum possible amounts of food and fibre. Further complications have come from the reluctance of successive Administrations, of both parties, to force farmers to stand on their own feet and from the mutual readiness of politicians to strike generous bargains for the benefit of their constituents. Broadly speaking, the result of the support system has been that American farmers, who in the past have relied on exporting a large part of their output, have been priced out of world markets and that huge surpluses have piled up in the Government's hands. What is fundamentally perhaps more serious is that farmers have had little incentive to adapt their activities to changing patterns of demand. The price support system has tied American agriculture to an outmoded concentration on grain and cotton production, when today the consumer wants a higher proportion of livestock, fruit, vegetable, and dairy products.

Unfortunately for the Republican Administration, the cumulative effects of the farm policies of the last twenty years have only become inescapably obvious since President Eisenhower took office in 1953 During these three years the value of the surpluses held by the Government increased from $2 5 billion to $9 billion, and the cost to the taxpayer also increased similarly. Efforts to dispose of these surpluses abroad have been hampered by understandable complaints against dumping from competing exporters, whether allies such as Canada or politically sensitive countries such as Egypt. Nor has the farmer been satisfied: under a system intended to give him economic equality with industrial workers, his income has been declining steadily at a time when every other group in the country has been enjoying bounding prosperity.

It is easy, although unjustifiable, to blame this decline on the new price support legislation brought in by the Republicans, farm prices, however, were falling before the Republicans took office, and the new legislation is only now having any real effect. Furthermore, the legislation is based on a principle which was part of the price support idea when it was originally conceived by the Democrats and which many of them have supported in the past; some still do today. This is the principle of flexible price supports, at varying levels of parity depending on supply and demand, and accompanied by restrictions on the amount of land which may be

planted with crops which benefit from price support when they are in surplus.

But with an election in the offing, the Democrats put political opportunity before economic responsibility and pushed through Congress a complicated and unworkable Bill intended to give farmers immediate relief. The basic objection to it was that it restored the system of rigid price supports, fixed at 90 per cent of parity, which the President had repeatedly condemned as being the main root of the farm problem. The Bill, however, presented Mr Eisenhower with a dilemma for it also authorized the soil bank scheme, his latest and most constructive proposal for solving the surplus difficulty; under this scheme farmers would be paid for taking land out of crop production and diverting it to pasture or forest.

The President was faced with this dilemma just as a series of primary elections, the preliminaries to next autumn's general election, had provided direct evidence that normally-Republican farmers were in revolt and prepared to vote for Democrats. A similar protest in 1948 is usually credited with giving Mr Truman his unexpected victory in that year. While it is very doubtful whether the farmers would, or could, go so far as to turn Mr Eisenhower out of the White House, their dissatisfaction might easily mean that the Republicans failed to gain control of Congress next November. President Eisenhower settled this situation in the courageous way, by rejecting the Bill, but he also made it easier for the voters to reward his courage with their continued support. For he accompanied his veto of the principle of rigid price supports by administrative actions which will in fact raise price supports temporarily by almost the same amount and will provide as speedy help for the farmers as the Bill itself would have done. After all this, American agricultural policy is left as uncertain as ever. But one thing at least is certain—the question will be a major issue in next autumn's election.

The Dissolution of the Cominform

THE report that the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was to be dissolved was first given by the Zagreb radio on 22 March, referring to a meeting of the Italian Communist Party central committee after Togliatti's return to Italy from the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. Togliatti denied the report the next day. The news was not given officially

until 17 April, when it was announced in Moscow by Mikoyan

The Cominform was founded at the end of September 1947 at a meeting in Poland of representatives of the Communist parties of the U.S.S.R., Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria Hungary, Yugoslavia, France, and Italy, 'to exchange information and co-ordinate activities'. It was regarded at the time as a move to counterbalance the Marshall Plan, which Zhdanov, one of the two Russian representatives, said they would do their utmost to frustrate. As far as official reports go, only three meetings were held, the foundation conference, the second in June 1948 which expelled the Yugoslav party, and the third in November of the following year, also largely devoted to the anti-Tito campaign. Its only other public activity was to publish a weekly newspaper in several languages.

Like the dissolution of the Communist International (Comintern) in 1943, the present move is regarded as a gesture of conciliation; but whereas the Comintern's dissolution was directed to the Western Powers, the end of the Cominform appears to be designed to further the recent *rapprochement* with Yugoslavia, and to meet the wishes of 'neutralist' opinion—Mr Nehru is said to have suggested its dissolution during the Russian leaders' visit to India. So long as it lasted, it was difficult to answer the charge that the Soviet Union interfered in the internal affairs of other countries. But it is unlikely that this spells the end of Moscow's control of foreign Communist parties, and indeed Togliatti, in an interview given the day after the statement in Moscow, said that the dissolution did not mean that contacts between Communist parties would cease, although they had now reached a degree of maturity which enabled them to exercise independent judgement Conversations, he said, had been going on for months, and agreement on the dissolution was reached at the Soviet Party Congress and had since been ratified by the Central Committees of the parties concerned. The Cominform, he added, had not been an entirely satisfactory body; its worst mistake was the expulsion of Tito.

Claims to Gibraltar

THE Queen's visit to Gibraltar in May 1954 had two consequences: it gave an opportunity to the Gibraltarians to demonstrate their loyalty; and, more unhappily, it led to a renewal of anti-British demonstrations by the Falangist Party. The official attitude of the Spanish Government has reverted to what has been seen

several times in past history, a policy of restrictions imposed upon the commerce and communications between the British fortress and the Spanish mainland.

It may be worth while to recall that Gibraltar was captured by an allied army and fleet during the War of the Spanish Succession, in 1704. At their own desire the civil population withdrew into Spain, and the present inhabitants are the descendants of new immigrants from other parts of the Mediterranean. Gibraltar has now been British longer than ever it was Spanish. In the preliminary moves towards peace the other allies withdrew their claims, so that Queen Anne was able to instruct her envoys to base the British claim upon right of conquest; and, by the Treaty signed at Utrecht on 2/13 July 1713, the town, fortress, and harbour were ceded '*cum omnimodo jure*'. These provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht have been repeatedly renewed and confirmed, never more cogently than at the exchange of identical notes between Great Britain and Spain in May 1907. Each party undertook 'the preservation of the territorial *status quo* and of the rights of Spain and Great Britain in the Mediterranean and in that part of the Atlantic which washes the shores of Europe and Africa'.

During both World Wars, Spanish statesmen entertained hopes that a German victory would provide them with an opportunity of regaining Gibraltar at the division of the spoils. There is no truth, however, in the allegations that the British made any sort of proposal to cede the fortress in return for Spanish aid. The last time that any such proposal was made was in 1757, when it was rejected by Spain. Sir Winston Churchill's emphatic denial in the House of Commons (20 May 1954) should put an end to the suggestion that an offer was made during the second World War. In January 1956 General Franco gave an interview to the *Daily Mail* in which he said that the return of Gibraltar was still a matter of honour to every Spaniard. He added that if it were retroceded he would be willing to allow Britain to use the naval harbour under some such agreement as had been made with the U.S.A. for their leased bases in Spain. In reply to a question in the House of Commons on 13 February 1956 the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord John Hope, stated that the Government was 'not prepared to consider any change in the status of the Rock'.

During the last seventy years it has sometimes been argued that modern weapons have lessened the strategic value of the fortress.

Several times it has been suggested in Britain, and during the dictatorship of Primo da Rivera in Spain also, that an exchange should be negotiated of Gibraltar for Ceuta. As Mr Amery pointed out in the House of Commons in 1923, millions of money would be needed to equip Ceuta; it has no military advantage over Gibraltar, and, unlike Gibraltar, where the people are loyal British citizens, it has a large Spanish population. Thirty-three years later these considerations are unchanged.

The most persistent bickering between Spain and Great Britain has arisen over a loosely drafted sentence in the Treaty of Utrecht. Article 10, or so the words seem to imply, excluded the British from territorial jurisdiction outside the fortress, and no agreement has ever been reached over the limits of British authority in respect of the outworks and the anchorage. By common consent, though not by any formal instrument, the isthmus has been treated as 'neutral ground'. The British have always maintained advanced military posts over the southern end, and the Spaniards, long ago, made an entrenched line (La Linea) across the northern end. During the last war the British constructed an air-strip across their section of the neutral ground and used the soil excavated from the Rock to extend it 150 yards into the anchorage. The Spaniards made no objection and the work was largely done by Spanish labourers from La Linea In 1955 the Spaniards advanced their frontier posts as far as the British lines, thus occupying the remainder of the neutral ground.

The strategic value of Gibraltar was demonstrated in 1942 when it became the headquarters and the assembly point for the invasion of North Africa. During the war the civil population, excepting essential workers, were evacuated to Britain and, on their return, re-housing was an urgent problem. The sum of £350,000 was at once allotted from Colonial Development and Welfare funds for housing, and a further £500,000 was allocated in 1954 for the development of housing and harbour-works during the succeeding five years. The limitation on progress is the shortage of labour Although about 11,000 Spanish labourers come into Gibraltar daily, the Spanish Government has recently restricted the number of labour permits, and has imposed new formalities at the frontier. Efforts have also been made to exploit Algeçiras, where the harbour facilities are much inferior, as a rival to Gibraltar, and one American line has gone so far as to change its port-of-call to Algeçiras.

The Unorthodox Left and the Ceylon Elections

THE world Trotskyist movement, to which attention has been drawn by the success of the L.S.S.P. in the recent elections in Ceylon, is a bewildering tangle of conflicting sects, most of them torn by internal disputes on tactics and doctrine. To attempt to unravel this tangle would be a monumental and thankless task. There is, however, a broad cleavage among the Trotskyists on the fundamental question. is Russia a 'workers' State'? This accounts for the existence of an 'official' body, the so-called Fourth International, with headquarters in Paris and *La Quatrième Internationale* as its theoretical organ; and various 'unofficial' organizations not linked up internationally, of which the L.S.S.P. is one. Outside of Ceylon and Indonesia, the only country where these 'unofficial' Trotskyists have any following at all is the U.S.A., where the Independent Socialist League, under the leadership of Max Shachtman, conducts vigorous propaganda and is in a stronger position than the 'official' Socialist Workers' Party led by James P. Cannon. After a seven-year battle the I S.L. last June won what was widely regarded in the U.S.A. as an historic 'civil liberties' victory, when the Federal Court of Appeal for the District of Columbia unanimously adjudged unconstitutional the refusal of the State Department Passport Division to grant Shachtman a passport.

The Trotskyist movement had its origin, of course, in the inner-party struggle in Russia, but it was not until after the sixth congress of the Comintern in July–August 1928 that it took root abroad. At that congress Trotsky's *Draft Programme of the Comintern, A Criticism of Fundamentals*—directed against the Bukharin–Stalin programme—was circulated to a strictly limited number of delegates. This document was smuggled abroad by one of the American delegates, Cannon, and published in the U.S.A. in 1929. Henceforth it was the Americans who played a major part in the publication and dissemination of Trotsky's writings.

Up to the coming to power of Hitler, the Trotskyist Left Opposition continued to consider itself part of the Communist movement, although expelled. In spite of all shortcomings Russia was regarded as 'a workers' State', and the Communist parties as being capable of 'regeneration'. After Hitler's triumph, however, this latter view was abandoned and the appeal for the creation of a Fourth International launched in September 1933. This change led to defections and splits in all countries where

unorthodox Left groupings existed. In the course of time the accumulation of doubts about the 'workers' State' led to further splits. Today, those who cling to the 'workers' State' theory held by Trotsky up to his assassination are nevertheless internally divided on tactics: some strongly inclined to regard the 'Stalinists' as brothers under the skin, and therefore urging 'infiltration' of the Communist parties; others urging an 'independent' policy. The 'unofficial' Trotskyists, on the other hand, consider Russia an imperialist Power and stand on the ground of a 'third force', independent of and hostile to all 'imperialisms'. The Ceylonese L.S.S.P. (one of whose leading members, Mr Gunawardena, now Minister of Agriculture, was a member of a Trotskyist group in London during his student years) holds to this view, but it is highly probable that it is not unaffected by 'bourgeois nationalism'.

CORRIGENDUM

In the recent Note on 'Rival Claims in Antarctica' (*The World Today*, March 1956, pp. 91–2) the following points call for correction:

(i) p. 92, line 5: 'The Chilean counter-claim seems to be based merely upon geographical fantasy'. It should be made clear that this relates to the Chilean claim to a sector of the mainland. The claim to Deception Island, on grounds of prior occupation, is not without substance.

(ii) p. 92, 6 lines from end: 'three Chilean bases' should read 'four Chilean bases'.

New Policy Trends in Eastern Germany

The S.E.D. Party's Third Conference and the 'Back-to-Lenin' Line

THE third Party Conference of the Socialist Unity Party (S.E.D.), the Communist Party of Eastern Germany, was the first major satellite party function since the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in Moscow last February. It provided, as it were, the first testing ground for the new back-to-Lenin line and the emphasis on collective leadership. The leading figure was, of course, Walter Ulbricht, the party's first secretary, who has been playing such a prominent part in aiding and abetting the posthumous murder of Stalin's reputation. In common with all other satellite leaders he must have been considerably surprised when on coming to Moscow he learned that Stalin was no longer to be regarded as a demi-god. How little even the top-ranking satellite leaders were in the confidence of the Kremlin on this occasion is shown by the fact that the East German message of greeting addressed to the Congress, and published in the press, ended with the words 'Long live the invincible teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin'. Yet when Ulbricht addressed the Congress two days after Khrushchev had spoken he said that he was going to read the message, but did not do so, and ended by giving cheers for 'Marxism-Leninism'.

On his return to Berlin Ulbricht published a report about the Moscow Congress in which he made the by now celebrated statement that Stalin could not be considered a Marxist classic. These words, coming as they did from 'Stalin's most faithful pupil', far from being quietly accepted as the new dogma, caused a great deal of consternation and unrest in party circles. He then made a speech at the Berlin district conference of the Socialist Unity Party, a week before the opening of the Party Conference, in which he grasped the nettle even more firmly. This speech was evidently to have been part of his conference address but it was felt necessary to deliver it earlier with a view to counteracting confusion and oppositional tendencies. Thus in order to assess the impact of the twentieth Congress on the third Party Conference of the East German Communists, and on the situation in East Germany generally, it is essential to discuss the new Moscow line and in particular the emphasis laid in Ulbricht's pronouncements

on Lenin's view as to reaching Socialism by different roa

A GERMAN ROAD TO SOCIALISM

The possibility of reaching Socialism by different roads, and t need to co-operate with Social Democrats and others in order achieve unity of action, are of particular interest to Commun ideology and policy in Germany. These ideas played an importa part in the early history of the Socialist Unity Party, as, of cours they did also in Czechoslovakia and Poland where Gottwald ai Gomulka at one time expressed similar views. In the mont preceding the fusion of the Social Democratic and Commun Parties in Eastern Germany in 1946, the chief ideologist of t Communists at that time, Anton Ackermann, was at great pains make Lenin's point. In the first issue of *Einheit*, a periodical pu lished to prepare the ground for the fusion (the journal later b came the chief theoretical organ of the S.E.D.), Ackermann di cussed the question whether the working class could obtain cor plete political power via parliamentary democracy or only throu revolutionary force. He arrived at the conclusion, drawing liberal on Marx and Lenin, that, to use his own words, it would be t greatest mistake to exaggerate the truth about the general validi of Russian experience. He also referred to Lenin's dictum of t different roads and stated that the answer to the question wheth there was a special German road to Socialism had to be given u conditionally in the affirmative.

Whether he sincerely held this view, or whether it was son form of ideological Malenkovism designed to induce the unwilli Social Democrats to participate with an easier mind in the sho gun wedding of the two parties, may be open to question. The fa remains that this view of the special German road to Socialis was the ideological basis of the fusion. Gradually matters change and in 1948, when Stalin had decided on the complete integrati of Eastern Germany into the Soviet orbit, the ideology became t heresy. Ackermann wrote an article saying that 'after matu consideration' he had come to the conclusion that the theory such a special road was a serious theoretical deviation and mu be rejected. Other party spokesmen denied that there was such thing as a peaceful road to Socialism. And Ulbricht made t position quite clear by declaring that the fusion of the two parti was necessary in order to further the progress from peopl democracy to Socialism, and 'for the co-ordination of the econom

plans'. Thus the ideology had to be changed because the Soviet Union wished to increase its control over the economic potential of the satellites.

Now a new phase has been reached. Soviet economic control over Eastern Germany is complete. It was Khrushchev, not Stalin, who spoke of the two German States which had become a reality and described Eastern Germany as the bulwark of Socialism and an example for Germany as a whole. But the new strategy now proclaimed in Moscow, of moving step by step rather than by forced march, with its recognition of different approaches to Socialism and its re-acceptance of Titoism as a legitimate creed, makes it necessary for the East German Communists to revise their tactics *vis-à-vis* Western Germany and, in particular, the West German Social Democrats. Today Ulbricht repeats all the nice things that Khrushchev has recently found to say about Social Democrats, and tells the West German Socialists that there is no objective argument to prevent them from participating in the co-operation of the two workers' parties in Western Germany and in Germany as a whole. The East German Communists had shown the West German workers how an anti-fascist democratic State could be established peacefully and democratically 'with the help of parliamentary majorities'. In fairness it should be said that he admitted that it was easier for them in Eastern Germany because, to quote his words, the Soviet occupying Power protected the democratic reconstruction.

As for relations between the Federal Republic and the so-called German Democratic Republic, Lenin's principle of the co-existence between States possessing different social orders should apply here, Ulbricht said. A few months ago, at the beginning of October, Oelssner, a member of the Politbureau and in charge of ideological matters, had flatly stated that to apply the principle of co-existence to German conditions would be to acknowledge in principle the division of Germany and would 'contradict the German people's right to their struggle for reunification'. Now, because Soviet foreign policy changes its tactics, the ideology of the East German Communist Party follows suit once again.

THE CONFERENCE AND THE MOSCOW LINE

It is against this background of ideological *volte-face* that the deliberations of the third Party Conference must be viewed. And it must be taken into account when considering the political

headaches which have afflicted many East German party functionaries as a result of Stalin's dethronement. In his key speech at the conference, which lasted six hours, Ulbricht contrived to mention Stalin's name not even once. All he had to say was that the Soviet Congress had told the truth to the world. It would be wrong, however, to interpret this as merely an attempt to gloss over an unpleasant subject. On the contrary, on the eve of the conference the Central Committee adopted a resolution approving the views that Ulbricht had expressed prior to the conference. Once they had become an ideological directive for the party there was no need for him to go over the same ground again, and the guns of potential opponents (a somewhat improbable metaphor in relation to a Communist party conference) had been successfully spiked. It seems likely that even if such opposition had manifested itself during the secret session reference would have been made to the binding character of the Central Committee's resolution.

But two other Politbureau members had been given the task of attacking some of the views expressed at local and district conferences and, of course, in private conversations, up and down the country. Rau, Minister of Foreign Trade and a Stalinist of long standing, repeated Khrushchev's statement that Stalin's theory of the capitalist countries lagging behind in economic development was incorrect, and said that comrades should learn the necessary lessons from the criticisms of Stalin's work made in Moscow. undoubtedly Stalin had made mistakes during the last fifteen years of his life. But, said Schirdewan, chief of the Cadres Department, Stalin's mistakes should not be viewed in isolation: he had also remarkable achievements to his credit. Stalin, then, is criticized, but is not condemned wholesale. By recalling his achievements the party leaders were obviously endeavouring to minimize the disillusionment of party members at the Politbureau's and Central Committee's earlier adulation of a false god. That feelings of this kind did, and no doubt still do, exist, and that they have also been expressed, is made clear beyond doubt. Hysterical attacks of Western newspapers, exclaimed Rau, and attempts to play off one comrade against another, were doomed to failure. One might well wonder why Rau should be concerned about articles in Western newspapers whose circulation is forbidden in Eastern Germany. He probably had in mind Western broadcasts, and his words are an indirect tribute to their effectiveness. But why should either newspapers which are banned, or broadcasts which are partly

jammed, and to which no good party man should listen anyway, have any influence in playing off one comrade against another? Of course, these words were really addressed to people in Eastern Germany, and most likely in the party itself. If proof of this was needed, it was supplied by Schirdewan. Any attempts by our enemies to belittle the achievements of Ulbricht, Pieck, and Grotewohl, and of the Central Committee, he warned, would encounter the unanimous resistance of the whole party. At this the whole conference cheered its leaders with raised clenched fists. It can be taken for granted that those to whom this warning was directed were not present in the conference hall, since all delegates had been carefully screened by the Cadres Department.

The same nervousness was noticeable in the discussion of the principle of collective leadership and the personality cult. Ulbricht naturally paid lip service to the decisions of the Moscow Congress. But just in case some comrades should get liberal ideas into their heads, they were plainly told by Schirdewan that collective leadership did not imply adopting an anarchical attitude towards the veteran leaders in the collective. Personal responsibility and the importance of leading functionaries should not be overlooked. Remarks like these are typical of what one might describe as the restricted application of the new Moscow dogma.

REHABILITATION AND RECANTATION?

But the Moscow line could not be completely passed over. An eight-man commission, Ulbricht announced, had been formed to review, under the 'guidance' of the Politbureau, the cases of party members who were expelled from the party or penalized in violation of party statutes. While it is, of course, a somewhat damaging admission for a first party secretary that such things could have happened, Ulbricht will be much more concerned about the extent to which history is to be rewritten. The necessary instructions, if any, will come from Moscow, at least as far as top-ranking leaders are concerned. If the men in the Kremlin feel that gestures are needed to improve morale in Eastern Germany or to impress the West German Social Democrats, they will give orders that some of the former leaders and lesser men should rejoin the party, if they had been expelled, and should even assume leading functions once more. Moscow is not likely to worry unduly about Ulbricht's qualms, and they might even remove him if they thought it helpful to their policy. But one of the inherent problems

of any totalitarian regime is that those oppressed by it tend to interpret any relaxation of pressure as a sign of weakness. This was the lesson of 17 June 1953, when the East German workers rose *after* the regime had relaxed some of the worst pressure. And all the evidence since points to the fact that this lesson has not escaped the men in Moscow or in Berlin.

This, then, is the dilemma now facing Ulbricht and his Stalinist group: how to carry out, at any rate in part, the liquidation of Stalinism without running risks of this kind and without encouraging 'dangerous thoughts' both inside and outside the party. It is difficult to imagine how the new commission, working under the Politbureau, can avoid looking into the cases of such men as Ackermann, Dahlem, Zaisser, Herrnstadt, and others. Ackermann, the advocate of a 'German road' to Socialism, is of course, an obvious case for rehabilitation. He fell into disgrace in 1953 and was given an administrative post in the film industry, after having been a candidate-member of the Politbureau and State Secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

But undoubtedly the most interesting case is that of Franz Dahlem, Ulbricht's great rival. Until May 1953, when he was deprived of his offices and expelled from the Central Committee, he was second only to Ulbricht himself. Unlike Ulbricht, who during the Nazi-Soviet honeymoon called on the German workers not to obstruct Hitler's armaments production, and who spent the war in the Soviet Union, Dahlem was in charge of the German Communists in Paris and obviously entertained doubts as to the correctness of Stalin's foreign policy. He had come under fire as a result of the Slansky trial, and the charges levelled against him in May 1953 included contact with Noel Field, insufficient confidence in the U.S.S.R., a wrong evaluation of the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact and a false assessment of the part played by the Western Powers, especially by France. The interesting thing is that Dahlem never recanted but fought to the last ditch. At present he is head of a department in the State Secretariat for Higher Education, without, of course, holding any party post. This fact notwithstanding, he recently reappeared on the political scene in a most remarkable fashion. At a students' meeting in Berlin at which he was answering questions he was asked whether, after the Moscow Congress, 'Titoists' in Eastern Germany would be rehabilitated as well. Dahlem declared that Beria and his followers had misled the East German leaders 'and comrade Ulbricht'. If those

punished had been guilty only of Titoism they might be treated leniently. To make a statement of this kind (which was reported in the West Berlin press and not denied by East Berlin papers but, on the contrary, confirmed by implication) is extraordinary, and even more so when made by a man who was, and still is officially, purged. To have his name linked with Beria need cause Ulbricht no undue concern. After all, Khrushchev himself confessed to Tito that the Soviet leaders had been deceived by Beria. But the case is surely different if the purges decreed by Ulbricht after the June 1953 rising were linked with Beria's name in a way which he might regret today. When Zaisser, then Minister of State Security, and Herrnstadt, editor of the party organ *Neues Deutschland*, both Moscow-trained but men of greater intellectual calibre than Ulbricht, were expelled from the Politbureau and the Central Committee they were accused of having negotiated with Beria's agents about Ulbricht's deposition. Now if Ulbricht can be misled by Beria, why not Zaisser and Herrnstadt, party members are likely to ask themselves; or was their only crime that they wanted to put an end to Ulbricht's one-man rule? These are unpleasant questions which sooner or later will have to be answered, and it will be interesting to see how the investigation committee is going to tackle the issue.

So far only one leading functionary, Jendretzky, who was leader of the Berlin party organization at the time of the June rising in 1953 and was made a scapegoat and deprived of his post, has quietly re-emerged. It was announced that he is to be a member of a new 'Commission for Developing Democracy on a Broad Basis'. The significance of this committee becomes ominously apparent when one hears that other members include Hilde Benjamin, the notorious Minister of Justice, Wollweber, Minister of State Security, Melsheimer, Prosecutor General, and the Chairman of the Party's Control Commission: those, in fact, who have been mainly responsible for purges. It is worth noting that the composition of this committee was made public before Grotewohl's strictures on the work of public prosecutors and the judiciary, a fact which sheds some light on the true weight of these criticisms, even if they were made in somewhat dramatic fashion.

The exhibition of self-criticism on the part of the Prosecutor General, who served Hitler as a judge of the Prussian Appeal Court and discovered his belief in Communism only after the war, means little. The Minister of State Security's defence of his

department (he had not been mentioned by name by Premie
Grotewohl) was more in the character of a demonstration of th
power of his position than a promise to do away with all arbitrar
police actions. Even loyal party delegates may have been surprise
to hear that no one had ever been arrested merely because hi
political opinions differed from that of the S.E.D. Only 'agents
were liable to arrest, and not everyone who expressed disapprova
was necessarily an agent too. This, of course, leaves in the hands o
the security services the power of decision as to when disagree
ment becomes a hostile activity. But it certainly was significan
that the Minister of Justice, who was referred to by Grotewohl i
his speech, did not think it necessary to comment.

If the party really wanted to make a contribution to the restora
tion of the rule of law it might have included in its admission o
mistakes and miscarriages of justice the persecution of the churche
and the drive to restrict still further the freedom of religion
guaranteed in the Constitution. This was not the case On th
contrary, as one speaker in the discussion pointed out, co-existenc
in questions of *Weltanschauung* was impossible. 'Communism i
irreconcilable with superstition and religion, which obstruct pro
gress. Some Bishops should take careful note.' Both before and
even more, since the conference the words 'superstition' anc
'religion' have been bracketed in the press, and the term 're
ligious superstition' is frequently used, a fact which does not augu
well for the future. Whatever changes there may be in the Stalinis
line, it does not seem likely that the pressure against the churche
will be relaxed, since they obstruct, in Communist eyes, th
further 'development of Socialism'.

REUNIFICATION AND INTEGRATION

That further Sovietization remains the target of Communist
strategy in Eastern Germany has never been in doubt. And in case
party members were wondering how such a policy could be
squared with the long-term concept of a re-united Germany, as
against the short-term plan of co-existence between the two States
of Western and Eastern Germany, Ulbricht was quite unequivocal
about the true Communist aim. Up to now the East German
Communists have always pretended, following the Soviet line,
that reunification should proceed on an all-party basis. Now
Ulbricht says that in the event of reunification the socialist achieve-
ments of Eastern Germany must not only be safeguarded but that

they are the pre-conditions for a peaceful and democratic development of Germany as a whole.

A glance at the directives for the new East German Five-Year Plan makes it abundantly clear that the Soviet policy of relegating reunification to a dim and distant future is dictated by hard and fast economic motives. Once again this is not new, but it has never been stated more clearly. As a result of detailed discussions within the Soviet bloc planning organization which were evidently going on right up to the eve of the S.E.D. conference, Eastern Germany's part in the orbit division of tasks has been defined in some detail. Production is to concentrate on lignite mining which is to provide the raw material basis for the chemical industries, on potash mining, and above all on the construction of those types of machinery which require the greatest degree of skilled labour. This does not seem to be an unsound proposition from the economic point of view, but it presupposes that the economic potential of Eastern Germany has become an integral part of the Soviet orbit.

It is worth remembering, as was mentioned earlier, that the 'German road' to Socialism was dropped in 1948 to facilitate the co-ordination of the economic plans. Now even greater stress is placed on concerted orbit planning. The result of the first co-ordination phase was a steadily mounting economic and social pressure, accompanied by progressive Sovietization. Judging by the target data of the second Five-Year-Plan such pressure is to increase still further, and so too is the degree of 'building Socialism', in other words of Sovietization. In such circumstances, a 'German road', even if proclaimed (which seems, to say the least, uncertain), would be mere ideological window-dressing.

Some people may think it ironical that a party conference which is to bury Stalin should proclaim his policy. Yet is this not really a reminder that whatever form the dictatorship in the Kremlin may take, and whatever tactical concessions, if any, it may make, the long-term policy is still the thing that matters? And the man who impressed this on his followers was the undisputed classic of Marxism-Leninism, Lenin himself.

S. E. S.

The Indian Question in Mexico

MEXICO's attempts to solve her 'Indian question'—i.e., the problems caused by the existence of a considerable proportion of Indian population not fully integrated into national life—have a relevance that goes beyond her national boundaries. This has been recognized in an earlier article in *The World Today* where it was stated that 'all these (Latin American) countries, Guatemala, Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Panama, are trying to solve the native question by following more or less closely the example of Mexico'[1] The relevance is, however, by no means confined to Latin America. Mexico has grappled, with a considerable measure of success, with questions that arise wherever people who are primitives or peasants or both have to be incorporated into a world which they did not make and hence do not feel to be theirs. This means not only Guatemala and Bolivia but also Kenya and South Africa, the Ukraine and Central Asia, Spain and Southern Italy, and, perhaps more surprisingly, places as close to home as Ireland and the Scottish Highlands. Another area of relevance is opened up whereever the relations between races have reached an acute stage. One need not go as far as Lucien Fèbvre, French delegate to a UNESCO conference held in Mexico, who exclaimed: 'Mexico is a blessed country. In the year 1948, the phrase "race hatred" has no meaning there'.[2] But here, too, Mexico can point to great achievements carried out in the face of overwhelming difficulties.

Mexico's handling of its 'Indian question' might, therefore, be usefully studied in other countries, which could benefit from Mexican successes—and failures. But if the Mexican lesson is to be fruitful abroad, foreign observers must first divest themselves of certain mental attitudes, emotional impulses, and tricks of scientific method which they tend to take for granted. They must learn to look at the Indian in the way that a Mexican looks at him, however much it may go against the grain. This is particularly true of Westerners, be they Europeans or Americans.

To begin with, the word 'Indian', as applied to that part of Mexico's population which is not of European or mixed (*mestizo*) origin, is something of a misnomer. It was first used by the Spani-

[1] 'The Indian and the Land in Latin America', in *The World Today*, October 1954, p. 449.

[2] Quoted in Silvio Zavala, *El contacto de culturas en la Historia de Mexico* (Culture Contacts in Mexican History), *Cuadernos Americanos*, July-August 1949, p. 203.

ards, who thus applied a European concept to a non-European reality that only partly coincided with it. Even today, 'Indian' is to a considerable extent only an 'anthropological expression'; more justifiably than Italy was only a 'geographical expression' to Metternich. The word 'Indian' covers a multitude of tribes of a highly varying degree of cultural advancement and social self-consciousness. There is a world of difference between a Seri, belonging to one of the most primitive peoples on earth, and a Maya, much more conscious than outsiders assume of belonging to a people with a remarkable record of past achievement. But both Seri and Maya tend to consider themselves as 'Seri' and 'Maya', rather than as 'Indians', to a much larger extent than enthusiastic white or *mestizo* 'Indianists' are willing to admit.

This discrepancy is reflected even in such a relatively simple matter as the census of Mexico's Indian population. The last available figures grouped according to tribes date, characteristically, from the 1930 census; for both in 1940 and 1950 the Indian population was treated as a single lump of people speaking Indian languages exclusively or bilingually with Spanish. The 1930 figures are:[1]

Nahua	685,389
Mixtec-Zapotec	501,131
Maya-Quiche	457,628
Otomí	299,291
Zoque-Mixe	96,607
Totonac	94,211
Pima	68,210
Tarascan	44,371
Others	2,558

These figures, however correct as they stand, are apt to be misleading as guides to Mexico's social realities. They need considerable explanation and commentary if they are to be of practical use. The first thing to note is that the criterion adopted is exclusively linguistic: the figures refer to speakers of certain families of Indian languages, distributed very unevenly over the vast territories of Mexico: there are very few of them in the steppe-like north, and a good many in the central plateau and the southern tropical lowlands.

The scattered tribes of the north, which is more of a 'white man's country' than the other parts of Mexico, are grouped as 'Pima', which includes the Yaqui and Tarahumara tribes of the

[1] Quoted in Carlos Basauri, *La Población Indígena de México* (The Native Population of Mexico), Mexico, Ministry of Public Education, 1940.

north-west. Neither of them can claim any high degree of civilization; but the Yaqui are a warrior tribe, resembling the Apache, which was not fully incorporated into Mexico until the end of the nineteenth century. Even then, a considerable proportion of them preferred to cross into the United States rather than submit to General Porfirio Diaz; they took their revenge by enlisting in the armies of General Obregon and taking a prominent part in the revolution which started in 1910 and, officially at least, still continues.

Nahua, Otomí, and Tarascan cover the tribes of the Central Plateau. Nahua is the language of the Aztecs, but the Aztecs as such no longer exist. There are, indeed, a few families claiming descent from the Aztec imperial and noble families. General Mejía, who was shot with the Emperor Maximilian, claimed descent from Montezuma; but, characteristically, justified his taking sides with Maximilian against the Indian Juarez by saying that it was the destiny of the Indian to serve the white men. Today, the Nahua speakers are scattered to the east and west of the very central part of the plateau near Mexico City, which was the Aztec stronghold, and they have hardly any cohesion beyond the linguistic. Their place has been taken by the Otomí—a name covering the Otomí tribe near the capital and the Huicholes further to the north-west These were originally tribes subject to the Aztecs. They now live in rather depressed circumstances; a good deal has been attempted by Governments and Indianists on their behalf, but they have shown little initiative to help themselves. Not so the Tarascans, living still further to the north-west. They never submitted to the Aztecs, and today play a part in Mexico's public life quite out of proportion to their small numbers. General Cardenas is a full-blooded Tarascan.

Of the southern tribes, the Totonacs (a term which includes the related Huastecs) live on the shores of the Caribbean and, while making a sizeable cultural contribution, have not gone in much for political action. This is not true of the Zoque-Mixe, who share with the Zapotec-Mixtec group the isthmus between the Pacific and the Caribbean. It includes two highly gifted tribes, the Mixtecs and the Zapotecs, both very conscious of their historical heritage and tribal identity and both very prominent in the politics of the state of Oaxaca and of Mexico as a whole. During the presidential election campaign of 1952 the writer observed a poster asking people to 'Vote for so-and-so: he is a pure Mixtec'. The candidate

in question was duly elected and became the only member of the legislature who does not speak Spanish. As for the Zapotecs, they gave Mexico Benito Juarez.

The Maya-Quiche group is not confined to Mexico but spreads into Guatemala, Honduras, and British Honduras—a situation not without importance in international affairs as it occasionally produces 'incidents' on frontiers which to the Indian just make no sense. In the 1890s a war almost broke out between Mexico and Guatemala after Guatemalan Mayas had crossed into Mexico and 'kidnapped' a much venerated picture of Our Lady of Izamal; nowadays, tension is caused by more prosaic reasons such as Indians crossing from Guatemala to work on Mexican coffee plantations without benefit of passport or labour permit. The things to remember about the Maya are that they have a considerable degree of solidarity, transcending the linguistic boundaries of the various Maya-Quiche dialects, and that they are more prone to self-assertion than any other Mexican Indian people. The state of Yucatan is their stronghold and as late as 1846 they made a bid to get rid of white rule there. This 'War of the Castes' is estimated to have cost Yucatan 300,000 victims out of a population of 500,000. Remnants of the rebels remained 'unsubmitted' in the jungles until 1917, sometimes with the support of the authorities of British Honduras—a fact which to this day breeds anti-British sentiments in Yucatan. The 'Indian question' is certainly more potentially explosive in Yucatan than elsewhere in Mexico, especially since, until the coming of air travel, the state was almost completely isolated from the rest of the country and hence the scene of regionalist and even 'separatist' movements. The Maya language is not only spoken in Merida, the capital of Yucatan, but it is also written and printed there. Buses with Maya names can be seen in its streets—the giving of names to individual buses being one of the more charming Mexican customs.

But language does not tell the whole story: the Indians are by no means confined to the speakers of Indian languages or dialects. The latest estimate of the racial composition of Mexico published in *Colliers Encyclopedia* gives 61 per cent to *mestizos*, 29 per cent to Indians, 9 per cent to whites, and 1 per cent to Negroes. Since Mexico's population is by now little short of 30 million, this would give an Indian population of around 9 million. But the latest census figures (undifferentiated according to language) give the monoglot and bilingual speakers of Indian languages as some 3

million.[1] This discrepancy led one Mexican observer[2] to the Orwellian conclusion that 'some are more Indian than others'. It is more fruitful to view language as a clue to the most important aspect of the 'Indian question'—how to incorporate in the nation considerable numbers of people who feel more or less foreign to it The spread of the Spanish language has been, ever since the Spanish colonial days, the traditional method of the assimilation policy and—as the figures show—by no means an unsuccessful one.

But it has been increasingly recognized in Mexico that the adoption of Spanish by Indians is not enough. The assimilation, to be lasting and really effective, must be a two-way process. Alfonso Caso, Mexico's foremost 'Indianist' and director of the National Indian Institute, stated in a recent interview[3] that, while 'three million natives must be integrated into Mexico', the Institute also aimed at 'conserving and developing the positive aspects of the culture of these communities'. This rejection of one-way assimilation is, of course, a world-wide rather than Mexican phenomenon. No one explained it better than the Senegalese poet and politician Leopold Sédar Senghor with his slogan for the 'new Negro'. '*assimiler: non être assimilé*—to assimilate, not to be assimilated. But the peculiar aspects of Mexican history made this rejection particularly clear and emphatic.

History is something very much alive in Mexico. The reader of Mexican newspapers and magazines may well be surprised to find, for every one article dealing with the Indians of today, ten if not twenty highly emotional texts exposing the rights and wrongs of Cortez and his great Indian antagonist Cuautemoc (Montezuma is completely out of the running, contemporary Mexico agrees with the sixteenth-century Aztec who called him 'the hen of Cortez') The reason why Mexico is still fighting sixteenth-century battles is that it was then that the foundations of the 'Indian question' of today were laid. It is not for nothing that Mexicans talk of 'the trauma of the Conquest'. Of late, feelings have been exacerbated and exalted by the finding of the alleged bones of the two great protagonists. Eulalia Guzman, who unearthed the finds, happens to be a rather violent 'Indianist' and concluded from the bones that

[1] *Septimo Censo General de la Población, 6 de junio de* 1950 (Seventh General Population Census of 6 June 1950), Mexico, 1952

[2] Moises T de la Peña, *La Mexicanización del Indio* (The Mexicanization of the Indian), Mexico, 1945, p 4

[3] *Atisbos* magazine, 26 January 1956

Cortez had been a hunchbacked and syphilitic dwarf. Diego Rivera, an even more violent 'Indianist', promptly painted him in this guise in a mural. Whereupon a no less ardent 'Hispanist' used a pneumatic drill to put the word *mentira* (lie) into Rivera's pictorial version of Mexican history on the staircase of the National Palace.

One curious feature of history as written in Mexico is that the Indian has hitherto been treated as its object and not as its subject. Almost any historian will judge the rights and wrongs of Spanish rule by quoting its Spanish defenders and opponents, beginning with Las Casas and his great opponent Sepulveda in the sixteenth century. But hardly anybody has deemed it worth while to find out what the Indian himself has thought about his fate. Contrary to the general opinion, the Indian has a long historical memory and he makes no bones about judging his friends and foes. The 'War of the Castes' broke out to avenge the injustices of three centuries; the first thing rebellious Indians in Mexico City did in the 1890s was to burn down the 'Tree of the Sad Night' under which Cortez is supposed to have wept after his defeat. And the Indian historical memory has been strong enough to ensure that not a single monument to Cortez exists in Mexico today. On the other hand, the Maya still place offerings of flowers on monuments to Felipe Carrillo Puerto, the revolutionary defender of their rights; and when the well-known Italian Jesuit Father Lombardi recently asked some Tarascans what they thought of their sixteenth-century Spanish benefactor, Vasco de Quiroga, they replied: 'Well, he was an Indian like ourselves!' The Indian has written history, too. The *Books of Chilam Balam*, a Maya miscellany, tells its reader that 'everything, as it happened, so it is written', and it contains the superbly ironical judgement of the Conquest: 'In the year 1516 there came from the East the Men of God, who brought suffering'.[1]

But even if the Indian has been unable to incorporate his historical tradition into the writing of Mexican history, his past is very much part of the Mexican present, which becomes incomprehensible unless the Indian element is taken into account. One good example is the Virgin of Guadalupe, Patroness of Mexico. Her picture, preserved in a basilica on the outskirts of the capital, shows a woman with unmistakable Indian features. A few years after the Conquest, an Indian called Juan Diego reported to the

[1] Quoted from memory from translation by A Mediz Bolio.

Archbishop Zumarraga that Our Lady had appeared to him. After considerable hesitation the Archbishop sanctioned her worship, which has continued ever since. The 'Brown Virgin' was assigned the name of Guadalupe (a village in Spain where a similar miraculous appearance had been reported) in order to bring her worship into line with Spanish ideas. But she has always been a symbol of Mexico's Indian heritage, even though today she is worshipped by Spaniards and Indians alike. She has been proclaimed by the Pope successively Queen of Mexico, Queen of Latin America and the Philippines, and Queen of the Americas (including Canada and the United States). And quite recently, in an attempt to wean Mexican workers' allegiance from Communism, she was proclaimed Queen of the Workers.

The story of the Virgin of Guadalupe is but one example of the historical merging of the Spaniard and the Indian which produced the Mexican As early as the sixteenth century this was advocated by some enlightened Spaniards. Cortez himself set the example by marrying his Indian mistress Malinche (whose name has now become, by a process common in Mexico, converted into an 'ism' —*malinchismo*, which roughly means the practice of un-Mexican thoughts and activities through undue admiration of everything foreign). By the seventeenth century the Spanish poetess Juana Ires de la Cruz wrote verses in Nahua and the scientist Carlos de Siguenza y Gongora collected Indian antiques In the next century, a pro-Indian version of Mexican history was hammered out by Jesuits like Father Clavijero

All this helps to explain how it came about that the Indian took a more considerable part in Mexico's struggle for independence, which started in 1810, than was the case in other parts of Latin America. The first leader, Father Hidalgo, seems to have been of pure Spanish origin But Indians fought in his armies and he put the Virgin of Guadalupe on his flag. His successor Father Morelos, a *mestizo* with a considerable dose of Indian blood, went further As a reaction to Spanish racialism he asked that everybody, without reference to his or her racial origin, be called American. He also advocated far-reaching economic and social reforms, including the restoration of land to the Indian (William Z. Foster, Secretary-General of the U.S. Communist Party, has acclaimed Morelos as the greatest man produced by the Americas, followed by Toussaint L'Ouverture, leader of the Haitian slaves, and Thomas Jefferson). The first two Presidents of Mexico, Generals

Guadalupe Victoria and Guerrero, both *mestizos*, made some practical attempts to put Morelos' reform schemes into action.

Their failure produced a second revolutionary wave, which culminated in the so-called 'War of the Reform' between Juarez and Maximilian. The successful leadership of Juarez made a pure-blooded Indian for the first time head of the Mexican State. His Indian origin was strongly objected to by his opponents. But the 'War of the Reform' is important not only because of his victory. Side by side with the warfare on the battlefield a propaganda war was waged by a number of intellectuals who were, like Juarez, pure Indians, e.g. the novelist Ignacio Altamirano and the scholar Ignacio Ramirez. The latter, writing under the *nom-de-plume* of *El Nigromante*, produced some vitriolic 'Indianist' prose.

The long dictatorship of General Porfirio Diaz produced another reaction. Diaz, a countryman and former lieutenant of Juarez, seems to have had an inferiority complex about his largely Indian origin. Mexican intellectuals in his day were all too often convinced under the influence of Nietzsche, Gobineau, etc. that the Indian was an inferior race and doomed to inferiority. Most important of all, the Indians' position became more and more desperate through wholesale robbery of their lands.

It might well have been expected in these circumstances that the Revolution of 1910 which overthrew Diaz and laid the foundations of contemporary Mexico would be an Indian uprising But this is only very partly true. It was much more an uprising in favour of the Indian, and there was little division on White v. Indian lines. Madero, Carranza, and Obregon, the first three leaders of the victorious Revolution, were of Spanish origin Calles, who came next, was of Syrian parentage. Of the two leaders of the 'revolution from below', which fought the new leaders as well as the old regime, Pancho Villa was a *mestizo* with little Indian blood and Zapata a *mestizo* with considerably more of it. Zapata provided the nearest approach to an 'Indian uprising' during the Revolution. At one time no one wearing European dress was allowed to enter the territory he controlled, and white men fighting in his armies had to adopt Indian dress and customs. But José Vasconcelos, who reports these facts, also notes that even Zapatista leaders who were pure Indians, like Montaño, spoke Spanish and demanded 'land and freedom' in terms of European, not Indian, ideologies.[1]

[1] J Vasconcelos and M Gamio, *Aspects of Mexican Civilization*, University of Chicago Press, 1930, pp 89–90

If the Revolution of 1910 did not degenerate into a race struggle it is largely due to a number of men, mostly though not entirely intellectuals, who, though white or *mestizo* by origin, were able to win the Indian's confidence and persuade him that every white man's hand was not raised against him. In Yucatan, where the situation was most explosive, there arose Antonio Mediz Bolio and Felipe Carrillo Puerto. Mediz Bolio made Maya legends and historical texts accessible to his Spanish-speaking countrymen; his poem *Manelich* was a widely-heeded call to Indian self-assertion. Carrillo Puerto, a political leader, learned Maya in order to address the Indian plantation workers, then little more than slaves, in their own tongue. He translated for their benefit the Mexican Constitution, which forbade slavery, and organized them into unions. He was shot; but his work lives on—the Maya today is no longer isolated but takes his part in the public life of Yucatan.

Better known abroad are the efforts of such friends of the Indian as the archaeologist Alfonso Caso and the anthropologist Manuel Gamio, who have directed educational institutes designed to integrate the Indian into Mexican life through a two-way process, and the 'Big Three' of Mexican painting, whose efforts have been more spectacular and explosive. Orozco preached in his murals a Franciscan harmony between the races, Rivera and Siqueiros issued calls to battle. Siqueiros, who came to 'Indianism' comparatively late, recently painted violent murals of Cuautemoc: Rivera has been 'shocking the bourgeois' for over thirty years by 'putting the *huarache* (the leather sandal worn by the shoeless Mexican Indian) at the eye level of the spectator', as he expressed it to the present writer. His murals are an 'Indianist' interpretation of Mexican history that can be read by illiterates, very much like the mediæval paintings which presented the Gospel story to the unlettered people.

Mexico today is reaping the benefits of the work of these men. A good deal still remains to be done before the Indian's position is fully satisfactory. But even the most cursory survey of Mexican realities reveals progress in many directions.

The 'Indian question' has been taken out of politics. General Cardenas has been attacked from all kinds of quarters and on all kinds of grounds; but his Indian origin was not one of them. One of his predecessors, Emilio Portes Gil, was the subject of many jokes when he was appointed Mexico's first ambassador to India (he happens to be a very dark-skinned man): but it was good-natured

banter without nasty racial overtones. The Communists are the only political party which tries to make political capital out of the Indian. The candidate of the fellow-travelling Partido Popular in the 1952 presidential election, Vicente Lombardo Toledano, started his electioneering with a speech at Ixcateopan at the alleged tomb of Cuautemoc. His speech was translated into a number of Indian languages and so printed in the party organ *El Popular*. This was an election stunt with no lasting consequences. Still, it must be considered an effect of the prevailing political atmosphere when a man like Manuel Gamio has to defend 'Indianism' against accusations of Communist penetration.[1]

Economic solutions of the 'Indian question' are less easy to achieve than political ones The Revolution has stopped and reversed the process by which the Indian was deprived of his land; but it has run against two major obstacles. The Indian system of co-operative or collective farming by the village group or *ejido*, of which General Cardenas and his men have been enthusiastic adherents, has not been easy to adapt to the requirements of modernized agriculture. The Indian clings to traditional methods and is often not at home in the modern world. Like almost all primitive peasants, he is primarily interested in growing food crops for his own consumption; he will not normally grow plantation crops for a distant market or a nearby landlord without some kind of compulsion. The first thing the Maya Indians did when Carillo Puerto distributed among them the land of his native village of Motul was to cut down the sisal plants and plant maize. They now cultivate sisal, Yucatan's main export crop, but they do not do it willingly. On the other hand, the Indian has been drawn into Mexico's growing industrialization.

Few Mexicans would balk by now at including the cultural achievements of the Indian in their national heritage. The American scholar F. S. C. Northrop was struck by the symbolism of four figures he saw in the courtyard of the Ministry of Education: Plato, Buddha, Las Casas, and—Nezahualcoyotl, the poet-philosopher-king of pre-Cortezian Mexico.[2] Two big panels in the National Palace list articles for which the world is indebted to Indian Mexico: they include potatoes and tomatoes, tobacco, and maize.

[1] Quoted in Juan Comas, *Ensayos sobre Indigenismo* (Essays on Indianism), pp 269–271

[2] F S C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West*, New York, Macmillan, 1946, p 16

Mexico still practises 'the Latin system of assimilation and inte marriage and mixture of races as opposed to the Anglo-Saxo system of matrimonial taboos and pure-race standards'.[1] Its sla is not quite as clean as Vasconcelos suggests; among the matr monial advertisements seen in a Mexican magazine of the 'Tru Confessions' type, the prospective parties to the marriage ar usually described as 'white', 'light brown', 'dark brown'—ver thin disguises for whites, *mestizos*, and Indians. And the partne who is advertised for is to be either of the advertiser's own colou or lighter, never darker. But this is still a very, very long way to g to 'the South' in the United States, or to the Union of South Africa. Individual preferences are not the same thing as lega barriers.

The historian Silvio Zavala notes that in Mexico 'now as eve there are no magical solutions . . . there are still yawning depths o misery, ignorance, and primitivism'. Nevertheless, he refers to the 'moral health achieved by Mexico in this respect (i e race relations)' and concludes that 'the informed traveller may watch among our people the realization of a deep union and welding o people belonging to cultures originally distinct and distant' This seems to be a fair judgement. And, in the world of 1956, i reflects a considerable achievement.

I. A. L.

Soviet Political Strategy in Asia

THE radical *volte-face* of Stalinism at the twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February has evoked intense speculation. Do current Soviet policy moves signify that the U.S.S.R. has become weaker in comparison with the free world, as is claimed by the American Secretary of State Mr John Foster Dulles, or is it stronger? The West European situation has reached a stalemate; Tokyo has not yet signed a peace treaty with Moscow. But such circumstances as these warrant no victory celebrations. The Communists are masters of the

[1] J. Vasconcelos, *op. cit.*, p. 88
[2] Silvio Zavala, *op cit*, pp 202–4.

indirect approach: Germany and Japan may be the ultimate objectives, and the way to Berlin still lies via Cairo. And it seems in fact that the Soviet strategists have shifted their weight into the world sector where their chief antagonist, the U.S.A., is the weakest. That is the region of dying colonialism—South Asia and North Africa.

The Asian and African peoples uncommitted to either side in the Cold War number some 900 million. They are of many tongues, and many religions. But there are basic similarities: they are predominantly non-white; they cherish a fierce nationalism that has either newly won them independence or drives them in that direction; and they have the further urge to better their economic lot—but would go without any Occidental 'aid' that might incur a new dependence. It is in such circumstances that the U.S.A. warns the Asians to defend themselves, and presses swords into their hands for a crusade against an unrecognized Communism in the name of a Democracy they have never known; the Communists, on their part, now offer ploughshares.

GROWTH OF A STRATEGY

This development in Soviet strategy should not be viewed as a bolt from the blue. Communist theorists have long been interested in the world's colonial, economically backward areas. Lenin began his own thinking on the subject long before World War I sent the first electric shock through colonial empires. After 1917, Bolshevik strategists pondered at length the problem of engaging the myriads of colonial peoples for the work of the world revolution. Writing in the last year of his life, Lenin took a final look at his enemy, 'world capitalism', and said that the determining factor in the political equation was that Russia, India, China, 'et cetera' possessed the great majority of the world's population. Thus, 'there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world struggle will be . . . the final victory of Socialism is fully and absolutely assured.'

In 1923, when Lenin wrote, Bolshevik hopes of immediate world revolution had already faded. Lenin was then chiefly concerned with evolving tactics which would enable the fledgling Soviet Union to survive pending 'the next military conflict between the counter-revolutionary imperialist West and the revolutionary and nationalist East. . .' Meanwhile the CPSU decided definitely on 'the construction of socialism in one country'. It

became more than ever the over-riding duty of foreign Communist parties to serve, and defend, the 'Socialist Fatherland'. That strategic concept governed until World War II was won.

V-J Day found Asian colonialism in precipitate retreat. Soon after, in 1949, the Communist revolutionaries in China overturned the Kuomintang dictatorship. Two new problems had thus been created for Communist strategy: what should be done about the Asian Revolution; and, more particularly, what principle should govern relations between Communist China and the Communist U.S.S.R.?

Mao Tse-tung had said in 1940 that the Chinese revolution would inevitably become a part of the 'proletarian-socialist world revolution', but he asserted further that China should have its independent 'national form'. In 1945 he made his thought specific: 'Russian history has created the Russian system. . . Chinese history will create the Chinese system.' Mao's theory was a denial of the omniscience and omnipotence of Moscow. But Tito broke with the Cominform (that is, Stalin) in 1948 on the very question of Yugoslavia's subordination to Moscow's *diktat*, and in 1949 Soviet philosophers were still bitterly denouncing that 'bourgeois nationalism' which was equated with Tito's thought. Would the victorious Chinese Communists in 1949 accept Soviet overlordship?

On 1 July 1949 Mao Tse-tung laid down his now well-known doctrine of 'leaning to one side':

> . . . in order to win and to consolidate the victory we must lean to one side . . . the Chinese people either lean to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. . . Not only in China but also in the world, without exception, one either leans to the side of imperialism or to the side of socialism. Neutrality is a mere camouflage and a third road does not exist.[1]

With a barely perceptible hesitation, he left shortly after the establishment of the Chinese People's Government (1 October 1949) on what seemed to be the usual pilgrimage to Moscow. But in the Sino-Soviet alliance of 14 February 1950 China occupied the status not of a satellite, but of the political equal, of the U.S.S.R. Tito had been vindicated, and 'Titoism' legitimized.

Nevertheless, Stalin and 'Stalinism' still breathed; turning the full circle was accomplished only by way of the Korean War. The

[1] Cf John Foster Dulles on 10 October 1955: 'The United States does not believe in practising neutrality. Barring exceptional cases, neutrality is today an obsolete conception.'

North Korean aggression that followed the Sino-Soviet alliance by four months must be presumed to be related to joint estimates by the new-pledged allies of the condition of the Asian Revolution, and to a decision that followed. But any deductions they may have made from Chinese insurrectionary experience proved unprofitable in application in Korea. The fighting came to a deadlock which neither side could break without danger of a major war. Political conditions were unfavourable for the Communist bloc: the United Nations had branded the North Korean action as aggression, and the 'neutralism' of the South Asian States was developing the hard, resistant characteristics of Titoism The Asian peoples craved above all peace with political independence and economic progress.

The nineteenth CPSU Congress that met in October 1952—the first Congress in thirteen years—faced up to Communism's global problems. A Peking delegation headed by Chou En-lai had been in Moscow for important discussions in August and September, and it seems probable that there had been joint consideration of policy matters of common interest. Georgi M. Malenkov in his report to the Congress as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee revealed two strategic decisions of critical importance· 'to weld together a powerful democratic anti-war front . . ., to strengthen the ties of friendship and solidarity with supporters of peace the world over,' and to pursue a policy of 'international co-operation and promotion of business relations with all countries'. This, together with Stalin's contention in his essay on 'Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.' (published on the eve of the Congress) that World War II had resulted in the replacement of the single world market by two parallel world markets, confirmed a shift in line.

For so long as Stalin lived, there could be no radical about-face in Soviet foreign relations. Not only was it impossible for the rigid old Bolshevik to fit in with the new revolutionary trends in foreign fields, but while Stalin lived it was difficult for Soviet protestations of regeneration to carry conviction. The death of Stalin in March 1953 facilitated the reorientation. *Pravda* duly set forth the new line: it was to be collective leadership in the U.S.S.R., and the peaceful co-existence of socialism and capitalism. On what must be recognized as Communist initiative, truce agreements for Korea and Indo-China were reached in July 1953 and July 1954 respectively.

'PANCH SHILA'

Tito began to warn the West in 1954 that Soviet domestic and foreign policies had changed. But in January of the same year Mr Dulles had undertaken the development of the doctrine of 'massive retaliation', with its undertones of preventive war. As Moscow deployed on to political grounds, Washington mobilized its military might. Moscow was probably little concerned with Washington's myopia: the Communist strategy was based upon an assumption of the inability of 'capitalism' to comprehend and meet the new trends in Asia and Africa, and Moscow wooed not Washington but the restless colonial and ex-colonial peoples. The U S.A in the role of Moloch fitted the Communist book.

It was in June 1954 that Chou En-lai met Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru to formulate rules to govern relations between China and India. Their Five Principles were later to win acceptance from Burma, Yugoslavia, and Egypt; they were incorporated in the 10-point policy declaration of the 1955 Bandung Conference; the U.S.S.R. formally agreed to them by the Bulganin-Nehru statement of 22 June 1955. Those principles—Nehru's '*Panch Shila*'—are as follows: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; (2) non-aggression; (3) non-interference in each other's affairs for whatever reason, economic, political, or ideological; (4) co-operation for mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful co-existence.

The *Panch Shila* were in direct conflict with the Cold War precepts. When Washington strove from March onwards to create a 'united front against Communism' in South-East Asia, Mr Nehru stood in opposition, contending that the introduction of Western military alliances into Asia would bring that Cold War to India's borders. SEATO was nevertheless organized in September 1954 At its Bangkok meeting the following February Mr Dulles outlined, for all Asia to see, the extent of U.S. military might in the Pacific. He disclosed the essence of U.S. strategy in a radio address to the American nation after his return: any advance of Communism in the treaty area would be blocked by U.S. air and sea power employing 'new and powerful weapons of precision [that is, the so-called *tactical* atomic weapons] which can utterly destroy military targets without endangering unrelated civilian centres'.

But Asians had no desire to fight further in the white man's wars, and they had taken to speaking their own language. The conference

of twenty-nine Asian and African nations that met at Bandung in April 1955 split no hairs between 'tactical' and 'strategic' atomic weapons, and wasted no breath weighing the nice differences between 'massive retaliation' and 'measured retaliation' and 'graduated deterrence'. In their declaration of policy the delegates showed themselves unanimous in the simple belief that co-existence was preferable to atomic war—at least in Asia.

FIRST AMONG EQUALS

The Bandung Conference was a turning point in history, and Soviet policy revolved around it. By the Warsaw Pact of 14 May 1955, the U.S.S.R. and its seven East European satellites agreed that they would further develop their economic and cultural ties and 'will not interfere in the internal affairs of each other'. Then, on 2 June, Yugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. were reconciled. The guiding principles here were acknowledged to be peaceful co-existence between nations and non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 'because questions of internal organization, of difference in social systems and of different forms of Socialist development, are solely the concern of the individual countries.'

Shortly afterwards the Yugoslav theoretician Veljko Vlahovitch, writing in the Belgrade *Kommunist*,[1] attacked the recent trends in Marxist thought that had led to subordination of different socialist movements to the control of a centre maintaining 'a monopoly of ideology'. His thesis was that, with the advent of the Chinese and Yugoslav revolutions, there had been established the law of 'the inequality of the development of socialism', which should in future determine the relations of 'socialist forces of all nuances' in an international association which would permit each to express itself freely without any '*arrière-pensée d'hégémonie*'.

Here was the pattern for a new international coalition of 'socialist' States. The strategists had returned to Lenin, who once stood for 'a fusion of nations, but on a truly democratic, truly international basis, which is *unthinkable* without the freedom of separation' (italics in original). The U.S.S.R. was henceforth to be only *primus inter pares*. Clearly, Moscow felt the stronger in the new relationship. On 15 July the new Soviet Premier, Nikolai A. Bulganin, pronounced a confident challenge: 'Some people think,' he said, 'that capitalism is better than socialism. We are convinced that the opposite is the case. This argument cannot be settled by

[1] As reported by *Le Monde*, 7–8 August 1955.

force, through war. Let everyone prove in peaceful economic competition that he is right.'

The philosophy underlying these various acts and statements received further clarification when First Soviet Deputy Premier Kaganovich, speaking on the anniversary of the October Revolution, repeated what was essentially the Vlahovitch thesis in more concrete terms: he proposed the creation of a new 'socialist internationalism' based upon close bonds between the Soviet people and the popular masses of all countries, and a broad programme of economic aid to under-developed countries—especially in Asia.

Promotion of the Five Principles had undermined the oft-reiterated American warnings that the Communists were plotting aggression in Asia. The Warsaw Pact and peace with Yugoslavia cleared the way for broad manœuvres of 'socialist' political and economic forces. The Geneva 'meeting at the summit' contributed a more favourable political climate. The 1954–5 exchange of visits between Peking, Moscow, New Delhi, Rangoon, and Prague had been an integral part of the working out of the new political relationships. Now, at the end of 1955, Marshal Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev made their tumultuous tour of India, Burma, and Afghanistan, and the new policy bore its first substantial results.

The Indian-Soviet communiqué issued at New Delhi on 13 December recorded agreement on a wide variety of international problems, and arrangements for Soviet aid in construction of a steel plant for India. The Soviets drove the bargain home by siding with India against Pakistan on the thorny Kashmir issue, and in January followed it up by offering to lend the money and technicians for the construction of an aluminium plant and a hydro-electric works in South India. In Burma, the Moscow team reached agreements whereby the U.S.S.R. would aid in the construction of Burmese industrial plants and the development of agriculture in exchange for Burmese rice; and the U.S.S.R. offered to set up a technical institute in Rangoon, simply 'as a further token of good-will'. Visiting Kabul on the way home, the Soviet leaders extended a $100 million credit to Afghanistan for economic purposes, and voiced support for the Afghan demand for the carving of an independent Pushtunistan from Pakistan's North-West Frontier province.

Pakistan, a member of SEATO and the eastern anchor-post of the Baghdad Pact's 'Northern Tier', was visibly shaken by these unfavourable developments. She was granted $171 million in

military aid from the U.S.A. under an agreement of May 1954, but she had just witnessed a politico-economic coup in the Afghan bridgehead by 'the enemy'. The Cold War had indeed been brought to South Asia, and Karachi shuddered.

THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS

From the address made by Mr Khrushchev to the twentieth Congress of the CPSU in February we can now tell where we stand. Mr Khrushchev said that 'the principal feature of our epoch is the emergence of socialism from the confines of one country and its transformation into a world system'. An extensive 'zone of peace', comprising both socialist and non-socialist States in Europe and Asia, with a population of nearly 1,500 million people, had entered upon the world stage. The U S.S R. proposed a 'business-like co-operation' between nations; 'As against the slogan of the North Atlantic Pact: "Let us arm", we advise the slogan: "Let us trade". ' He held that 'there is no fatal inevitability of war', but for so long as capitalism existed certain 'reactionary forces' might strive to loose war. That thought was clearly related to the question of war between capitalism and 'socialism', for Mr Khrushchev went on to say that 'There is not a shadow of doubt that for a number of capitalist countries the overthrow of the bourgeois dictatorship by force and the connected sharp aggravation of the class struggle is inevitable.'

In the new foreign policy line Mr Khrushchev laid down, there were two notable departures from the 1952 pattern· (1) Yugoslavia, long the pariah, now got 'fraternal' mention; and (2) one of the tasks ahead was 'to reinforce indefatigably the bond of friendship and co-operation' with India, Burma, Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, 'and other States that stand for peace'. The Soviet strategy of fostering 'socialist internationalism' was now official, the main force for its implementation would be economic; and the chief areas of operations at this time would be located in South Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa.

The plain question today is therefore whether the Communist bloc, by the projected international division of labour, can live up to the promise of economic 'co-operation' it holds out to under-developed countries, particularly in Asia.

The bloc possesses raw materials in adequate quantities. China, one of the two major partners in the Communist enterprise, is straining to develop her own productive capacity, and cannot as

yet contribute significantly to the industrialization of neighbouring Asian nations; but she lies in Asia, and her influence will be felt There is in any event an economic-demographic development working to the advantage of the U.S.S.R. itself in Asia. Soviet Asia, comprising three-fourths of the U.S.S.R.'s total area, contains much of the nation's mineral reserves and has a vast hydro-electric potential. Ever since the launching of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928, the Soviet Union's economic and demographic centres of gravity have been ponderously moving eastwards. World War II gave a special impetus to that movement, and the Yalta Pact gave the U.S.S.R. an added lift, back to the Kuriles and South Sakhalin. Soviet Asia now has a population of 40 million, and an industry that is already strong—and rapidly growing. New railway lines are being constructed to support Soviet Asia's growth—and to connect with China. The U.S.S.R. is binding itself to Asia with ties of iron and coal.

The Soviet sixth Five-Year Plan, for 1956–60, discloses the powerful forward thrust of the country's economy But the impressive production figures do not tell the whole story. Production costs are expected to be reduced with the introduction of new technical processes, automation, and electronics. The Plan envisages the construction of atomic-energy plants with a total installed capacity of between 2 and 2·5 million kw—more than the U.S.A. and Britain combined will possess by the target date The U.S.S.R. moreover is turning out more scientists and technicians annually than the U.S.A. Finally, the economic power of Communist bloc countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany must be included in the general accounting. The basic fact that emerges is that the Communist bloc commands sufficient economic power to sustain the political programme it has launched [1]

CONCLUSION

The united front concept has now been extended to embrace continents. Mr Khrushchev pithily remarked last September that those who wait for the U.S.S.R. to abandon the teaching of Marx, Engels, and Lenin must 'wait until a shrimp learns to whistle'. But in fact a harsh 'international centralism' has been transformed into a more benign 'socialist internationalism' having economic benefit

[1] Cf., as pertinent in this general connection, 'Trade Between China and the Soviet Bloc', in *The World Today*, May 1955, 'Some Aspects of Soviet-Satellite Economic Relations', *ibid.*, October 1955.

as its cement. Soviet strategy has, that is, undergone a fundamental change. It changed because the U.S.S.R. and its people are different from what they were a generation ago. The Soviet Union is no longer the backward country of the 1920s—a land of the barefoot illiterate *muzhik*. It is a consolidated Power, with economic strength to spare, and with a strong middle class of bureaucrats, technicians, and intellectuals. The Soviet leaders have shifted course in order to align the U.S.S.R. with Asian aspirations and Asian needs, that is, with the Asian evolutionary process.

Granted the hypothesis that the Soviet strategists may still harbour some '*arrière-pensée d'hégémonie*' purposing that the U.S.S.R. shall some day, somehow assume centralized control of the whole world, one must note that they would probably find it difficult to exercise authority over an Asia come of age. All things change; and once a political change is undertaken, it develops a character and inertia of its own. The Soviets may in the end find it more difficult to disengage than to join.

A. B. C.

Economic Prospects in Czechoslovakia

The Second Five-Year Plan

IN common with most East European countries, Czechoslovakia has been marking time to enable her economy to begin a new Five-Year Plan at the same time as the U.S.S.R. Short-term planning, preparatory to the current Five-Year Plan, has been the order since the completion of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953. The present Plan will run till 1960, but its targets have not yet been exactly defined. So far only the target figures for this year have been determined by Government decision and a draft for the whole five years has been made public. This was discussed in great detail at a number of industrial conferences towards the end of last year and will be formally approved by a National Conference of the Czechoslovak Communist Party next summer. There is little reason to expect that any major changes will be made by the Party delegates now that the targets have been approved by the economic

and industrial experts, and it is most unlikely that the Party Conference will argue with the draft presented by the Central Committee.

Czechoslovakia's first Five-Year Plan was marked by an intensive industrialization drive and a ruthless campaign to collectivize agriculture as quickly as possible. The so-called 'new course', which set in throughout the Communist bloc after Stalin's death, was not only political in its origins. There were sound economic reasons for slowing up the expansion of heavy industries and for halting the collectivization of agriculture, as supplies of food and consumer goods had declined to an alarming degree The Czechoslovak Communist Party did succeed in raising agricultural production, partly by placating the peasantry, and the recent claim that the pre-war level of agricultural production had at long last been reached[1] does not appear to be exaggerated. On the other hand, while more food is obviously available, there is still much room for improvement. The reduction of consumer goods prices in April of last year excluded bread, meat, and butter on the ground that supplies of these foodstuffs were inadequate A further price reduction decided by the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party at the end of last March does include wheat flour, but butter is again left out Mutton and tinned meat will be cheaper, but the price of pork and beef, which are in much greater demand, remains unchanged. The Minister of Internal Trade told the Central Committee that the present demand for meat could be met after the shortages of the last two years, but he did not specify the kind of meat on sale Although in the less important sphere of industrial consumer goods less success had been achieved, the Czechoslovak regime saw no reason why it should not follow the Soviet lead in returning to orthodox Marxist economics. The interim 1955 Plan was a move in that direction, and with the onset of the new Five-Year Plan the emphasis on heavy industry was renewed.

However, a National Economic Conference, held last December to discuss this year's Plan, revealed that the means to be used to expand heavy industry during the next five years would not be the same as those applied in 1948–53. Premier Široký[2] told the Conference that the planned 50 per cent increase in industrial production during the next five years would be achieved mainly by

[1] Made by Agriculture Minister Krutina, *Rudé Právo*, 9 February 1956.
[2] cf. *Rudé Právo*, 11 December 1955

concentrating investments on new machines, by improving technological processes, and by raising labour productivity. The total volume of investments (including agriculture) would be raised by 75 per cent as compared with the first Five-Year Plan, but there would be less building of new factories and more improvements of the existing production potential. The mistakes of 1948–53, when too many new projects had been taken in hand, thus side-tracking financial and material resources, would be avoided. Široký was most careful to point out that the desired production increase would have to be based to some 80–90 per cent on improved labour productivity.

It was explained at this conference that 1956 would be a year of 'mobilization' for the remaining four years of the Plan and that really tangible results could not be expected till next year. Thus. for instance, 33·7 per cent of total investments will be devoted to new machines this year, as against 32·1 per cent in 1955 and 28·5 per cent in 1954. Yet Široký stressed that most of the new machines produced this year would have to go to agriculture and transport and that industry's turn would come later. In the meantime, research and the construction of prototypes would be speeded up.

In brief, the second Five-Year Plan should result in a considerable increase in output of means of production, particularly of power, fuel, and raw materials. By improving the performance of the building industry it is hoped to ensure the implementation of investment plans. Agricultural production will also be raised, mainly by expanding its so-called socialist sector (i.e. collective and State farms). The foundations to be laid this year are to consist of an overall increase of 9 per cent in the gross volume of industrial production: the increase for consumer goods will be 7 per cent and for capital goods 10 per cent

The extent to which economic progress in the future will have to be based on technological advance was stressed by a document issued by the Party's Central Committee last September. The 'Theses of the Party on the Technical Development of Industry'[1] are an attempt to make Czechoslovakia take her place in the world-wide search for new techniques and more technicians. The document instructs all Party officials and those responsible for economic planning and industrial management to concentrate on mechanization and automation. Transport is singled out as an example of wasteful manual work: for example, on the railways thousands of

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 22 September 1955

men are still employed in loading and unloading trucks, a task which ought to have been mechanized years ago. More attention is to be devoted to the electronics industry in view of its vital importance for the development of automation.

The 'Theses' pay particularly close attention to all questions connected with the introduction of new production processes, the training of technicians, and the progress of industrial research. The number of industrial research institutes is put at 100, with about 18,000 workers, but they are criticized for often neglecting the study of technological achievements abroad, both in the Communist bloc and in the capitalist world. The 'Theses' deplore the excessive concentration of research work in the capital. All secondary schools are told that they must concentrate more on the teaching of scientific and technical subjects and modern languages so as to provide the raw material for the Technical Universities and Colleges. The youthful cadres produced there must be fully utilized. 'Fully qualified young people, who are completely devoted to the regime, must be promoted to responsible management positions', says the document.

FUEL AND POWER

A number of official spokesmen have pointed out that during the first Five-Year Plan the rate of expansion in the coal mining and power industries was too slow in relation to that of industry as a whole. This disproportion is to be rectified by 1960.

A National Coal Conference was held in Prague at the beginning of last October, and there Fuel Minister Jonáš made much of the discrepancy between the country's fuel and power resources and the rest of the industrial economy.[1] The hard coal production plan last year was not fulfilled, and some of the Minister's criticisms of the industry at this conference show the reasons for this failure Above all, too little has been done to introduce new methods and machines, and even in the opencast mines, where there has been less opposition to mechanization, the available coal-cutting and earth-moving machines are being utilized only to 50 per cent Jonáš warned the conference that the planned increase in annual coal production from 62 million tons[2] in 1955 to 85 million tons in 1960 would have to be achieved mainly by raising labour productivity by some 31 per cent. Only about one-fifth of the increase

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 1 October 1955.
[2] All references are to metric tons

in coal production will be covered by the opening up of new mines. He underlined his argument by the statement that within five years 60 per cent of all the work in the Ostrava hard coal mines, Czechoslovakia's most important mining area, would be mechanized.

The Coal Conference was also addressed by First Vice-Premier Dr Dolanský, still the Czechoslovak Communists' senior economic policy-maker. He spoke at some length about the prospects of using atomic energy, but made it quite clear that for a long time to come coal would remain the predominant source of power. New mines would be put into production with the aid of Soviet experts, but they would not add much to the coal production totals during the next five years.[1] The exhortations addressed to the miners seem to have done little good, for the industry was 320,000 tons short of its target for the first two months of this year.[2] The poor weather conditions must, however, not be overlooked when assessing this failure.

The power industry discussed its problems at a similar conference two weeks earlier. There Dr Vlasák, the Minister of Power, summarized the constantly increasing demands on the industry.[3] The growing mechanization of industrial production, particularly in the mines and engineering factories, the electrification of an additional 800 km of railway lines during the second Five-Year Plan period, and the constantly rising demands of the private consumer made it imperative to increase the annual production of electricity from 15,000 million kwh in 1955 to some 27,000 million kwh in 1960. A new main grid, with a capacity of 220 kilovolts (which could be stepped up to 380 kv in case of need), will be constructed during the next five years. It will be connected to the power grids of neighbouring countries. Czechoslovakia's first atomic power station will be in operation by 1960, but it will of course produce only an infinitesimal fraction of the country's power requirements. The Minister criticized the long time needed in Czechoslovakia for the construction of power stations, especially in comparison with the U.S.S.R. He also spoke of the frequent breakdowns and the unfavourable ratio between fuel consumption and power production, which he ascribed to the existence of too large a number of small and medium-sized stations. By 1960 a

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 2 October 1955.
[2] *Rudé Právo*, 15 March 1956.
[3] *Rudé Právo*, 17 September 1955

number of new power stations, with a combined capacity of 2,300 megawatts, will be added to the economy.

The National Power Conference was also addressed by First Vice-Premier and Defence Minister General Čepička.[1] He made no attempt to conceal his view that the Ministry of Power, and the Minister in particular, were to blame for the inefficient planning and long delays connected with the construction of new power stations. He had some scathing things to say about their efforts to put the blame on other Ministries and on the building and engineering industries. He recalled that during the first Five-Year Plan the intention had been to build up a sound heavy engineering industry and to follow this up with the expansion of the production of coal and power. That stage had been reached in the spring of 1953: the country's power requirements had far outstripped supply and he cited as an example the power failure fiasco in the winter of 1953. Since then steps had been taken to improve power production and this policy would be continued during the second Five-Year Plan. In this connection it is noteworthy that this year's severe winter did not lead to the almost total breakdown of power supplies which occurred in 1953.

Čepička recalled that the second Five-Year Plan envisaged an increase of some 50 per cent in industrial production as a whole, the increase in power production would be nearer 80 per cent. He said that this could only be achieved if the Ministry of Power abandoned its present system of managing the industry, which had led to the piecemeal squandering of resources and a continual waste of time, money, and labour

ENGINEERING AND FOUNDRIES

The engineering industry also had its conference, and there the then Minister of Engineering, Poláček, stressed its importance by pointing out that almost one-third of the country's industrial production consisted of engineering products.[2]

The 'Theses', mentioned earlier, stated that during the second Five-Year Plan the gross volume of production in the engineering industry will have to increase by 80 per cent. The industry will have its work cut out to reach this target, especially if some of the criticisms voiced by Poláček at the National Engineering Conference are considered. He complained that there was far too little

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 18 September 1955

[2] *Rudé Právo*, 24 September 1955.

specialization and that too many factories wasted their time on secondary products which could be made more cheaply elsewhere. Too much work was still being done by hand and the production norms, which determine the rate for the job, were not strict enough, for 70 per cent of all workers exceeded them by as much as 80 per cent as a matter of course. This robbed the wage system of any realistic foundation it might have had and made production far too costly. Local initiative among factory managers was practically non-existent, but that is hardly surprising in the light of the Minister's statement that only 10 per cent of them possess the required qualifications for their jobs.

Obviously much remains to be done in order to place the Czechoslovak engineering industry on a sound basis. This task is all the more urgent in view of the important part played by Czechoslovak engineering products in the Soviet bloc's trade offensive in the Middle East and South-East Asia. The notorious arms deal with Egypt is only one of many trade agreements under which Czechoslovak products are supplied to that part of the world, and heavy commitments have been undertaken for the future. These include installations for mines, power stations, steel mills, and rolling stock for India; the equipment for a cement factory in Afghanistan, refrigerating plant for Persia; and rolling stock for Turkey.

The foundries will have to increase their gross volume of production by 49 per cent during the second Five-Year Plan in order to keep pace with the demands of the engineering industry.[1] According to Reitmajer, Minister of Foundries and Ore Mines,[2] 30 per cent of the planned increase of pig iron, 20 per cent of that of steel, and 15 per cent of rolled products will have to be achieved by raising the output of plant now available The foundries, too, will have to do much better to meet their increased tasks: in the first half of last year 500,000 tons of steel fell short of the required standards.

OTHER INDUSTRIES

The building industry is probably the weakest spot of the Czechoslovak economy at present. Its constant failure to fulfil its targets and to retain its qualified workers has made a mockery of investment plans. Towards the end of last year the Central Com-

[1] In 1955, 4,500,000 tons of crude steel were produced (*Práce*, 15 February 1956.)

[2] *Rudé Právo*, 6 October 1955.

mittee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party passed a special resolution[1] calling on the industry to mend its ways and to make a start with the introduction of modern methods. During the second Five-Year Plan it will have to accelerate its output by some 60 per cent, and that can only be done by using industrial methods, including prefabrication, and by avoiding the seasonal movement of labour, which makes the training of really skilled operatives almost impossible. Apart from delaying the building of new industrial projects, the shortcomings of the industry have made the bad housing situation worse. The 1954 housing construction plan was not fulfilled[2], and although some 48,000 housing units were completed in 1955 performance in this sector was described as 'far from satisfactory' in the official Plan Implementation Report for last year.[3]

The chemical industry was informed of its tasks under the second Five-Year Plan by its Minister, Jozef Pučik, at its own national conference.[4] He pointed out that Czechoslovakia was really backward in the production of artificial fertilizers and this will have to be trebled by 1960. The production of synthetic diesel oil is to increase by 77 per cent, that of synthetic petrol by 50 per cent, and that of sulphuric acid also by 50 per cent. More attention must be paid to the quality and variety of plastics and synthetic yarns. Above all, Czechoslovakia's first atomic power station is to begin operation in 1960 and the chemical industry will have an important part to play in organizing the necessary supplies of pure uranium, pure graphite, and heavy water

Little information is so far available about plans connected with light industries. The Party 'Theses' already mentioned criticize the 'primitive' state of the food processing industry and also call for an unspecified expansion of the glass and ceramics industries to enable Czechoslovakia to re-enter her traditional export markets with these goods.

AGRICULTURE

During the second Five-Year Plan agricultural production is to be raised by one third, and the regime obviously intends to do this by pressing forward with the policy of collectivization and large-scale mechanization. This was played down during the 'new course', but was reintroduced with some vigour by the Party's

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 15 October 1955.
[2] *Rudé Právo*, 29 January 1955
[3] *Práce*, 15 February 1956
[4] *Rudé Právo*, 18 October 1955.

Central Committee last June. The decline in the numbers of collective farms and their members in 1953–5 is being made good rapidly and at the beginning of this year there were 7,016 collective farms, with 335,027 members and 1,857,087 hectares of land. The socialist sector, i.e. collective and State farms, disposed of 41·7 of all agricultural land.[1] This process of collectivization will continue to provide the foundation for the expected increase in agricultural production. More land will be brought under cultivation and the target set in 1954,[2] which was to add 200,000 hectares to the national total by 1957, is being well implemented. Last year 170,000 hectares of formerly fallow land were put to agricultural uses. The same applies to the target of 320,000 new workers who were to transfer to agriculture by 1957.[3] Last year some 10,000 did so, and this year's target has been set at 74,000.

CONCLUSION

On the whole, the Czechoslovak economy now appears to be in a healthier state than at any previous time since the Communists seized power in 1948. The targets of the new Five-Year Plan have been much more realistically assessed than those of the previous one. The tremendous waste of material and human resources which went on after 1948 need not be repeated. The integration of the economies of the Soviet bloc has proceeded apace since then, and as a more realistic view of things now seems to prevail in Moscow there is no reason why it should not be applied in Prague.

The Communist policy of industrialization, now even more important as it enables the Soviet bloc to build up its arsenal for its peaceful co-existence and trade offensive, has been placed on a sounder footing throughout the Soviet bloc. Czechoslovakia forms an important part of the economic potential of the Communist world, and it is most unlikely that her strength will again be dissipated as it was by the blunders committed in the days of Stalin and Gottwald. It is only to be hoped that this Five-Year Plan will also benefit the Czechoslovak people: the promise that their living standard will be raised by one-third by 1960 is not enough.

J. F. A.

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 9 and 15 February 1956

[2] cf. 'Politics and Economics in Czechoslovakia', in *The World Today*, August 1954.

[3] *ibid*

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INCREASE IN PRICE

It is regretted that, owing to increases in printing and postal charges, the annual subscription to THE WORLD TODAY will have to be raised to 30s. ($6.00) and the price per copy to 2s 6d. (55 cents) from the issue for July 1956.

Members of Chatham House have already been notified of the coming increase in their concession rate.

Notes of the Month

Problems Facing the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference

THE communiqués issued on the occasion of a Prime Ministers' Conference are not, as a rule, very revealing. But one thing is certain—these busy men do not travel half round the world to talk platitudes; and another almost as certain—the informal talks are at least as valuable as the formal discussions on the agenda. It can hardly be denied that Commonwealth progress has seen some severe setbacks since the last Conference in February 1955, and that the structure of the institution, flexible and yielding though it may be, has been strained. Almost inevitably, these checks and strains are likely to loom large in the background, if not in the foreground, of the Conference.

The period of the Cold War now discloses itself as a time when the Commonwealth nations drew together strategically, and Britain's interest alike in NATO, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact formed a link which to some extent co-ordinated their otherwise divergent interests. Two years ago the free world seemed to be building up a system of interlocking defensive arrangements which might well have grown into a system of mutual co-operation for peaceful ends, and the loose organization of the Commonwealth with its world-wide interests was admirably placed to adjust itself

to these desirable purposes. India, of course, stood outside th
strategic groups, but there was little danger of Mr Nehru's Indi
lining up with Stalin's Russia. The recent swerve of Ceylon out (
the Commonwealth strategic system into the neutralist camp ind
cates a tendency that has steadily become more evident since th
announcement in 1953 of the withdrawal from Suez: the crumblin
of the whole British position East of Suez.

For almost a hundred years the old imperial system was base
upon a chain of posts—Gibraltar, Malta, Suez, Aden, Colomb(
Singapore, Hong Kong—important alike for defence, communica
tions, and commerce. In the last ten years a valiant effort has bee
made to adjust this plan to the needs of the modern Commor
wealth, to integrate it into the defences of the free world, and t
increase the beneficent commerce along these seaways by whic
alone, it seems, can prosperity be brought to the under-develope
countries. The switch of the British base from Suez to Cyprus ha
been tactically unfortunate and, along the whole chain of post
the only one that is not at present threatened by internal or extern
pressure is, paradoxically, Hong Kong. A weakness of the Com
monwealth is that Britain alone concerns herself with the mult
plicity of problems; Australia, though deeply involved in SEATC
takes no responsibility for Singapore; Canada, though so promir
ent in NATO, no responsibility for Cyprus. Far less does Australi
concern herself with Cyprus or Canada with Singapore. For pro
gress in the lesser colonies Britain is expected to find all th
ha'pence and take all the kicks.

In short it would seem that the Commonwealth Conferenc
might devote some of its time, at least, to the discussion of funda
mentals. How can this valuable network of social and econom
links, running round the world, be saved and used for the mutu
benefit of all? The suggestion that Ceylon might lapse fro
membership might be countered by evidence that it is in Ceylon
interest to stay; the suggestion that South Africa should be colc
shouldered out might be countered by recognition that the mult
racial problem is unsolved over half the continent of Africa. M
Lennox-Boyd has now firmly stated that the admission of ne
members is a matter to be determined by all. If the Gold Coa
comes forward as the first candidate for admission, it must b
recognized that Central Africa claims a higher place in the queu
If these are matters for discussion at the Conference, no less so a
the association of Singapore with Malaya, the breaking of th

Cyprus deadlock, the forming of a policy for Antarctica, the future of the small non-viable islands, to name but a few.

The Status of Tangier

In the Franco-Moroccan Agreements of 2 March 1956 the French Government admitted that the 1912 Franco-Moroccan Treaty of Fez, which established a French protectorate over the whole of Morocco, had become outdated. Article 1 of this treaty stipulated that the city of Tangier should 'retain its recognized distinctive characteristics' which should 'determine its municipal organization'. The Treaty also confirmed the status of Tangier agreed upon in a secret Franco-Spanish convention of 1904 and in the Algeciras Treaty of 1906. In the 1956 agreements the French Government further expressed its desire to respect, and to see that others respected, Moroccan territorial integrity as guaranteed by international treaties. This was interpreted to mean that France had pledged herself to help the Rabat Government to recover Spanish Morocco and the International Zone of Tangier.

Less than five weeks later on 7 April Spain recognized the independence and sovereignty of Morocco thus bringing to an end her forty-four years' guardianship of the Spanish Zone. The Sultan thus moved one step nearer his declared aim of uniting the Cherifian Empire. Apart from Ceuta and Mellila, coastal enclaves that are juridically a part of Spain, and the Ifni enclave which has the status of a Spanish colony, Tangier remained the only area over which his full sovereignty had not been acknowledged.

France and Spain, two of the three Powers most interested in Tangier, had now by implication accepted the need to reconsider its status as defined by the International Statute of 1923 (an outcome of the Fez Treaty). As revised in August 1953, the Statute is still in force today. Under it the zone is administered by an International Legislative Assembly of twenty-seven members over which a control committee—composed of the diplomatic representatives of Britain, France, Spain, the United States, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Portugal—has a power of veto.

After the return of the exiled Sultan, tension in Spanish Morocco was reflected inside the International Zone by anti-Spanish demonstrations on 6 March. Fears that after the unification of Morocco Tangier might cease to be a refuge for gold and capital caused a steady exodus of gold from the zone. In December 1953 there were more than 52 metric tons of gold in the Tangier banks;

by the beginning of 1955 the amount had dropped to 40, and by 17 April 1956 it was reported to be only 6 or 7 tons.

On 30 April the Moroccan members of the International Legislative Assembly proposed that no more laws should be made by the Assembly since independence now gave full legislative powers to the Sultan. After a majority had voted for the reference of the motion to a committee, all the Moroccan members—Arabs and Jews—withdrew from the Chamber. This followed demonstrations by trade unions. The meeting of the Assembly was suspended after the President had stated that he would be obliged to seek guidance from the Sultan.

On the following day Ahmed Balafrej, the newly appointed Moroccan Minister for Foreign Affairs, arrived in Tangier. He declared that the Sultan wished to respect all foreign interests and that any modification in the International Statute would necessitate a conference of the signatory Powers. He undertook to ask the Sultan to make a declaration regarding a possible special economic regime in Tangier, to re-establish confidence and encourage the return of capital already withdrawn. He emphasized that the Sultan wished to avoid disruption by any hasty overthrow of the existing regime. He made it clear, however, that in his view the problem of Tangier had been implicitly stated and implicitly solved by French and Spanish recognition of Moroccan sovereignty. Balafrej asked the Assembly to confine legislation to municipal matters pending the outcome of consultations.

On 4 May the International Control Committee, by agreement of its members, decided to renounce its legislative powers in order not to interfere with the powers of the Sultan. The administration of the zone may therefore be said to have broken down. In the following week, Spain, the United States, and Britain indicated their willingness to consider the possibility of revising the Statute The position of Russia is uncertain. Although she has never exercised the right, granted to her after 1945 as a victorious ally in the war, to be represented in the Legislative Assembly, there has been speculation as to her present intentions in this area.

It is of interest that many Moroccan nationalists, though they believe that the zone will eventually come under Moroccan administration, wish to see the present economic freedom of Tangier preserved because they consider that a free money market could be a valuable asset for a newly independent country in need of foreign investments and loans.

Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent

N all the Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent political power is
t the moment (if only nominally) in the hands of a group which
nay be called traditional Arab Nationalists. Many of these fought
gainst the Turks in the first World War. They also led the national-
st struggle against the Mandatory regimes. They belong to a
ague nineteenth-century school of liberalism, are secular in out-
ook, and basically pro-Western. On the question of Arab unity
hey favour the *status quo* policy of the Arab League for which
ndeed they were responsible. On the question of Palestine, they
o not lead but are led by public opinion. They are representative
f the old aristocratic families of the towns and the feudal and
ribal chiefs of the countryside. They are also in alliance with
owerful local industrial and commercial interests. They are the
Middle Eastern group upon which Western policy is based.

Everywhere they are on the defensive and in some countries in
hinly camouflaged rout. In Lebanon, the requirements of de-
ominational equilibrium and a clever policy of replenishment
rom younger members of the same group has kept them more
rmly in power than anywhere else, but they are not by any means
nchallenged there. In Syria a series of *coups d'état* has consider-
bly weakened their hold over the country, and the recent return of
'resident Kuwatly gives them only a momentary and precarious
espite. In Jordan, the discrediting of the old Palestinian oligarchy
f Jerusalem families, the murder of Abdullah, and the removal of
Glubb have all but destroyed their power. In Iraq they seem to be
upreme, but the very measures to which Nuri Pasha has to resort
hows that, to say the least, their supremacy is not effortless.

These traditional Arab Nationalists were their own worst
nemies. Under the Mandates, their object was to show that it was
oo costly and impracticable for the foreign Powers to continue the
irect occupation of their countries. This could be achieved by
purely negative policy, by civil agitation, and by administra-
ve sabotage. In this they succeeded, but they could never after-
vards shed their negativeness. Moreover, with independence
chieved, the *raison d'être* of their cohesion—the presence of the
oreigner—was removed and with his removal the solid front with
vhich they had faced him collapsed. They now fell to fighting with
ne another for the fruits of office. The countless parties with
ompous titles into which they divided were entirely meaningless

except in terms of clashes of will and personality. Because of the aristocratic and feudal background of most of them, office became synonymous to them with the protection and expansion of the particular land or commercial interest which they represented. Their triumph over the foreigner was erroneously taken by them as proof of their own importance and placed them in a false moral position *vis-à-vis* their public. They felt that they had satisfactorily fulfilled their duties to the people and that they could now start attending to themselves.

None of this was lost upon the rapidly growing educated classes and the people in general. These now began to look upon the traditional nationalists not as leaders but as targets. Two great post-war international developments made a deep impression upon the educated classes in particular: the rise of British Socialism, and the emergence of the USSR as the greatest Power in Europe and Asia. Both these developments focused the attention of the intelligentsia upon such mundane matters as the necessary conditions of a welfare State.

The gap between the ruling classes and the rest of the people was further widened by the Arab, or rather non-Arab, policies of the rulers. Before independence the traditional nationalists were Pan-Arabists. After independence they became jealous particularists. To satisfy the popular feeling of Pan-Arabism the Arab League was formed as a half-hearted attempt in that direction. But the Palestine war of 1948 exposed the bankruptcy not only of the Arab League but also of its authors.

One aspect of the Palestine war is of special importance. It is seldom realized that this was launched by the Arab politician, not the Arab soldier. The soldier had no illusions about Zionist strength but the politicians were under tremendous pressure from public opinion at home and had to make some gesture however feeble. It is of course arguable that if the Arab armies had not entered the Arab part of Palestine in 1948 the whole of the Western bank of the Jordan would have been lost, but that is beside the point. The unpreparedness of the armies and the humiliating terms imposed upon them by the armistice agreements inevitably caused them to turn against their Governments. The Arab officer became the spearhead of all the pent-up feelings of the educated people and the masses against the traditional ruling classes. First Kuwatly went and then Farouk. Glubb is only the latest victim of one and the same trend.

The year 1948 is probably the most important single landmark in the modern history of the Arab World. As far as one can see, the future of each Arab country of the Fertile Crescent will depend to a large extent on the political outlook of its particular officer class, on the trend to which this officer class gives wholehearted support, and on the degree of co-operation between the officer classes in the various Arab countries.

This is not difficult to understand. The tension along the borders of Israel, and the overwhelming superiority of Israel, particularly in comparison with Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, emphasize the importance of the military. People feel the same confidence in them that the Americans felt in Eisenhower at the height of the cold war. Moreover the Arabs are keenly aware that they lag far behind in modern developments and look to the military to supply them with the short-cuts to a more egalitarian society, however paradoxical that may sound. Finally, there is the inescapable fact that the Arab officer class has become the repository of self-conscious political power at a time when the traditional ruling class is bankrupt, the other growing forces and trends have not sufficiently crystallized, and the general masses positively look to this class as a saviour. Iraq is no exception to this; for the army there is neutralized only by drastic periodic purges, a process which cannot be carried on indefinitely. After all, the first Arab military *coup d'état* took place in Iraq. Moreover, the will to survive of the traditional Iraqi ruling class, strong as it is, derives to a large extent from the powerful personality of one man, Nuri Said, and Nuri has had his moments of triumph and failure.

What are the forces and trends which are trying to succeed traditional Arab Nationalism and to convert the Arab officer class?

Traditional Arab Nationalism occupies the centre. On the extreme right is the Islamic trend. This is represented organizationally in the Moslem Brotherhood. It must be remembered that although the Brotherhood has been greatly weakened in Egypt, it has not been altogether smashed, and its branches in the other Arab countries are still intact. It is strongest in Syria and Jordan, and has important nuclei in both Lebanon and Iraq. It has a wide emotional appeal, not only to the lower middle urban classes and peasants, but also to the students and intellectuals. It is also very active among the Palestinian refugees.

The version of the Brotherhood in the Fertile Crescent is milder than that in Egypt. This is due to consideration for Chris-

tian sentiment in Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan and for Shi'ite feelings in Iraq. On the question of world orientation it is neutralist but non-doctrinaire. It has co-operated with Communists but is basically and explicitly anti-Communist. It is anti-'Western policy' but not anti-West, and there are conditions in which it would co-operate with the West. It is very sensitive to Western military occupation and control and sees Israel in this light. It is not against Arab unity but sees it as an indispensable preliminary step towards Islamic unity. Tactically, it is regrouping its forces and carefully watching the course of events in Egypt.

Facing the Brotherhood, on the extreme left of the traditional Nationalists, are the Communists. They have old-established nuclei in select trade unions in all Arab countries, and are possibly strongest in Iraq although they are outlawed there. Their power is growing everywhere, especially among students, workers, and Palestinian refugees. On the question of world orientation they at the moment preach doctrinaire neutralism. They are not enthusiastic about Arab union or Arab rights in Palestine, but are careful to keep up appearances. Their general policy is not only to replace Western influence, political, military, and economic, with Soviet influence. it also aims at preventing any other local trend—Arab, Islamic, or otherwise—from stabilizing the situation. It is interesting that while the Communists are hostile to the concept of the Baghdad Pact, they are delighted with its consequence, which is the isolation of Iraq, potentially the richest Arab country, from the rest of the Fertile Crescent. Tactically, they outwardly conform to the dominant trend.

To the right of the Communists, but at no great distance from them, are the Marxist Socialists represented in the Ba'ath or Renaissance party. This party has greatly grown in power, particularly after the Palestine War and the deflation of traditional Arab Nationalism. It is strongest in Syria and Jordan and has an important nucleus both in Iraq and Lebanon. It has succeeded in winning over considerable sections of the middle and lower officer ranks of the Syrian army, and was behind some of the Syrian *coups d'état*. It is very popular among schoolteachers, students, and Palestinian refugees, and in certain rural areas. It has not succeeded as much as one would have expected among workers. On the question of orientation it believes in and preaches doctrinaire neutralism. It is anti-Zionist, but its main emphasis is on the ideological contradictions within Zionism, and it sees Israel mainly

as a Near Eastern bastion of Western imperialism. It supports Arab unity, but the stress is not on Arab sentiment but on class solidarity against the traditional ruling circles. It is of course secularist and will have little to do with either Islam or Christianity. Tactically, its followers adopt a fastidious and carping tone and set themselves up as arbiters of true nationalism. They refuse to take part in any national or coalition Government, partly to escape responsibility for failures and partly to allow the traditional ruling classes more rope with which to hang themselves.

To the right of these Marxist Socialists, though still well to the left of traditional Arab Nationalism, is the dominant trend of the moment—'Nasserism'. This has swept everything before it. Traditional Nationalists, Communists, Marxist Socialists, and even Moslem Brothers bend the knee to it. The one exception is Nuri Pasha and his circle. But while all these trends pay lip service to Nasserism, they are deeply frightened and suspicious of it because it threatens to undermine their whole position. Most annoying of all, it does not fit anywhere into their ideological manuals. For Nasserism is not an ideology but an attitude of mind. It is eclectic, empirical, radical, and yet conservative. It starts with the fact of an Islamic Arab Egypt and the desirability of perpetuating this fact with its constituent elements. The interests of this Islamic Arab Egypt are its overriding concern, and in pursuing these interests it is untroubled by historical determinism, a divine scripture, or dialectical materialism. This gives it greater scope for manoeuvre and increases rather than decreases the possibility of agreement with it. On the question of orientation it is neutralist, but its neutralism is tactical, not doctrinaire. This neutralism is based upon a realistic appraisal of the popular Arab mood, a mood which has deep roots in the Arab-Western tension of the last fifty years. It is therefore at least as practical as Nuri's approach, if indeed it is not more practical. It is anti-Communist and basically pro-Western. Its system of bilateral treaties has greatly strengthened, and largely displaced, the looser Arab League arrangements. Its purchase of Czech arms has been universally welcome in view of the aggressiveness of Israel's frontier policy.

The appeal of Nasserism lies in the fact that it has transferred, if only partially, to the Arab world itself the centre of decisions concerning the future of that world, from the Western European capitals where those decisions have been taken for more than a century. It has also restored to the Arabs a feeling of confidence in

themselves and thus has largely counterbalanced the psychological shock of the loss of Palestine upon which the Communists, Marxists, and Moslem Brothers have been cashing in since 1948. Its policy of radical domestic reform has shown that such reform can be effected without resort to the bloody class struggle of the Communists and Marxists.

The success of Nasserism has revealed three important facts: the vast majority of Arabs are still uncommitted to the extreme Right or Left; the ideological bases of Nasserism, such as they are, are acceptable to this vast majority; and these bases have a counter-dynamism capable of wresting the initiative from the hands of the extreme Right or Left. But an important reservation must be made. Nasserism, with Egyptian nationalism as an indispensable component, cannot in all its details strike permanent roots in the Fertile Crescent countries. What it can do, and is already doing, is to inspire the growth of a parallel local movement, a neo-Arab nationalism. Such a movement would truly reflect the needs of the time, and the mood and aspirations of the majority. It would move in the general direction of the other important trends. It could eventually rally round it most of the groups lying to the right of the Communists. Its regard for Islamic culture and values could serve as a link with the moderate Moslem Brotherhood of the Fertile Crescent. Its genuine Pan-Arabism and reformist platform would attract many pseudo-Marxists and fellow-travellers who have turned away in disgust from the more traditional Arab Nationalism. The centre parties would also see it as a lesser evil than that of the extreme Right or Left parties. Moreover, since the criterion of this group would be enlightened self-interest, it would be possible for it to come to a business-like agreement with the West on a more broadly popular basis than has so far been possible.

The natural backbone of this movement is Iraq. Only Iraq with her potential wealth, economic, technical, and military, can give it reality and permanence. But the policy of Iraq at the moment, particularly in relation to the Baghdad Pact, prevents her from taking any lead in Arab affairs in the other countries of the Fertile Crescent. The Baghdad Pact may or may not be a worthwhile objective, but, even if it were, it should have been conceived, not as the starting point, but as the goal to be approached through a number of intermediate stages. While it is true that the Pact was in no sense imposed on the Government of Iraq since Nuri Pasha was perhaps at least as enthusiastic about it as Britain, yet the

alacrity with which Britain joined it would seem to reflect particular British interests rather than those of the West as a whole.

The danger of the Baghdad Pact lies in the possibility not only that it may not succeed, with all the consequences that failure would entail for the West, but that it may succeed only too well. For an Iraq truly orientated towards Turkey and Iran and truly integrated within an all-embracing Western organization would, to all intents and purposes, be a de-Arabized Iraq, and a de-Arabized Iraq would, in the long run, be a loss not only to the Arabs but also to the West. Iraq can be regarded in two ways: by herself and *in vacuo*, or as part of the Arab World. From the former standpoint which seems implied in the Baghdad Pact policy, the most important potential stabilizing factor in the Middle East as a whole seems likely to be wasted; for an Iraq that was not cut off behind the curtain of an untimely or an unnecessary Western Pact could even now be exerting a beneficial influence in Jordan and Syria.

It may be argued that the object of the Pact is first and foremost to build up Iraq into a modern State and to enable her at some future date to exercise her influence for good on the other Arab countries of the Fertile Crescent. But this argument overlooks the following facts: Iraq having gone her own way for so long might not wish to do this; an Iraq with such Western credentials, however strong and developed, would be unacceptable to the majority of people in the other Arab countries; and Egypt would almost certainly consider such an Iraq hostile to herself and might physically oppose such a move. Lastly, in the process of thus building up Iraq into a modern State which should in the future be able to exercise its influence on other Arab States, the internal battle to win the vast uncommitted majority on a neo-Arab nationalist basis might be lost for ever.

But assuming the Baghdad Pact were dropped tomorrow and Iraq began to spread her influence westwards, would Egypt stand by and allow this to happen? Such a change in Iraqi policy, if it were to come about, would in itself be a cause of deep satisfaction to Egypt. Moreover, it would entail a change in Iraqi leadership and the coming to power in Iraq of a group that has more in common with the Egyptian leaders from the point of view of age, temperament, background, and outlook. It should also not be forgotten that if Jordan and Syria turn to Egypt today it is because, from their point of view, Iraq has not till now allowed them to turn

to her, so that if Egypt is stepping in she is doing so because there is in fact a vacuum into which to step.

On a long-term basis, Egypt has everything to gain from a strong and united Fertile Crescent so long as it is friendly to herself. Such a Fertile Crescent would protect her Eastern flank. It would take off her shoulders the immediate military burden of Israel. It could lend her much-needed capital for her development projects and so save her from the necessity of begging for Western or Eastern capital. It would help her to improve the acute situation of the 300,000 Palestinian refugees in the Gaza strip. It could even accept some of her surplus population in its under-populated territories

There is, moreover, the fact that while Egypt, like every other country, enjoys possessing prestige, she does not make a cult of prestige and certainly does not pursue prestige at the expense of her own real interests. There is every indication that the Egyptian leaders are well aware that not only the future of their country but their own personal survival depends on finding solutions for the great economic and domestic problems confronting them. They believe that the present Anglo-Egyptian tension is a transitory phase and that the atmosphere not only in Egypt but throughout East Africa may relax considerably once the High Dam scheme is under way. They also believe that then would come the opportune time for Britain to try to bring Iraq and Egypt together, in her own interest and in the interest of the Arabs and of world peace.

W. K.

The Soviet Bloc and Under-Developed Countries

An Assessment of Trade and Aid

THE Soviet economic drive into the under-developed regions of the non-Communist world has by now gone on long enough to permit a tentative assessment of some of its basic features.

The drive is developing under the banner of 'economic aid' and this calls for one or two remarks on its semantics. The Soviet

use of this term, even where it does not rise to the emotional heights of Mr Khrushchev's famous phrase about sharing the last crumb with India, is somewhat confusing. It stands for outright gifts and grants only in a few exceptional cases, such as the gift of a technological institute to Rangoon, or that of equipment for a State farm in India. Indeed, the Soviet doctrine rejects scornfully the very concept of economic development based on unrequited external assistance.[1] True aid—it is claimed—'is that insisted upon by the Soviet Union and all the people's democracies, the comprehensive expansion of normal economic links based on mutual benefit and equality'. No contradiction is perceived between the idea of aid to the one and reciprocal benefits to both parties. In a very few instances only, as will be seen, economic aid implies longer-term credits. As a rule the tag is attached to Soviet sales of some categories of commodities. Typical of them is grain. If sold on normal commercial terms by the USSR it becomes magnanimous assistance in feeding populations threatened by starvation: 1951–2 deliveries to India and Pakistan are cases in point.[2] At the other end of the scale the label is given to supplies of producer goods, especially if they consist of capital goods: still more if the Communist country undertakes to provide its partner with a complete development project, or to give technical instruction. However, it is doubtful if such terminology would be acceptable in regard to Soviet economic history: it is perhaps an excusable digression to recall that in the post-revolutionary reconstruction period half the machinery installed in Soviet Russia came from the West and that in the two decades preceding World War II the non-Communist world supplied her with 8,000 million dollars' worth of producer goods.[3]

Nevertheless it may be said of the Soviet use of the term 'economic aid' that it has been highly successful in the sense that it has gained acceptance among those concerned.

The emotional load which the Soviet bloc tries to impart to its commercial deals with the under-developed areas stems from its political background. It is almost platitudinous to say that the

[1] V Kollontai, 'Burzhuaznaia Politekonomiia o Razvitii Slaborazvitykh Stran', in *Voprosy Ekonomiki*, 1956, No 3

[2] S. Viktorov, in *Vneshnaia Torgovlia*, 1955, No 12, p 5

[3] cf E. S Gorfinkel, *SSSR v Sisteme Mirovogo Khoziaistva*, Moscow, 1929, p 180, *Vneshnaia Torgovlia SSSR*, ed A. M Smirnov, N. N Lubimov, Moscow, 1954, *passim*.

drive is aimed at areas of particular political and strategic importance, and tends to exploit political and social tensions, conflicts, and instabilities: it is enough to mention the advantage taken of hostility towards the United States and of social pressures in some of the Latin American countries, of the Arab-Israeli conflict, of the Egyptian drive for hegemony in the Arab world and the campaign against the Baghdad Pact, of the Afghan-Pakistani dispute, and of the desire to maintain links with the two camps of Powers which is characteristic of the wide 'uncommitted belt' in Asia.

Expanded economic relations serve to influence public opinion. But at the same time public opinion is manipulated to serve as a lever for Soviet economic penetration. In this drive, for example, the Tudeh party is a would-be ally in Persia. There is no attempt to conceal the encouragement given to local trade unions in Latin America to impress on public opinion the advantages of an expansion of economic relations with the Communist bloc as a means of solving acute marketing difficulties.[1] It would, however, certainly be a far-fetched simplification to assume that there is, on the Soviet side, no economic motivation. The range of primary produce in which the Soviet bloc is interested has grown of late to embrace, in addition to the traditional items such as wool, rubber, and some non-ferrous metals, some foodstuffs such as meat, dairy products, rice, and grain. At the same time, the Soviet bloc tries to ease its payment position by establishing direct trade links with some sources of supply—for instance, buying Uruguayan wool direct instead of via Britain. Generally speaking there is an avowed attempt to eliminate as far as possible the traditional triangular pattern, that is, the pattern in which the Soviet bloc country earns a surplus in trade with the industrial Western nations with which to pay for purchases in some primary producer countries.

It is fortunate for the Soviet Union that all the major underdeveloped areas on which she has political or strategic designs—and they stretch from Latin America in the one hemisphere to the Near and Middle and Far East in the other—share to a greater or smaller extent one common characteristic. It is the dependence in exports on a very small range of commodities which are (*a*) affected by sharp price fluctuations, and (*b*) face growing competition from other sources of supply. A typical case is that of rice producers who have to face the competition of the United States,

[1] M. Danilevich, *Kommunist*, 1956, No. 2

which grew and exported before the war a relatively small amount of rice but has now expanded production and increased exports by over 150 and 670 per cent respectively.

There is also the delicate problem of American sales of surpluses on concessionary terms. Again rice is typical. The U.S.A. is selling to Indonesia considerable quantities of her rice surpluses and negotiates such sales with India and Japan. The proceeds, in local currencies, would be used to assist the economic development of the buyer country. But other under-developed countries—in this case Burma—feel affected by an unfair competition. Soviet Russia tries to cash in on such feelings although they lack justification

It is worth recalling that agricultural produce accounts on an average for 90–100 per cent of total exports from Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, the Sudan, and Turkey, cotton and grains for the area as a whole accounting for almost two-thirds of agricultural exports, which make up 90 per cent of the total, if oil is excluded.[1] Cotton dominates Egyptian exports with an 80–85 per cent share of the total. Further east there is a similar dependence on a few crops. Karakul, cotton, wool, and fruits make up 90 per cent of Afghan exports.[2] In general, around four-fifths of the total value of exports in most Far Eastern countries is made up of no more than two primary commodities.[3] Tropical produce represents about half the value of Latin-American exports, coffee heading the list followed at some distance by sugar, cotton, and cocoa. If wool, wheat, hides, meat, and a few more commodities exported principally by the River Plate countries are added they make up about seven-tenths of the area's total.[4]

This structure of exports makes the economies extremely sensitive to price fluctuations in the world markets An analysis of the most important commodities exported from these economies has shown that variations in their year-to-year yields over the past half-century averaged as much as 22·6 per cent.[5] It may be said that, on the whole, prices of primary produce have been affected

[1] FAO, *Problems of Food and Agricultural Expansion in the Near East*, Rome, 1955, pp 48 seq , UN, *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945 to 1954*, New York, 1955 pp 9 seq

[2] ECAFE, *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1955*, Bangkok, 1956, p 55

[3] Ibid p. 32.

[4] ECLA, *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1954*, New York, 1955, pp 55 seq

[5] UN, *Instability in Export Markets of Under-developed Countries*, New York, 1952 Cf Eugene Staley, *The Future of Underdeveloped Countries*, New York, 1954, p. 383.

by a downwards drift since the end of the Korean emergency.

It is hardly surprising therefore that the Soviet overtures, whatever their motive, have met with a favourable response

A wide network of barter and bilateral agreements has been created in both hemispheres which secures to the under-developed areas additional outlets in the Communist bloc. In Latin America the drive was initiated by Argentina's trade pact with Czechoslovakia, followed by one with the USSR (1953). Argentine trade with the Soviet bloc is by far the greatest in the area. The second largest customer of the bloc in the area is Brazil, although the absence of diplomatic relations with the USSR—they were severed nine years ago—is an obstacle to direct bilateral trading Argentina and Brazil represent over four-fifths of Soviet bloc commercial exchanges in the region. They concentrate on the Latin American side on the sale of a few commodities only. from Argentina mainly oils, linseed, meat, and wool; from Brazil coffee, cocoa, wool, and cotton. Little business is done with Uruguay, Paraguay, Mexico, or Chile. Cuba's change of heart in selling some sugar (500,000 tons in 1955) has particularly gratified the Soviet Union as a symptom of her success in the role of rescuer from a severe depression.

In the Near and Middle East Egypt has become by far the most important trading partner of the bloc. The expanding trade is based on Egyptian sales of cotton; the Sino-Soviet bloc takes between a quarter and a third of Egyptian exports. Czechoslovakia has moved up to the place of Egypt's second largest customer for cotton, preceded only by India. This obviously is the result of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms deal. Afghanistan exports to the Soviet Union half her cotton, three-fourths of her wool, one-fourth of her hides, and more than nine-tenths of her oil seeds Barter and bilateral agreements with the Soviet bloc were entered into by India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Burma, Pakistan trying to find new outlets for her jute and cotton and Burma for her rice In 1954–5 she disposed of some 170,000 tons of rice to the Communist world,[1] which is about one-tenth of her total rice exports The July 1955 agreement provides for Soviet buying of about 150–200,000 tons, and Soviet sources estimate that eventually the bloc will buy as much as half of Burmese rice exports.[2] At the

[1] ECAFE, *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1955*, p. 60, and I M Reiser, R. T. Abramovich, *Nash sosed Afganistan*, Moscow.

[2] S Viktorov, in *Vneshnaia Torgovlia*, 1955, No. 12.

present time the Sino-Soviet bloc's purchases appear to run at a level of about 500,000 tons, which is rather more than a third of total shipments. Contracts for 600,000–1,000,000 tons have been vaguely mentioned recently.

In some cases Communist bloc purchases have become a significant stabilizing factor from the point of view of the seller. This is certainly true, for example, of Argentine hides, Cuban sugar, Egyptian cotton, and Burmese rice.

It may be noted here parenthetically that Soviet policies in buying up primary produce surpluses are by no means free of 'inherent contradictions'. Such produce is in most cases either consumer goods or the raw material for consumer goods. Hence purchases may conflict with the primacy of producer-goods industries, as reasserted in the Soviet Union. Secondly, there is a conflict with the long-term autarkic trend. Broadly speaking, in 1956–60 the output of raw cotton and wool is planned to increase about twice as fast as that of textiles: in the long run such tendencies must reduce Soviet bloc purchases of wool as well as of cotton.

One may be inclined to look for some analogy between the present vigorous Soviet drive and that of Germany in the 'thirties. There is a parallel between the objectives of commercial and political penetration, on the one hand, and of gaining outlets for crude produce on the other. There are, however, also some essential differences. Germany's strategy ran counter to her trading partners' national aims of industrial development: this is in contrast to the Soviet strategy of tempting backward countries with prospects of large-scale help in their industrialization. In this the USSR is greatly assisted by her prestige as a once backward country which within one generation has succeeded in transforming itself into a first-class industrial Power: the uniqueness of her geo-economic and political circumstances, as well as the price paid by her population in the process, in terms of political and economic sacrifices and human misery, are overlooked easily by her would-be imitators.

The crucial question is how far the Soviet Union does and can live up to her promises and the hopes she raises.

In most cases the primary produce of an under-developed country is bartered for producer goods from the Soviet bloc such as oil, coal, cement, iron, chemicals, semi-finished steel products.

About half the value of its supplies is taken up by agricultural, industrial, and transport equipment. As has been mentioned earlier, offers of complete plants and comprehensive 'developmental' projects are played up and given particularly great publicity.

It is not easy to produce a sufficiently significant list of offers of such projects, since the known offers differ greatly in the degree of firmness, and even those which have led to some kind of actual deals differ in the stages of their implementation.

The Indian steel project takes pride of place in Soviet writing and propaganda (the report in *Pravda* on the preliminary agreement[1] claimed that 'Indian public opinion received with enthusiasm the news of the construction of a metallurgical plant by joint Indian and Soviet efforts'). The mill to be erected with Soviet machinery and technical assistance at Bhilai is expected to produce by 1959 1,300,000 ingot tons of steel and 300,000 tons of pig iron. This project, at an estimated cost of 230 million dollars, is presumably to be the counterpart of those constructed under Soviet patronage in satellite Central Europe.

The project second largest in value, though much vaguer, is the Soviet-sponsored development plan in Afghanistan, which is known to cover agriculture, construction of hydro-electric stations, irrigation works, motor car repair workshops, and the reconstruction of the Kabul airport. According to an agreement made in December last, a study was to be made of the implementation of this programme. For obvious political and strategic reasons Afghanistan has attracted the attention of the Soviet leaders to an extent quite out of proportion to her size and potentialities Under previous arrangements the Soviet Union had committed herself to the construction of grain elevators, flour mills, oil tanks, and a tar factory.

Several countries of the bloc have been interested in or committed to various smaller projects in different countries. Thus Czechoslovakia followed the Soviet Union in her economic penetration of Afghanistan by undertaking to construct a sugar refinery, a slaughter house, an engineering works, a plant for the production of oxygen, and a cement factory.[2] Poland has undertaken to construct a railway, of first-class strategic importance, running through Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. She has also

[1] *Pravda*, 24 October 1955
[2] *Rude Pravo*, 7 January 1956

undertaken to construct an enamel-ware factory in Egypt.[1] Czechoslovakia built two bridges in Egypt. She is reported to have obtained orders for a sugar factory and a cement factory in India. Poland has been reported to be negotiating for the construction of several plants in different countries, such as a railway carriage works in India, iron casting plants in Argentine and Syria, a metallurgical plant in Turkey, a plant producing ship propellors in Brazil. The Soviet Union offered to supply Syria with a complete oil refinery: a similar offer has been made by Czechoslovakia and there have been reports of an acceptance of this offer. Offers of development projects have been made by the Soviet Union to Indonesia, where some East European countries are already engaged on the construction of sugar and cement factories, in which East Germany and Rumania are interested. There has been a Czechoslovak offer to erect a steel plant in India on conditions similar to those agreed upon with the Soviet Union, and the latter is recently reported to have made an offer to Burma to build a steel plant on the same lines. Even Bulgaria offers help to build a canning factory in Egypt.

Of the outstanding offers undoubtedly the largest is that made by the Soviet Union to supply the material, equipment, and personnel for the construction of the Aswan High Dam, a project estimated to cost about $1,300 million, in exchange for Egyptian cotton over twenty-five years. This offer, which has never emerged from the nebulous stage, is typical in more than one respect. It shows the Soviet tendency to concentrate on projects which stir the imagination of nations and become in their minds symbols of their future greatness. It may also be typical in the sense that it gives maximum returns to the Soviet Union in terms of prestige, and a high dividend to the recipient country by giving a spur to rival and effective bids from the West. It may be said with some reason that in this kind of offer the two parties—the Soviet Union and the receiving country—act on the tacit understanding that the offer will never actually materialize, and yet both try to profit from this game of make-believe.

The most striking feature of the economic drive of the Soviet bloc in the under-developed areas of the world is the paucity of means so far engaged, if measured by any yardstick, certainly if measured by that of the psychological success achieved.

It is a not infrequent feature of the barter arrangements of the

[1] ECE, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*, p. 182.

Soviet bloc with the under-developed countries that they provide for deferred terms of payment to be made in the given country's produce: agreements with Afghanistan and Burma stipulate a five-year period. The operation of these clauses, and that of the agreement of August 1953 which provided for a Soviet credit of $30 million for the purchase of capital equipment by Argentina, will be considered below. Apart from the latter agreement there are only two major loans granted by the Soviet Union. One is the credit placed at the disposal of India (March 1956) to finance the steel project: the Soviet Union is to lend half its estimated cost, i e about $115 million. The loan is repayable over a period of twelve years. The other is one of $100 million promised (December 1955) to Afghanistan for the Soviet-sponsored development programme: little is known of its details.

It may well be true that some under-developed countries are worried about some aspects of foreign bilateral aid in the shape of gifts of special credits, as is constantly claimed in Soviet writing on the subject. In fact there is a wide measure of agreement in both East and West that economic salvation for the backward areas of the world will come primarily from their own exertions. These areas have a very low *per capita* income; it averages about $130 a year, that is about one-tenth of the figure for the economically mature countries of North America and Western Europe:[1] although the figure reaches about $250[2] for the 'middle class' group of Latin America, it falls to a mere fifth of the average in a wide belt of Asia.[3] It has been estimated that in Asia net investment averages about 5 per cent of national income, and there is no hope of closing the gap between Asian and Western living standards unless this rate is at least trebled.[4] Since in most of the under-developed countries poverty makes it impossible to earmark such a portion of income for development, it is the foreign unrequited supply of capital and investment goods (as well as 'know-how') which must provide—to use someone else's phrase—at least a 'catalyst' in this development.[5] Powerful as the Soviet 'economic myth' may be, the Soviet Union can hardly expect to play a decisive role in the economies of the

[1] USA, *Foreign Operations Administration, Report*, 27 May 1955, p 2

[2] cf. ECLA, *Economic Survey of Latin America 1954*, New York, 1955, p 4

[3] cf. UN, *National and Per Capita Incomes of Seventy Countries in 1949 Expressed in U.S. Dollars*, October 1950

[4] ECAFE, *Economic Bulletin for Asia and the Far East*, vol. III, No 1-2, November 1953

[5] Norman S Buchanan and Howard S Ellis, *Approaches to Economic Development*, New York, 1955, p 433.

backward areas without sending them unrequited exports, and with only about $250 million of long-term credits placed at their disposal, even if the terms of these credits appear most generous (the rate of interest of Soviet loans is 2–2·5 per cent).

For comparison it is perhaps worth recalling that between 1945 and 1955 American aid to Near Eastern, Asian, and Pacific countries amounted to some $15·5 thousand million, and it runs currently at about $1·6 thousand million yearly. India alone obtained from the West between 1951 and 1956 aid approximating $645 million.[1] During the first five years of the Colombo Plan, Governments and organizations from outside the area have granted loans and credits of about $1·82 thousand million. The United Kingdom made available between 1951 and 1955 about $225 million in grants, loans, and credits to Colombo Plan countries, and this represents only a part of British capital aid to which releases of sterling balances (about $120 million a year) and private investment should be added. A study by the Reserve Bank of India has shown that between mid-1948 and the end of 1953 United Kingdom private investment amounted to about $280 million. Such figures naturally dwarf their Soviet counterpart.

Anyone impressed by the publicity accompanying the wave of Soviet trade offers and transactions with the under-developed areas cannot fail to experience some surprise when he turns to statistics.

As the table on p. 232 suggests, the total volume of Soviet bloc trade, i.e. exports plus imports, reached in 1953 about a quarter of a milliard dollars: the figure leapt by about 80 per cent the following year, and rose about 20 per cent between 1954 and 1955, yet in the latter year it was still only about $530 million. For the whole Sino-Soviet bloc the 1955 volume was probably about $600 million. Under current agreements it should run this year at perhaps $800 million, but past experience shows that in the trade of the Sino-Soviet bloc with the under-developed areas there is a wide gap between agreed targets and actual performance (in the case of the Soviet Union's largest Latin-American partners, for example, the difference varied between two-fifths and one half in 1954).

In the trade of its largest trading partner among those considered here, Argentina, the Sino-Soviet bloc accounts for about

[1] *The Times*, 26 January 1956.

TABLE I

TRADE OF THE SOVIET BLOC WITH ITS MAIN PARTNERS IN THE UNDER-DEVELOPED AREAS

(*million dollars*)

Country	*Exports from USSR*			*Imports to USSR*			*Exports from USSR plus Eastern Europe*			*Imports to USSR plus Eastern Europe*			*Total volume of trade (both ways) with Soviet bloc*		
	1953	1954	1955	1953	1954	1955	1953	1954	1955	1953	1954	1955	1953	1954	1955
Egypt	14.1	6.6	4.3	11.9	5.4	15.3	37.7	26.1	30.1	37.7	45.0	61.6	75.4	71.1	91.7
Iran	23.9	13.4	26.4	22.0	18.9	22.5	27.1	21.2	30.5	22.8	21.2	27.0	49.8	42.4	57.5
Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Sudan, and Ethiopia	0.3	2.1	1.0	1.0	3.1	2.5	11.6	27.0	17.4	2.7	6.2	10.9	14.3	33.2	28.3
Indonesia	—	0.6	0.3	—	0.4	—	4.6	11.9	36.8	4.2	6.7	31.2	8.8	18.6	68.0
Colombia, Haiti, Mexico, Venezuela	—	—	—	—	—	0.6	1.8	3.3	4.2	0.4	—	1.2	2.2	3.3	5.4
Argentina	—	27.8	31.3	11.5	50.3	17.5	15.6	69.3	68.4	24.8	100.9	72.0	40.4	170.2	140.4
Brazil	—	—	—	—	—	1.4	9.7	18.3	30.8	10.3	21.5	36.2	20.0	40.3	67.0
Chile and Uruguay	—	—	—	0.2	19.9	4.4	0.3	1.4	3.3	1.0	24.6	16.4	1.3	26.0	19.7
India	0.9	2.4	5.7	0.7	5.3	5.1	4.2	6.4	13.3	6.6	10.7	9.0	10.8	17.1	22.3
Pakistan	—	0.2	0.2	7.3	3.6	—	1.0	1.3	0.8	12.3	7.5	8.2	13.3	8.8	9.0
Burma	—	0.1	0.2	—	—	—	0.5	2.4	1.4	—	0.6	1.4	0.5	3.0	2.8
Afghanistan	—	—	15.0	—	—	10.0	—	—	15.0	—	—	10.0	—	—	25.0

All figures, except for Afghanistan, derived from *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*, p 181 Data for 1955 are yearly rates averaged from monthly figures covering a period of four to ten months, hence these estimates may differ from actual 1955 performance The Afghanistan figure is based on estimates

5 per cent of exports and 9 per cent of imports. Only in the special case of Afghanistan does the bloc take as high a share as about 20 per cent in both exports and imports. In Egypt, whose trade with the Sino-Soviet bloc has now approached the level of that of Argentina, the share is substantial—around 25 per cent—in exports only: it is a quarter of that proportion in imports. The latest reports seem also to suggest a sharp rise in the Soviet bloc share in Burmese trade.

If Latin America is taken as a whole, exports and imports of the Soviet bloc account for only 2·5 and 1·6 per cent respectively.[1]

TABLE II

SHARE OF THE SINO-SOVIET BLOC IN THE TOTAL TRADE OF SELECTED UNDER-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

(*per cent*)

		Exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc	*Imports from the Sino-Soviet bloc*
Egypt	1954	14 1	5 9
	1955	25 0	6 2
Iran	1954	18 3	9 5
	1955	12 7	12 4
Sudan	1954	0 8	8 0
	1955	0 8	3 9
Afghanistan	1954	12 0	25·0
	1955	19 0	21 0
Burma	1954	—	1 5
	1955	8 5	2 3
Ceylon	1954	12 3	11·3
	1955	4·1	7 4
India	1954	1 6	0 9
	1955	1·8	1·5
Indonesia	1954	1 1	2·4
	1955	3 0	10 1
Pakistan	1954	9 4	0 9
	1955	5·1	2 9
Argentina	1954	7 8	7 1
	1955	5·3	8 5
Brazil	1954	1 5	1 1
	1955	3 0	2·3
Uruguay	1954	9 5	0 9
	1955	8 2	1 6

This table is derived from *Soviet Deterrents to Increased Foreign Trade*, 7th report to Congress by the Director, International Co-operation Administration, Washington, 1956, pp 80 seq Data for 1955 are based on returns for a number of months varying for different countries, consequently they may differ from actual shares.

[1] ECLA, *Economic Survey of Latin America, 1954*, pp. 61 and 63.

Trade of the Asian and Far Eastern countries with the bloc is around 1 per cent of their total.

The remarkable feature of trade exchanges between the Soviet bloc and under-developed areas is that it is rather the latter which appear to be the credit givers. In 1955 these credits were of the order of $40 million (see table on p. 232). The experience of the Soviet bloc's largest single partner may not be without relevance. Soviet pro-consumer policies at home in 1953–4 resulted in larger purchases of Latin American produce. As a result Argentina built up a credit balance of around $40 million (see table on p. 232), far in excess of the $25 million swing credit provided by the agreement. Soviet counter-deliveries fell much below expectations. The pattern of the exchanges has had to be readjusted, and the volume of trade dropped between 1954 and 1955 from about $170 to about $140 million. The Uruguayan credit balance had to be eventually settled by the USSR at the end of 1954 not in commodities as arranged, but in sterling.

The second largest Soviet partner in the under-developed areas —Egypt—exported to the Soviet bloc in 1955 twice as much as she imported. Her credit balance with the whole of the Sino-Soviet group amounted to about $60 million.[1] Presumably the balance built up in this way has since been used to pay for arms deliveries from Czechoslovakia, which, however, does not invalidate the general argument with regard to normal commercial exchanges with the bloc Burma, too, has been unable to take advantage of the deferred payments provision for Soviet deliveries over the agreed five-year period, although recent reports indicate a striking increase of Soviet bloc deliveries.

While any generalization may be risky, it seems that at least in the case of Latin America the causes of the failure to fulfil agreed quotas were insufficient Soviet availabilities and Argentina's reluctance to take equipment considered to be not up to standard. This experience seems to be shared in some cases by some Middle Eastern countries.

Understandably enough, countries with a glut of their staple export produce on hand try to get rid of it even if this involves providing the stronger partner with credit in the bilateral transactions. No wonder that countries whose bargaining position is strengthened by developments in world markets try to get away

[1] Total Egyptian exports to the Sino-Soviet bloc amounted in 1955 to $106 million, as against $43 million imports.

from bilateral trade: a notable case in point is recent Indonesian policy.

Another case in point is that of India. Prophecies of a rapid expansion of trade with India are given special prominence in Soviet pronouncements (the Soviet press and economic journals repeat an Indian newspaper forecast that Soviet-Indian trade would increase fifteen-fold[1]). Yet there is certainly truth in the remark made by the Economic Commission for Europe to the effect that 'the expansion in trade of the Eastern European countries, and also of the Soviet Union, with India has been extremely modest, perhaps because India, as a member of the sterling area, has a wide and relatively unrestricted market for its exports and a smoothly functioning payments system at its disposal, and has less need to develop its trade on a bilateral trade and payments basis.'[2]

If there is a field in which there appears to be great scope for the expansion of the USSR's economic relations with the under-developed countries, it is that of the supply of scientific and technical services. The Soviet Union appears to have sufficient expert manpower. Providing expert teams yields the highest dividends in terms of influence with the smallest capital outlay. A Soviet source reported that 'the Indians and Russians in Bhilai (the site of the Soviet-built metallurgical plant) form a close-knit community'. This and similar contacts are, for Soviet purposes, invaluable. No less useful to them politically are contacts and influence established by assistance in the construction and, even more, the staffing of technological institutes in Rangoon and at Powai, near Bombay (the former is a Soviet gift, the latter will be supplied with Russian equipment and aids out of the Soviet contribution to Unesco).

Hence Soviet zeal in providing technical assistance, whether under her own or under the United Nations flag. In fact, when the Soviet Union joined the United Nations technical aid agencies—after a prolonged boycott—she constantly complained of being discriminated against in the allocation of opportunities to assist

[1] This forecast by the *Hindustani Standard* of 17 December 1955 has been repeated by S Viktorov, loc cit., and by practically every other Soviet writer on the subject

[2] ECE, *Economic Survey of Europe in* 1955, loc cit , p 182 Most under-developed countries also experience transport difficulties in their trade with the Soviet bloc To overcome them in the case of India, the April 1956 agreement provides for regular services between Soviet and Indian ports, each country providing six ships of about 8,000 tons each. A similar arrangement has been made between Poland and India.

countries which she would be only too happy to help. To illustrate the expense incurred in such operations, it may be noted that the three Soviet member countries—the USSR, the Belorussian and the Ukrainian Republics—are contributing between them this year to the United Nations technical assistance $1,275,000, which is a little more than half the contribution of Britain, a country with a fourth of their population. Incidentally, it would be wrong to suppose that the teams of experts who go to the under-developed countries under the Soviet flag are inexpensive to the recipient: complaints were voiced in the Indian Parliament because of the high salaries charged to the Indian Government for the Soviet oil and mining technicians; the answer of the Minister was that comparably large teams were not available from other sources.

So much for Soviet availabilities of expert manpower. But what about Soviet possibilities of mobilizing goods which go into the economic development of a country?

An attempt to answer this crucial question is bound to be far less conclusive.

Exportable surpluses are, generally speaking, something very relative indeed, even in a market economy. They are far more so in a highly collectivized system where priorities are weighed up and determined by the central planner. Poland, which produces about 4,000 motor cars a year, sells cars to Latin America: China has appeared in the Middle East as a seller of machine tools and textile machinery. Consequently the possibilities of directing suitable goods to exports, in a country whose total output gives it second place among the industrial countries of the world (and which controls in addition an industrially developed part of Central Europe), may appear at their face value immense. There is a logical parallel in the fact that during the war the Soviet Union managed to 'squeeze out' a higher output of munitions per ton of steel produced than, say, the United States.[1] By 1960 the Soviet Union will be using as much as 60 million tons of steel to make capital goods and armaments out of a total of about 68 million tons, which is almost 90 per cent as against 40 per cent in the United States. According to this estimate, the quantity of steel which the Soviet Union will then be diverting to capital goods and armaments will be about as great as the amount used at present for

[1] Cf the contribution by E Ames to a discussion in the American Economic Association, *American Economic Review*, xli, pp. 491 seq

these purposes in the United States.[1] In a word, on this line of argument, it is only the place accorded by the Soviet planner to the economic offensive in his hierarchy of aims and means which determines the Soviet potential for an all-out drive in the under-developed areas.

Yet when all this has been said it must still be reconciled with the evidence from the experience of the last three or four years, as analysed here. How is it that the Soviet bloc has been apparently unable to marshal means which would stand any reasonable comparison with the West? A plausible answer appears to be that Soviet resources, vast as they are in absolute size, are chronically strained 'at the margin'.

The Soviet bloc is acutely short of energy-generating and other raw materials: its fuel and raw material 'basis' lags admittedly behind the expanding fabricating industries. Shortage of metal was one of the points raised by Mr Khrushchev in his report to the twentieth congress of the Communist Party. True, an agreement with India pledges the Soviet Union to provide her with one million tons of rolled steel products over a three-year period, yet the sacrifice which this involves has become a point constantly stressed by Soviet writers.[2] The strained position of the Soviet Union with regard to the supply of engineering products was discussed in this Journal in another context.[3] The output of machinery and equipment is scheduled to rise appreciably in the current five-year plan, but internal demand is bound to rise even faster. The Soviet leaders are worried about the disquieting, abnormally high proportion of obsolete equipment, and the back-log in replacements:[4] the current five-year plan is to be one of large-scale scrapping. This, plus the need to substitute equipment for the steep fall in the intake of industrial manpower, must add to the tightness in the supply in engineering products. This has appar-

[1] ECE, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*, p 188 The British Steel Mission to the USSR put on record a cautious opinion '... it is clear that in steel and probably equally so in many other manufactured goods, Russia is potentially a serious competitor This position would be modified if large concessions were made to pressures for higher living standards in the near rather than in the more distant future ' *The Russian Iron and Steel Industry*, a Report produced by a British Steel Mission to the USSR, Special Report No 57, The Iron and Steel Institute, London, 1956, p 35

[2] *Trud*, 13 March 1956 Poland, which is very short of metal, agreed to sell India 300,000 tons of iron and steel products in return for iron ore

[3] *The World Today*, Vol xi, No 10, October 1955.

[4] Cf A. Notkin in *Planovoe Khozіaіstvo*, 1955, No 6.

ently made the Soviet Union slow down the relative pace of development in her own backward areas.[1] It is legitimate to ask, therefore, how far the Soviet Union can go in her drive to develop backward areas in the non-Communist world, if she has to save on development of such areas within her own borders. There are in addition, of course, commitments outside her borders in the Communist world. It is arguable that to save up means for winning over the uncommitted nations she would be prepared to sacrifice the needs of those who are already in the Communist fold. This argument, however, hardly applies to China, a partner whose goodwill the Soviet Union would not wish to forfeit. In fact China may be considered, with good reason, the test case of Soviet possibilities. From this angle it is relevant to note that the USSR is pledged to supply the Chinese with equipment and technical assistance to the tune of nearly 8,500 million rubles, while the credits she has accorded them equal only about one-fifth of this figure. Soviet credits for Chinese projects under the current five-year plan amount to no more than one-twelfth of their cost.[2] (In fact China had to lend more to the smaller Far Eastern Communist countries for their economic expansion than she obtained from her Soviet partner.) Since it may be argued that the USSR would like to buy the favours and goodwill of her important Asian partner by providing it with the maximum relief in carrying the burden of the immense industrialization programme, the question may be asked whether what she actually supplies indicates the maximum possible.

The proper evaluation of past experience is of course relevant for future Western policies. What justification is there for the school of thought which seems to suggest that the best course is to let the Soviet bloc commit itself as widely as possible, and then to call its bluff? It cannot be denied that there is much to be said for this line of policy in the light of past happenings. The apparent difficulties of the Communist bloc and the disappointments of those with whom they have dealt must inevitably grow as the Soviet economic offensive expands, and as the bloc is forced to pass from vague promises and pledges to their implementation. Yet a passive approach to the Soviet challenge carries all the risks of every 'Maginot line' strategy. It may result in breaks-through in the more vulnerable sectors of the front.

[1] ECE, *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955*, p. 220
[2] ECAFE, *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1955*, p. 98, *n.*

This argument, if valid, calls for a massive programme of aid by the West in under-developed areas, quite apart from the moral and purely economic case for a more balanced world economy. An imaginative attack on the problem of marketing primary-produce surpluses seems to be as much needed as massive direct aid in capital equipment and technology.

A. Z.

Political Progress in Nepal

THE struggle for popular government in Nepal is now in its sixth year. The Interim Constitution of 1951, establishing a constitutional monarchy, is still in force. But its democratic features have been whittled down by royal proclamations and practice. In fact, but little progress has been made toward democracy since the overthrow in 1951 of autocratic rule by the Rana family who were hereditary Prime Ministers. The reasons are not difficult to find. The mass of the people, certainly outside the capital of Katmandu, have no knowledge of democratic principles and sometimes oppose the introduction of democratic measures. They are possessed of a feudalistic mentality. Exposure to contradictory propaganda from various political factions leaves them bewildered, waiting for promised improvements and frustrated because they do not materialize. Too many political leaders are concerned with their own and not the country's welfare. Nepotism and corruption are rampant everywhere. This state of affairs is aggravated by the poverty of the country and its situation in a strategic area where rivalry between several foreign Powers for political influence has recently become strong, albeit hidden, and often unscrupulous.

Under such conditions, the burden upon the King to maintain national unity and modernize the country is heavy. He is the centre of public life and its only guarantor of stability. His position is upheld by its traditional prestige and, probably, by the loyalty of the recently reorganized army. No party dares seriously to criticize him: not even the Rana-supported Ghorka Parishad on the extreme right, or the Communists. The late King Tribhuvan increased the traditional respect for the King by his active support of the democratic cause. He was a popular ruler, venerated for his

high character and praised for his endeavour to improve the people's lot. There is, however, a feeling among educated Nepalese that he lacked the knowledge, training, and political acumen to guide the transition from Rana rule to popular government. His son, Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah Deva, who has been King since March 1955, is felt to be equally well intentioned and better prepared for his task. His activities during the first year of his reign would indicate that this is a justified impression. He has shown wisdom and sagacity as well as firmness in dealing with the political chaos caused by the rivalry and immaturity of the political parties. He has been successful, so far, in keeping a reasonable balance between India, China, and other nations with interests in his country. The King is today the main depository of political power in Nepal. Yet, in spite of his involvement in daily politics, necessitated by the inability of the parties to govern, he has kept himself above political critcism.

The most elementary equipment for governmental activity is lacking. Communications are practically absent. A precarious road connects Nepal with India and a few 16,000-foot-high or higher passes lead into Tibet. In the Katmandu Valley and the Terai some 300 miles of road are motorable most of the time, and at great expense to the chicken population. Several airports exist, but only Katmandu's landing strip is suitable for all weather. In general, as an official guide puts it, the country is served by 'undeveloped mule tracks'. The capital has a medium-wave radio transmitter and with Indian aid several small transmitters are scattered across the country in strategic spots which are useful when they are in working order. Several of the more important towns are connected by telephone. The total electric output in the country is 4,250 kilowatts.

The administrative machinery is at present in process of development. Until the accession of King Mahendra it was in a most rudimentary state or for all practical purposes non-existent There were a good many public servants, but no public service. There were no bureaucratic classes, no categories of function, no systems for collecting facts and keeping records. Ministers rarely knew of the Government's activities and were often unaware of the state of their own departments. Departmental intercommunication was often interrupted by rivalry between Ministers. The Interim Constitution created a judicial system, but its function was severely limited by a shortage of judges and the arrogation

of much judicial power by the King. The police force is in a constant state of reorganization and most of its functions are performed by the Indian-trained army. King Mahendra is fully aware of these shortcomings and is devoting a good deal of attention to the introduction of a public administration. In numerous orders since he came to power old offices have been eliminated, others consolidated, and new ones created. The structure of a new bureaucracy has been outlined. Businesslike methods have been introduced. Corruption is under serious attack. But no amount of goodwill can quickly overcome the customs of centuries or produce the required qualified personnel.

In this situation, government of the country from the centre is well-nigh impossible. Unfortunately, many of the governors (Badahakim) who have been appointed to the various districts have proved unreliable. Some of them spend their days in the capital instead of in distant, isolated headquarters. Others prefer to run their district according to their own independent decisions. The Government has recently tried to overcome these difficulties by appointing more responsible governors and distributing sections of the army at strategic points. Even so, some of the outlying districts, especially in the hills, are run as quasi-independent units by their governors, by landlords, by Communists, by bandits, or by whoever else happens to have the power. The population suffers and is restless. Selfish factions use the unsettled conditions to foment uprisings and civil strife. A good many Nepalese in Katmandu are nostalgic for the days of peace and order under the Ranas. They are convinced that efforts to establish democracy in a society whose social and economic pattern is still largely feudalistic can only lead to its corruption and bring it into disrepute.

The reputation of 'democracy' in the country is further worsened by the nature and activities of many political leaders. They contribute too much to confusion and too little to the King's constructive efforts. The best that can be said for their activities is that they would make a restoration of autocratic rule by anybody difficult and that something resembling modern democracy may yet emerge from the bedlam. What little political power the parties possess has been used so far only for the rather negative purpose of obliging the Government to come before the people from time to time and justify actions taken by it in an authoritarian manner. Nevertheless, for Nepal, this is progress.

There have been some thirty-five to forty political groupings

since the revolution. They are difficult to distinguish, except for the extremists on the right and left. Their platforms and programmes coincide in essentials. They all refer to the country's obvious problems—stabilization of currency, lowering of food prices, restoration of law and order, preservation of civil rights—and they all promise to take care of them. The multitude of parties despite the similarity of their programmes can be explained by their nature. Parties are, in essence, groups of followers of a leader. It is the personality of this leader, not the party or its principles, that counts. The fate of the parties depends therefore very much upon the fortunes of the leaders, who find it easy to form alliances, united fronts, and mergers, or, on the other hand, to split, to create new parties, or to do several of these things simultaneously. Their only discernible aim is the acquisition or maintenance of personal power by the leaders. The nation can ill afford such 'childhood diseases', as the King once called them, for they increase instability and waste talent that is badly needed for more constructive purposes. The parties have hitherto shown no evidence of self-improvement. The public is becoming increasingly impatient with them and the King in January 1956 cut through the interminable bickering and haggling by forming the fifth ministry since 1951 with only one party, the Praja Parishad. The leader of this party, Tanka Prasad Acharya, is now Prime Minister. It is not one of the most prominent or active Nepalese parties, but it is one of the oldest and most respected. The Prime Minister has long had a reputation for honesty and integrity. The King presumably introduced the novelty of one-party government—in contrast to previous coalition Governments—in order to guarantee 'homogeneity' and prevent the internal disputes which led to the ruin of all preceding ministries.

All these earlier ministries were under the Premiership of M. P. Koirala, with Ministers chosen from various parties. Their activity consisted for the most part in mutual recrimination and in attempts to oust each other from office. The inevitable result was invariably the resignation of the Cabinet, followed by government by the King and his advisers during the interim period.

How the other parties will accept their exclusion from office remains to be seen. During the continuous and complex bargaining preceding the appointment of the present Government, they all professed a desire to see the end of the King's direct rule for the sake of democracy and of preservation of the King's prestige

They alleged their willingness to serve as a loyal opposition as long as a 'popular' Government could be formed by any party. But such protestations at times when the parties are out of office have become almost routine and were never lived up to when one or more were in the Government. In the past an Advisory Assembly served as an instrument through which the parties could make themselves heard and agitate in legitimate fashion, though the manner in which they did so prevented the Assembly from becoming a constructive institution. For the present, the Assembly has not been recreated and the parties are restricted to campaigning for the popular election of a Constituent Assembly, which has now been promised for October 1957, after having been postponed annually from 1952 onwards.

Among the many political groups which call themselves parties there are only a few with significance and, in the absence of nation-wide elections, their true popular support cannot be ascertained. One of these parties is the Nepali Congress. It was once the counterpart to the Indian Congress and the main leader in the fight against the Ranas. But since 1951 many prominent members have left it to form their own parties. Until January 1956 its president was B. P. Koirala. He and his half-brother M. P. Koirala, the former Prime Minister, are the most prominent politicians of Nepal and a source of disturbance since they are locked in an unending struggle for power. When M. P. Koirala was thrown out of the Congress he formed his own party, the Rashtriya Praja Party, which provided him with the formal facilities to become Prime Minister. It is doubtful whether this party has many more members than those who were turned out of the Congress with Koirala, and presumably for this reason it is always on the search for other groups with which to merge. The Nepal National Congress, an early splinter of the Congress, has prominence mostly because of its well-known leader Professor D. R. Regmi. The Jan Congress and the Terai Congress have a regional following. These four parties, together with the Praja Parishad at present in power, are the only parties which the King has seriously consulted in the formation of a Government. There are however two more, the extremist Ghorka Parishad and the Communist Party. Both are forbidden, which does not prevent them from being quite active and attracting a good deal of uneasy attention.

The Ghorka Parishad, on the extreme right, is a Rana-supported

communal organization. Its popular strength lies in the hills, because in the Valley and the Terai the population is largely Newar, the people who were defeated by the invading Ghorkas in the eighteenth century and who participated most prominently in the defeat of the Ranas in 1951. For the time being the Ghorka Parishad is working quietly, not to say subversively, mostly outside the capital. It is secretly attracting a good many political leaders who presumably want to be on the safe side should the still influential Ranas return to power. The Ghorka Parishad does not come into the category of the 'democratic' parties, and indeed its attraction proves the stronger the more 'democracy' comes into popular disrepute.

The Communists are working more openly, through a great variety of front organizations which they have created for the various classes of the population. In spite of occasional difficulties of leadership, they faithfully follow the party line established in Moscow and Peking. They had considerable success in the municipal elections in Katmandu in 1952, the first general elections ever held in Nepal. But their candidates were labelled 'independent' and the public was not aware of their Communist nature until after the elections. This unawareness also applies to the front organizations, and while they are very active and frequently succeed in fomenting much unrest, the attraction they have for their followers rests much more on general dissatisfaction among the poor peasants than on any ideological appeal. This does not, of course, reduce their danger to the political future of Nepal.

The relation between the Communist movement and Dr K I Singh is somewhat obscure. Singh steadfastly denies being a Communist. Yet the revolt which he led in Katmandu in 1952, and his sojourn in Communist China until last September after the failure of that revolt and his escape from prison, permit the conclusion that he is certainly very close indeed to the Communists His political pronouncements, which often reflect the changes in the Communist party line, further substantiate this conclusion. Upon his return to Katmandu last year, with all his sins forgiven by the King and with a remarkable popular reception, he began to play the role of the great patriot and saviour of the nation. His programme does not differ much from that of the parties which, he claims, he despises for their petty and unpatriotic quarrels. But the myth built around him by his supporters during his exile, and his severe attacks upon the politicians, give him considerable prestige

throughout the country. Many Nepalese consider him the 'strong man' with a great political future, though they are uncertain just where he would lead the country.

This variety of political groupings and their nature are in part the result of political inexperience and the influence of a feudalistic environment, but in part they result from the low level of the Nepalese economy. The country is singularly poor in raw materials. The forests, which cover about a quarter of the country, are mostly useless for the supply of timber. Moreover their ruthless exploitation by the governing class has resulted in much erosion of good soil. The arable land is inadequate for the support of the population. Its irregular distribution across the country assures a reasonable food supply to the people of the Valley and the Terai. But in the hills where only an occasional fertile valley allows some growing of rice, barley, and fruit, the production is insufficient to feed the population. Hence much of the unrest bedevilling Nepal today originates in the hills and most of the hunger marches converging periodically on the capital start there. This is the area of greatest political instability and at the same time of the weakest governmental influence. To some small extent cottage industries supplement agricultural activity, and trading between Tibet and India provides a few with a small income. There are no factories of any appreciable size. A geological survey, not quite completed, has shown the presence of a variety of minerals, but apparently none in commercial quantities—not to mention the technical difficulties of their exploitation.

With the aid of foreign money and technical assistance the Government is trying to improve the methods of the peasants and the quality of the soil. A number of irrigation and power projects, such as the Indian-sponsored Kosi River scheme, are expected to bring a noticeable improvement in the foreseeable future. But technical improvements will not be enough. They must be supplemented by land reform. Under the two main systems of landholding predominant in Nepal the peasant is in either case the exploited underdog, while under the one system the State receives no income, and under the other only little, from land tax. Since there is no other source from which any sizeable tax could come, the national treasury is empty. Yet, limited as governmental activity may be, it costs money, and too much of it comes from the public printer. Inflation and the accompanying evils of currency speculation and black marketeering are Nepal's most pressing

problems today. The Government and all parties call for corrective measures. Those introduced to date have not been successful. Too many highly placed persons gain too much from the present situation to permit their impartial and rigid enforcement. Moreover, only an increase in the national wealth could fundamentally eliminate the evil and there is no prospect of that happening soon. In the meantime, foreign aid from India and other members of the Commonwealth under the Colombo Plan and from the United Nations, the United States, and certain other nations provides some support for the bankrupt economy of Nepal.

This aid is not universally appreciated. Nationalist sensitivity suspects elements of imperialism in it and objects. India and the United States, as the largest suppliers of aid, are the worst sufferers from such suspicions. Agitation against alleged Indian attempts to exercise control over Nepal reached such heights during 1954 and early 1955 that an Indian parliamentary mission was physically attacked in Katmandu and clashes between Nepalese and Indian workers in Nepal took place on several occasions. Almost all parties participated, at one time or another, in the anti-Indian agitation. The Indian Government itself supplies some grounds for fears of imperialism. It has always openly admitted that it considers the Himalayan hills a part of Indian defences, and these hills traverse Nepal. It has more or less openly interfered first in the revolution against the Ranas—on the side of the Nepali Congress—and then at various times in the squabbles of the parties among themselves and with the King. The assertion of some Nepalese that the Indian Ambassador in Katmandu is the real ruler of the country is a gross exaggeration. It is nevertheless true that he has enormous influence. Most Nepalese officials and a large section of the public realize, however, that Nepal's fate is inevitably bound up with India's. Taking the reasonable view they advocate the closest friendship with the big neighbour and subscribe to India's policy of 'dynamic neutralism' and the five principles of peaceful coexistence (Panch Shila). They share with India the general attitude toward Asian solidarity and criticism of the Western Powers, particularly the United States.

Toward Communist China there was, at one point, a difference of opinion. The Nepalese Government hoped to preserve special trading and travelling rights for Nepalese citizens in Tibet by not establishing diplomatic relations with China. These hopes faded when in 1954 Tibet referred Nepal to Peking on all matters relating

to Tibet. At the same time the Indian Government exerted pressure upon Nepal to sign a treaty with Communist China establishing diplomatic relations, while making it clear to both sides that it considered Nepal to be within its sphere of interest. A treaty was signed in August 1955. But it left open details of Nepalese-Tibetan relations, which are now in process of negotiation. The Nepalese Government is anxious for their conclusion. There is some uneasiness in Katmandu regarding Chinese policy toward Nepal, based on Chinese maps showing sections of Nepal as Chinese territory, on Communist border raids into Nepal, on the seizure of Communist propaganda material coming across the high passes, and on the apprehension of Communist agents entering Nepal as shepherds and traders.

While the recent admission of Nepal to the United Nations is a matter of pride and joy to many Nepalese, they also detect some disadvantages in their country's entry into world politics. They have to make political decisions which they were spared during the days of isolation. Foreign influences are complicating an already complicated internal political system. They would prefer to be left alone for some time to be able to work out their problems by themselves. They are hoping to have this opportunity if the Indian Government is successful in maintaining an 'area of peace' in South Asia.

W. L.

The Case of László Rajk

THE rehabilitation of fallen Communist idols throughout Eastern Europe is an expression of a new stage of Communist practice. This time it is not the purging of the purgers (a recurrent trend in Soviet history) but a drastic revision of accepted dogmatic assessments of the past leading to the restoration of honours to some of the dead and of liberty to some of the prisoners. The most striking feature of this reassessment is that it involves the quashing of sentences duly passed according to all the tenets of law of a Communist State, and based on full confessions of the accused who had

pleaded guilty both to charges of espionage and to 'national deviationism'.

The revision affects mainly those East European Communist leaders who, in the late 1940s, represented (or might represent) a national or, to be more correct, a local implementation of Communism disagreeing with the Party line imposed by Moscow: a clash that came to the fore with Yugoslavia's expulsion from the Cominform. László Rajk, the Hungarian Communist who went to the gallows in Budapest in 1949, has now attained unqualified rehabilitation. Similar is the case of Traicho Kostov whom the Bulgarian Communist Party in April declared to be innocent. In Poland, Władysław Gomułka has been released, though it is officially stated that his past views had been wrong. In Czechoslovakia, Mr Široky, announcing the release of some of Slansky's alleged accomplices, makes it clear that Rudolf Slansky himself will not be rehabilitated. The explanation of the Polish case lies perhaps in the fact that Gomułka (and all that he stood for when attacks were constantly made on Gomułka-ism) is still potentially dangerous for the regime. He represents a pronounced, native Polish (patriotic, as it were) approach to Communism, and therefore might presumably still command support within the Party. The ramifications of the Czechoslovak deviation—of Slansky-ism—were far wider, both internally and externally. The case might well be that Slansky had been a protégé of Beria and is thus denied rehabilitation by the present ruling circles. Moreover pro-Zionism (i.e. support of Israel) was one of the most spectacular charges among those made at Slansky's trial, and—in the light of the present international situation—the Communists may well be reluctant to go back on these accusations. The revisions of Kostov's and Rajk's trials (and especially of the latter's) must be viewed primarily in the context of relations between the orthodox Communist States and Yugoslavia.

But there also exists a wider aspect The Communist Parties, and especially the Soviet Party, are now, in their movement away from Stalinism, abandoning certain features of the past that had cost Communism great losses. In this search for respectability among both friends and foes a part is also played by revising sentences, and by exposing State methods and the fraud of some of the staged trials. Party members, dead or alive, innocent or guilty, have still the duty of serving the Party in this process. And even if murdered by the Party, they may still prove useful. After

all, the aim of the amnesty for heretics apparently decreed by th recent Moscow Communist Congress is to benefit the Communis Party.

László Rajk, the self-confessed spy and *provocateur* within th Party's ranks, was the first to benefit from this amnesty. It was hi trial which served as the signal for similar trials elsewhere. It wa an expression of a specific climate in Eastern Europe at the end o the last decade. The view may be held that, in its essence, the tria had nothing to do with Rajk himself for, at the time, the aim o Communism was the consolidation of its gains by every availabl means, by daring and cruel exploitation of all opportunities opene by the post-war situation. The shock of Tito's defection appeare as a serious threat to the whole structure of Communist domina tion in the area, and hence resort was had to measures designed t prevent anybody else from seeking his own 'road to socialism'.

The climate of 1956 is quite different. The Communist hol over the satellite States seems to be more indisputable, with al remnants of potential opposition ruthlessly eradicated. But th post-war consolidation of power had, by the beginning of th present decade, led Russian policy into a blind alley: Mosco found itself faced with a formidable and united front of opponents Because of Soviet expansionist policy the integration of militar defence of the West came into being, and after Korea it was diffi cult to see how the cold war could continue indefinitely and wha advantages the Communists could reap from its continuation.

The death of Stalin provided an opportune moment for a re appraisal; and this has indeed been an agonizing process in th case of the admissions made by the very same men who had calle Rajk a spy and who now declare him innocent. It seems that choice has been made to break with the Stalinist past, not becaus this past is being blamed for consolidating the victory of Com munism (first in Russia itself and then in the satellite States an China), but because Communism can no longer be extended b cold-war technique as before. It is in this light that many problem have to be assessed. If we take the example of relations wit Yugoslavia, we see that precisely because of the failure of the ol approach new attempts are being made to bring the heretic back t the fold, by admitting the fallibility of the Stalinist doctrine tha the interests of the Soviet Union have priority over the interests o satellite States. As far as the satellites are concerned, the risk o such an admission seemed to the Communists to be worth taking

for it could eventually lead to the complete recapture of Yugoslavia; hence the visit of the Soviet leaders to Belgrade, the economic concessions and loans granted, and now the complete reversal of the sentence passed on László Rajk.

The life, death, and rehabilitation of László Rajk were unique in many ways. He became a Communist as a young man, fought in Spain, was imprisoned, spent the war years in Hungary, and fought in the underground. When the war ended he became Secretary of the Budapest Party organization. Later he rose to be Minister of the Interior. Together with Gábor Peter, the secret police chief, he was responsible for the arrest and interrogation in 1947 of those Smallholders' deputies whose trial in the same year led to the complete seizure of power by the Communists. It was his efficiency which destroyed the Hungarian opposition. Yet it was he who had to fall. In August 1948 Rajk was removed from the Ministry of the Interior and made Minister of Foreign Affairs, a significant demotion in a police State. Apparently he was summoned to Moscow to defend his 'national' approach to Communism, and failed to restore confidence.

In Rajk's case opposition to Moscow was at least partly due to the fact that, in contrast to Mátyás Rákosi, he did not come in the train of the Red Army to the homeland; Rajk was a more native product, unschooled in the Kremlin. And rumour had it that there also was personal rivalry between the two men in the implementation of policy Michael Karolyi in his *Memoirs* says that Rajk, not having received Soviet training, 'approached Communism in a different, more romantic, idealist fashion, believing that its moral and human aspect was of major importance. He believed in the people and loved them . .' Somehow this appraisal does not sound very convincing. Karolyi seems to be nearer the truth when he says that Rajk was a man who 'without ambition and vanity . . . wished to be a soldier and not a general'.[1] It was this obedience, coupled with an apparently very pronounced streak of fanaticism in his character, which must have made him an ideal performer at a show trial. There seems to be little doubt that, in the eyes of the hierarchy, he had erred, and that subsequently he recanted while still continuing to proclaim his belief in Communism. This claim was then presumably put to the test, a test which Rajk had passed with flying colours. Unlike Kostov, the Bulgarian, he did not retract in open court some of his confessions. And unlike Gomułka or Anna

[1] *Faith Without Illusion* (London, Cape, 1956), p 327

Pauker he was sufficiently trusted to appear in court. Rajk was deliberately trying to incriminate himself; one may say that he was speaking in the dock as if acting under orders. And the order was quite clear: to vilify Tito and the Yugoslav Communists, to brand them as 'imperialist agents', as conspirators against Communist rule in Eastern Europe. His trial was to be the trial of Tito.

Rajk was arrested at the end of May 1949, and although official confirmation was not forthcoming, rumours about his fall began when on 9 June he did not appear at the opening of the National Assembly. Two days later his name was dropped in a Government re-shuffle. Then on 13 June a communiqué announced the arrest of Rajk and Tibor Szönyi, head of the Communist Party cadres. The communiqué described them as 'spies and Trotskyite agents of foreign imperialist Powers'. Their weapon was most dangerous, it was said, for this was 'penetration into the Party'. A major purge of the Hungarian Communist Party had begun. At least 18 per cent, or about 200,000 people, were deprived of membership. In the Hungarian Parliament deputies were saying: 'Marxism and nationalism are incompatible' and 'Nationalism is equal to treason'.[1] At one meeting, a Communist was recorded as declaring: 'A rope for all traitors like Rajk'.[2] Titoism was not yet an indictable offence, but that was to come.

When the trial opened in Budapest on 16 September, Rajk and seven others faced an indictment on charges of conspiring with Yugoslav and other foreign help to overthrow the Hungarian Communist regime and to murder its leaders. A *Daily Worker* correspondent reported from Budapest as follows: 'It is one of the most important and dramatic trials of our time. It will reveal a network of police spying and espionage which began before the Spanish Civil War and which placed hundreds of American and British agents in the ranks of East European Communist Parties.' The trial would show, the same correspondent went on to say, how Tito and Ranković aimed at the eventual destruction of 'the new Socialist States'.[3]

And what did the trial in fact reveal? The Blue Book published by the Hungarian Government (*László Rajk and his Accomplices Before the People's Court, 1949*) provides the answer: first and foremost, it destroyed the legend of Rajk the Communist. In court,

[1] *The Times*, 17 June 1949   [2] *The Times*, 22 June 1949.

[3] *Daily Worker*, 15 September 1949 The correspondent, Derek Kartun, also wrote a book on his impressions of the trial, *Tito's Plot Against Europe: the Story of the Rajk Conspiracy* (Lawrence & Wishart, 1949)

the principal accused spoke, to quote *The Times* correspondent present at the trial, 'without a shadow of emotion', and there came 'revelations' of how for nearly twenty years he had been passed on from one intelligence service to another; how he had started his career as a police informer and *agent provocateur*; how he was sent abroad by Horthy's secret police to spy on Hungarian Communists in Czechoslovakia and then in Spain; how he worked for the Gestapo and Szálasi's police; how he helped American intelligence; and especially how, following his acquaintance with 'Yugoslav agents of foreign espionage services', he entered Yugoslavia's secret service to bring about Hungary's subjugation to Tito's rule.

Thus, after the destruction of one legend, another legend came into being—the legend of Tito's anti-Communism and fascism. The seven other defendants and the witnesses for the prosecution all contributed to the replacement of one legend (the real one) by another (the invented). Those in the dock with Rajk included an officer who had risen under Horthy, a Social Democrat deputy, and a Yugoslav diplomat who had disowned Tito for allegedly conspiratorial reasons Here they were to supply all the principal propaganda points required by the Hungarian Communist State: divorce from the past, relations with the West, attitude to Tito, and internal problems. The most important of these was Titoism—a conception which meant many things and could be made to mean many more.

The *mise en scène* of the trial, with all the paraphernalia of espionage, secret meetings, couriers, political assassinations, and so on, was meant to emphasize that it was Tito who was in the dock. Yugoslavia, it was maintained, aimed at 'the re-establishment of capitalism through the overthrow of the people's democratic regimes', at planning to set up a federation which—to quote Rajk himself—would ultimately result in the creation of a military bloc 'on the side of the United States and against the Soviet Union'.[1] The Yugoslav Government, of course, did not wait long to prove conclusively that all the detailed evidence at the trial was false.[2]

[1] Hungarian Blue Book, especially passages in Rajk's testimony on pp 62 and 63

[2] Yugoslav Government Communiqué, 17 September 1949 (*White Book on Aggressive Activities by the Governments of the U S S R , Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania towards Yugoslavia*, Belgrade, 1951, p. 129 seq)

In his final plea Rajk, probably realizing the distorting magnification of details and the introduction of obvious lies in what he and the others had said, found an excuse for this too, because he simply declared: 'The various accidental circumstances and other compelling conditions to which I referred in my testimony were only of secondary or even more subordinate importance.' All that really mattered, he told the court when pleading guilty, was the 'substance' of the accusation.[1] And this *substance* was his part in the destruction of the Tito legend.

After Rajk's trial there came arrests and deportations. With more and more ruthless elimination of Social Democrats and with the imprisonment of many Communists (including Rajk's successor at the Foreign Ministry) attempts were continuously made to increase industrial output and to speed up collectivization. The impact of the cold war was becoming more and more harsh, the Soviet demands on the economy of the satellite States more exacting, and failures in dealing with internal problems more pronounced. To quote a Budapest Radio broadcast, Hungary's tasks were: 'To increase political vigilance, to improve production, and to strengthen the peace camp.'[2]

The last of these, as far as the satellites were concerned, primarily meant struggle against Yugoslavia. This took the form of bitter strife, of frontier incidents, trials, recriminations, and propaganda sallies. The pattern had been set. The Cominform held a conference in Budapest to discuss Yugoslavia's defection. And in 1950 Vasile Luca, the Rumanian Communist (who has since been purged), wrote in a Soviet journal of the recent trials which 'had fully unmasked the Titoist conspiracy against the countries of people's democracy'. The latter, Mr Luca confidently predicted, were marching ahead 'along the road indicated by the great teacher of mankind, the great friend of peace-loving and freedom-loving peoples, the leader of genius of the whole world, J. V. Stalin'.[3]

But after Stalin's death things changed. Hungary was one of the first of the satellites to experience internally the change in atmosphere. In July 1953 Rákosi was replaced as Prime Minister by Imre Nagy. The latter appeared as the exponent of the Malenkov policy of concessions to consumers and peasants, and of a more

[1] Hungarian Blue Book, p 289
[2] A Radio Seminar for Advanced Listeners, 23 November 1949
[3] V. Luca, 'Banda Tito-Rankovicha—agentura amerikanskogo imperializma na Balkanakh', *Bolshevik*, October 1950

lenient regime in which some of the worst features of a police State were discarded. A number of people were released, and a brief announcement in March 1954 said that Gábor Peter had been tried for 'anti-State and anti-people activities' and sentenced to life imprisonment.

Following Russia's example, Hungary also embarked on a policy of 'normalization' of relations with Belgrade. In 1953 she was the first Communist State to follow the lead of the U.S.S.R. and re-establish full diplomatic relations with Yugoslavia. There was a more amicable atmosphere along the troubled border, and in May 1954 the first barter trade agreement came into force.

The 'journey to Canossa' of Mr Khrushchev and Mr Bulganin (May–June 1955) was bound to have its effect on Hungary as well. The Soviet leaders flew on from Belgrade to Sofia, and then to Bucarest, and satellite leaders were given an account of the talks with the Yugoslavs. The hatchet, Mr Khrushchev implied, had been completely buried. This was received with acclamation throughout Eastern Europe, declared the Soviet journal *Kommunist* [1] And the Central Committee of the Hungarian Communist Party issued a communiqué welcoming and approving the *rapprochement*;[2] but in spite of all outward appearances, in spite of attempts to normalize relations, there must still have been strong undercurrents, after all these years of incessant application of the anti-Tito line. And it is possible too that a certain relaxation throughout Eastern Europe also gave greater liberty to the local Communist leaders and made them pay only half-sincere lip service to Moscow's directives concerning relations with Belgrade

Moreover, Hungary more than any other of the satellites was preoccupied with her own troubles; 1955 was for her in many ways a crucial year. The 'new line' of Mr Nagy came to a sudden end. In February he was said to be desperately ill, in March he was accused of right-wing deviationism, and in April he was dismissed and replaced by Mr Andras Hegedus. Mr Nagy's twenty months in office—it was now said—had distorted the Party line, his promises of increase in consumer goods were pure demagogy. The reasons advanced in Russia to explain Mr Malenkov's fall were now repeated in Budapest. Because industry and agriculture simply failed to deliver the promised goods and popular discontent in Hungary increased instead of vanishing, a return was made to economic policies advocated all along by Mr Gerö (and by Mr

[1] June 1955. [2] *Soviet News*, 10 June 1955.

Rákosi himself). An attempt was made to emphasise the primacy of heavy industry, following the pattern set by Mr Khrushchev in the Soviet Union.

The above considerations seem to explain why last August Tito in so many words accused the Russians of bad faith. His thesis was that while the Moscow hierarchy was genuinely working for an improvement of relations, some of his Eastern neighbours were sabotaging the Belgrade accord. At Karlovac, in Croatia, on 2 August he spoke of those who 'for years had been scared of Stalin', were now afraid to say what they thought, and were continuing their intrigues behind the scenes, assuming that the Russians were merely engaging in cunning tactics designed to fool people. In driving his point home Tito was resurrecting the past: he recalled attempts to implicate Yugoslavia at staged trials 'as for instance in the case of the Rajk trial'. At present, he said, 'they find it hard to admit their own mistakes before their people, for the dead cannot be brought back'. In Czechoslovakia, too, there were men who lacked the 'Communist courage' to say 'We made mistakes. We will follow a new path'.

Tito was becoming a hard taskmaster, and Mr Rákosi did not wait very long to give his reply. Hungary, he said, was pleased and satisfied with the improvement of Soviet-Yugoslav relations. Following the pattern of Mr Khrushchev's accusations against Beria, Mr Rákosi simply said that, as to the past, it was all Gábor Peter's fault. It was Peter who had slandered 'the Yugoslav comrades' and deceived the Hungarian Communist leadership with provocative and hostile activities. He declared: 'Now that all this is clear to us, we will do all we can to improve relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia and to make them friendly. . . We assure the Yugoslav people, our Yugoslav comrades, and Comrade Tito that on our part we will do all we can. . .'[1]

But little progress was made in this direction until the Soviet Communist Party Congress. After the Congress Mr Rákosi reported to the Central Committee in Budapest on 12–13 March, he reiterated the condemnation of the cult of personality, with special reference to Stalin, as voiced in Moscow, and spoke of the new Soviet interpretation of the past. It was probably then that the decision was taken concerning the rehabilitation of Rajk. To the hierarchy the Communist cause must have seemed sufficiently consolidated on the home front to permit of so sensational a reversal

[1] In a speech at Csepel, 8 August 1955

of past actions. The right-wing deviationism of Mr Nagy and his associates was a closed chapter; in any case the principal target was not so much internal as external. It was Yugoslavia which demanded sacrifices of principle.

Tito had mentioned Rajk's trial, and that reached the agenda too. On 27 March at Eger, Mr Rákosi, the same Mr Rákosi who presumably had taken a leading part in arraigning Rajk, who had once apologized to the Communists of Budapest for his lack of foresight and vigilance in the unmasking of 'Rajk and his gang', who had been hailed as Hungary's saviour from 'Rajk's common band of murderers', announced the dead leader's rehabilitation Hungary's Supreme Court, he said, 'acting on a resolution' of the Party, had 'rehabilitated László Rajk and other comrades'. After the 'unmasking of the imperialist agents Beria and Gábor Peter' a further investigation had been ordered and 'this established that the entire Rajk trial was based on provocation'. The trial had resulted in 'a miscarriage of justice'.

The case of László Rajk, the Hungarian Communist, seems now to be closed. He had played his role. His last service to the cause is being rendered now, part of the price to be paid to Yugoslavia, it is in line with the effort to prove that Communism is earnestly seeking co-existence and turns its back on some of the deeds of the Stalin era which had provoked anger and wrath The process now being set in motion throughout the Communist world has one principal feature (a feature that is sometimes overlooked). the divorce from the Stalinist past means a repudiation of *methods* and not of basic *aims*. And the fundamental aim which still prevails is total Communist victory everywhere. In the search for this *Ultima Thule* a new technique is being applied today, while the principle that the end justifies the means is and remains the basic expression, the essence as it were, of Communist theory and practice. Everything else has no meaning or importance; all that matters is *substance*. Is this not what Rajk was saying, virtually asking to be sentenced to death, when nearly seven years ago he addressed that packed courtroom in Budapest?

G. L.

ERRATUM

In the article on 'Economic Prospects in Czechoslovakia' (*The World Today*, May 1956) the following correction should be made· p 209, line 13, '10,000' should read '100,000'.

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INCREASE IN PRICE

It is regretted that, owing to increases in printing and postal charges, the annual subscription to THE WORLD TODAY has had to be raised to 30s ($6 00) and the price per copy to 2s. 6d. (55 cents) from the issue for July 1956.

Members of Chatham House have already been notified of the coming increase in their concession rate.

Notes of the Month

The Trinidad Oil Deal and Canada

THE Trinidad oil deal which recently received the reluctant assent of the United Kingdom Government brought out clearly, if somewhat abruptly, some of the difficulties inherent in Britain's current economic position. Among other things, it proved to be a rather embarrassing reminder of Britain's relative weakness as a source of capital for external use within the Commonwealth itself. Certainly it could not have been an easy decision to permit the Texas Company to purchase the Trinidad Oil Company, a British company which contributes about one-third of Trinidad's crude oil production and about two-thirds of the output of its refineries.[1] Moreover, the Trinidad Oil Company has an equal interest with the California-Texas Corporation in the Regent Oil Company which, while it supplies refined products for only 6 per cent of the United Kingdom market, is the third largest distributor in that market. Considerations of national interest, to say nothing of prestige, had to be weighed with those of commercial advantage and economic exigency, as well as with those of political principle and, more specifically, of Britain's interest in the future welfare of

[1] Trinidad's oil production is of course only a small fraction of the world's total.

Trinidad itself. And if in the end the Government decided that its only course was to allow an important British asset to pass under American ownership, this was not without the rather rueful admission from the Chancellor of the Exchequer that he too had shared the general sense of regret, even dismay, at this prospect.

The implications of the transaction for Canada were also a matter of important although somewhat subordinate interest Through its Canadian subsidiary, the Regent Refining (Canada) Company, the Trinidad Oil Company owns a refinery which processes annually about 750,000 tons of crude oil, a capacity which is being expanded to 1 million tons. Its present capacity is slightly over 1 per cent of the total capacity of Canada's operating refineries This subsidiary, through its marketing organization in Ontario, supplies about 1½ per cent of the Canadian market for petroleum products. It owns a number of oil leases in Alberta but so far it has been a negligible producer of Canadian crude oil.

In its Canadian context, then, the Trinidad Company's operations have been of a relatively small order. From the viewpoint of the Texas Company, the acquisition of this Canadian subsidiary would be an important but incidental part of the deal. For the Texas Company already has sizeable interests in Canada through the McColl-Frontenac Oil Company which it controls. While it is not a substantial producer of Canadian crude oil, its two operating refineries represent nearly 12 per cent of Canada's total operating capacity. Its purchase of the Trinidad Company's interests will, however, add a further and useful increment to its own interests in Canada's expanding petroleum industry.

There was, in fact, little indication of any marked Canadian reaction to the Trinidad deal. While the Federal Government was informed of the matter by the Government of the United Kingdom, the Chancellor of the Exchequor did not enlarge upon Canada's official reactions But these may be readily inferred from Canadian policy in relation to the petroleum industry. This has been one of non-interference in the financial arrangements of the industry And this policy is likely to continue so long as domestic investors are allowed to participate freely in the industry.

Moreover, the Canadian petroleum industry is already largely controlled by American interests. A recent survey of investment in the industry showed that nearly 70 per cent of the industry was controlled abroad, 67½ per cent being controlled in the United States. A more intensive survey, made more recently in connection

with the work of the Royal Commission on Canada's Economic Prospects, is reported to have found that foreign control, largely American, now extends to 90 per cent of the industry.

In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Trinidad oil deal should have had relatively little impact upon Canada. This is not to say that many Canadians would not have shared the British regret at seeing a portion of British interests in the Canadian petroleum industry, however small that portion might be, transferred to American control. Foreign investment continues to be a very significant factor in current Canadian development. But more recently the growing preponderance of American investment is causing some concern as to its implications for the nature and direction of Canadian development, particularly when there is as yet no significant counter-weight from the side of British investment. Evidently one consequence of the Trinidad deal may be certain British tax concessions for overseas trading corporations and 'pioneering companies' in Commonwealth and colonial countries. To the extent that this may lead to further inducements, the relative position of British investment in Canada might well be substantially improved. And this many Canadians would welcome.

Efforts Towards Self-Government in Singapore

THE first chapter in the story of Singapore's search for self-government, which might be called 'The Dash to Freedom', is now complete, with the failure of the constitutional talks and the resignation of Mr Marshall. There is no question of re-writing it: the second chapter, if less breathless, must follow on.

Mr Marshall has three achievements to his credit. First, he dramatized and made real to the people of Singapore the fact that their country had crossed the watershed from a colonial type of government and that the initiative now lay with the elected representatives of the people, and not with officials. He readily and publicly took power and responsibility to himself, and, by actions like his 'Meet the People' sessions, patently brought that power to the level and service of the people. Secondly, he forced the pace of constitutional development till it outgrew the Rendel Constitution which, it is generally agreed, no longer fits the political facts. Within five months over the issue of the appointment of junior Ministers he had achieved a great limitation of the Governor's discretionary powers, had raised the demand for full internal self-government, and, hypnotizing the Progressive Party

into a demand for immediate independence, had secured a vote of all the elected members of the Assembly in favour of immediate internal self-government. Thirdly, while recognizing Singapore's strategic position in the Commonwealth, he brought its problems into the Asian context, achieving in his goodwill visits to Djakarta, Colombo, and New Delhi direct links with Singapore's Asian neighbours which only an elected Chief Minister, treated as effective head of the State, could forge. With his Chairmanship of the Colombo Plan Conference in Singapore last October, Singapore assumed a new Asian as well as a world importance.

But the constitutional consolidation of this somewhat breathless, but accepted, advance has not been achieved, although the auspices seemed good. When the constitutional crisis was resolved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr Alan Lennox-Boyd, during his visit in August, he agreed to a review of the Constitution after a year of its working and meanwhile invited Mr Marshall to come to London in December for preliminary discussions and to provide the opportunity for him to see, and be seen by, those concerned with the next stage of Singapore's advance. Mr Marshall felt confident. He had met the challenge of the politically militant unions; he had secured the passage of his Public Security legislation; he had piloted Singapore's first Budget to be passed by Parliamentary procedure. The visit to London had proved successful. The agenda for the constitutional talks in April were drawn up to include a date for, and a definition of, self-government. The issue of citizenship was referred for local decision. Immediate gains were won on the issues of multilingualism in the Assembly, a separate portfolio for the Chief Minister, and control by the Council of Ministers of Singapore's national service men.

But the pace had been too fast and too personal to ensure solid advance. In November a meeting of the Labour Front, called to establish the firm party basis which the Rendel Commission had emphasized as essential for steady advance, ended in failure Mr Marshall's critics were charged with having packed the meeting. As a result two members crossed the floor of the Assembly, leaving the Government with a minority of the twenty-five *elected* members out of thirty-two, a criticism on which the Opposition readily seized. It weakened the coalition in the All-Party mission which Mr Marshall had promised to take to London, and Mr Marshall himself, as leader of the Mission, had the task of securing

agreement among members who among themselves traversed the whole political spectrum.

Moreover there was too little preparation for the London talks, and events in March only emphasized disagreements. Mr Marshall had been ill during January and February. He returned to Singapore from Switzerland on 29 February. Detailed discussion of constitutional proposals then began behind closed doors. They were never made known to the public, who during the Merdeka ('Freedom') Week were subjected to emotional appeals in favour of an undefined Merdeka which generated, not support for specific proposals, but a negative feeling of restlessness whose focus tended to be anti-European. Overseas reports of the Merdeka Rally on 19 March were exaggerated, but the hooliganism which went on, and which no party could control, gave a sobering picture of some of the forces which had adopted Merdeka and associated it with Picasso doves and Peking dances. The Malays were particularly disturbed and, with the Eurasians and Indians, raised for the first time the issue of protection of minorities. The Liberal Socialist Party, newly-formed from an amalgamation of the Progressive and Democratic parties, in the Assembly Debate on 4 April demanded greater guarantees of internal security, exposing the line of fault which was finally to break the London discussions; while the People's Action Party (P.A.P.) limited their demands to what they considered the maximum on which all parties would agree—'75 per cent Merdeka' now, and independence in five years.

When, therefore, the Misson left for London on 14 April, after six weeks of public agitation and private discussion, the public was aware of differences, and expectations were moderated in advance. Again no papers were published during the conference and, although press reporters defined the issues as they gleaned them, it was the fact, rather than the precise point, of differences which left the dominant impression on public opinion in Singapore.

The constitutional talks failed to bring agreement, but they were not doomed to total failure, and there remains a readiness on both sides to resume the talks. Mr Marshall has blamed the Colonial Office (but not the Colonial Secretary); and the not too happily timed series of speeches by British Ministers on the need to maintain the strategic bases afforded him grounds for alleging that, without a surrender of its fundamental rights, Singapore was bound to lose. But this has led to no sudden deterioration of

relations with Britain. The concessions offered by the Colonial Office—a greatly increased and entirely elected Assembly and Council of Ministers, the removal of the Governor's powers from the day-to-day administration, and the concession of a separate citizenship—show the Colonial Office as far from rigid, while the debate which took place in the Legislative Assembly on the Mission's return served once more to emphasize its disunity. It is too much to hope that a colonial territory will absolve the Colonial Office from blame, but it is significant that the 'Protest Week' was organized by one party, the People's Action Party, and not on an all-party basis. And public opinion in general has realistically learnt the lesson—that Singapore had neither an agreed definition of its immediate constitutional wishes nor a Government with sufficient political strength or prospects to allay the concern, naturally increased by events in Ceylon, of the British Government lest constitutional advance should lead to Singapore's becoming strategically valueless and ideologically a Peking outpost These lessons will be applied under Mr Lim Yew Hock, and this gives a respite of up to one year for advance by agreement and constitutional pressures But if the new lessons produce no more success the second time, a third attempt is much less likely to be made under such favourable auspices

Mr Lim Yew Hock leads the same political grouping as did Mr Marshall. He has no secure majority, and will depend on the goodwill of both wings of the Opposition with whose parties he seeks co-operation, but not coalescence or coalition at this stage. Although he must fill the role vacated by Mr Marshall's dominant personality, he has courage, conviction, and clear-headedness, and the full co-operation of his Ministerial colleagues. He has a Budget and urgent social problems ahead of him to test the practical fruits of Social Democracy. And he has the advantage of good personal relations with the Chief Minister of the Federation, whose attitude to Singapore affairs—as shown, for example, in the case of the ban on the moving of parties of Singapore Chinese Middle School students to the Federation without a permit—will be an increasingly important factor in Singapore politics.

But the constitutional issue remains the dominant one by which Mr Lim Yew Hock will be judged; and here there is a genuine second chance for a constitutional solution, which is as important to the Commonwealth and to Asia as to the people of Singapore themselves. It is an aspect of Britain's relationships with Asia

in which failure would have no fewer repercussions on the Foreign Office than on the Colonial Office.

Recent Developments in the Southern Sudan

THE mutiny of troops and uprising of tribesmen in the border districts of Equatoria Province in August 1955 were a symptom of the ancient differences between the Northern and Southern Sudanese. Although the rising might be ascribed to more immediate causes—to unstable Southern politicians, to inexperienced handling by Northern administrators, to Egyptian propaganda, even to British machination—yet its basic cause remained twofold, the sheer physical divergence and the mutual distrust between the two halves of the country; the former an inescapable fact of nature and the latter an unfortunate inheritance from the time of slave-raiding.

British administration had been based on a recognition of these facts, and while it was never empowered to go to the lengths of a separatist solution, it endeavoured to give the backward peoples of the South time to develop themselves before coming to terms with the North. The necessity for special treatment of the South was stressed up to the time of the take-over by retiring British administrators, but Northern Sudanese politicians had long been committed to ascribing former 'Southern policy' to imperialist plans to sever the Southern provinces from the North, and were reluctant to admit any difference between North and South. Their policy after the take-over was that of 'one country'; Southern politicians were included correctly in the Governor General's Commission and the Council of Ministers, and there was a routine assumption of administration in the South by Northern district commissioners

The reaction of the tribes of the extreme South to the take-over was delayed and, when revealed in last year's rising, came as an unpleasant shock to the North which found itself faced suddenly with a situation of considerable gravity. Units of Northern troops were moved speedily to Juba, but before the situation could be restored large numbers of Northern Sudanese, including some administrative officials, had been murdered. In the aftermath the Prime Minister, Sayed Ismail el Azhari, wisely appealed for moderation and promised fair trial to the mutineers. The Chief Justice himself went to Juba to see that justice was done, and all reports speak of well-conducted trials. Nevertheless it was in-

evitable that the execution of a large number of death sentences, coupled with a few acts of reprisal which were almost unavoidable in the circumstances, left behind a feeling of bitterness among the tribes which remains unabated. As a result administration in the districts round Juba does not extend beyond the roads and district headquarters which are guarded by troops, and news of occasional raids on posts reveals that there are still armed mutineers in the bush. Their existence has, in particular, prevented the reopening of schools since Northern teachers could not serve without guard.

The position appears to be one of stalemate in which the Sudanese Government is reluctant to take any positive step, preferring to let time play on the problem. Thinking Sudanese in the North are coming more and more to realize the nature of this problem—that the South is intrinsically different from the North, and that the North has a colonial question on its hands to be solved either by occupation or by concession. Southern Sudanese politicians have been actively propagating the idea of a federal solution for the South. This idea is as yet unacceptable to most Northern Sudanese, particularly to those such as, for example, Northern merchants who have a material stake in the South. It was the latter who protested recently that the elder Southern statesman Sayed Stanislaus Paysama, reputedly the most incorruptible of Southern politicians, had been pressing for a federal solution during a tour of the South. At the moment their views seem to have carried the day since the latest news is that Sayed Stanislaus has been asked to resign from the Council of Ministers

In the long run it is probably the reaction of the tribes rather than the action of politicians which will decide the issue At the moment it is only the tribes of the far South who are seriously disaffected; the large body of Nilotic tribes, like the Dinka who stretch across both Upper Nile and Bahr el Ghazal provinces, are uncommitted. In the past, assisted by their conservative solidarity and the difficult country they inhabit, they have tended to achieve a *modus vivendi* with the North. Their future attitude may decide the relations between North and South.

Anatomy of Tyranny

Khrushchev's Attack on Stalin

RARELY has a document aroused more interest and speculation than the paper issued by the State Department purporting to be the text of the speech delivered on 25 February 1956 by Mr Khrushchev, first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to its twentieth Congress. The United States Government does not vouch for its authenticity; nevertheless it has been received everywhere as plausible; it is in keeping with the tenor of statements made by responsible officials of non-Soviet Communist parties, and Communist newspapers in the West have made no attempt to denounce it as a forgery. On the contrary, they have treated it as genuine.

To read this paper is to recall a dozen highlights of Soviet history between the assassination of Kirov in 1934 and Stalin's death in 1953. Of these two events the first is presented in a highly equivocal light, suggesting a plot by the secret police in collusion with Stalin, the second as a release from unparalleled tyranny. Overshadowing all the rest is the sombre horror of the great purge of the later 1930s

The ostensible purpose of the speech was to destroy Stalin's reputation, or, in its own terms, to destroy the 'cult of the individual'. Mr Khrushchev's picture of the Soviet Union between 1934 and 1953, as given here, bears a startling resemblance to the more lurid efforts of the extreme anti-Communist school. They, too, spoke of Stalin's dictatorship by terror, of mass injustice, of the execution of thousands of innocents, of cringing judges and confessions, extorted by torture, to crimes that were never committed, of the distortion of history, of the paralysing rule of fear—all of it smothered under choking clouds of servile adulation.

In contrast to Lenin, Mr Khrushchev is alleged to have said, Stalin 'abandoned the method of ideological struggle for that of administrative violence, mass repressions, and terror.' Whoever opposed him was 'doomed to moral and physical annihilation'. But not only those who opposed him. Stalin used terror against 'many honest Communists, against those party cadres who had borne the heavy load of the civil war and the first and most difficult years of industrialization and collectivization'. It was enough to be 'suspected of hostile intent'. Mass arrests and executions without trial

'created conditions of insecurity, fear, and even desperation'; in his 'intolerance and brutality' Stalin condemned to summary death many thousands who had committed no crimes at all, but who were forced to confess to the most 'unlikely crimes' by the use of 'cruel and inhuman tortures'. The military collegium of the Soviet Supreme Court is now reviewing these cases. Since 1954 it has 'rehabilitated 7,679 persons, many of whom were rehabilitated posthumously'

Stalin is also declared to have been responsible for 'the mass deportation from their native places of whole nations'. These actions were 'not dictated by any military considerations'; others, by implication, were, and it is therefore not surprising that Mr Khrushchev did not include in his list of the uprooted the Volga Germans, the Poles, and the Balts. For these, apparently, the Stalin regime is not yet at an end.

To attribute to Stalin alone the responsibility for these and innumerable other acts is to carry the cult of the individual far indeed It imposes too great a strain on credulity to believe that for twenty years one man could terrorize 200 million, while his colleagues in the Party, the Government, and the Army remained utterly helpless Mr Khrushchev deplored the tendency to 'elevate one person, transform him into a superman possessing supernatural characteristics akin to those of a god', in his own fashion this is precisely what he himself has done

Mr Khrushchev's was a curious contention for a Marxist. No revolutionary of Tsarist days would have accepted as a reason for inactivity the plea that the tyrant 'treated all others in such a way that they could only listen and praise him', or that 'a situation was created where one could not express one's own will'. It is tantamount to an admission that the revolutionary terror had succeeded —where Tsarist persecution had failed—in destroying the spirit and traditions of the party which elevates revolution against oppressors to the highest level of social obligation.

The alternative plea of ignorance, of Stalin's failure to convene the Central Committee, or to inform his colleagues of action about to be taken, cannot even have been intended seriously; it might have some validity for a few months, but not for twenty years. The present rulers of the U.S S.R. saw their colleagues, their superiors, and their subordinates fall by the thousand. It is difficult to believe that they had to wait for Stalin's death to learn that the victims were innocent. In any case, the plea of ignorance cannot be ad-

vanced to excuse inactivity when, on Mr Khrushchev's own showing, Stalin's policies threatened the country, in the opinion of the Army chiefs, with immense losses and dangers during the war. (Neither ignorance nor obedience to orders was accepted as a valid plea at Nuremberg; in his final speech there the Chief Soviet Prosecutor, General Rudenko, said that the Nazi leaders 'were necessary to Hitler just as much as he was necessary to them. Göring, Frick, Rosenberg . . . are inconceivable without Hitler, just as Hitler is inconceivable without them'.[1])

In fact neither plea was meant to be taken at face value. Mr Khrushchev was not talking to a gathering of schoolchildren but to his country's outstanding political figures. What he was in effect saying was that they were *all* equally responsible. As witnesses and accomplices, none had the right to claim a pre-eminence on moral or historical grounds. If there was collective leadership, there was also collective guilt.

There were two interesting exceptions Mr Khrushchev appeared to go out of his way to suggest that Mr Malenkov's guilt was greater than average by recalling two occasions during the war when he acted as Stalin's spokesman, and to display in a favourable light Marshal Zhukov, whom Stalin denigrated. (Mr Malenkov, it may be remembered, was highly critical of Khrushchev's agricultural policies at the nineteenth Congress in 1952)

Why was the risk taken of bringing the details of this nightmare of tyranny out into the open? Why not have continued the policy of silence which was pursued up to the twentieth Congress, while eradicating the worst abuses of the earlier years? For three years the Party leaders had been cautiously refashioning many facets of Soviet society, executing or getting rid of leading officials of the secret police, encouraging local initiative, loosening the stranglehold that had virtually killed the arts, and generally reducing the extreme tensions and fears of the Stalin era It might have been thought that this was a settled policy, and would be followed until the present itself denied the past and the dead tyrant's name sank unremarked into oblivion without explicit disavowal.

There is no convincing answer to be found in the 'objective situation', for reasons that were valid in the spring of 1956 were equally valid three years earlier. The answer can lie only in the situation within the Communist Party itself, and here there are only slender indications to support speculation.

[1] *Trial of the Major War Criminals*, vol xxii, p 358 (Nuremberg, 1948)

In the published records of the 20th Congress there is only one speech which departed from the practice of silent repudiation. That is the speech of Mikoyan which contained the first explicit attack on Stalin. It seems reasonable to assume either that this section of Mikoyan's speech came as a surprise to his colleagues, or that it had been inserted by agreement 'to test audience reaction' —the first being the more likely. It was presumably a step in the manœuvring for position within the leadership. The popularity of the measures taken after Stalin's death to mitigate the harshness of the regime suggested that support could be won by the open denunciation of its chief architect, and if prestige was to be enhanced by these means, Mr Khrushchev was unlikely to allow it to be won by a colleague. The response to Mikoyan's attack probably convinced the Party presidium that the risks were smaller than they had supposed (There is in fact a strong suggestion, implicit in the parentheses indicating the mood of the audience which occur in the report of the speech, that the Party cadres welcomed this opportunity to purge themselves of feelings of guilt, to find a more telling and significant scapegoat than Beria.)

There was no suggestion, in Mr Khrushchev's opening speech at the Congress, of any crisis of authority. The forces making for change, embodied in the technical and administrative personnel of the country, received full recognition. But it must be assumed, *post facto*, that the air of confidence was in part fictitious, that the Communist leaders still felt the need to create fresh bonds between themselves and the members generally, to build relations of confidence and understanding between the rulers and the mass of the ruled. No better way could have been found—given the political narrowness of the regime—than to denounce the man who had destroyed all earlier bonds and made a virtue of mistrust.

In any case, once the conspiracy of silence was broken, it would have been difficult to stop at the point to which Mr Mikoyan ventured. Whether a landslide has been set in motion by this drastic action it is too early to say. But the subterranean forces were already there, imprisoned within the petrified Stalinist mould. They would in any case have sought an outlet, and it is more likely that they can be kept under control and guided if the initiative in their release comes from above.

What cannot be in doubt is that the dual process—of establishing a hierarchy within the leadership, and reaching a new social equilibrium—will take time to work itself out. The Soviet rulers

must hope that the revelations—or rather admissions—will prove no more than a nine days' wonder, that their own part in the twenty years of tyranny and misrule will be overlooked in thankfulness that it has ended, and that they will be able to go ahead untrammelled by the discarded garments of their past.

It is difficult, unless one has lived in a totalitarian country, to understand the pressures to which its inhabitants are subjected. But what of the Communist leaders in the decadent democracies, over whom no secret police kept watch? They found no difficulty in approving the purge, and apparently as little in approving the rehabilitation of its victims. They were prepared to subscribe to the belief in Stalin's infallibility and now appear equally prepared to tread his reputation into the mud. Was none of them capable of distinguishing between theory and dogma, between dissent and treason? What of their historians, for whom the records were available, their scientists, technicians, writers, and artists, who were in a position to compare the Soviet output with that in other countries? It is not Stalin's writings, or genetics, or the quality of Madame Pankratova's history, or the technical standing of Western industry that have changed, but the Party line, and in following it Communist leaders outside the Soviet bloc show themselves as subservient, with backbones as flexible and pens as docile, as in the past.

This is not to suggest that the leaders of Communist Parties in the West will have as little freedom in the future as they have had hitherto. On the contrary, it seems probable that they will have a far wider scope for initiative thrust on them. The Soviet leaders have emancipated themselves from the cramping obsession that there is only one pattern of revolution; it will now be up to the leaders of other parties to seek, under licence, their own road.

Mr Khrushchev dates Stalin's degeneration from the seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U., that is from 1934. The choice of the date is significant, not because more than half the delegates who attended the Congress, and 70 per cent of the members of the Central Committee it elected, fell victims to the purge, but because it implies endorsement of the policy with which Stalin's name will always be associated, the policy of 'revolution from above', of forced collectivization and industrialization—whose victims were probably no fewer than those of the great purge. To have denounced him wholly, as Beria is denounced, would have destroyed too much. To deny him altogether would be to deny the present

leaders' own legitimacy and the very essence of the system they are operating. For if it would be foolish not to admit that Stalin's insanely suspicious and envious character, his megalomania, ignorance, and vanity account for some of the worst abuses of his rule, it is equally incontestable that a policy which imposed such burdens, pains, and punishments could not have been applied except in a society where there are no alternative parties, alternative policies, and alternative rulers. How indeed, except in a totalitarian system, could Stalin have concentrated such power in his own hands?

This is the cardinal feature of the Soviet system which Mr Khrushchev could not attack. And it is to preserve this that Stalin's crimes were said to have been committed from a mistaken view of the interests of the Party and the masses. 'In this lies the whole tragedy.'

The more striking excrescences of the dictatorship, the paralyzing rigidity and conformity of Stalin's last years, can be condemned and abandoned now that the painful and costly stage of 'primitive accumulation' is past. There is no risk that relaxation will start the whole system sliding backwards. (In the same way the forced labour camps have largely fulfilled their economic function and can be in part dissolved: the roads and railways and houses have been built, the mines have been mechanized. Inducements can now be combined with pressure in varying degrees to get labour to the uninviting wastes of the Arctic region.) Industry now has a broad enough basis and sufficient momentum to expand without subjecting the population to conditions which only brutal terrorism could persuade them to endure in silence. The endorsement of Stalin's earlier policies implies that criticism of the Communist Party, of its position in the country, and of its monopoly of power, will still not be tolerated.

The resignation of Molotov and Kaganovich from their ministerial posts (while remaining deputy premiers) continues the programme of disavowing the past, leaving, of Stalin's old guard, only Mr Mikoyan and the figurehead President, Marshal Voroshilov. The balance of power within the presidium has shifted, and Mr Malenkov now seems to hold a fairly isolated position While the newly-released forces find channels of expression, and eventually settle down into a pattern that reflects the Soviet Union's changed position, internally and externally, the machinery of political power remains unchanged and the new élite appear to

have full control of its operations. They are aware of the need for experiment and adaptation, and are prepared to initiate it themselves. Stalin is said not to have visited the rural areas after 1928, whereas Mr Khrushchev spends a good deal of his time travelling round his own as well as other countries.

The men who now rule were the beneficiaries of the policy they have discarded. They are operating a new policy. For the inhabitants of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc, the change is most welcome. The extent to which 'controlled relaxation' may be permitted can perhaps be gauged from the way in which this policy has operated in Yugoslavia, there nothing has been allowed to encroach on the unique position of the Communist Party, and the reduction in the size of maximum landholdings testifies to the belief that an independent peasantry is potentially an enemy of the Communist regime.

Externally, the change in policy antedates the twentieth Congress. The rapprochement with Yugoslavia—the quarrel was singled out by Khrushchev as a glaring example of 'Stalin's shameful role' for which the Soviet Union 'paid dearly'—and the rapid development of friendly relations with the countries of Asia were all set in motion before the Congress. Broadly, Soviet foreign policy continues to aim at the neutralization of Europe, the isolation of America, and advance through the under-developed countries. But these aims are pursued with far greater flexibility and in more conventional terms than before; 'during Stalin's leadership our peaceful relations with other nations were often threatened'. There is basically no difference between competitive co-existence and cold war, but the current term emphasizes that the struggle will be waged by other than military means. For its part, the U.S.S.R. cannot begin to compete successfully until it approximates to the level of productivity achieved in the United States, and to do this it requires, not the sullen acquiescence of an intimidated working class, but voluntary co-operation, and the belief that initiative and independence will not have fatal consequences. The largest obstacle of all—the stagnation of agriculture—remains, and there is no sign that in this respect the essentials of Stalin's policy have been abandoned. Twenty-five years of collectivized agriculture have failed to attract the peasants, who, after all, represent nearly half the working population.

J. D.

A Year after the Staatsvertrag in Austria

A Political Balance Sheet

THE aim of all political parties is to obtain an overall majority. This is usually achieved in Britain, with her system of only two major political parties, but very rarely on the Continent where it is practically impossible to pour a great variety of opinions and traditions into two main bottles. Austria's conservative Oesterreichische Volkspartei (Ö.V.P.—People's Party) gained an overall majority in the first elections following liberation (1945) and came very close to it in the elections held on 13 May 1956. The results of this year's elections, compared with the previous ones of 1953, are as follows:

	Seats		*Votes*	
	1956	1953	1956	1953
Oesterreichische Volkspartei (Ö V P —People's Party)	82	74	2,000,068	1,781,777
Socialist Party (S P Ö)	74	73	1,873,250	1,819,817
Freedom Party (F.P Ö)	6	15[1]	283,713	472,866[1]
Communists and Left Socialists	3	4	192,432	228,159

[1] Then the Verband der Unabhängigen (V d.U).

It is not difficult to discover a similarity in the mood of the electorate on both occasions. In 1945 the war came to an end, but in a period of great economic instability and famine most Austrians found their new political home in the Second Republic. However hard life might be, there was more to be defended than to be attacked, and the general atmosphere was defensive rather than offensive; slow recovery seemed possible, whereas sweeping reforms were repudiated as dangerous. Eleven years later, the country has emerged from a period of economic instability marked by the celebrated wage and price agreements, milestones in a rather violent inflation, and, for the first time, it has reached a phase of prosperity and of stability as well. Once again, however, Austria's internal situation has created a mood in which drastic reform and social upheaval are not popular, and once more the Conservatives have profited from it, although this time they have fallen short of an overall majority by one seat. Here the parallel between 1945 and 1956 ends, and the changes in political and social life are impressive indeed.

In the elections of last May the Socialist partners in the coalition

Government were the challenging party. The Ö.V.P. leader, Federal Chancellor Raab, is not really at home in the turmoil of an election campaign, although his homely speeches are by no means ineffective. Like so many conservative politicians, he sees in those weeks and months of campaigning an undesirable interruption in the serious business of economic reconstruction, and when a 'dynamic' group among his followers urged an early decision last year after the signing of the State Treaty, at a moment when the Socialists were involved in one blunder after another, he told them off in a paternal manner. He therefore felt that he was being unfairly treated when his Socialist coalition partners prevented the parliamentary term from dying a natural death and forced him to fight at least six months earlier than he had expected. At the same time, although the challenge came from the Socialists, their leading group was not very enthusiastic about the early date either; but they were labouring under intense pressure from their own left wing which made further concessions to the Ö.V.P. difficult if not impossible, and without mutual concessions no coalition Government can continue in office.

The question has often been heard: 'What is the use of having an election, when at the end of it all you have the same group of people tackling the same problems?' It is true that well-informed people throughout the country were in agreement that, whatever the outcome of the campaign, a new coalition Government would have to be formed. The Socialist leaders' attitude to this question is believed to be that during an election campaign a good deal of steam is let off, and when it is all over it has become much easier to convince your radical wing that their plans and ambitions may, indeed, be very fine, but they cannot be realized under the present political constellation. But the dilemma of the moderate Socialist leaders lay deeper than this. Some of them believed that victory for their party, that long-awaited triumph, would make their own left wing stronger than was desirable. A situation would emerge in which government with the Conservatives would no longer be possible and they would have to put up with a small majority or else an uneasy coalition with the right wing of the Freiheitliche Partei (F.P.Ö.), a situation similar to that which prevailed in the thirties and which ended democratic life in Austria altogether. This mental reservation doubtless gave them a more sober view of the situation than that of their party colleagues on the left wing. It is certainly a fact that the radicals within the Socialist party

were much the most optimistic, and it was only in the last phase of the campaign that a rather dramatic change took place: the light of victory faded, and in one of the last Socialist leaflets victory was no longer mentioned but instead the danger was stressed that the Ö.V.P. might gain a majority over all other parties. This, at least, the rank and file must prevent.

Analysis of the election results does, however, provide the Socialists with some grounds for consolation. It is even possible to explain the traditional phenomenon, so puzzling to English observers, whereby after an election all parties, victorious or vanquished, claim success. For the Socialists have lost no votes; on the contrary, they gained, and in some regions their gain is not inconsiderable. In the Vorarlberg, for instance, the Socialist vote went up by 30 per cent. Their setback is therefore only relative But the Ö.V.P. vote increased at a much higher rate. Whereas in the 1953 elections they had 30,000 fewer votes than the Socialists and only the whims of the system of proportional representation gave them an additional seat which enabled them to nominate the Chancellor, the Conservatives now have an additional 200,000 votes and a majority in the House of eight seats. A closer examination of the results will show, however, that this is not merely a normal setback for the Socialists which can be made good at the next election, the basic concepts of Austrian Socialism, with its proud traditions and the intellectual inheritance of Otto Bauer, seem to be in jeopardy.

The Austrian Socialists have again and again come tantalizingly close to commanding a following of 51 per cent of the electorate, but they have never reached it, and at present they are at the level of 43 per cent. Inability to create a large enough following has set up pressure in two directions. In the pre-war First Republic it strengthened the undemocratic wing of the party, in which Socialists were to be found who believed that effective control could only be attained by force of arms, i.e. by civil war. This minority group never led the party, but it was large enough to extract certain concessions from the leadership, and some phrases in the 'Linzer Programm', probably intended to appease them, were used by right-wing leaders to convince their following that an armed show-down was inevitable and must be prepared for. The critical moment finally materialized in 1934, and found the Socialists lamentably unprepared.

In the Second Republic no such development could take place,

but the question 'How do we reach a Socialist vote of 51 per cent?' still retained its priority. This time the answer was a sociological one. It was argued that people vote Socialist under certain conditions of life and work, that war and inflation had helped to create such conditions, and that if the Socialist influence in the coalition Government were properly used to speed up the development a scientific forecast of ultimate triumph should be possible. This again proved to be a fallacy. The election results show quite clearly that this time a good many workers have voted for the Ö.V.P.; the bigger the towns, the more obvious is the phenomenon, and whereas the Socialists have by and large been able to attract part of the Communist following, they yielded ground in Vienna both to the Communist Party and to the Ö.V.P., a bitter experience indeed—though it might be argued that not all new Communist voters in that area are genuine Communists but merely register their complaints by throwing in their lot, for once, with the hammer and sickle.

But there is one point which is no longer at issue: the S.P.Ö. has ceased to be exclusively the workers' party. Statistical evidence had already shown this. By May 1955 the S.P Ö. headquarters knew that only 39 per cent of the party's members were manual workers; but at that time few people outside the party leadership knew what has since become obvious to all. The Socialists have, in other words, only escaped a much heavier defeat by outflanking the Conservatives in the rural areas and by attracting part of the floating middle-class vote. For the first time they have a legitimate claim to call themselves a 'national' party. This is a proud claim, but the problems of leadership have become more difficult. We now find inside the S P.Ö. the radicals who want to press on with nationalization and advocate further doses of egalitarianism like the Bevanites in Britain; the old moderates, men like the late President Renner, or Helmer, the present Minister of the Interior; and the Socialist middle-class voters. The radicals are in many ways the most active group It is they who go to meetings, who organize the clubs and work in the trade unions. The middle-class Socialists have usually not embraced all the Socialist doctrine, but they have been attracted by, or become dependent upon, the welfare State. Their work within the party is insignificant, but without their numbers polling day would be rather a sad affair for the S.P.Ö. It is one of those situations which look almost insoluble on paper: if concessions are made to the radical Socialists, the middle-

class voters will shift back to the Conservative camp; if the radicals are unduly neglected they might join the Communists The solution might lie in the creation of a certain balance of power which, in the end, would enable the moderates to continue their work within the framework of the coalition, a work from which so many of the population have benefited. Much will depend on the composition of the new Cabinet and on whether the more radical elements will be able to act from a position of strength.

The recent negotiations for the formation of a new Government therefore not only reflected the natural struggle for power between Socialists and Conservatives but they also threw into relief the struggle within the S.P.Ö. Although the country is very quiet and is enjoying the splendour of summer days after one of the hardest winters experienced within memory in Europe, there was an air of hidden drama in these negotiations. Apart from a coalition on the old pattern no stable government seemed possible, thus a crisis in the negotiations might have proved really serious [1]

After this investigation into the causes of failure, we must now look into the secrets of success, which in the case of the Ö.V P are inseparable from the names of Federal Chancellor Raab and of Dr Kamitz, his Minister of Finance. It is unnecessary to stress the fact that economic progress, that is to say full employment without inflation, has laid the foundation of these statesmen's political achievement, but a further insight into their problems and methods can be obtained by a consideration of the weak points in their policy. It has already been seen that the Conservatives have lost followers in the rural areas and that they forfeited part of the middle-class vote. How did this come about, and what was the general trend? The picture must be seen as a whole The Ö.V.P. had been steadily on the decline since its triumph in 1945, and the fortunes of the party reached their lowest ebb when, three years ago, Socialists and former Nazis (who found a political organization first in the Verband der Unabhangigen—V d.U.—and now in the F.P.Ö.) combined to vote for a Socialist President, Dr Körner, whose impeccable supra-party attitude has, incidentally, embarrassed the Socialists more often than the Conservatives. An election followed in which the total Conservative vote fell below the total Socialist vote, although the Conservatives had one seat more in the House.

[1] Dr Raab's new coalition Government was announced on 22 June, while this article was in the press.

Under the influence of such a humiliating defeat the Ö.V.P. looked for new men and new methods. Luck was with them because Dr Raab discovered a new Minister of Finance who is not only an extremely able man in his own field but has proved an asset in any election campaign through his gift for making the most intricate problems of State economy comprehensible to the voters. It proved more difficult to develop new methods, and here a purely defensive attitude prevailed. Being hard pressed, the Ö.V.P. leaders mentally divided the voters into two categories: those who for reasons of tradition, upbringing, self-interest, or religious sentiment would vote Ö.V.P. in any case; and the vacillators. They then concentrated their efforts on the second group, clearly with some success. But the natural result was that the first group felt badly neglected. The farmers, for example, have complained for years past that the price of milk fails to cover the cost of production, and although milk prices were on the agenda when the old coalition broke down it cannot be said that the Ö.V.P. has done all in its power to assist the farming population in this matter. Similar examples can be found in most spheres of life. Seen as an economic pressure group the Socialists are quite obviously much more efficient.

It can of course be argued that the election results showed the defensive attitude to have paid handsomely. But there are certain 'buts' which must weigh rather heavily in the minds of the Conservative leaders. The voters lost to the Socialists in this election were 'old Conservatives' ('Policy is a family matter in Austria', said the late President Renner); they had probably voted Conservative all their lives, and the transfer of allegiance to the 'Reds' must have been a serious matter to them and the process is possibly irreversible. The new Conservative voters, on the other hand, may have voted Conservative largely because they want to hold on to what they have and do not want to endanger their newly won prosperity by reforms, nationalization, and other radical measures; but no one can forecast in what mood these people will go to the polls next time. The Ö.V.P. must arrest this process because it simply cannot afford to lose more voters in the same way. It is clear that the Ö.V.P. has profited this time by the heavy defeat of the F.P.Ö. (the greatly altered V.d.U. of the previous elections), but this is a gain which cannot be repeated. The liberal-national camp is not large enough to be tapped once again.

What caused the F.P.Ö. debacle and gave this group only six

seats instead of the fifteen which they held in the former Parliament? Shortly before the elections a further split occurred in the party, which was in any case riddled with internal strife, and two founder members, Reimann and Kraus, left it. As the two men have often been described as 'liberals' some observers assumed that the party had split in two and that the nationalist wing, mainly embracing ex-members of the N.S.D.A.P., had voted for the F.P.Ö. and its new leader Rheintaller (once a Minister in the short-lived and ill-fated Government of Dr Seyss-Inquart), while the genuine liberals had thrown in their lot with the Ö.V.P.

The truth is slightly different. The liberals in the F.P.Ö., as in the German F.D.P., were from the beginning in a very small minority. To assume that their exodus split the party in two is to pay them a tribute which, unfortunately, they do not merit as a political force. There were various different motives which led part of the rank and file of the old V.d.U. to vote Conservative on this occasion. Before Hitler marched into Austria the Nazi party was illegal and a certain number of their followers got into trouble for their political activities, a fate which they shared with the Socialists Although this 'persecution' was very mild compared with all that happened to political opponents under the Nazis, it had developed a certain resentment, and these *ressentiments* were still alive when the Second Republic came into being. It caused a good many former members of the N.S.D.A P. to prefer the Socialists to the Conservatives, a choice which can only be explained emotionally, as on all principles of policy the two groups had nothing in common. All the same, the slogan 'Lieber Rot als Schwarz'—better Red (Socialists) than Black (the Conservatives' nickname)—was a powerful one and had the advantage that it needed no rationalizing It expressed a feeling in a magnificently abbreviated way.

Had the Socialists not committed certain blunders, the people who felt in this way might have found a new political home in their party. What kind of blunders did they commit? Did they fail to woo the former Nazis with adequate zeal, to appeal to their feelings or to glorify their past? The truth is that nothing so undignified was required. Both parties this time refrained from any such humiliating concessions; both acted on the assumption that it would be best to let sleeping dogs lie and not to appeal to their sense of comradeship and political romanticism, not to attack them frontally and rally them to 'the last of the old flags'. But it

became obvious to many of the former N.S.D.A.P. members who on principle dislike giving power either to the S.P.Ö. or to the Ö.V.P. that if you vote Conservative you give them a degree of power, but if you vote Socialist you give them a great deal more power; so as they wished to withhold much power from both, they voted Ö.V.P.

In order to understand this attitude one has to realize the extent to which the Socialists are entrenched in the public life of the country. They control the trade unions and all the social welfare organizations (*Krankenkassen*), and through Waldbrunner's Ministry which controls transport, radio, and all the nationalized industries they are in charge of a considerable part of the national economy. Had the Socialists used their power with discretion and care no one might have objected to it, just as no one seems to object to the great concentration of power which is exercised through the nationalized banks, particularly the Creditanstalt, which is run by the Conservatives. But here and there the Socialists used this power both ruthlessly and clumsily. Much harm to the Socialist cause has been caused by constant quarrels between the *Krankenkassen* and the doctors employed by them. Any such large organization as the Austrian health service must leave a certain number of people dissatisfied—they may have had to sit too long in the waiting rooms or failed to obtain an expensive drug free; and latterly complaints had become both frequent and embittered because the cost of the health services had risen so suddenly that the tax reductions conceded to the lower income bracket were completely swallowed up by individual health service contributions. Every complaint against the *Krankenkassen* was immediately assumed by the public to be justified without further inquiry, and opinion was strongly on the side of the doctors. Feeling that public opinion was against them, the *Krankenkassen* committed further blunders. When the Vienna doctors went on strike (all necessary work in fact continued, only certain routine services being curtailed), officials were sent out to 'break the strike' and in some cases violence was reported, thus incensing public opinion still further. Through these and other incidents people became what is known as 'Apparat' (organization)-conscious and a general atmosphere of 'we' and 'they' came into being.

More trouble for the Socialists arose from the fact that as a consequence of nationalization it is increasingly the Socialist Party which provides the industrial 'bosses'. It was probably a

mistake to allow the higher executives in the nationalized industries to make Socialist propaganda; it was undoubtedly a mistake that in some areas the Socialist management advised their employees to buy in the Co-operative shops (*Konsum*) only; and it was unfortunate that, having considerably raised public transport charges in Vienna, an increase in the wages of transport workers was refused on the grounds of increased costs. Since this last event, every Communist public meeting, normally an unimpressive affair, has been swelled by a large group of public transport workers, mainly Viennese tram employees who have a long and proud Socialist tradition behind them.

It must be admitted, however, that the Communists would have maintained their two or three seats even if the Socialists had made no such mistakes. Those followers who stayed with them for fear of losing their jobs so long as the Russians were in Austria have fallen away, but the fanatics remain, and obviously there are enough fanatics available to ensure to the Communist Party its 'Grundmandat', or basic seat which must be secured in one constituency, an effort which is then rewarded with a share in the remaining votes within any one voting area (*Wahlkreisverband*). The Communists actually gained the necessary votes for two 'Grundmandate', and it now appears that they did not anticipate this as Koplenig, the head of the party, had placed himself at the head of the list in two constituencies, and failed to state in good time who should be nominated if he should succeed, as he did, in both constituencies. Finally he was permitted to nominate a candidate, and he chose Fischer, undoubtedly one of the best speakers in Parliament and perhaps the most brilliant and cultured man a Communist party in Europe has produced.

What are the most important conclusions to be drawn from the 1956 elections? First, no coalition against the Ö.V.P. seems to be possible. Secondly, continued coalition between Socialists and Conservatives seems inevitable and we may expect a carefully planned 'middle of the road' policy. Thirdly, the Socialists have ceased to represent the 'working classes' alone, and their leaders will need both wisdom and skill if they are to avoid splits and break-aways in the near future. And finally, the 'Nazi question' is no longer an important political issue but is receding ever further into the past and into political oblivion.

J. M.

A 'People's Government': Social and Political Trends in Ceylon

THERE were three novel features in the opening of the Ceylon Parliament by the Governor-General on 20 April, and these have been taken as symbols of three dominant trends in the social and political condition of the island. The three features were the presence in force of yellow-robed *bhikkus* (members of the Buddhist clergy); the beating of *magul bera* (traditional ceremonial drums) in place of a fanfare of trumpets; and, at the end of the ceremony, a great surge of friendly, interested, sarong-clad people up the steps of the House, past the departing guests, and into the Chamber itself. '*Apē ānduwa*', they said, 'It's *our* Government', as they explored the House and tried out the seats of the members they had just elected.

The great and growing influence of the Buddhist clergy, the resurgence of traditional Sinhalese culture, and increasing political consciousness and awareness of the power of the ballot box among the mass of the people, these do indeed represent powerful social and political forces that played a large part in the spectacular defeat, in the elections held last April, of the ruling U.N.P. by the M.E.P. coalition led by Mr S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. The U.N.P. (United National Party) was largely the creation of Ceylon's first Prime Minister, the late D. S. Senanayake, and had ruled Ceylon continuously since Independence came in 1948; the M.E.P. (*Mahajāna Eksath Peramuna*, People's United Party) is an *ad hoc* coalition in which by far the largest element is Mr Bandaranaike's own S.L F.P. (*Sri Lanka* Freedom Party) and in which the N.L.S.S.P. (one of Ceylon's two Trotskyite parties), the *Bhāsa Peramuna* (Language Party), and other groups play a smaller part. The strength of the parties in the new Parliament is shown in the following table.

CEYLON ELECTION RESULTS, 5–10 APRIL 1956

Party	*Candidates*	*Seats*	*Votes*
M E P	60	51	1,046,362
N.L.S S P	21	14	274,204
Federal Party (Tamil)	14	10	142,036
U N P	76	8	738,551
Independents	60	6	270,094
Communist Party	9	3	119,175
Tamil Resistance Front	1	1	6,853
Tamil Congress	1	1	8,914
Tamil-Speaking Front	4	1	21,554
Labour	4	–	18,123

REASONS FOR THE U.N.P. DEFEAT

But to take the crushing defeat of the U.N.P. and the overwhelming triumph of the M.E.P. as indications of the combined strength of the Buddhist and cultural revival and of popular political awareness is to obtain somewhat too exaggerated an impression of the changes that have recently come over Ceylonese society and politics. For, as the table shows, the U.N.P., although it only obtained eight seats, was supported by nearly three-quarters as many votes as the M.E.P. (it in fact polled more votes than any one of the constituent parties of the M.E.P.). And it might have emerged with more seats than the M.E.P. were it not for considerations independent of the three trends which have been mentioned. One of these was the 'no contest' agreement, whereby the parties of the M E.P. group together with the Communist Party and the N.L.S.S.P. (*Nawa Lanka Sama Samaja* Party, the other Trotskyite Party) agreed not to fight each other in any constituency in order to avoid splitting the anti-U.N.P. vote. It was only an overwhelming desire to be done with the U.N P. which brought together such strange bed-fellows as the M E.P. (with its large number of traditionalists and devout Buddhists, and its policy that Sinhalese only should be the national language), the Communist Party (wedded both to Moscow and to the parity of the Sinhalese and Tamil languages), and the N.L S.S.P. (ideologically somewhat akin to left-wing Labourites in Britain, and also in favour of the parity of the two languages)—strange bed-fellows not all of whom were in sympathy with the three dominant trends. Even within the M.E P., there seemed to be the possibility of disharmony between the S.L.F.P. and the N.L.S.S.P.

The 'no contest' agreement may be seen as an attempt to capitalize on the unpopularity which the U.N.P had accumulated around itself, especially in the last few years. Partly this was due to the fact that it had been too long in power; from being the dynamic instrument (akin to the Indian Congress Party) by which Ceylon had won independence, it had grown lethargic, out of touch with the country, and, in spite of its considerable achievements, had no clear-cut and thought-out policy for the future comparable to the economic planning and the role in foreign policy mapped out by the Congress leadership in India. There was little new blood in the Cabinet: 'Permanent Ministers with Permanent Secretaries', they said. And the public became aware of numerous allegations of jobbery, of corruption, of preferential

treatment for U.N.P. members' constituencies, of accessions to party funds acquired by dubious means (including sums properly the revenue of the State), of attempts to hedge about the independence of the judiciary, of the tapping of telephone wires and other infringements of liberty, and of misuse of the privilege of recommending recipients of honours to Her Majesty.

Some of these allegations are undoubtedly true. It may be argued by some that these contraventions of the spirit of parliamentary democracy as now understood in Britain are only to be expected in an oriental country or, from a different point of view, at the present stage of political development in Ceylon; one or other of these contentions may be true, and it may also be true that things will be no different under the new regime (though they probably will be better, at least at first). But the fact remains that a large section of the electorate had become aware of many dubious actions on the part of the U.N.P., that knowledge of these effaced the memory of the stable government which the U.N.P. had achieved, and that a change was desired on this ground alone, it was on this desire that the 'no contest' parties worked. (Incidentally, the comment has also been made that by acclaiming Sir John Kotelawala, the U.N.P.'s last Prime Minister, as a hero in the containment of Communism the West has once again demonstrated its tendency to simplify situations and to uphold Asian politicians who had ridden to power on parties striving for independence and who were later preoccupied with retaining office for their group at the expense of political morality and economic and social change.)

The U.N.P. also suffered from the fact that the Government had suddenly increased the price of rice at the time of the financial crisis of 1953; and from the resignation from the party of Dudley Senanayake (who preceded Kotelawala as Prime Minister) and the rebellious defection of R G. Senanayake, his cousin. The U.N.P. thus lost the great vote-catching power of the Senanayake name.

It is possible to hazard a guess that but for the 'no contest' agreement, and but for the reasons just given for the unpopularity of the U.N.P., the three social forces mentioned at the outset of this article would not have carried the M.E.P. into power. But they would nevertheless have been at work on the election programme and subsequent policy of whatever Government was elected; and they must now be further analysed, for each is the resultant of a complex situation of great interest and importance.

THE CLERGY AND THE BUDDHIST REVIVAL

Let us consider first the social and political role of the Buddhist clergy. It cannot be doubted that many *bhikkus* (especially those joined in the *Eksath Bhikku Peramuna*) did use their influence against the U.N.P., notably by representing the U.N.P. leaders as Western in thought and habit, gluttonous men and wine-bibbers who ate meat, drank beer, and merely paid lip-service to Buddhism; or as open or secret Christians or, at any rate, strongly under the influence of the Roman Catholic Church (which, rather than the Protestant denominations, resurgent Buddhists mainly attack). Specific allegations were made against particular candidates: that this one roasted a whole calf (this was said of Sir John Kotelawala, with the added refinement that he roasted it alive), that the other one had sent his son to England to be trained as an Anglican priest, and so on. Sometimes, it is said, priests would go round villages with an image of the Buddha under their robe; on encountering a villager they would reveal the image and declare that a vote for the U.N.P. was a vote against the Buddha.

The political role of these *bhikkus* was and is all the more important because of the current strong Buddhist revival. As in Burma, this has led to an increase in both the number and influence of the clergy. Everywhere ancient temples are being restored and new ones built. Many remote villages which formerly were under the influence of local *kapurālas*, priests more Hindu and Animist than Buddhist, now have resident *bhikkus*. The Buddhist revival in Ceylon is more closely linked with nationalist fervour than are the comparable revivals of ancient religions in most other parts of South Asia. For it is Buddhism that, with the Sinhalese language, marks off the Sinhalese from their Indian neighbours, and, for that matter, from the minorities within their gates. And the Sinhalese language has itself been the especial care of the priesthood It is thus all the more inevitable that the backward-looking nationalism of the newly-independent Sinhalese should contain a very marked strain of religious revival. This influence is the more marked just at present because of the wave of fervour generated by the celebration this year of Buddha Jayanthi, the 2,500th anniversary of the passing of the Buddha. But on any view of the future of Ceylon, Buddhism and the *bhikku* must loom very large indeed. The end-product may take many forms, including a wholesome ethical regeneration consequent on reconversion to the gentle precepts of the Buddha. But in the meantime, in a period of some-

what neurotic reaction to foreign rule and Western impact, there may well be a tendency to xenophobia and obscurantism, to an irrational turning of the back on many aspects of Western culture.

One reason why it is not easy to foresee the course of the Buddhist revival is that, while all members of the clergy presumably rejoice in the extension of their religion, they are by no means united on social and political questions. There are several *nikayas* amongst the priesthood; *nikaya* is generally translated 'sect', but this is misleading since the *nikayas* are not separated by matters of faith and government, as are Christian sects, but mainly by caste. The most aristocratic *nikaya*, which is represented notably by the priests of the Malwatte and Asgiriya chapters in Kandy, tends to stand aloof from political activity, particularly on behalf of 'people's parties' such as the M.E.P.; so do older priests generally, for they were bred in a tradition which branded political agitation as beneath the dignity of the priesthood. Clearly the influence of such conservative and unpolitical *bhikkus* is less in the loosely-organized Buddhist priesthood than it would be if there were a markedly hierarchical organization like that of the Roman Catholic Church. But their influence is none the less considerable, and serves to complicate the simple picture of a resurgent, politically-active clericalism.

There is also the point that, although the influence of the priest is great, it is by no means unchallenged; instances are not unknown of unacceptable priests being chased out of a village by irate peasants. Further, Buddhists have by no means the monopoly of nationalist sentiment and cultural revival; many non-Buddhists of considerable influence share in these things and would resist any claim by the priesthood to be their sole means of expression or to be the guardians of a State religion.

RESURGENCE OF TRADITIONAL CULTURE

Let us now turn from the Buddhist revival to other secular aspects of the re-awakening of a culture long submerged under the impact of the West; it is these aspects that were symbolized at the outset by *magul bera*, the ceremonial drums. There are many ways in which an attempt is being made, especially by the Sinhalese, to discard what are thought to be the insignia of a Western way of life and to resume the ways of the nation's forefathers. Often this is associated with an attitude akin to Puritanism, or with a Gandhian view of the West as decadent and materialistic, or

with a picture of Western culture which would not be recognized by a Westerner. Let us take a few examples. Ministers and M.P.s have discarded trousers and coat (in public, at least) in favour of cloth and *banyan* (vest), or of the so-called national dress (white cloth and white shirt-like garment worn outside the cloth); to some extent this is a class as well as a nationalist phenomenon, an attempt to identify the politicians with the masses and to discredit the wearers of trousers. Most Ceylonese women, both Sinhalese and Tamil, have clung to the *sari* and eschewed Western dress; but they are exhorted to give up fashions in hair-styles and cosmetics which they have borrowed from the West, and to dress their young daughters in Eastern style and not in the short cotton frocks now customary almost everywhere, in town and village. Traditional auspicious dishes like *kiri bath* (rice cooked in coconut milk) have replaced sherry and cocktails at official receptions. There are proposals to ban horse-racing, gambling, and all alcoholic liquor, indeed, Western-orientated Ceylonese are saying that so much of what they are used to is to be banned that it would be simpler if the Government simply banned everything and then issued permits for the few remaining pleasures that are still allowed. And increased recognition is being given to ayurvedic (indigenous) medicine.

In all these and in many other ways, some trivial, some more important, the process of cultural reorientation goes on; and because of its connections with the Buddhist clergy and with other traditionalist groups, and because of the class-composition of its supporters (of which more in a moment) the process is much more likely to be accelerated and to be officially encouraged by the present M.E.P. Government than by the previous U.N.P. Government. For U.N.P. leaders were almost exclusively drawn from a Western-educated group who dressed, drank, and made merry in ways now frowned upon officially in Ceylon.

The process of cultural reorientation has, of course, much in common with similar processes elsewhere in Asia. It is self-conscious to a degree, often more than faintly ridiculous to an observer who is not caught up in it. There is rich ground here for the satirist. Again, the process is highly selective. Western hair-styles may be taboo for ladies, but no one has suggested that men give up their Western-type haircuts and grow their hair into the *konde* (bun) once universal but now seen only in old men, or in younger men from remote areas. Likewise no one has suggested

that Ceylon should give up railways or buses or the electric light which now beautifies so many Buddhist temples. No one in the traditionalist group has suggested an end to parliamentary institutions or to the rule of law; and the M.E.P. has embraced socialism, a Western concept indeed.

THE LANGUAGE ISSUE

All the features of resurgent nationalism so far mentioned are superficial and insignificant when compared with the language issue which has roused so much furore in Ceylon and which has touched off the riots in Colombo of which one hears at the time of writing. Linguistic revival is, of course, an almost universal concomitant of nationalism, especially when, as in Ceylon, it takes the form of a movement to discard, wholly or partly, the language of a former foreign ruler in favour of the indigenous language; and linguistic revival can contribute to unity and efficiency when, again as in Ceylon, it is intended that all classes in a community shall speak the same tongue, so that the great gulf between an intelligentsia and bureaucracy speaking the language of the former imperial Power, and the masses speaking the vernacular, will be narrowed.

The complication in Ceylon is that there are two vernaculars, Sinhalese and Tamil (or three if one counts the English spoken by Burghers, Eurasians, and deracinated Sinhalese and Tamils). The S.L.F.P. has always stood for Sinhalese only, as the 'national language' to supersede English, and the M.E.P. adopted the same policy. The U.N.P. at first stood for parity of Sinhalese and Tamil, but bowed to an apparent popular clamour before the elections and came out for Sinhalese only. (Its *volte-face* did it no good; on the contrary, it thereby laid itself open to charges of insincerity.) The Communist Party, the N.L.S.S.P., and, of course, the Tamil parties (in all their disastrous disunity) stood, and still stand, for parity.

Pressure for 'Sinhalese only' seems to come mainly from politically-minded *bhikkus*, ayurvedic physicians, and from lower middle-class Sinhalese (schoolmasters and others) who resent the inferiority that has been theirs because of their inability to speak English (the pressure is thus partly a class campaign against the English-speaking upper classes). But pressure also comes from those Sinhalese who resent the fact that the Ceylon Tamils hold a number of public posts which is disproportionate to the size of

their community, a fact that results from such conditions as the better educational facilities in the Tamil North and the greater seriousness of the Tamil mind. The issue, then, is economic as well as cultural, and threatens to divide a country hitherto held up as a model for its lack of communal strife, and to reduce the utility, and possibly induce the resignation, of indispensable Tamil public servants. On 15 June the House of Representatives actually passed, by 66 votes to 29, a Bill in favour of making Sinhalese the sole official language, but the Federal (Tamil) Party at once claimed that this measure contravened the Constitution and announced their intention of bringing it before the courts. Tense situations and rioting were reported from various places.

NATIONALISM AND REACTION TO THE WEST

So the swing of the pendulum towards the East, and especially the Sinhalese East, goes on. Possibly the swing will go still further in the present mood of reaction from the West. It may then be that traditionalism of the Right will prove to be a greater threat to liberal institutions and to such concepts as the rule of law than revolutionary activity from the Left, in spite of Mr Bandaranaike's undoubtedly sincere belief in and competent handling of those institutions and ideas. This may particularly be so if Buddhism becomes false to itself and intolerant of minority views; or if Sinhalese nationalism becomes harsh and chauvinistic; or if latent authoritarian traditions and habits come to the surface.

Western commentators on the Ceylon scene have been wont to see in the election results a 'setback for the West', and by this they have usually meant a setback to Western foreign policies of containing Communism and of maintaining bases and alliances to that end. But the 'setback to the West' can also be seen as a setback to the absorption of certain elements of Western culture and, potentially, to liberal democratic ideas of government, of political philosophy, and of the nature of man, all of which have proved so attractive and so beneficent to many Eastern peoples and which, as, for example, Mr Guy Wint has recently shown in his *Spotlight on Asia*, are engaged in a struggle with authoritarian Communism for the soul of Asia. That book maintains that India under Mr Nehru is the chief upholder of liberal democracy in Asia. Mr Bandaranaike is known to look to India and to Nehru for a model in many matters; but the forces of intolerance and chauvinism which lurk amid the national cultural revivalists may nevertheless

overwhelm Mr Bandaranaike and may present India with a disturbing and embarrassing neighbour.

It is also conceivable that Sinhalese nationalism may postpone the solution of the pressing economic problems of a country with a rapidly increasing population, with chronic unemployment and under-employment of labour, and with a too narrowly based export industry. This may come about in two ways. The Government may be so preoccupied with salving nationalist pride over a host of issues, from religion and language to drink and dress, and with overruling or compromising with the minorities, that fundamental problems of economic development will be shelved; then very possibly a dictatorship, either of the Right or of the Left, may capitalize on the resultant misery and discontent. Or, secondly, the irrational elements in Sinhalese nationalism may, on a score of fronts, hold up the scientific research and rational, objective appraisal which are essential before the economic problems of the country can be formulated, let alone solved. Thus ayurvedic doctors may hold up medical research and the development of health services, religious feeling may inhibit scientific animal husbandry, poor knowledge of English may cut off Ceylonese from new developments elsewhere, and obsession with the community or religion of applicants for posts may rule out men of merit and ability where merit and ability are all too scarce.

On the other hand, the drift to Sinhalese traditionalism is not unopposed. As we have seen, Tamils (and for that matter many English-speaking Ceylonese) oppose its particular manifestation in the language issue. Christians and others oppose an intolerant Buddhism. The large number of votes cast for the U.N.P. suggests that it is by no means a spent force. Though it may lose adherents and even M.P.s to the M.E.P., it is possible that it can cleanse itself of its past failings and re-emerge as a party which is conservative in economic policy (representing business men, landowners, and so on) but Western-looking, liberal, and rational in social policy (representing Western-oriented Ceylonese).

And it is highly significant that the N.L.S.S.P., the more moderate of the two Trotskyite parties, gained nine seats to become the second largest party in the House and the largest party in the Opposition, in spite of (or, possibly, because of) its stand for parity on the language issue. Most of its successes were in the urbanized coastal fringe north and south of, and including, Colombo (where the M.E.P. did badly) and in estate areas where

wage-labour is important. It is undoubtedly the dominant party of the Left at present. Its success was due to many causes, including the unpopularity of the U.N.P.; the personal popularity of its leaders, of whom Dr N. M. Perera is outstanding for ability, integrity, and consistency (he was ousted from the Mayoralty of Colombo by a manœuvre which helped to contribute to the U.N.P defeat); the appeal of its parity policy to Tamils and Western-educated Ceylonese, quite numerous in some urban areas; and its Leftist policy generally. Certainly the N.L.S.S.P. will be the main opponent in Parliament of a number of traditionalist policies, though it has promised to support the M.E.P. in 'progressive' activities. If it can win support in Tamil areas (as it well may), and if Ceylon thinks tomorrow what Colombo thinks today (which is more doubtful), Dr Perera may one day become Prime Minister

'APĒ ĀNDUWA'

What, finally, of '*apē ānduwa*'? How far is the new Government in any sense a 'People's Government'? It is true that there was great popular interest in the elections and elation at the U.N P defeat. Those who hope for the survival of liberal parliamentary institutions in Asia may take heart from the fact that the elections were, by most accounts, quieter and less marred by bribery, intimidation, and similar malpractices than ever before in the island; and from the additional fact that a firmly entrenched Government, with all the advantages of great wealth and influence in its hands, was soundly beaten. Further, it cannot be doubted that in the Colombo conurbation and elsewhere the election was preceded by free and informed discussion, and that the urban members elected are, by and large, truly representative. But in less sophisticated rural areas there is something to be said for the view that the peasant voter has been influenced over-strongly by newly-ascendant elements in the struggle for power in the village, notably by the political *bhikkus*, ayurvedic physicians, and vernacular schoolmasters who are in the forefront of the Sinhalese religious and cultural movement. In the towns, power has shifted a long way towards the people; in the countryside, it has shifted towards the new Sinhalese-speaking lower middle class and away from the English-speaking landowners, business men, and traditional aristocratic families (there are very few representatives of the Kandyan aristocracy in the new Parliament); but it is to be doubted if it has in any real sense come down to the mass of the people.

'*Apē ānduwa*', then, is a relative term; the new Government is not largely of the people, as is a British Labour Government. Still less is it a 'People's Government' in the Communist sense of the term, in spite of the presence in it of the Marxist N.L.S.S.P. (who may ultimately clash with the traditionalist wing of the M.E.P.). Rather is it, for the most part, a Sinhalese nationalist Government with its roots in Sinhalese-speaking sections of the middle class. As such, it is bound to be more thoroughly Asian in outlook than the U.N.P.; and it is against this background that one must seek to understand the reasons for its foreign policy—its neutralism, its attitude to British bases, its desire for relations with Communist China.

B. M.

Operation Lazarus

Some Consequences in Poland of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U.

WHEN the Polish Communist Party assumed power in 1945 there was not among its leaders a single one who had made his name before the war; even Gomulka was unknown. All the pre-war leaders had been liquidated in the Soviet Union between 1931 and 1938, and the Party itself was officially disbanded by the Comintern in 1938 as infested with spies and provocateurs.

The inability to display its native progenitors caused singular embarrassment to its post-war propaganda. The Polish Communist Party had to expand from a very narrow numerical basis.[1] The indoctrination of its new cadres had to proceed with perplexing silence on the subject of its own genealogy. There were only

[1] The total membership of the C P.P in 1938 was officially given as 40,000, only a very small proportion survived until 1945. It is now 1 3 million. The shortage of cadres after the war was so acute that the Party obtained permission from Stalin to search for Communists in the Soviet concentration camps. It secured the release and repatriation of a number of those who had vanished in the 'thirties. They were promptly put into various administrative positions One of them, A. Zawadzki, is now Chairman of the State Council, legally the Polish Head of State.

skeletons in the cupboard. No Communist Plutarch could emerge in Poland, for all his possible models had been condemned to oblivion.

A romanticized history of the Party was published in Warsaw in 1951 under the title: *C.P.P. Reminiscences from the Field of Combat.* The editors, the department of history of the Polish United Workers' Party (P.U.W.P.—the present name of the Polish Communist Party), managed to avoid mentioning the name of a single prominent Communist leader in the inter-war years. It was left to the reader to ask who had conducted all those 'heroic struggles'. Thus even before Stalin's death Polish Communists were forced to avoid the un-Marxist deviation of writing history in terms of the leaders instead of the masses. For lack of an alternative, history had to be anonymous.

At the time of the 2nd Party Congress (March 1954) when Khrushchev as fraternal delegate stood with other delegates in silence to commemorate 'the immortal memory' of Stalin, no change was yet in sight. It was only at the beginning of 1955 that the first signs appeared that it had been decided once more to rewrite history.

THE REHABILITATION CAMPAIGN

The second volume of *Decisions and Resolutions of the C.P.P*, published in April 1955,[1] contained references to persons any allusion to whom had hitherto been prohibited, such as A. Warski (Warszawski), Y. Lenski (Leszczynski), E. Pruchniak, and others Given the green light, Polish publications began mentioning hitherto unmentionable names, forgotten leaders such as Dombal, Kostrzeva, Zharski, Ryng, and others liquidated by Stalin A 'rehabilitation' campaign was conducted in the Polish press, putting them back on their pedestals and extolling their revolutionary virtues. Their life and activities were praised, but only veiled references made to their ultimate fate; the formula used was to put all the blame on 'Beriovshchina' (i.e. Beria-ism). 'Rehabilitation' also took the form of reprinting some of their articles.

Volume 34 of the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia* (published in June 1955) anticipated further developments. It stated that 'in 1938, in connection with the suspicions which had then arisen about the widespread infiltration of enemy agents into the party leadership,

[1] The first, covering the years 1918–23, had appeared in 1954. It mentioned no names.

suspicions which were subsequently proved to be unfounded, the Executive Committee of the Comintern decided temporarily to dissolve the C.P.P.'

Formal 'rehabilitation' took place during the 20th Congress of the C.P.S.U., when the Central Committees of those Communist parties which had signed the Comintern resolution declared in an official statement that the charge against the Polish Communist Party in 1938 'was based on the evidence of provocateurs who have since been exposed' and therefore its dissolution 'was an unfounded act'. No reference was made to the author of the charge. The statement was welcomed by an editorial in the official *Trybuna Ludu* as a 'historic document'; the fact 'that the truth about the C.P.P. has been brought to light is, above all, to the credit of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which exposed Beria's criminal acts'.[1]

This was still the old formula for attributing blame. But it was not long before Poland became the first country where Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech was openly and explicitly used to identify the new scapegoat. On 10 March 1956 *Trybuna Ludu* published an article on 'The cult of the individual and its consequences', reproducing the title and some of the text of the original. After the introductory tributes to Stalin for his early merits in building socialism in the Soviet Union, when he acquired 'unique authority and popularity', *Trybuna Ludu* went on to announce the new line: 'Gradually, however, in the 'thirties, Stalin put himself above the Party and began to impose his individual will on it. The collective principle in the Party-leadership became more and more undermined and was finally liquidated altogether. All this caused great harm to the C.P.S.U. and to the international workers' movement.'

On 27 March 1956 a secretary of the P.U.W.P., Jerzy Morawski, made a much more direct attack on Stalin, who had 'applied repression against adversaries and later against everyone who did not share his views'. Some of the war losses of the Soviet Union 'were due to the fact that the danger of Nazi invasion was not detected in time'; others occurred because 'a number of operations were carried out on Stalin's personal orders contrary to the opinion of military experts.' The security organs 'were used to consolidate the personal power of Stalin. Later on repression was used auto-

[1] At the time of the dissolution of the Polish Communist Party Beria was still in the Caucasus.

matically and blindly . . . evidence was forged to produce false accusations. . . As a result many honest people were sent to prison or penal camps or shot.' Morawski was quite explicit about the fate of the pre-war Polish Communists: 'Almost all the leaders and active members of the C.P.P. then in the Soviet Union were arrested and sent to camps.'

The editor of *Trybuna Ludu* wrote that the dissolution of the C.P.P. was only 'one of many affairs . . . calumny became a deadly weapon . . . people who wanted to defend their Party rights in a Party manner were declared enemies of the people and liquidated. . .' On 29 March Warsaw radio stated that 'Stalin himself approved the list of the members of the Central Committee about to be arrested. The list of false accusations is long. . . To keep people obedient terror was required.' The answer to the question why Khrushchev danced when ordered and murdered as ordered was provided by Morawski 'on a theoretical level'. 'Many Soviet comrades,' he said, 'certainly found themselves in a difficult dilemma whether to take up the struggle or not.' Heroically, they did not.[1] 'The point was not to save one's own life, but to save the revolution . . . the correctness of this decision has been confirmed by history.' The 'laws of history' are invoked to justify participation in what are explicitly recognized as Stalin's crimes. The corpses may be 'rehabilitated' but 'Operation Lazarus' has very little to do with repentance. In the satellite countries, as in the Soviet Union, it is selective in the choice of cadavers, reflecting the current political situation rather than any concern for historical justice or historical accuracy.

In Poland, Gomulka, who had been discharged from prison two years ago and kept under house-arrest, was 'rehabilitated' Various other 'elements' were released. The release of three of them was first announced in a characteristically oblique manner in the form of a letter to the editor of the daily *Zycie Warszawy* (The Life of Warsaw) complaining that the Minister of Justice had not informed the public about the release of 'people sentenced for high treason'.

The official announcement of the liberation of those wrongly imprisoned came a week later at a Party rally in Warsaw, when the Party secretary Ochab stated that the Central Committee of the P.U.W.P., in line with the decisions of the 20th Congress of the

[1] One Polish writer ironically referred to 'heroic opportunism' (*Przegląd Kulturalny*, 1956, No 8).

C.P.S.U., had resolved to rehabilitate people arrested by the accomplices of the 'Beria gang' in the Polish State Security forces, who 'had made many arrests among the Party and the population in general on the basis of false evidence by bribed witnesses. Among those released are more than twenty officers . . . arrested on faked charges of espionage.'

Ochab admitted that the arrest of Gomulka 'in consequence of the Rajk trial' was 'unjustified'. He hastened to add that this did not mean that the Party now approved of the political opinions for which he was criticized. It 'had defeated Gomulka's views in an open and sharp ideological struggle'. Gomulka, said Morawski, had advocated the Polish road to socialism. It was not the slogan itself which was false, but the class content which he had put into it. It was not a variation of the Soviet road; objectively it denied the road to socialism altogether. *La vérité est dans les nuances.*

How willingly do the members of the Party oligarchy perform their *gopak* à la Khrushchev, their expiatory *danse macabre*?

The rehabilitation of their liquidated elder brothers relieves them of some of the guilt-complexes arising out of the adulation of Cain-Stalin. But their position must remain ambivalent: like their Soviet tutors, they owe their power to him. In terms of local legitimation they are even more vulnerable, and his downfall exposes them again as a 'foreign nationalist party'. There were murders outside the family too. It is not surprising that a race began to blot out the memory of servility to ex-Big Brother by a display of posthumous hostility to him. In most cases the sentiments expresssed, although licensed, are genuine enough.

For party propaganda the balance sheet of the recent *volte-face* is not without advantage. The population was given a chance to blow off steam. Many seized the opportunity eagerly.

The role of the Stalin myth in the satellite countries was far smaller than in the Soviet Union, and its destruction does not create so many problems. It affects a certain proportion of the Party members but hardly the population as a whole. The 'cult of the individual' can now be replaced by ancestor-worship. Before 'rehabilitation' there was nobody to invoke. The figure of 'the immortal Lenin', brought forward in the Soviet Union to fill the gap created by Stalin's shrinking dimensions, could not serve for Poland. The newly 'resurrected' come handily into the picture now that Bierut is dead and affords no obstacle to the 'collective principle'. The acquisition of a genealogical tree comes just in

time.[1] Not that the pseudonyms or real names of the pre-war Communist leaders mean much to the masses, but some sort of binding ritual within the ruling party is a condition of the perpetuation of its totalitarian dynamics. An element of hero-worship helps to cement their loyalty and checks the cynicism and indifference which are perpetually encroaching upon the instruments of rule.

POPULAR REACTION TO THE NEW LINE

These universal shortcomings of totalitarianism are particularly pertinent in Poland, where poets and writers traditionally played a prominent part in political life. Disillusionment came to the surface in the angry reaction against double-talk immediately after the 'thaw' had set in. The remarkable 'Poems for adults' by the Party poet Wazhyk exploded like a time-bomb with long-suppressed feelings.

There were few outstanding Polish Communist writers before the war.[2] One of them, Bruno Jasienski, has recently been recalled from the house of the dead. He was one of the originators of futurism in Polish literature in an epoch when the literary *avant-garde* was everywhere flirting with extreme political ideas.

In the late 'twenties Jasienski, having joined the Communist Party, went to France where he published a novel entitled *Je brûle Paris*, a *pendant* to Paul Morand's *Je brûle Moscou*. It was serialized in *L'Humanité*. Like Camus's book thirty years later, it dealt with the imaginary consequences of an outbreak of plague in the city. The half-realistic and half-symbolic vision included the proclamation of a Soviet republic in Paris. From Paris Jasienski went to Moscow and became the editor of the Communist Polish language paper *Kultura Mas* and one of the editors of *Literatura mirovoi revolutsii*. When the 'proletarian episode' in Soviet literature was over he performed the necessary recantation. In a novel written at the time, *Man changes his Skin*, he included several lyrical passages about the re-educative role of the G.P.U.

[1] The portraits of the rehabilitated leaders were prominently displayed on the central Party building in Warsaw on May Day.

[2] Their representative work, a collection of poems by three Communist poets, Wandurski, Stande, and Broniewski, was published in the 'twenties under the title: *Three Salvoes* Of the three, Wandurski was shot in Soviet Russia in 1932, Stande in 1938, and Broniewski was imprisoned in 1940 and sent to a forced labour camp. He left Russia in 1942 with General Anders' army but returned to Poland after the war and wrote a sycophantic *Ode to Stalin* included in school readers. The other two were recently 'rehabilitated'.

He was soon to learn about it from personal experience. In 1937 he, with several Soviet writers, was denounced by Pavel Yudin,[1] then the literary law-giver, heresy hunter, and hatchet-man of the Party on the intellectual front. Jasienski hastily wrote an article full of appropriate zoological metaphors denouncing 'the gang of cultural wreckers and traitors'; but the N.K.V.D. did not believe in men or vipers changing their skin. Jasienski was imprisoned and later transferred to a concentration camp, where he died in 1941.

On 26 February 1956 *Nowa Kultura*, the Communist literary periodical in Warsaw, devoted an issue to the memory of Jasienski. His portrait and poems were printed, and an article by his friend Anatol Stern, also a poet, appeared on another page. Visiting Moscow two months earlier Stern had learnt from his hostess, wife of V. A. Katanyan,[2] that Jasienski's widow, Anna Berzin, had returned to Moscow after spending eighteen years as a deportee in Komi A.S.S.R. Describing his meeting with Anna Berzin he writes about the 'abnormally tranquil voice of a woman who was the wife of a great revolutionary poet condemned to death by a gang of provocateurs and traitors to their great Communist Fatherland: the voice of a woman who has been condemned to eighteen years of life in the far North. . .'[3] A small but significant detail gives a glimpse of the rebellious state of the 'captive mind'. Stern boasts that he 'smuggled' one of Jasienski's translations of a poem by Mayakovsky into a volume of collected works and inserted the name of his friend, although he had not yet been 'rehabilitated'. He is naturally proud of this, and for good reason, for at the time it was a crime against the State.

Warsaw radio, announcing 'a new epoch of truth', discovered that 'The child cannot be told lies. . . When a child discovers that the grown-ups have lied to him he loses faith once and for all. The slogans with which the young people were fed were untrue answers to their problems—it was all, unfortunately, the school of hypocrisy.' The 'grown-ups', as the Communists euphemistically call themselves, were feeding lies not only to the youth but to the whole population; but indoctrination is always concentrated on the

[1] Yudin was made a member of the Central Committee of the C P S U during the twentieth Congress

[2] And sister of Elsa Triolet, Aragon's wife. Katanyan is the biographer of Mayakovsky.

[3] The Soviet periodical *Novy Mir* is publishing Jasienski's novel *The Plot of the Indifferent* In a preface his widow refers to the fabricated charges which led to his arrest

'coming generations'. It is admitted that the result of party education was the creation of young cynics or tired agnostics. Now they are promised that the new epoch will be 'ruthless in its truth about the past, in repairing mistakes, cruelties, and foolishness'.

Artists and writers were told by the Minister of Culture Sokorski (since dismissed), who had become expert in fitting them out with Stalinist straightjackets, that they 'must be trusted implicitly, and in this lies the most important feature of the metamorphosis now taking place'. At a conference of architects the same promise was proclaimed even more vigorously by the Premier, Mr Cyrankiewicz: 'Let the new period be characterized by freedom of creation. Let nobody be afraid of bold and creative "ferment". Let nobody restrict his horizon. Let everyone learn from the achievements of other countries.'

It is not surprising that the frenzy of 'self-criticism' often went beyond the implicitly prescribed limits. The young poet Viktor Voroshilsky wrote in *Nova Kultura* of his visit to Moscow in 1952 that he found there 'an atmosphere of fascism . . . and the demoralization of youth'. He discovered 'the ultimate source which made it impossible to breathe in Moscow—bureaucracy, administrative pressure, decadence'. The same periodical published a letter (22 April 1956) which began: 'I am eighteen. Now I find that what my family said about the cruelty of secret police investigations and the dictatorship of Stalin was true. I find that history was really forged. And I? I do not know how to change my soul for the fourth time without the fear that it will become a rag' Again, another young poet writes:

> Boredom was heaped upon our youth,
> And stiffened by the noise of paper slogans
> We were ordered to sing a non-existent joy.

LIMITING THE THAW

It could safely have been predicted that after the initial shock which usually follows a sudden change in the Party line, and which this time was unusually severe because of the unprecedented nature of the change, 'excesses' would be condemned. Very soon the old Party hacks sounded a note of alarm. While admitting that 'the whole previous period was a gloomy epoch of fraud, knavery, careerism, and lies', A. Braun, in *Nova Kultura*, implored the young writers 'not to let themselves be misled by the myth of personal integrity'. *Pravda*, which was eighteen days behind

Trybuna Ludu in its official announcement of the new character attributed to Stalin, felt compelled on 5 April 1956 to soft-pedal the new line by denouncing those 'rotten elements [which] under the guise of condemning the cult of the individual . . . are trying to question the correctness of the party's policy'.

Sure enough, Mr Ochab echoed the same sentiments. A day later he complained that 'some comrades seem to have lost their sense of balance and proportion' in their criticisms, while others had come out against the Party 'in public and in the press'. 'It will be necessary to separate the chaff from the grain, the constructive ideas from the rare excesses of irresponsibility and hysteria,' and he added suggestively: 'We shall check all attemps at anti-Soviet attacks.' He also appealed for a 'strengthening of the role of the party in all spheres of life'. He dealt with the same theme in *Pravda* (29 April): 'Some petty-bourgeois elements in Poland comment upon the 20th Congress in an anti-party spirit. . . In the course of an extensive discussion, which on the whole was fruitful and creative, opportunistic, harmful, and sometimes simply anti-Party attacks and statements appeared here and there which in some editorial offices failed to receive proper rebuffs.'

POPULAR APPEAL AND POPULAR CAUTION

But in Poland the orgy of self-flagellation went on. It was still 'criticism' ordered from above, and the participants sought re-insurance in references to the 20th Congress. But it offered an extraordinary occasion for sincerity from below. The picture revealed makes comprehensible the earnest request of one spokesman of the regime that Poles 'should at last believe that they have an independent State'.

Steps were taken to dispel disbelief and to canalize the flood released when the barriers were lowered. The application of the amnesty of 27 April which, it had been suggested, would cover 80,000 prisoners, was completed in principle by 5 June; 36,000 only had benefited from it, of whom 2,900 were political prisoners. It was announced that between 1 August and 31 December 1955 more than 10,000 former deportees had been repatriated from the Soviet Union.

During the April session of the *Sejm* the Prime Minister, Cyrankiewicz, announced that the security apparatus had been reorganized and reduced; it is now to be directed by a collegial body—the Committee for Security Affairs. Radkiewicz, who after

the revelations of Swiatlo[1] was transferred from the Ministry of Security to the Ministry of State Farms, was dismissed. His two notorious subordinates, Fejgin and Romkowski, were arrested The prison sentence of another, Rozhanski, is to be increased. The Minister of Justice, Swiatkowski, was dismissed; so were the two State Attorneys. And as the crowning symbolic gesture J. Berman, widely regarded as the *éminence grise* of the regime, has resigned from the Politbureau and the Government.

While emigrés were being urged to return, a new measure was taken to punish those who might attempt to leave the 'free cage' On 7 April the Official Gazette announced that the maximum penalty for crossing the frontier without a permit, increased from one year's imprisonment to three in 1948, was now to be five years

The reaction of the population to the new line was not uniform, the rulers did their best to convince them that it was not a tactical manœuvre but 'an irreversible change', but while the Party intelligentsia, more or less sincerely, used the occasion to assert long-suppressed feelings, the response of the workers was more guarded.

Describing the factory meetings organized to encourage the 'new criticism', *Poprostu* reported: 'People still do not believe in the sincerity of the present reforms and changes. They still expect that one fine day somebody will give a signal and everything will "go back to normal".' *Przeglad Kulturalny* complained that 'the evil isolation of many Communists has not yet been overcome everywhere. The time of suspicion has not ended—we are still harvesting the bitter fruits of fear.' A leading Party philosopher, A. Schaff, admits that 'the question is often asked, what guarantee is there that the same thing will not be repeated?' His own answer —'The guarantee consists in the struggle of the Party against the factors producing undesirable phenomena, a struggle based on knowledge of their causes'—is less forthright than his diagnosis 'If people are silent because they are afraid or do not believe us, that is bad enough; it is worse if they are silent because they have nothing to say, because we taught them to look for ready-made judgments coming from above which are infallible and not subject to discussion. . .'[2]

The opportunity to admit some past wrongs is at the same time used to attack those who denounced them *avant la lettre*. A writer

[1] His subordinate who defected to the West in December 1953.
[2] *Nowe Drogi*, No 4, April 1956.

in *Trybuna Ludu* remarks that Orwell, whose writings are unknown to Polish readers, was mistaken in asserting that 'a socialist State cannot exist without the cult of the individual, without the violation of legality, and without the system of "doublethink" and "doubletalk".' From now on all these 'mistakes' are a thing of the past—that is the official line.

There is little doubt that the relaxation provided fertile ground for an unprecedented outburst of criticism. It is also clear that many have chosen to interpret the 20th Congress in such a way as to press for maximum liberalization from within. The top échelon of the Party oligarchy professes to take it seriously, but it knows that the sources of its own power and of ultimate political decision remain outside Poland. The new Party secretary, Ochab, was personally installed by Khrushchev. He may be replaced, but only if it serves Moscow's appeasement of Tito.

The changes inside the country, genuine though they may be, have not affected the basic structure of power. How long the 'spring' will last nobody can tell, not excluding the present rulers. The present 'managed catharsis' has gone further in Poland than in the Soviet Union and its other satellites. But although it often went out of bounds it did not get out of control Its motives and limitations were perhaps best summarized in a frank statement of the weekly *Przekroj* on May Day: 'The most important date of the decisive year 1953 was not 5 March [i.e. the day Stalin died], but 12 August, the day of the first explosion of the hydrogen bomb in the Soviet Union. . . The Cominform may exist or not, relations between States may take this or that form; the content will remain the same: the U.S.S.R. is the first socialist power in the world and the C.P.S.U. is the greatest force of the working-class movement, and therefore their influence must be paramount.'

L. L.

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Notes of the Month

The Arab States and Mr Shepilov's Visit

THE most obvious purpose of the new Soviet Foreign Minister's visit to the Middle East in June was to stand in the limelight of Egypt's 'liberation' from the British occupation and to promote further the goodwill resulting from last year's arms deals and offers of economic and financial aid. It was natural that in these circumstances the controlled Egyptian press should dwell mainly on the festive aspects of the visit. Thus *ash-Sha'b*, recently founded as the organ of Salah Salim (the sometime 'dancing Major' who was relieved of his ministerial functions after the foundering of his Sudan policy last year), wrote with typical grandiloquence that the official communiqué on the visit to Cairo could be considered 'a victory for the Arabs, a victory for the Algerians, a victory for Arab Palestine, a victory for all the peoples of the African continent, and a victory for Cyprus itself'; but, *ash-Sha'b* continued,

> We would wish to caution public opinion against the manœuvres of imperialism at work among us, trying to make us think that . . . Egypt has become a satellite of the U.S.S R. We wish it to be known that . . . the Egyptians, who have refused to be the servants of the West, will equally refuse to be the slaves of any other group in the world.

In fact, on 28 June, just as Mr Shepilov was finishing his tour of the Arab countries, the Cairo military court passed sentences of two to seven years' imprisonment on forty Egyptian Communists who had been arrested a year ago. It is possible, of course, that Russia's present rulers may consider as 'expendable' party-members who, awaiting trial for this length of time, can hardly be expected to have adjusted themselves to the recent climacteric denunciations of Stalin's misdirection of Communist policy. The sacrifice of these forty may be a cheap way of flattering Egypt's rulers in the belief that they enjoy real independence and that Soviet offers are in very truth innocent of any political implications

While the Egyptian dictatorship was thus engaged in repressing

its Left wing, in Syria the Left, both the Communists and the more numerous fellow-travelling *Ba'th* party, have never been more influential than today. In the change of government that preceded Mr Shepilov's visit Salah ud-Din Bitar, one of the directing triumvirate of the *Ba'th*, became Foreign Minister. His appointment confirmed, and probably accelerated, Syria's leftward trend; and on Mr Shepilov's departure the new Minister announced that the Syrian President would visit Moscow in the autumn. The leader of the Syrian Communist Party, Khalid Bagdash, lent his voice to those who were calling for a unification of policy with Egypt, while more conservative politicians were urging that Syria should not allow her neutralism to degenerate into dependence on Soviet policy.

It was only in Lebanon that Mr Shepilov's visit could be debated with any ease by a press which, almost uniquely in the contemporary Arab world, has achieved and maintained a large measure of democratic freedom, if not always the responsibility desirable for democratic well-being. The President of the Republic, addressing Mr Shepilov at the dinner given in his honour on 26 June, said:

> I hope that from your visit to us you will take back a true picture of Lebanon as a land essentially composed of hospitality, toleration, and freedom; a land which returns good for good and friendship for friendship; a land attached to the moral side of life rather than to its material aspects, and believing firmly that the free self-determination of peoples, international justice, and peaceful co-operation between nations are the safeguard not only of small countries but of the whole human race . . .

The reservations implicit in President Sham'un's words were underlined by a memorandum to Mr Shepilov in which the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs expressed their 'consternation' at the Soviet communiqué on Palestine of 17 April, with its advocacy of a settlement satisfying the interests of 'all the parties concerned' The memorandum stated that Lebanon could not accept a peace with Israel; that the Palestine question had become the touchstone of the Arab countries' international friendships; and that their relations with the U.S.S.R. would depend on her attitude to the Palestine and Algerian questions

The greater part of the Lebanese press was quick to remark that whereas Mr Shepilov had hardly waited to alight at Beirut airport before launching a verbal attack on the Baghdad Pact, he had been significantly silent about Palestine; and two newspapers invoked

the fact, recalled all too rarely in the Arab world today, that the U.S.S.R. had been one of the first Powers to recognize Israel and had substantially aided her with armaments during the Palestine War of 1948.

The joint communiqué issued in Beirut and Moscow on 28 June spoke only of 'an exchange of views on international problems, including those of the Arab world' and made no specific question of Palestine. The majority of the Beirut press did not now hesitate to express their dissatisfaction at this reticence, one newspaper stating that the Lebanese Government had pressed in vain for specific reference to the Palestine and Algerian questions. This gained some confirmation from the Lebanese Foreign Minister's telling his press conference that, while he was satisfied with Mr Shepilov's declarations on the Palestine question which had shown the extent to which he was convinced of the justice of the Arab case, 'I could have wished, however, that this question had been examined in greater detail.' Then, correcting himself, the Minister added: 'I mean that I was satisfied with the result of the conversations, but would have liked to be more satisfied.'[1]

The minority of fellow-travelling newspapers, which in these days may derive their financial backing from Riyadh as likely as from Moscow, clearly felt some embarrassment. Before the publication of the communiqué *at-Tilighraf*, the most consistently pro-Soviet organ in the country, had boasted: 'The spies of the Baghdad Pact will work in vain; they will not succeed in shaking Lebanese confidence in Soviet friendship. The Soviet Union has given her friendship to the Arabs. She will not draw back, and this Arab-Soviet collaboration will enable the Arabs to settle a great number of their problems ' But now the fellow-travellers were constrained to criticize the Lebanese Government for an 'excess of zeal', as compared with the Egyptian and Syrian Governments, in pressing the Palestine and Algerian questions on their Soviet visitor. The 'supporters of the Baghdad Pact' and 'agents of imperialism' were accused of casting doubt on Soviet good faith; and it was indeed interesting that the Lebanese Foreign Minister, in telling his press conference that the date when the President of the Republic would take up the invitation to visit the U.S.S.R. had not yet been fixed, had added that in September the President would be paying official visits to Iran and Pakistan[2]—both members of the Baghdad Pact!

[1] *L'Orient* (Beirut), 29 June 1956. [2] *Ibid.*

It was at this point that the news appeared of the Poznan demonstrations against the Polish Communist Government and their stern repression. Hitherto it has been very difficult to get politically minded Arabs, intent on securing their own 'liberation' with Soviet help if necessary, to pay any heed to the total loss of liberty suffered by the peoples of the Soviet satellites; but now two Beirut newspapers—admittedly among those least favourable to the popular drift to the Left—emphasized in their leading articles the indivisible character of freedom, national self-determination, and the struggle against imperialism which, they said, existed in an Eastern as well as a Western form. Is it premature to hope that the education of the Arab public in the international 'facts of life' may at last be making some small progress?

Preparing for the American Election

ON Monday, 13 August, some 3,000 Democrats, watched directly by at least as many newspaper correspondents and on the television screen by millions of Americans, will meet in Chicago, and probably in almost tropical heat, to choose their Presidential and Vice-Presidential candidates and to decide their party's policy for the election which takes place on Tuesday, 6 November A week later a similar number of Republicans will travel to San Francisco for the same purpose, but their activities will take place in a cooler atmosphere politically as well as physically.

The Republicans really have nothing to argue about, unless of course President Eisenhower's health deteriorates further. He has let it be known that he intends to stand again, in spite of his recent operation, in a matter of fact way which implies that the Democrats have no justification for claiming that his health makes him unfit for office. And he has made it indisputably clear that he wants the young Vice-President, Mr Nixon, as his running mate again, even though he is a controversial figure whose name on the 'ticket' may lose some votes When it comes to the Republican platform, the details have already been filled in by the President's various unanswered requests for legislation during the past years. The document itself is therefore likely to be even vaguer and less specific than these attempts to be all things to all voters usually are: a paean of praise for the President, for peace, and for prosperity—and little, if anything, else.

Mr Eisenhower's readiness to run for office again has once more dashed the hopes of the Democrats and their Presidential nomina-

tion is now hardly more attractive than it was a year ago, before his heart attack. But the nomination, for what it is worth, seems almost safe in Mr Adlai Stevenson's pocket, although there is still just time for a surprise. His only serious rival now appears to be Governor Harriman of New York, who wants to attack the President all along the line in the aggressive way which gave Mr Truman his unexpected victory in 1948. Whether or not a similar success could be achieved this year, the Democratic leaders are unlikely to allow Mr Harriman to try. For his emphasis on the importance of genuine racial equality and his appeal to the labour vote would alienate the right wing of the party and almost certainly make the South break away entirely. The party officials are determined to avoid this at all costs, and it is Mr Stevenson's moderation, his ability to bridge the gap between the two wings of the Democratic party, which appeals to them. A man with similar qualities will probably be chosen as the Vice-Presidential candidate.

Equally, the official spirit of conciliation will be applied to the arguments over the platform and seems likely to prevail, although perhaps not without bitterness, even over the deeply divisive matter of civil rights for Negroes. Moderation on this question, however, may drive many Negroes in the key northern cities into the welcoming arms of the Republicans Both in outlining their programme and when it comes to the campaign itself, the Democrats, from present indications, will be hard put to it to find any burning issues The possibility of a recession in the autumn has almost certainly been postponed by the steel strike, since it will take several months to make up for the economic activity now being lost. And the farmers, whose depressed condition seemed so satisfactory from the Democratic point of view a few months ago, are now enjoying better prices and incomes.

Foreign policy is developing more promisingly as an issue: the Administration can be criticized from many angles for the ineffectiveness of its approach to the new Russian challenges, both military and economic. But it will not be easy to shake the faith of the voters in Mr Eisenhower's ability in these fields. Indeed, their faith in him is such that the Democrats might be well advised to keep off the question of his health altogether. The public may react very unfavourably against them if they go on suggesting, as they have been doing, that he is no longer able to fulfil his duties and that the Republican Vice-Presidential candi-

date should be someone more suited to the White House than Mr Nixon, since the Vice-President is likely soon to succeed Mr Eisenhower.

But if the Democrats have little hope in the Presidential campaign, they have a great deal in the Congressional one, to be settled on the same day. It is unprecedented for the House of Representatives to go Democratic in a year when a Republican becomes President, but, if Mr Eisenhower does not win by a landslide, such a divided result might be achieved. In the Senate the Democrats have a real chance of maintaining, or even increasing, their present majority of two. Of the thirty-five Senate seats at stake this year, nine are in the safely Democratic South and only four are absolutely certain to be held by the Republicans. It looks as if the real interest of the coming election will be found in the struggle of the Democrats to hold their other nine seats and of the Republicans to hold their other thirteen. The Democrats are likely to have most difficulty in Oregon, Washington, Kentucky, and perhaps New York, while the Republicans may be in particular trouble in Maryland, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and California. In this struggle, as in the Presidential campaign itself, the Democrats will make much of the differences of opinion within the Republican party and will point out that the President has received much more practical support for his programme from the Democratically controlled Congress elected in 1954 than he did from the Republican Congress which he had during his first two years of office

The S.P.D. Conference in Munich

In the year immediately preceding a General Election the normal annual conferences of political parties in the Federal Republic acquire an increased importance. The first in point of time was that of the Free Democrat Party, held in Wurzberg in April. Here the differences led to a definite split as a result of which the Free Democrat members of the Federal Coalition Government, with a few like-minded individuals (sixteen in all), formed a new party, *Freie Volkspartei* (or F.V.P.). In the following month the Christian Democrat conference took place in Stuttgart, when the party took the hitherto unprecedented step of failing to defer to the wishes of its leader, Dr Adenauer, in electing four instead of two deputy leaders.

By 1957 the present Coalition Government will have been in power for eight years. This fact, as well as recent political events,

makes it likely that next year's election may result in a change in the balance of parties. Thus the potential significance of the annual conference of the Social Democrats, the second largest party in Western Germany, which began in Munich on 10 July, was recognized and commented on both within the Federal Republic and outside its frontiers. The chief concern of the S.P.D. leaders was, naturally enough, to lay foundations first within the party and secondly, potentially at least, within the electorate at large on which victory at the polls in the Federal Elections of September 1957 could be built. As one delegate put it, 'Not being in a position to co-operate [in government] leads too easily to lethargy. Impotence holds no spur and only power can exercise a compulsive force.'[1] On the basis of membership the Social Democrats represent only about a third of the German electorate. The aim of the party executive must in the first instance be to win the undivided support of the party for a policy which might reasonably be expected to attract votes in next year's Election from other parties or from uncommitted members of the community. It must also have an eye to the probable necessity of forming or joining a coalition Government; its ultimate partner, or partners, then might well be affected by present decisions on policy.

Approximately 388 delegates met in Munich to consider some ninety-two resolutions, to listen to the key-note speech (to borrow a term from the United States electoral jargon) of the party leader, Herr Ollenhauer, and to elect the executive. Of the resolutions brought forward, some thirty-seven dealt with general policy, twelve sought for the repeal of the existing defence legislation, and about the same number were concerned with reunification and the opening of direct negotiations with the East German Government in Pankow. Herr Ollenhauer's speech, apart from his attack on Chancellor Adenauer, was characterized by political moderation and tactical skill.[2] Reunification was, he said, the primary aim of the party, but this must be achieved by negotiations with the Four Powers and not by means of direct negotiations between Bonn and Pankow, since there could be no common ground either in the present or in the future between free socialism and Communist dictatorship. The Social Democratic Party was based upon parliamentary democracy and not upon any version of a people's

[1] 'Das Nichtmitwirkendurfen fuhrt zu leicht zur Lethargie. Ohnmacht ist kein Magnet und nur die Macht zieht an.' (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 14, 15 July 1956.)

[2] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 14 July 1956.

democracy, totally unacceptable in Germany.[1] Thus the coming into existence of a freely elected all-German Parliament was an essential prerequisite of reunification. The aim of the party as regards defence policy was, according to Ollenhauer, the revision of the present conscription law on the basis of the treaties and by parliamentary means. He described as the most urgent need of the hour a general internationally controlled disarmament and the creation of a security system acceptable to the Soviet Union. Although Herr Ollenhauer attacked the free market policy of the present Federal Government and urged the need for trade agreements with Eastern Europe, he did not concern himself predominantly with economic policy.

In the discussion which followed, arguments put forward against Herr Ollenhauer's policy in favour, for example, of direct negotiations with Pankow, and not only against conscription but against any form of defence contribution, apparently received little support either from the rank and file or from other members of the executive who had been expected in some quarters to dissociate themselves from their leader's policy. Herr Ollenhauer was re-elected for two years by 368 out of 379 votes (and his deputy, Herr Wilhelm Millies, was also re-elected). He had, according to comment in newspapers not by any means normally uncritical of the party and its leadership, proved himself to be 'a man of compromise' (*Man des Ausgleiches*).[2] He had, moreover, shown himself a skilful leader who would not let himself be led, and had thus snatched the S.P.D. from the danger of division.[3]

Chinese Budgetary Policy

THE Chinese Budget for 1956 reveals better than other public pronouncements the Communist Government's policy at the present stage of the country's development from an agricultural to an industrial community.

As in the Soviet Union, the Budget occupies a more prominent position in China than in the countries of the West. Almost all economic activities are directed by the State, and, outside the rural economy, they are closely controlled by the State. The Budget thus covers a larger portion of the country's output than is the rule in Western countries. By now in China, as in the Soviet

[1] *The Bulletin: A weekly survey of German affairs issued by the Press and Information Office of the German Federal Government*, Bonn, 19 July 1956
[2] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 11 July 1956
[3] *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 14 July 1956.

Union, the State has acquired most of the functions which in Western countries rest with private individuals or firms. Moreover, as in the Soviet Union, the Chinese Budget represents the consolidated national, provincial, and municipal accounts. (This fact has to be borne in mind in any international comparison of social and cultural expenditure, which in Western countries is partly the responsibility of local authorities.)

But whereas in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the Soviet orbit a certain shift of emphasis has been discernible of late, no such change appears to have taken place in China. The main emphasis is still centred on the development of industry, and especially heavy industry; and the comment of a leading Communist paper[1] on the 1954 Budget, that 'Capital construction takes the lion's share of the huge appropriations for economic construction', is equally true of this year's Budget.

In spite of gaps in the official accounts, it is possible to assess the meaning of Chinese Government income and expenditure in the last seven years. Most startling of all is the enormous increase in the size of the Budget. Between 1950 and 1956 it rose from less than 7,000 to more than 30,000 million yuan, or more than four times. Industrial progress, though substantial, has been far less. This means that an increasing portion of the nation's output has been directed into the Government's coffers. Within the last seven years the tax burden has risen from less than $6 to almost $20 per head of the population. As the national income has not kept in step, taxation now absorbs half of it compared with one-fifth in 1950. This is a clear measure of the price the Chinese cultivator, worker, and intellectual has to pay for the Government's ambitious industrialization programme.

In spite of considerable efforts to raise the tax burden of the agricultural population, relatively little has been achieved in this sphere. Consequently the share of the agricultural tax has declined within the last seven years from 27 to 10 per cent of total revenue. In order to obtain as large a contribution as possible from the rural community, the Government has introduced compulsory deliveries at fixed prices.

Compared with the stagnation in agricultural taxation, the increase in revenue derived from newly set-up State enterprises is momentous indeed, having risen to almost fifteen times the amount collected in 1950. The growing importance of the national-

[1] *People's China*, 1 August 1954.

ized industries could not be better illustrated than by the figure revealing their share in Government revenue. When the Five Year Plan came into effect in 1953, State enterprises supplied one third, but in the meantime their share has risen to almost one half of Government revenue. This rapid increase has been due in part to the acquisition by the State of existing industries, but in the main it reveals the great progress made in setting up new key industries. By comparison the share of private industry and commerce in budgetary revenue is small, but this is to some extent deceptive. Like the cultivators, all craftsmen and small manufacturers pay indirect taxes in the form of compulsory deliveries at low prices. Ultimately the main contribution to the Budget is, of course, made by the individual citizen who has to pay high prices for daily necessities such as salt and cloth which carry a heavy commodity tax. This is his way of contributing to the rapid progress in industrialization.

This is borne out by an analysis of the expenditure side of the Government's accounts. In 1950 expenditure on national economic construction, i.e. capital investment, absorbed one-quarter of total expenditure. By 1956 its claim on the Budget has risen to more than half. Its volume doubled between 1950 and 1951 and doubled again during the next two years. Today it is twice as much as in 1952.

Defence absorbs a smaller share of Government expenditure than in the past, but in spite of the cessation of hostilities in Korea it remains a heavy burden on the nation. In fact twice as much is spent on defence now as in 1950.

In spite of official protestations in favour of increased consumption, the emphasis of the investment programme is on heavy rather than light industry. In the budget for 1956, the ratio is approximately equal to 8:1. Defence absorbs almost as much as heavy industry. Of the total current expenditure only 3 per cent is earmarked for light industries. In these circumstances the consumer has to postpone the satisfaction of his own needs to some future date. Chinese consumption levels are unknown, but the Budget is sufficiently revealing in this respect, particularly when State expenditure on social services is taken into account. At no time since 1950 has more than one-seventh of total budgetary expenditure been spent on the welfare and educational requirements of the Chinese people.

Spain in Morocco: A Retrospect

HISTORY has recorded more than 2,000 years of relations between Spain and Morocco. The most recent phase of these is being concluded by the negotiations for the transfer of powers which were being held in Tetuan while this article was being printed. These will result in Spanish political control in Morocco being limited henceforth to the two 'presidios'—the word means garrison or penitentiary—of Ceuta and Melilla. In view of the prevailing tendency to resent the existence of any foreign enclave in a geographically clearly-defined national territory, it seems likely that their status too will be queried in the fairly near future, particularly as their economic well-being is bound up with the hinterland, and Ceuta is dependent for its water supply on a source far within independent Morocco. The optimism of Spanish diplomats concerning the possibility of retaining these posts indefinitely seems to be based on the length of their tenure, which is over 300 years, and the fact that the local population is almost exclusively Spanish so that a plebiscite would give an overwhelming majority for the continuance of Spanish rule. Their feeling is strengthened by an overestimation of the gratitude felt by Moroccans for the Spanish refusal to recognize the French deposition of the Sultan and for the Spanish cultivation of friendly relations with the Arab world in general.

But such emotions are not really likely to decide Moroccan policy in the matter of the geographical integrity of the Empire. The postponement of the issue is much more probably due to the desire of the Moroccans to take first things first and to limit the number of problems with which the young and inexperienced Government has to deal at one time. Those who have seen the conditions under which they are working will not be surprised. Probably no body of men have ever had to take over the government of a country of the size and complexity of Morocco with less previous experience of administration or with fewer trained staff to help them. The Foreign Minister had actually to begin handling a whole series of complicated problems without any ministerial staff or even an office in which to work. The skill which the Moroccans have exhibited in these circumstances has impressed all who have seen them at work. What they lack in experience they have done their best to make up for by energy, reasonableness, and the responsible spirit in which they have undertaken their duties. In

the field of international affairs not the least contribution made by that very able diplomat the Sultan was the eminently suitable appointment of Ahmad Belafrej as the first Foreign Minister of independent Morocco.

MIXED FEELINGS ABOUT WITHDRAWAL

Amongst Spaniards in Morocco there must of course be mixed feelings about their withdrawal. No country is altogether happy in resigning the control of a territory for which it has previously been responsible. In the case of Spanish Morocco this applies particularly to the army officers, not only for reasons of prestige but also for practical considerations. The army always played a great part in Morocco. It was the one place which offered a change from the routine of Spanish garrison towns. Special allowances could be drawn, though the cost of living was actually less than in metropolitan Spain. Though the High Commissioner himself, Lieutenant-General García Valiño, appears always to have favoured a liberal policy, a number of officers would no doubt have been glad to hear that it had been decided to declare a state of emergency instead of issuing independence, and to put the army in charge of an attempt to maintain Spanish rule by force. There are also a number of high civil officials who by long exercise of authority have come to believe that their presence is essential to prevent the country from lapsing into the anarchy which prevailed in 1911, immediately before the occupation. The 4,000 civil servants, who are on a separate establishment from the metropolis, are naturally anxious about their future. Spanish merchants and traders view with alarm the prospect of working under a foreign and unknown administration; but some say sarcastically that no system could be worse than the present controlled economy and hope that the opportunities for trade in the whole of Morocco will more than make up for the loss of their privileged position in the very limited and poor northern zone.

In Spain itself there appears to be much the same variety of feeling. In the capital the withdrawal from Morocco is fairly widely felt as a serious loss of prestige. The majority of diplomats however express the view that the movement of the subject peoples to attain self-government is an irresistible tendency of the present age which it would have been the height of folly on the part of Spain to resist; and they congratulate themselves heartily on the fact that the Spanish Government has sought to benefit

from freely accepting the inevitable rather than embark on a hopeless struggle. As for the Spanish masses, it can hardly be said that they feel strongly on the subject. Hundreds of Spaniards who have done their military service in Morocco in the years of peace which followed the conclusion of the Rif War look back with pleasure on that portion of their life as an interesting and easy time with few duties to fulfil; but, in so far as they consider the matter at all, they admit that the time has come when the Moroccans, if they wish to do so, should be free to govern themselves.

A MEASURE OF SUCCESS

Looking back on the episode of the Spanish protectorate in Morocco one can say that it has been a reasonably satisfactory stage in the slow progress of Spain's recovery from her centuries of decadence. It was gratifying to national sentiment that Spain participated to some extent in the last stage of European expansion overseas, in that closing period when European rule began to be justified primarily as a trusteeship and was no longer regarded as a natural result of conquest. At the beginning of the century it had been understood that, in any partition of Morocco, Spain should control the whole northern half of the country, and Spanish publicists have sometimes treated the non-implementation of this understanding as an unfair act on the part of the other countries involved. But in fact it seems to have lapsed principally because the Spanish Governments of the time, feeling the operation was beyond their power, failed to ratify the agreement.

The area which it fell to Spain finally to occupy was about one tenth of the country, a poor territory, mountainous, with few natural resources, but inhabited by a very warlike and at that time xenophobic population. The result in 1923 was the terrible disaster of Anual where a whole army and its arms and supplies were lost and the commander, General Silvestre, committed suicide. This disaster can however be paralleled in the history of the colonial conquests of many other countries, and the position was restored soon afterwards by the dictator General Primo de Rivera. When the French were in their turn attacked and also suffered severe losses, the two countries undertook combined operations and finally brought the campaign to a successful conclusion. Looking back from this space of time, it can be seen that it was the Rif War and not the Treaty of Fez which was the real basis of European rule in Morocco for the subsequent thirty years,

during which the foundations of modern Morocco were laid. During this period peace and order prevailed in the Spanish zone, except for a few minor riots as modern nationalism began to manifest itself, and Spaniards and Moors lived side by side in a reasonable degree of amity. Most of the administrative defects which showed were defects common to Spanish administration in the metropolitan territories and not manifestations of what is now known as colonialism. An example was the frequently shockingly bad maintenance of the roads, as is the case at the moment between Tangier and Tetuan, a state of affairs which it is to be hoped the young Moroccan Minister of Communications will soon remedy.

In the later stages of the protectorate, when nationalism had become a really powerful force, the Spanish managed to avoid most of the worst errors into which the administration of the neighbouring French zone fell. The Spanish always realized that the force of the movement was derived from a perfectly natural desire of educated Moroccans to regain their independence, and they never tried, as the French often did, to hold some extraneous force—British policy in the Lebanon or Libya, Communist intrigue, American business ambitions, or Egyptian imperialism—responsible for a movement whose origin was adequately explained by local circumstances. From the appointment of General Valiño as High Commissioner, the policy which they pursued, and would no doubt have urged on the French if the latter had thought fit to consult them, was one of recognizing the necessity of ultimate independence, of making meanwhile the minimum necessary concessions to the nationalists, and of keeping on good terms with the Arab world in general. It is probable that they were right in thinking that such a policy would have resulted in the continuance of European control for a few years longer and an eventual hand-over that would have been less of an ignominious scramble. As far as the northern zone is concerned, it has meant that Spanish rule is being terminated without the bitterness, the fighting, and the downright humiliation that the French have undergone in the south.

THE PROSPECTS FOR SPAIN

Undoubtedly the Spanish attitude to the deposition of the Sultan had a favourable effect on Moroccan opinion and was sincerely appreciated by the monarch himself, while the cultivation

of the Arab world has at least created a favourable disposition towards Spain. But this is not to say that there exists an intense feeling of admiration for Spain, thanks to which she can hope to enjoy much happier relations with Morocco than France can. There has been a bitter disappointment for the Spanish already in the precedence granted to the French Ambassador in Rabat over the earlier-appointed Spanish Ambassador. In fact Spain is at a serious disadvantage in several respects. The first is that the French zone is immensely richer and more prosperous than the Spanish—and it is the seat of the Government. Corresponding to this is the far greater wealth of France as compared with Spain and the superior technical, industrial, and intellectual resources which she can offer. Then the actual Government is composed entirely of Moroccans from the southern zone, whose intellectual background is French. However much they may have opposed French policy in Morocco, they have learned from their education to think in a French manner and to regard Spaniards with French eyes. Very soon no doubt this will change and Moroccans will begin to look at all the world from a point of view which is entirely their own. In the meantime it remains true that people who, in this critical period, look at things from a French angle are not likely to be favourably disposed to Spanish aspirations.

Not only the Spaniards but the Moroccans of the northern zone are likely to suffer from this. In the old days the French administration used to ignore the existence of the other zone as far as it could do so. The failure to include any Moroccan from the north in the Government seemed to the northerners painfully like a continuation of an attitude for which there was no longer any justification. The reason for it was not clear. Some say that Abdulkhaliq Torres, the most obvious candidate, did not wish to be a minister; others that since his party has now been merged in the Istiqlal he could not be appointed without further disturbing the party balance in relation to the Democratic Independence Party. This grievance was however largely remedied by the subsequent appointment of Torres as first Ambassador to Spain and his participation in the current negotiations.

Another point which goes against Spain was the hesitation of the Madrid Government after the Sultan had made his triumphal return. This was a moment when a bold recognition of the impending independence of Morocco and a suitable statement from Madrid would have finally convinced Moroccans of Spanish

sincerity. But just at this moment a fatal hesitation overtook
Spanish Government. Statements by the Head of State sugge
that Spain was going to hold on for a further undefined period
attempt to set up the Khalifa or Viceroy with the local pup
government (which three nationalists, including Abdulkh
Torres, had earlier been induced to join) as the government
a virtually separate state. The Tetuan Viceroy is said to h
refused to participate, saying that he was too young to play
part of a Ben Arafa—the aged puppet Sultan—while Abdulkh
Torres gave the scheme its *coup de grâce* by resigning. Very soon
Spanish Government came round and recognized the complete
dependence of the northern zone as an integral part of the Sulta
domains. But meanwhile much of the credit which Spain h
earlier gained was needlessly thrown away. Another unfortun
miscalculation occurred when the people prepared to celebr
the French recognition of independence. Unnecessary pol
interference with the demonstrators resulted in firing on t
crowds and caused a number of casualties including some deat
How unnecessary this had been became evident on the occasi
of the much more extensive demonstrations when the Sultan la
visited the northern zone in April 1956 after the success
negotiations in Madrid and his tour of the Andalusian cit
famous in the history of Muslim Spain. Some Europeans, feari
hostile demonstrations, remained indoors for the whole period
the visit, but in fact though the crowd was vast, and in pla
broke through the barriers, not the slightest hostility was shown
Europeans and the celebrations were conspicuous for their go
humour.

DURING THE INTERREGNUM

The only serious trouble that has occurred since was the att
on the Pasha of Larache, er Raisuni, and his agents. This t
place when Spanish control of native affairs had virtually ceas
but new authorities had not yet been appointed, pending
Moroccan-Spanish negotiations which were to determine det
of the transfer of powers. The affair was analogous to the att
on El Glaoui's former agents in Marrakesh. Er Raisuni, who i
son of the famous chieftain, more than half-brigand, who flourish
in the last days of independence, was unpopular with the peo
both for his administration and for his close co-operation with
occupying Power; and they took the first opportunity to settle

scores. Such things were almost unavoidable in the peculiar period of the interregnum when the Spanish had virtually abandoned control and no new Moroccan authorities could be appointed. It is really remarkable that the lapse from order has not been much greater.

Apart from this one episode, such lapses have been confined to robbery and pilfering, to the extortion of funds for supposedly patriotic purposes, to the refusal of peasants to pay the market dues, and to a certain amount of insubordination among workmen. In these circumstances the Liberation Army, which had not yet been integrated into the new Royal Moroccan Army, played a useful part. An English observer who knows the country intimately watched a detachment at work in Shauen, a small town inland from Tetuan. In a businesslike way they were controlling the crowds on market day, seeing that the proper dues were paid, and sending off the traders in kif, the local form of hashish. Now that the Sultan was free to exercise his authority again, they explained, he did not wish this to go on and the dealers had better remove themselves and their goods at once. Reports have also been received of Spanish concessionnaires who, when faced with unreasonable demands from their workmen, appealed to the Liberation Army and received immediate satisfaction without being expected to make any sort of payment in return. As Spain has never been in conflict with the Liberation Army and is not directly concerned with the situation in Algeria, no conflict has arisen with them concerning the presence of Spanish troops near the frontier. This has, on the other hand, been a major difficulty in the neighbouring zone.

Another development in the northern zone, as everywhere else in North Africa where the nationalists have acquired freedom to act, is the impulse given to the formation of trades unions. A former Istiqlal leader in the northern zone has been freed from political duties for this task. In the western half of the zone the organization is already set up and he hopes shortly to organize the mine workers and other labour in the eastern half. Though some of the first manifestations of this activity are somewhat naïve, as is to be expected in the circumstances, the tendency to see that the Moroccan worker gets a fairer deal in the future is a welcome sign of political maturity in the nationalist leaders. In this particular case the organizer concerned spent a long time in the U.S.A. and his ideas on labour organization are those of the West

He does not believe in the vertical organizations, including representatives of the Government and the employers, which have been favoured by the Spanish authorities and with which alone the workers in the northern zone have hitherto been familiar.

The immediate Spanish objective will be to see that Spain receives in the northern zone the equivalent of any privileges which France may acquire in the rest of the country. This may not be easy, if France succeeds in retaining anything substantial from her former position. There is already the case, mentioned earlier, of the precedence given to the French Ambassador in Rabat; it is not obvious what counterpart could be given to the Spanish If French should be the second language of instruction in the south, would it be consistent with Moroccan unification that Spanish should be in the north? Is the army to be advised by a Spanish as well as a French military mission?

Another problem is the adjustment of the economies of the two zones; hitherto they have been organized on entirely different lines, with different currencies and a very great difference in the level of prices. Apart from this, the Spanish and northern zone economies have been so long and closely integrated that their disentanglement must be a slow and difficult process.

On the purely Moroccan side, the difficulties of unification are much less. The Moroccans have a common language and common sentiments; once the artificial barriers are removed, the two Moroccan populations should mingle as easily as two masses of water which some obstacle has hitherto kept apart. The position of the Viceroy or Khalifa in Tetuan presents no difficulty The Sultan has always been represented in the principal towns by a Khalifa. This was in general an honorific post, something like the Lord Lieutenant of a county. The difference in the northern zone was that the Sultan had made a permanent delegation of all his powers as far as the zone was affected; this has simply now been withdrawn. Until the appointment of the new Moroccan authorities the Khalifa remained the Sultan's chief representative for all purposes. The puppet ministers were easily disposed of. When the Sultan visited Tetuan, accompanied by the members of his Cabinet, the Crown Prince was instructed to present them to the people. 'Here are your Ministers', he said. Whereupon the former puppet ministers retired to their houses and withdrew from public life.

THE LONG-TERM PROSPECT

[f the short-term prospects are not too favourable for Spain, as posed to France, this is not necessarily true in the longer view. ıe French connection is in a sense adventitious, an accident of ropean colonialism of the nineteenth century. The Spanish ınection extends over milleniums, being a matter of geography. is arguable that Spain and Morocco are in fact the two halves a geographical unity which extends from the Pyrenees to the las. The Arabs had a name for this sub-continent and knew it as : land of the two shores. The position is rather like that which gland and France would have if the Channel was only a third as le and they shared common geographical characteristics which l not apply to the rest of Europe. Spain and Morocco cannot be lifferent to one another; they are bound to feel a strong attrac-n or a strong repulsion or a strange mixture of these two otions. Many Moors have an instinctive appreciation of the anish way of life, to which they believe they have contributed; ne claim still to hold the keys of their former residences in dalusia. Similarly many Spanish, particularly in the south, feel omantic attraction for their Arab past of which they are con-ntly being reminded by its magnificent monuments in their ıntry. But a good many years must pass before it can be seen at effect such a background is going to have on the coming ge of Spanish-Moorish relations.

N. B.

Iceland: Reluctant Ally

ı 28 March 1956 Iceland's Parliament, the *Althing*, surprised world by adopting a resolution demanding the withdrawal of all American forces guarding the N.A.T.O. air base of Keflavik l four radar stations, and called for a revision of the defence eement with the United States of 5 May 1951. This is the eement under which the United States is permitted to station ces on Icelandic territory. The same resolution, however, ffirmed the country's adherence to the North Atlantic Pact.

[This seemingly ambivalent attitude was not easily understood

ıd. In Iceland itself it brought about a Cabinet crisis which :d the end of the six-year-old coalition between the con- tive Independence Party and the Progressives, a moderately ıl farmers' party, and as a result new elections were called ɟ June. The resolution was carried because the Progressives l forces with the Opposition, consisting of the social- cratic Labour Party, the Communist 'United People's list Party', and the new isolationist People's Defence Party. the Independence Party voted against it.

e actual cause of the crisis was quite as much a matter of ıal politics as of international policy. Elections for the ıg were normally due in 1957. But the prospects for these ɔns were causing serious anxiety to two of the parties. The essives were afraid that the People's Defence Party, which ɔlit away from them and won two seats in the *Althing* in 1953, increase its inroads on the parent party. The Social Demo- 'arty was equally afraid that the Communists might profit at pense from the country's economic straits and the runaway on Both parties saw hope in renewing their mutual co- tion of former years.

the Progressives decided at a convention in March to end coalition with the Independence Party, recommend the ıg of extraordinary elections this year, and co-operate with ɔcial Democrats. Partly in the interest of that co-operation, in order to exploit a strong popular trend and steal the onist People's Defence Party's only thunder, the Pro- ve Party at the same time reversed its stand on the presence ıted States troops on Icelandic soil and demanded evacuation e Americans. As a result, the coalition between the Pro- ves and the strongly pro-American Independence Party to an end, and the *Althing* resolution of last March demand- ıe withdrawal of the American forces was carried unani- y except for the votes of the Independence Party.

A CONFUSED ELECTION RESULT

ıe Progressives had hoped to stave off defeat by precipitating ɛctions they were sadly disappointed. Their total number of fell from 16,959, or 21·9 per cent, to 12,925 (15·6 per cent). ꞩocial Democrats did better and improved their poll from ; (15·6 per cent) to 15,143 votes (18·2 per cent). But polling ɛavy and consequently all the other parties increased their

h the single exception of the People's Defence Party. This st heavily, its poll falling from 4,669, or 6 per cent, to r 4·5 per cent, since the Progressives had now changed itude on the only issue that had caused this splinter group them. The Communist vote increased from 12,422 to that is, from 16·1 per cent to 19·2 per cent). But the idence Party, today the only one that wants the Americans also improved its position, its vote rising from 28,738 to or from 37·1 to 42·2 per cent. It achieved a spectacular in the part of the country which is most concerned with the he N.A.T.O. base, Keflavik and Reykjavik.

, as far as the issue of the base is concerned, the election showed that by a majority of 47,000 against 35,000 the wanted the Americans to leave. But the region where the ins are located wants them to stay. And the only party that iem was the one that made the greatest gains.

: results of the voting show a confused picture, the dis- n of seats in the new *Althing* is no less bewildering. It even one additional seat to the party with the heaviest losses, gressives, while the greatest gainer, the Independence oses two. The distribution of seats in the old and the new is as follows:

	1953	1956
lependence Party (Conservative)	21	19
gressives (Liberal)	16	17
oour (Social Democrats)	6	8
ited People's Socialists (Communists)	7	8
ple's Defence Party	2	0
Total	52	52

's not a situation that makes it easy to form a new Govern- id at the time of writing preliminary soundings had reach- tisfactory conclusion [1] The 'alliance of fear', as the sharp- Icelanders call the coalition between the Progressive and Democratic parties, is just two votes short of a majority ius condemned to an uneasy choice between the benevo- trality of the Communists and that of the Conservatives. Communists demand a sharp oust-the-Yankees policy, any Progressives prefer to go slow on this issue now that

tion Cabinet including one Communist was announced on 21 July.–*Ed.*

the People's Defence Party has been routed. Moreover the Social Democrats do not see eye to eye with the Independence Party either on economic questions or on the issue of foreign policy. Cabinet-building in such circumstances is pretty much a matter of squaring the circle, and the suggestion has even been made that another election might be called in the autumn which might—or might not—clear the picture.

YANKEE, GO HOME!

Why is the American base at Keflavik so unpopular that it can become the chief topic of controversy in Icelandic politics? The answer to this question involves several different reasons.

When Iceland signed the North Atlantic Pact in 1949 as one of its co-sponsors, the United States promised her not to demand bases on Icelandic territory. But a year later came the Korean War and the world outlook was much bleaker. According to what the Icelandic Foreign Minister Kristinn Gudmundsson recently told the Copenhagen daily *Information,* the Americans indicated that they expected, or at least were preparing for, a major Soviet aggression. So the Icelanders let themselves be persuaded to grant permission to reactivate the Keflavik base which was established when the United States took over the defence of Iceland in July 1941. After the war it had served as a civilian airport and as a refuelling station for American fighters on their way to the U.S zone in occupied Germany.

But a nation convinced against its will is of the same opinion still. The Icelandic public had never consented to the arrangement made by its political leaders. The Icelanders did not feel that they were threatened by the Russians, and it is highly doubtful whether the defence agreement could have been ratified if it had been necessary to submit it to the voters in a plebiscite.

The idea of having a foreign base on Icelandic soil was not and never could be popular. Iceland only became independent from Denmark in 1918 after 650 years of foreign domination, and she severed her last link with that country—the link of a common king—as late as 1944. Like any other nation that has won its independence within the lifetime of the living generation, Iceland is very much concerned about her young sovereignty, and to be defended by a 165-million-strong giant means, at the least, a considerable restriction of its freedom of action to a midget State of 155,000 people.

Moreover neutrality was a long-venerated tradition for Iceland. Owing to her isolated situation far away from any potential enemy she had never felt any need for national defence and had never bothered to establish any military forces. Until World War II the people had never even seen any soldiers, because the Danes kept no forces there during the time of their domination. So the very first thing that Iceland did when she became an independent Power in 1918 was to proclaim once and for all her permanent neutrality in all future wars.

In spite of this, Iceland acquiesced willy-nilly to the demands of her powerful neighbour to the West in 1951, and the Keflavik base was reactivated. But by the same token she reserved her right to demand revision of the defence agreement at any time she saw fit This right the *Althing* now wants asserted. The Icelanders do not see any imminent danger of war at present, and they think that if such a danger should arise in the future it might well be at a time when bases like Keflavik had become obsolete.

But revision of the defence agreement does not mean immediate evacuation. Article VII of the agreement stipulates that 'Either Government may at any time, on notification to the other Government, request the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to review the continued necessity for the facilities and their utilization, and to make recommendations to the two Governments concerning the continuation of the Agreement. If no understanding between the two Governments is reached as a result of such request for review within a period of six months from the date of the original request, either Government may at any time thereafter give notice of its intention to terminate the Agreement, and the Agreement shall then cease to be in force within twelve months from the date of such notice.'

In other and less involved words, since it was not till 11 June 1956 that the Icelandic Government requested a review of the defence agreement, the presence of the American troops is guaranteed at least until the beginning of 1958.

OPPORTUNITIES, BUT . . .

As many predicted, the return of American soldiers to Iceland worked both ways. On the one hand it brought a considerable influx of dollars to the island during a period of years when one fishing season after the other failed. This was highly important, for fish and fish products constitute 95 per cent of Iceland's single-

item export. Activity at the base also prolonged the general boom which war-time activities had begun and Marshall aid to the tune of $14 million had continued. On the other hand, it intensified the currency inflation and brought about a lopsided development of the small country's economy.

A tremendous construction job had to be done. Quonset huts and other makeshift installations of World War II vintage had to be replaced by more permanent quarters, and runways and other facilities had to be expanded to accommodate the products of the jet age. Altogether, the Americans have so far sunk about $150 million in this one base.

For the Icelanders this meant tremendous opportunities for work Interesting new jobs at tempting pay rates attracted young workmen from all over the country. Yet the influx of labour to the base region had also its disadvantages While the former fishing village of Keflavik grew to be the fourth largest city in the country, many communities in other parts became depopulated. As a result, almost half the population of a country about the size of Ireland and Wales combined is crowded together in the thirty-mile-long peninsula that harbours Keflavik and Reykjavik.

Other trades also began to suffer. The vital fishing fleet had difficulty in finding crews for its boats because youths preferred regular working hours and heavy pay envelopes at Keflavik to the hard life for a meagre wage in fragile boats on the stormy Atlantic. In other industries workers became restive and could not see why their payrolls should lag so far behind the alluring rates paid at the base.

With all this came complaints which were gleefully played up by the press. The behaviour of the soldiers was very good, better than most people had expected But certain American construction workers were less discreet with their pay of up to $250 a week including overtime—astronomical sums by Icelandic standards. They were big and easy spenders and could not see why they should behave any differently in Iceland from their customary habits in the boom towns out West or in Northern Canada whence they had come. Yet it irked the sedate burghers of Reykjavik to see the most desirable apartments or the newest houses snatched away from under their noses by carefree foreigners who had sold their dollars at fantastic rates on the black market. Icelanders grumbled when almost every item disappeared from the stores as fast as it arrived. Every commodity apart from fish and woollens has to be imported,

nd shipments do not always arrive on time in the few ports of mited capacity. Reykjavikers also resented being crowded out of he few and formerly tranquil restaurants by a swarm of noisy oreigners. Why, they grumbled, some of these spendthrifts had ot even any business to be in Iceland. According to a previous greement the American contractors were bound to give preferenial employment to Icelanders, but some of them did not seem to ake this obligation too literally.

To meet this situation the U.S. Government in 1954 signed a memorandum of understanding' with Iceland. The full text was ever published, but it is understood and generally acknowledged hat in it the Americans went to extremes to satisfy the Icelandic emands. Among other things it was agreed that the American ontractors should be replaced by an Icelandic contractors' yndicate as soon as the original contracts expired All construction ork was to be entrusted to Icelanders except where the necessary now-how was lacking, and in order to enable them to take over s much as possible without delay Icelandic workers were to be rained in the use of heavy American equipment at no cost for the rainees. Also the hiring of labour was to be effected according to a uota system worked out by the Icelandic Government, and even ay rates were made subject to Icelandic Government supervision n order to avoid too great discrepancies.

SEGREGATION OF AMERICANS

Most surprising of all, the Americans gave in to an Icelandic demand for the restriction of all military personnel to the base erritory. There had in fact been hardly any serious complaints about the soldiers. But the Icelanders remembered the unhappy days of World War II when there had been more foreign boys in uniform on the island than the entire male population, and competition for the beautiful Nordic girls had been terrific A base with thousands of unattached youngsters within thirty miles of the small capital of only 60,000 inhabitants was too close for comfort.

Since that time the American military community of Keflavik has been a segregated society. A high fence of barbed wire runs around the base territory and serves a double purpose. On the one hand it prevents access by unscreened civilians to the defence area, n important consideration in a country with a considerable Comunist movement in control of several important unions. On the ther hand, it prevents American officers and soldiers from leaving

the base except on official business or in strictly supervised groups for sightseeing purposes. Even for the lucky ones who are sent to Reykjavik on an important mission there is a strict 10 p.m. curfew. After that hour no American uniforms may be seen in the streets of the capital.

For a while these alleviations, granted in view of the paramount strategic location of the island republic half-way between Washington and Moscow, calmed down the Icelanders. Yet an undertow of discontent kept stirring.

Today it is primarily the value of the base for the national defence of Iceland that is disputed, rather than any individual incidents. Nobody denies that this outpost is of vital importance for the defence of the United States as a jet fighter base guarding the approaches to the North American continent, or as a supply station for tanker aircraft feeding fuel to eastbound bombers. Its value for the defence of the North Atlantic against submarines needs no proof after the experiences of World War II. Nevertheless the Icelanders argue that however valuable Keflavik may be to the United States, it is rapidly becoming a national danger rather than an asset to Iceland itself.

When the base was reactivated in 1951, they say, the United States was still the preponderant atomic Power. Today this is becoming doubtful and tomorrow it may no longer be so. If another world conflagration ever comes, they think, it will only be if and when the Soviets have become so powerful that they may hope to knock out the United States in one gigantic Pearl Harbour with inter-continental bombers and guided missiles. In such a case, minor and defenceless nations may well be left alone until the holocaust is over, while American bases will be subjected to the very first attack wave. And one single hydrogen bomb aimed at a target so near the capital could easily wipe out half the population of Iceland, a national catastrophe from which so small a nation might never recover.

There is one more consideration which carries considerable weight particularly with the older generation. This is concern about what one may call the Icelandic way of life.

THE ICELANDIC WAY OF LIFE

During most of its thousand-year-long history Iceland has been pretty isolated from the rest of the world. Only the development of the steamship, and in particular of the aeroplane, has put the

homeland of the Viking discoverers of America back on the map. During the centuries of isolation this tiny nation has developed a unique pattern of life and culture which is not only worlds apart from American civilization but is also quite distinct from the more nearly related cultures of its Scandinavian sisters. Many Icelanders fear that this particular civilization with its cherished values and traditions is now threatened by collision with an entirely different cultural system, and that the smaller and weaker would inevitably be the loser.

A good illustration of the singularity of this culture is its language, which varies only slightly from the Old Norse from which it stems. Icelandic is one of the very few languages that has managed to keep itself almost entirely free from the influx of foreign words. Even terms that are similar in almost all other languages have not been taken in but have been translated into the Icelandic vernacular. Take the word republic, for instance. You find it in French, Italian, Spanish, German, Danish, Russian, Czech with only the slightest variations. In Icelandic it is *thjodveldi*. 'Minister' is *Minister* in German, *ministre* in French, and *ministr* in Russian. In Icelandic it is *radherra*. 'Constitution' is *stjornaskra*. If you want to use the telephone, you ask for the *simi*.

Most peculiar of all, and a striking example of the different values of the Icelandic way of life, is the attitude toward wealth and possessions. For centuries Iceland was a nation of peasants and fishermen. No such thing as an indigenous ruling class ever developed until quite recently, because all trade used to be monopolized by the king's Danish citizens. At times the poverty was abysmal, while in other periods almost everyone was assured of a modest livelihood. But there was never much difference in wealth, and there was little to buy for those who had money.

Under such conditions earthly goods never acquired that emotional tinge and that social prestige that usually goes with money in almost all other societies. A man was generally respected and had a standing in the community if he was admired for his uprightness, trustworthiness, and honesty. Whether he owned more or less than his neighbours made hardly any difference. On the other hand, since everybody had enough to eat and money brought little advantage, the temptation to covet anything that is thy neighbour's was slight indeed. So Iceland became one of the countries with the lowest criminality rate. Today it still strikes the foreigner as the country where the taxi driver will hand you back

your tip and inform you with a smile that you are not supposed pay more than the fare previously agreed upon.

Such attitudes have become traditional and are strong and v even today. But the older generation is worried because it s them being undermined among the young under the impact Hollywood films, comics, outlandish dances, and the predilecti for shiny cars of American, British, German, or Russian orig Something keeps seeping in from abroad which the older peo dislike: avidity for money.

To many the American base just outside Reykjavik is an om ous symbol of a foreign threat to what they most cherish in th own national culture, and they feel helpless against it. They do r like to see their daughters marry these handsome boys from ov seas who are so preoccupied with dollars and care little for t poetry that is held in such high esteem in this thoroughly book nation. Many of them even frown upon the idea of inviting American in uniform to their houses, although Americans liked individually and get on very well with Icelanders. They satisfied that these foreigners are now restricted to the base ter tory. But they would feel even safer if they left the windy shores Iceland for good and went back to their homes on the other side the ocean.

G. L.

Indonesia After the Elections

TEN years after Indonesia declared her independence the Repub now stands at the threshold of a new period of parliament government. In one of the fairest and most truly popular electio in Asia, conducted during the past winter,[1] the Indonesian peo chose a democratic form of government on a parliamentary basis fulfil their present needs and their hopes for the future. The ne few years will thus be a testing time for democracy in Indones and in South-East Asia as well. Will it employ the human a material riches of Indonesia to the full benefit of the people, or w that goal be achieved by some other means—a dictatorship of t

[1] Elections for the House of Representatives began on 29 September 19 those for the Constituent Assembly on 15 December 1955.

proletariat or of an individual? The answer lies with the 257 men recently sworn in by President Sukarno in the Parliament chamber in Djakarta.

At first glance, the prospect is not too cheerful. No less than twenty-seven parties emerged from the elections. Apparently the Indonesian voter ignored Mr Sukarno's pre-election cry: 'Ideologies apart, preserve our unity! Maintain our wholeness!' But a closer look at the structure of Indonesia's first elected Parliament shows that nearly all its members revolve in three great orbits—nationalism, religion, and Communism. The nationalist bloc comprises the Nationalist Party (P.N.I.) and its small satellite party, the 'Movement for the Defence of Pantjasila'; this group controls fifty-nine seats. In the religious bloc the biggest party is Masjumi, followed by Nahdatul Ulama (Muslim Scholars' Association), the P.S.I.I. (Muslim Association), the Protestant Party, the Catholic Party, and P.E.R.T.I. (Islamic Party). Together these parties control 128 seats in Parliament. But in speaking of the religious parties as a bloc it is important to emphasize that they are united only in their opposition to a materialistic and atheistic concept of the State; on many positive issues they would take divergent paths. The third large group in Parliament is the Communist Party, with thirty-nine seats.

Most of the small 'independent' parties have grouped themselves into parliamentary factions, on the basis of a common policy. Thus, the 'Federation Upholding the Proclamation (of Independence)', which controls ten seats, comprises the following parties: I.P.K.I. (Upholders of Independence), the Labour Party (Partai Buruh), the Party of Indonesian Freedom (P.R.I.M.), the People's Party (P.R.I.), and the Village Unity Party (P.R.D.). The dominant member of this faction, I.P K.I., is linked with the Army General Staff, and the faction as a whole is said to represent the 'Army interests' in Parliament. Another group of small parties, with a total of nine members of Parliament, has called itself the National Progressive Faction. It includes two Trotskyite parties ('Murba' and 'Acoma') and B.A.P.E R.K.I. (Committee for Indonesian Citizenship), which represents a section of the Chinese community The dominant theme in this faction is Left nationalism and Marxism. For tactical reasons, eight members of the Communist Parliamentary group have hived-off to form the 'Reconstruction Faction'. It is believed that the Communists will use this faction to attract support from Left-wing groups, such as

the National Progressive Faction, which could not be given to the Party in its own right. Outside the three factions, and unattached to the great constellations of nationalism, religion, and Communism, is the Socialist Party, which has five members of Parliament

As soon as the pattern of the new Parliament was revealed in the official election results, political forecasters worked out various alternatives for the Government. There could be a Nationalist-Nahdatul Ulama coalition (as in the past), which would have Communist support. Or the Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama could combine, forcing the Nationalists and Communists into opposition. A third alternative was a grand alliance of the Nationalists, the Masjumi, and the Nahdatul Ulama. The decisive factor in all these combinations was the Nahdatul Ulama; with its forty-five seats it could make and unmake Cabinets.

When Mr Ali Sastroamidjojo was asked to form a Cabinet by the President, he attempted something which no political expert had foreseen. The first list of Ministers which he circulated to the big parties was a Cabinet of 'national unity' centred on the Masjumi, the Nationalist Party, the Nahdatul Ulama, and the Communist Party. His list, however, was not accepted by the non-Communist parties. This development marks an important change in the outlook of the non-Communist parties, some of which were willing, in former Governments, to co-operate with the Communists. The Communist vote of over 6 million in the general elections has clearly affected the attitude of the Nahdatul Ulama, and even some of the leading Nationalists. The combined efforts of Mr Sastroamidjojo and the President failed to bring the Communists into the Cabinet, even in a disguised form. The Nahdatul Ulama, with its big 'casting vote', played a decisive part in the negotiations which produced the present Government coalition of the Nationalist Party, the Masjumi, the Nahdatul Ulama, the P.S.I.I. (Muslim Association), the Christian Party, the Catholic Party, P.E.R.T.I. (Islamic Party), and I.P.K.I. (Upholders of Independence).

To make room for all these parties in the Cabinet, four new Vice-Ministries were created. Fears have been expressed that this unwieldy Cabinet will collapse under its own weight, or break up under the strain of office. Several years of bickering lie between the Masjumi and the Nationalist Party; and the Communists are exploiting every difference of personality and opinion between the two parties. But it is equally important to consider the large areas

of agreement between the Government parties. As Mr George Kahin has said:[1] 'With only slight variations the leaders of all significant political groups in Indonesia, except the Communists, are dedicated, for the immediate future, to the development of roughly the same kind of social and economic pattern, namely, a mixed economy—co-operative-socialist-capitalist. . .' The Masjumi stands, in theory, for a conservative society, based on Koranic law; but in practice it has found it easier to co-operate with the Socialists than with the Nationalists. The Nationalist Party though pledged to 'Marhaenism'—the ideal of the masses—has many prominent members drawn from the new-rich Indonesian bourgeosie. The Nahdatul Ulama draws its strength from the small religious schools found in almost every village in Java and Sumatra. It is a party of strict orthodoxy, and of opposition to foreign influences on Indonesian life. Thus it has affinities with both the Masjumi and the Nationalists, and has worked with one or the other in previous Cabinets.

THE GOVERNMENT PROGRAMME

By emphasizing the points of agreement, and playing down the differences, the programme drawn up by Mr Sastroamidjojo has been accepted by the eight Government parties. But he has achieved even more than this, for the programme has been endorsed by the other nineteen parties in Parliament, including the Communist Party. The Government programme may therefore be taken as a 'common denominator' of Indonesian views—Left, Centre, and Right—on the problems confronting the State.

The first item on the programme is the abrogation of the Dutch-Indonesian Union, and preparations to 'absorb the consequences' of the break with the Netherlands. Closely connected with this item is the decision to set up a Province of West Irian, as part of the campaign to establish the authority of the Republic over Western New Guinea. The programme states that the principles of Indonesia's policy towards West Irian were laid down at the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, and will be pursued within the framework of the United Nations. At the same time, the 'strength of the people will be mobilized'. The Province of West Irian mentioned in the programme will be a sort of Government-in-exile, with its provisional capital in the Moluccas.

[1] In 'Indonesia's Strengths and Weaknesses', in *Far Eastern Survey*, 26 September 1951.

On the wider question of foreign affairs, the Government declares that Indonesia will pursue an 'independent, active foreign policy'. The programme points out that the equilibrium of power has changed since World War II, creating a group of Communist countries in the East 'whose economic strength may not be ignored'. In the West, the 'old forces' are still in power, with a highly developed technology, culture, and standard of living. Between these two groups is a third, which is scattered over Asia, Africa, and South America, and is still gathering strength. Indonesia is a member of this third group. The Government warns that Indonesia may at times take steps which are not approved by the West, but that it would be 'utterly unfounded' to condemn such steps as anti-Western. 'With the United States,' the programme says, 'which has the capacity and readiness to render assistance to other nations, we will find means in order that our good relations may be preserved. In the same spirit we are also ready to make use of the capacity and readiness of the Communist countries'.

In home affairs, the most important question dealt with is security. The Indonesian Government declares its intention to restore security wherever it is threatened by illegal bands. The programme points out that national reconstruction has been greatly hindered by the rebellions in Atjeh (North Sumatra), South Celebes, parts of West Java and Central Java, South Borneo, and parts of the Moluccas. The rebellions, the Government says, are illegal, and therefore the Government has first of all 'the obligation to order its instruments of power to attack the rebellion by force of arms' A policy of appeasement will not be followed by the Government. Thus the programme deals firmly with one of the most explosive issues in Indonesia, and one which has engendered great bitterness among the people, among the parties, and even in foreign relations (because the rebels are alleged to receive help from foreign Powers). The programme conveys a stern warning to the terrorists, but at the same time does not ignore the non-violent approach advocated by some political groups. The Government declares that reconstruction in the economic and social fields is closely connected with the restoration of security.

ECONOMIC POLICY

The Government's reconstruction policy is outlined at length in the programme, and has something to offer to every section in the country. Economic reconstruction is to be undertaken accord-

ing to a five-year plan, 'which will be laid down by law' and administered by the new Ministry of National Planning. The object of the plan will be to increase production, raise the national income, and improve its distribution. The Government recognizes three sectors of investment—the State, the private, and the village sector. All three require an increase in the number of technicians and experts. The Government is willing to receive foreign technical aid 'on commercial terms', without political or military commitments. The question of foreign investment will be regulated by an investment law which will soon be promulgated.

The status of foreign entrepreneurs in commerce is to be changed by creating very favourable conditions for 'national entrepreneurs' in the import and export trade. The Government will give them priority in the expenditure of available foreign exchange, and will extend the list of goods reserved for national importers. But the 'brief-case importer' (an Indonesian who farms out his licences to foreign firms) will be eliminated.

An important factor in national reconstruction, the Government points out, is the movement of population from the overcrowded areas of Indonesia to the under-populated islands. In practice this has meant the migration of Javanese to Sumatra and Borneo. The programme states that the resettlement of populations must be carried out on the 'most extensive scale'.

In the sector of State finance, the programme reviews the current budgetary position and makes proposals for the future. During the four-year period 1952–5 the total deficit on the State Budget has been approximately 10,300 million Rupiahs [1] It is recognized that the financing of the deficit by increased money supply has caused a sharp rise in prices and wages, and other inflationary symptoms. The Government declares that it will try to balance the State Budget in future. As the programme points out, the main difficulty is the dependence of Indonesia's economy on foreign trade—the sale of raw materials in exchange for nearly every manufactured article used in the country. Consequently Indonesia is extremely vulnerable to trade cycles. The effort to stabilize the Government's finances is not only a question of balancing the internal Budget but is also closely linked with the foreign exchange position. Indonesia's gold and foreign exchange fund stood at 3,571 million Rupiahs in December 1952; by June 1955 it had dwindled to 1,522 million Rupiahs, which improved to

[1] Rp. 31·9 = £1.

a total of 2,381 million in December 1955. 'As far as possible,' the programme says, 'the level of December 1955 will be maintained for 1956.' The Government will stop, or at least reduce, the purchases of rice and salt abroad, and will channel its credit financing through Government banks, private national banks, and co-operative societies. One must assume that the Government, which has access to skilled financial advice, will not rely solely on these measures to check inflation.

The remaining sections of the economic programme concern the development of industries and agriculture, improvement of communications, and the drafting of a basic land law to define the conditions of ownership of estate and agricultural lands. For the most part, these sections express good intentions rather than precise targets. But it is clear that the Government is alarmed by the deplorable state of communications outside Java, especially the roads, and is determined to tackle this problem swiftly.

Two other important subjects are dealt with in the programme They are the development of regional autonomy, and the re-organization of the Armed Forces. Demands for greater autonomy in the Provinces have become insistent in recent years. Rich provinces like Sumatra and the Celebes feel that their valuable products enrich the Central Government, and that too little of this wealth returns to the Provinces in the form of schools, roads, hospitals, and so on. The fear of 'Javanese domination' is also prevalent in the scattered territories and diverse cultures of the Republic. The Government promises that the experiments in autonomy started last year will be extended to other areas. The elections for Regional Houses of Representatives will be speeded-up, and the financial relations between the Central Government and the Regions will be defined by law.

The problem posed by the Armed Forces in Indonesia is an extremely delicate one. Not merely is the Army suspicious of the politicians, but it is divided internally on questions of policy and organization. The power of the Army was demonstrated for the second time in July 1955, when it precipitated the fall of the former Sastroamidjojo Cabinet. The new Government approaches the subject of Army reforms with caution. Three tasks are specified for the Armed Forces: first, the settlement of personnel questions; secondly, operations to restore security; and thirdly, preparations to become the 'national organ of defence'. The programme states that though the National Defence Act (passed in

1954) proposed the reconstruction of the Armed Forces, the 'hard facts' require that the structure of the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces be further reconsidered. The Army has drawn up its own plan for reorganization, and this is now endorsed by the Government. The National Defence Act provides for compulsory military service, and it is proposed to implement this policy by means of a Bill which will lay down the conditions of service for all citizens. The Government believes that compulsory military service will give 'new spirit and strength' to the Armed Forces.

After dealing with these troubled matters, the programme moves into the relatively calm waters of education, culture, and religious affairs. It is not difficult to see why it has been accepted by the entire Parliament. Mr Sastroamidjojo has faced each important problem, and has offered the most popular solution. Intermediate steps in the theorem are left to the future. Yet it is precisely in these stages that the difficulties and the controversies will arise.

OBSTACLES AHEAD

A case in point is the abrogation of the Dutch-Indonesian Union. Since the break-down of the Dutch-Indonesian talks in Geneva this year, all parties, including the Masjumi, are in favour of rescinding the Union Statute and the related financial and economic agreements But how, in fact, is Dutch financial and economic power in Indonesia to be broken? From the extreme Left come demands for the expropriation of Dutch interests without compensation. On the Right, there are fears that the loss of Dutch banking and trading facilities will cause hardship, particularly to the new Indonesian comprador class. The Indonesian masses believe that the day of the big Dutch banks, the powerful trading firms, and the shipping companies is nearly done. But where will Indonesia find the capital and the managerial skill to replace them? And which country will assume Holland's role as Indonesia's international broker and banker? Recently there were rumours that Indonesia might join the sterling area, but even the mere suggestion was attacked by Left-wing groups. So the first item on the programme is fraught with difficulties, both internal and external, which the Government will have to solve.

The economic section of the programme faces similar problems of ways and means. Indonesia is one of the few countries in South-East Asia without a master plan for economic development. That

first essential step is now being taken. The stated objectives of the plan are to raise the standard of living, to favour national industries and entrepreneurs, to balance the Budget, maintain the gold reserves, develop communications, increase food output, and foster migration. Other objectives in the programme will impose heavy burdens on the economy, particularly the introduction of national service, and the 'tough' security policy. If they are not to remain mere paper promises, vast capital sums will be needed. But the Government has not indicated how it proposes to finance its programme. Gross domestic capital formation in 1952 was computed at 5,000 million Rupiahs. Indonesia's foreign policy of neutralism, and the internal objections to involvement with either the West or the Soviet bloc, suggest that aid in large quantities will not be found abroad. At the same time, the strongly nationalistic trend in the economic programme does not encourage private foreign investors. These considerations give an air of unreality to the sweeping promises made by the Government. A more realistic policy would be a 'crash programme', concentrating on a few urgent problems—food production, export stimulation, exchange control, for example—which would bear early fruit. These problems will undoubtedly be dealt with by the Government. But if the available resources are to be spread over the whole wide range of the programme, progress in any one sector, in the course of five years, will have a scarcely perceptible impact on the Indonesian economy.

Government policy towards the security situation is the outcome of a compromise between the major parties. The Masjumi has always believed that the Darul Islam (Army of God) rebellion can be ended by persuasion and political conversion, rather than force. Some Army theorists hold the same view. But the Nationalists and their supporting parties consider that the rebels must be crushed, and have accused the Masjumi of having ideological sympathies with the rebels. If the rebels have any ideology, it is to set up an Islamic Republic, and to achieve this by means of the Holy War. In fact, the majority of the rebels are the flotsam of the Revolution, who are unable to settle down in civilian life. There are three acknowledged leaders of the Darul Islam—Daud Beureueh in North Sumatra, Kartosuwirjo in West Java, and Kahar Muzakhar in South Celebes. A fourth chieftan, Somoukil, leads a non-Muslim rebellion in the Moluccas. Beureueh and Somoukil have set up respectively the 'Republic of Atjeh' and the 'Republic of

the South Moluccas'. Both leaders engage extensively in smuggling and are able to equip their followers with the latest weapons. The Indonesian Government also believes that the rebels are helped by Dutchmen, with the connivance of the Netherlands Government. Hence the arrest and trial of the late Captain Jungschlaeger and of other Dutch nationals.

The ruthless anti-rebel policy promised by the Government means that the Masjumi has yielded to the Nationalist view. In return, the Nationalists have promised to speed-up the development of regional autonomy—a political solution to the rebel problem advocated by the Masjumi. At the same time the Army has been promised better conditions and new equipment.

This is one instance of the many bargains struck in order to achieve a non-Communist coalition Government. Formerly such unity would have been impossible. But the newly elected Parliament is aware, far better than its predecessors, that the needs of the people override minor differences of policy and personality. The Indonesian people demand, above all, better standards of living, and security Because the Government programme promises to fulfil those needs, it has gained the support of all parties. If the programme is only partly achieved, Indonesia will move towards her natural position as one of the richest and strongest States in Asia.

J. F. S.

Caution in Prague

Reactions to the Khrushchev Report

It may be debateable whether Mr Khrushchev fully realized the extent of the chain reaction to be set off by his denunciation of Stalin at the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.[1] Press reports at the time suggested that some of the delegates to the Congress fainted on hearing of the enormity of Stalin's crimes. Eastern European Communist leaders had even more cause for

[1] In discussing Eastern European countries it must be remembered that the text of the so-called secret report made by Mr Khrushchev on 25 February 1956 has not been officially made public there

worry—they had been the representatives of Stalinism for a long time, and at first sight it seemed obvious that the victims of an anti-Stalinist purge would be found among them. Yet it appears that the collective leadership in Moscow went on its way regardless of the position of the Communist Parties outside the U.S.S.R. Perhaps they were certain that the economic and political ties linking the East European satellites to the U.S.S.R. were strong enough to survive this ideological shock, and they appear to have left the satellite regimes to cope with the new policy in their own way, secure in the knowledge that the general line would be followed.

The Czech Communists were most cautious in their reactions to the twentieth Party Congress. The new trend could not be ignored by the Party leaders, but it was applied with considerable restraint and even reluctance. From the very beginning the political leaders tried to limit the inevitable reaction, and indeed they never lost control of the situation. On 7 March 1956 the Party daily *Rudé Právo* pointed to the importance of the fight against the personality cult. It stressed that this had been dominant not only in the U.S.S.R. but throughout the international Communist movement. The Central Committee of the Party met towards the end of the month and heard a report from its Chief Secretary, Novotný, who had attended the Soviet Party Congress as a fraternal delegate.[1]

The Czechoslovak Communist Party, like most others, had its own personality cult to exorcize. In his report Novotný reminded the Central Committee of the idolization of the late President Gottwald.[2] Yet no blame was attached to Gottwald himself; on the contrary, Novotný praised his 'well-known modesty'. His underlings, however, had created the myth of Gottwald's infallibility to cover up their own shortcomings and in this way they had undermined the principle of collective leadership. This, according to Novotný, had been carried so far that some Ministers had insisted on having their portraits hung in the offices of their subordinates. He deplored the haughty behaviour and the privileges assumed by the members of the new managerial caste and called on them to be more modest in future.

The Central Committee then passed a resolution, endorsing Novotný's views.[3] It admitted that the personality cult had been

[1] *Rudé Právo*, 10 April 1956 [2] Who, like Stalin, died in March 1953
[3] *Rudé Právo*, 4 April 1956.

general in the Party, particularly since 1948, and stressed the importance of adhering to strict 'socialist legality'. The people's confidence in the judiciary and police must be strengthened, but the resolution emphasises that the courts must continue to guard the interests of the working class and that vigilance against the class enemy must not be relaxed. The aims of Czechoslovak, i.e. Soviet, foreign policy are restated, with the significant addition of the intention to develop economic and political relations with Yugoslavia. The resolution also contains some carrots, in the form of a promise to raise pensions and to introduce the seven-hour working day by degrees.

Rudé Právo on 11 April followed this up with a leading article on the power of truth. This article shows that a certain measure of disorientation had followed upon the reports of the Soviet Party Congress. The paper said: 'It would be ridiculous and cowardly to deny that there are less mature Party members who have lost their bearings and who ask: "What are we to believe?" These people are generally honest in their intentions, but they have not been able to find their bearings in this new situation. We tell them again: "Believe in the Party, Comrades!" ' The paper then called for the complete truth and promised its readers that the Party would prevent a repetition of the mistakes made in the past. Two days later *Rudé Právo* carried a long theoretical article which was obviously intended for the use of Party propagandists now called upon to explain the 'new situation'. In this great care is taken to acknowledge all Stalin's achievements in the ideological field, in particular his successful elimination of all Trotskyite and other deviations after Lenin's death. The growth of the personality cult is admitted, but it is described as having been gradual and therefore difficult to prevent. The article admits that for Czechoslovak Communists Stalin was the personification of the U.S.S.R., but it stresses that this new realistic evaluation of his later years, undertaken for the sake of establishing 'the historical truth', must not be allowed to affect Czechoslovak-Soviet friendship.

This moderate approach on the part of the political leadership had to be backed by some evidence of action. The expedient of finding a scapegoat was therefore again applied. The dismissal of Alexej Čepička, a First Vice-Premier, Minister of Defence, and member of the Party Politbureau, was announced before the month was out. He was accused of having fostered the personality cult in the Army and of being responsible for the low standard of

political work in the armed forces. In depriving Čepička of his functions, the Central Committee removed the most despised of the top Party leaders, who had long been regarded as the most brutal and ruthless of the exponents of the regime. Since joining the Government in 1947 he had held the posts of Minister of Internal Trade, Head of the Office of Church Affairs, Minister of Justice, and finally Minister of Defence. His name was associated with some of the most unpopular measures undertaken by the Czechoslovak Communists. As Minister of Internal Trade he was in charge of the liquidation of wholesalers and the subsequent nationalization of the retail trade. During the 1948 *coup d'état* he was General Secretary of the Central Action Committee of the National Front, which purged all non-Communist organizations of unreliable elements. Later he led the drive against the Catholic Church and initiated the replacement of the old criminal code by one more attuned to the demands of Communist justice. Čepička was the obvious scapegoat, and it is significant that he was the only member of the Politbureau to go. The equally obvious second choice, Kopecký, has retained his position, and it would thus appear that the de-Stalinization of the leading Party organ has not cut too deep. A few minor officials, headed by Aleš, the Procurator-General, have shared Čepička's fate, but so far that has been all.

From the beginning the Czechoslovak leaders realized the danger inherent in the new 'soft' line—that too much criticism of the Party and relaxation of control might impress forces opposed to the regime with the idea that the Communists were on the retreat and that the time for some sort of 'final push' had come. In view of later events in Poland, where the policy of easing a great many restrictions went much further than elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the Czechoslovak Communists may well have been right. In his first report to the Central Committee Novotný made it quite clear that criticism must never be directed against the Party itself. 'We shall not tolerate indiscipline or infringe the principle of subordinating the minority to the majority,' he said.

The most welcome result of the new policy in Eastern Europe has been the release of considerable numbers of political prisoners. In Poland, and to a lesser degree in Hungary, this has assumed really significant proportions, and victims other than purged Communists have also been included. In Czechoslovakia the picture is somewhat different. Many people, including some of Slánský's alleged accomplices, have been set free, but this has

been done very quietly and without any formal rehabilitation c
the men concerned. There is no Czechoslovak analogy to the re
instatement of Archbishop Groesz in Hungary; the Archbishop o
Prague, Dr Beran, is under arrest and prevented from exercisin
the functions of his office. As far as is known, only previousl
purged Communists have benefited in Czechoslovakia, an
nothing has been done to rehabilitate and free the thousands c
anti-Communists jailed since 1948. There have been a few mar
ginal amnesties since 1953, but they have generally applied to a
classes of criminals, or to particular categories such as peopl
sentenced for war crimes and collaboration with the German
during the last war, and returned emigrés.

Prague's reluctance to review the case against Slánský, despit
the steps taken to rehabilitate Rajk in Hungary and Kostov i
Bulgaria, is proof of the Czech Communists' desire to have th
best of both worlds. In his press conference on 13 April 195(
Premier Široký put forward the dubious thesis that the indictmer
against Slánský was only bad in parts—a sort of curate's egg lai
by the political police. The imputation of Slánský's conspirac
with Tito has been repudiated, but everything else has bee
allowed to stand. Obviously, Slánský's executioners think the
are being really clever in accusing him of having been one c
Beria's agents, guilty of introducing police State methods an
filling the security services with his own appointees.

The most ingenious explanation of the Slánský affair wa
offered by Barák, the Minister of the Interior.[1] According to thi
dialectician, Slánský, making full use of Stalin's mistaken theor
of the constantly increasing class struggle, had taken advantage c
'the then existing atmosphere of suspicion to hide his own hostil
aims and he therefore gave orders that a "Czechoslovak Rajk
was to be found. His intentions could not meet with success, fo
they were built up on lies. Some of the people arrested began t
give evidence against Slánský himself when he failed to come t
their aid In the end Slánský was arrested himself. The mistak
made by the security authorities at the time was their failure t
analyse the situation properly and to recognize the truth under th
veneer of lies, provocations, and statements extorted by force.
It would be hard to find a more striking illustration of the naïvel
tortuous character of Communist thought processes. In effect
Slánský had only himself to blame if some of the methods used i

[1] In his speech to the Party Conference in June (see *Práce*, 13 June 1956)

interrogating his followers were rough, for he had corrupted the security services in the first place. By claiming that the removal of Slánský four years ago was part of the process of eradicating all violations of 'socialist legality', the present Czechoslovak Communist leaders are trying to establish themselves as the original opponents of the police State as represented by Beria. The unlikely story that the process of re-establishing 'socialist legality', undermined by Slánský, has now been completed is advanced to justify the regime's reluctance to participate in the general re-appraisal of methods and policies put in motion throughout Eastern Europe by the twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party.

Similarly, the verdicts passed on the bourgeois nationalists in the Slovak Communist Party are still described as just. There is no rehabilitation of Dr Clementis, who was executed together with Slánský, and the releases of some of the imprisoned Slovak Communists are based on remissions of their sentences on the ground of good behaviour rather than on a re-examination of their cases.

President Zápotocký's personal views and inclinations may well have played a significant part. He is an old man, with a hard and turbulent life behind him, and it is quite likely that he thinks he has nothing to lose. Unlike Gottwald or Slánský he was never regarded as a Stalinist. His political roots are in the Czech trade union movement, and he spent the last war not in Moscow but in Buchenwald. Though he has the convictions of a Communist he is a remarkably straightforward man, and there is some reason to believe that he has been reluctant to join in the posthumous attacks on Stalin, who, after all, was responsible for setting on the road to power most of those who now insult him after having fawned on him for decades. In this President Zápotocký may be showing better psychological judgement than Mr Khrushchev himself.

Despite the cautious approach from above, the news from Moscow and the reaction recorded inside the Czechoslovak Communist Party caused a tremendous stir in the country. Unbiased visitors from the West have said that they found people in Czechoslovakia commenting freely on events, and there is no reason to doubt this, for a general easing of the tension felt by inhabitants of police States naturally took place. The Czechoslovak press certainly adopted a freer tone: attacks on various shortcomings on the part of factory managements, shops, etc.,

which had hitherto been the only safety valve for existing resentments, were augmented by criticisms of a more political nature. There were calls for a more realistic approach in parliamentary affairs, and the past unanimity of the deputies was ridiculed in a number of newspaper articles The old wound of Czech-Slovak relations was opened up again, and the personality cult was blamed for mistakes in this field. The 'lack of confidence and the suspicion and fear' between Czechs and Slovaks was ascribed to 'the neglect of Leninist principles'.[1] The removal of Čepička was the signal for an attack on the privileged position of the armed forces, the Czechoslovak Army being the only East European army to come under fire in the settling of accounts which followed the destruction of the Stalin myth. The Youth League paper, *Mladá Fronta*, wrote on 28 April 1956: 'The privileged position of the Army is unhealthy and incompatible with the interests of the people. . . It is obvious that Čepička's recall is not enough to erase the exaggerated personality cult and privileged position of the Army.' There have been tentative admissions of official anti-Semitism, and of discrimination against soldiers who had fought in the Czechoslovak armies in the West during the last war [2]

Generally speaking, throughout April and May there was some public discussion of past shortcomings, the highlights of which were the Czechoslovak Writers' Congress at the end of April and the traditional student festivities at the beginning of May.

Mladá Fronta, of 29 April 1956, reported a stormy student meeting in Prague, which criticized the Ministry of Education and demanded an application of the spirit of the twentieth Soviet Party Congress to academic activities in Czechoslovakia. The meeting presented a series of demands asking for improvements in hostel accommodation, the abolition of compulsory lectures, particularly on Marx-Leninism, and a reassessment of curricula. These demands were soon afterwards augmented by a call for a free press; they were circulated to all Czechoslovak Universities and received particularly strong support in Bratislava, where a similar movement had already arisen quite independently of events in Prague. The May festivities took on a strongly political flavour, and the authorities grew alarmed at the widespread demand for academic freedom and political liberty. In this connection it must be remembered that young people allowed to attend the University have been carefully screened ever since 1948, and from

[1] *Pravda* (Bratislava), 1 May 1956 [2] *Práce*, 26 April 1956

the Communist point of view it must have been most discouraging to see that the cream of the age group on which the regime is supposed to rely was ready to turn against it at the first opportunity.

At the Writers' Congress discontent took the form of a general attack on Jan Drda, the Chairman of the Writers' Union and the time-serving mouthpiece of the Communist Party. The Congress rejected the agenda issued from the platform and insisted on full opportunities for rank and file members to state their views. The young novelist J. S. Kupka made a scathing attack on Drda, who found no defenders, and Michal Sedloň extended this criticism to all the Party bosses who had for so long been in charge of cultural policy. He did not hesitate to name Kopecký, a member of the Politbureau, together with the 'ideologists' Štoll, Hendrych, and Taufer. The outstanding contribution was made by the poet Hrubín, who compared the fate of Czech literature to that of the swan caught among the ice-floes in Mallarmé's sonnet. He castigated the cowardly attitude of Czechoslovak men of letters in the past, saying: 'If we are not ashamed today, then our children will have to be ashamed for us.' He criticized all those who had silenced many poets and writers for political reasons. Jaroslav Seifert, one of the greatest of living Czech lyricists, who was viciously attacked by the Communists in 1949, called for the liberation of writers still in prison for their political views and appealed eloquently to the Congress to recall the great cultural traditions of Czech literature: 'I have no intention to engage in metaphysics, but it is with some trepidation that I turn to the dead giants of our past to ask them whether they would be willing to be seen standing at our side.' Both Hrubín and Seifert received standing ovations from the Congress, but President Zápotocký, who was present, soon poured cold water on this new-found enthusiasm: 'Those who now criticize only to further their own ends are wrong. Whether they like it or not, they become demagogues. This applies to the speeches made by Hrubín, Seifert, and others. I recognize their literary talent. . . I cannot, however, regard them as reliable supporters of our new socialist life.' Yet both Hrubín and Seifert were elected to the new Executive of the Writers' Union. On the other hand, the inevitable Drda was re-elected Chairman.[1]

The National Conference of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which met in the first half of June, had originally been

[1] Information about the Writers' Congress is drawn from *Literární Noviny*, 25–30 April 1956.

called to discuss economic questions. In view of the ideological ferment it became the occasion for a restatement of the basically Stalinist views of the Czechoslovak Communist leadership. Novotný, the Party Secretary, repeated several times that no basic criticism of the Party would be tolerated and that the Party line had always been correct. He attacked the Writers' Congress for 'unprincipled liberalism' and spoke of 'reactionary attempts' to make use of the students. He said bluntly. 'Independence of the press from the Party and its ideas we have always rejected and will continue to do so.' He dismissed demands for a special Party Congress as unnecessary.

The universally disliked Kopecký criticized the students and writers in equally open language. He refused the students' request that lectures in Marx-Leninism should no longer be compulsory, for Marx-Leninism 'is the science of all sciences and for that reason it must be taught'. He reminded students that the State was paying for their education and that they should therefore do as they were told. The demand for academic independence and freedom he described as 'absurd': the State could tolerate the outward trappings of academic dignity but would not put up with autonomous institutions which belonged to another social order. He abused the Writers' Congress for dealing with political questions and expressed his surprise at 'the passionate transports of liberalism' there. He informed the writers that they would have to 'take a proper view' of some of the statements made at their Congress.

Stalinism was the main theme of the Party Conference, and the leading Communists, with the exception of Čepička, who confessed his faults, emerged as staunch defenders of the Party line ever since 1952, when they did away with Slánský. The Czech Communists' reluctance to apply a really 'soft' line found its justification in events in Poland, and in particular in the Poznan rising. Nevertheless, the call for vigilance against the class enemy went up immediately after Poznan. On 2 July 1956 *Rudé Právo* warned that the class enemy was still active and that Western, and especially American, spies and agents were only waiting to utilize the situation for their own purpose. The student unrest was now officially described as the result of the work of enemy agents. Two days later the paper said that the criticism of Stalin must not be allowed to become an excuse for anti-socialist slander, and it echoed the latest resolution of the Soviet Communist Party's

Central Committee saying that the 'negative aspects are minute in comparison with the positive results already achieved'.

The situation is still fluid. The relatively unyielding line adopted in Prague from the very beginning seems to have been the correct one from the Communist point of view, and the Czechoslovak Politbureau is therefore in a strong position *vis-à-vis* both Moscow and its fellow-satellites. It is therefore most unlikely that any major changes will take place in Czechoslovakia. The strictly controlled easing of some of the worst restrictions will no doubt continue, but by their handling of the Slánský case the Czechoslovak leaders have saved themselves the unpleasant task of public recantantions and rehabilitations. The only real change is their refound friendship for Tito, but it would be optimistic to expect that the Czechoslovak people will derive any real benefit from this. In fact, as far as fundamentals are concerned, everything in Prague seems to be going on just as it did before Mr Khrushchev decided to throw Stalin from his pedestal.

J F. A.

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Notes of the Month

The Suez Crisis and the London Conference

WHEN the week-long London Conference on Suez ended on 23 August (the day that this issue went to press), it had produced two opposing plans for the 'internationalization' of the Suez Canal. The plan propounded by the Western Powers, and eventually supported (subject to modification) by 18 out of the 22 countries attending the conference, insisted on international *control.* Four countries—India, the U.S.S.R., Ceylon, and Indonesia—did not want to go as far as control and favoured international *supervision* only.

There has been no denying that control is infinitely preferable to supervision from the point of view of all users of the Canal whether they live east or west of Suez, or north or south of it: there is all the difference in the world between the right to manage an operation and the right to complain of mismanagement. Those who advocated supervision have not done so on the ground that mere supervisory authority gives them all they want, but on the ground that the cost of gaining control is too high. President Nasser has said that he will not accept international control, and since there is no reason to believe that he does not mean what he says (rather the contrary) the advocates of control must be ready to use or display force in order to gain their ends. This, say those of the opposite persuasion, would be disastrous because the Canal would immediately be blocked, pipelines in the Arab countries would almost certainly be sabotaged, forceful action would be condemned as unwarranted aggression by the United Nations, and the Russians would seize the opportunity of cementing an alliance with Asian nationalism (symbolized at the conference by the alliance of Mr Krishna Menon and Mr Shepilov against the Western plan) even if they did not join in the fighting, as Mr Shepilov seemed in this first speech to suggest that they would. The advocates of strong measures either pooh-pooh these dire possibilities, or else admit them and say that they must be faced

because of the overriding importance of keeping control of the Canal out of Egypt's hands and because (a rather wilder argument) President Nasser is really Hitler all over again.

A number of things about the conference remain obscure and some of them are important things. The American attitude is one of them. At first there was much talk of the restraining influence of Mr Dulles who, reversing the roles of the Dien Bien Phu crisis, was alleged to be dragging Sir Anthony Eden and M. Mollet back from the brink. Subsequently, however, there was much emphasis on the solidarity of the Western Powers, and it was in fact Mr Dulles rather than Mr Selwyn Lloyd or M. Pineau who compèred the Western plan. This shift in emphasis coincided with doubts about the survival of the British Government if it should have to back down after its extensive 'military precautions', and by the end of the conference one was left with the feeling that Mr Dulles was doing all he could to keep his ally from going over the brink of war but was also subject to an equally strong, perhaps even stronger, desire not to see him toppling into domestic electoral disaster. The Americans, in sum, found themselves much more engaged in the centre of the controversy and playing a more leading role in the first phases than had seemed likely at one time They had identified themselves more closely with a protagonist's position in this dispute than they did in the Persian oil dispute, when they waited on the sidelines until they could intervene as mediators.

One disturbing feature of the situation as we go to press is the absence of a possible mediator At one time India seemed an obvious choice, but the defining of the Western position has induced India to take up a definite position too, lining up with Egypt on the main issue of control versus supervision. India, like the United States, has identified herself with a protagonist's position—more so, in fact, than the U.S.S.R.

Although the Western plan got the support of a large majority of conference members, there was no vote. Consequently there was no 'conference plan', but two plans. The next step is for the supporters of each plan to present their plans to Egypt, and the eighteen majority nations have already designated five of their number to do this—Mr Menzies as leader of their delegation, accompanied by representatives of the U.S.A., Persia, Ethiopia, and Sweden. Egypt can then either accept the plan, or reject it, or propose some different solution and further talks. If Egypt returns

a flat negative, the proposers of the rejected plan are bound to refer the dispute to the United Nations, but the probability at the moment is that the Western plan will be presented in such a way as to serve as a basis for further discussions, initially between Egypt herself and the delegates of the eighteen, and later perhaps on a wider front. At the time of writing, however, it is impossible altogether to exclude the possibility that Britain and France will seek to short-circuit the argument and bring to bear now the force they were unable for technical reasons to assemble immediately after the purported nationalization of the Canal Company's assets.

Meanwhile two matters on the spot give rise to serious alarm. These are the payment of dues and the attendance of pilots. Either of these matters, which touch directly on the right of passage, could lead to an incident at very short notice, and an incident could easily become something much worse in the tense atmosphere created by accumulating armaments on the one side and a penchant for brusque action on the other.

The Gold Coast Elections

In the General Election held in the Gold Coast in July Dr Nkrumah's Convention People's Party was returned to power with a majority of 38 in an Assembly of 104 seats, which is exactly what it had before. The Election was of particular importance because it is likely to be the prelude to full self-government. During the past year or two there has been a marked resurgence of Ashanti nationalism in revolt against the political domination of the C.P.P., which draws its leadership and most of its support from the Fanti, Gas, and other coastal peoples. It found expression in a new party, called the National Liberation Movement, under the leadership of Dr Busia of the Gold Coast University College, and with the backing of the most powerful Ashanti Chiefs. This party demanded a federal form of government, with considerable powers delegated not only to Ashanti but also to the other Regions, including the Northern Territories.

Dr Nkrumah was prepared to compromise to the extent of setting up Regional Assemblies, but they were to be advisory, except in purely local matters, and all real power was to remain with the Central Government. He said that the Gold Coast, with less than 5 million inhabitants, could not afford the expensive paraphernalia of federal government, and in this he was supported by Sir

Frederick Bourne, the expert whom the British Government sent out to advise on the constitutional problem. The Ashanti would not give way and, as it was clearly going to be impossible to devise any form of agreed Constitution, Dr Nkrumah adopted the only possible alternative of placing his proposals before the electorate and challenging the National Liberation Movement and its allies in the Northern Territories, the Northern People's Party, to show their real strength. Mr Lennox-Boyd, the Colonial Secretary, supported this action and promised that, after a General Election, the British Government would accept a Motion by the new Assembly asking for independence, if it were passed by a 'reasonable majority', and would then fix an early date for the declaration of self-government.

Although there had for months been intermittent rioting in Ashanti between supporters of the C.P.P. and the N.L.M., the Election itself, in the high tradition already established on previous occasions, passed off very quietly. The C.P.P. won every seat in the East and West coastal Regions, and a majority of those in the Trans-Volta Region. In the Northern Territories it won 11 seats out of 26 and increased its proportion of the votes from 35 to 44 per cent. In Ashanti itself the C.P.P. won 8 of the 21 seats and actually increased its poll to 43 per cent of the votes cast. Over the country as a whole 57 per cent of the votes cast went to the C.P.P., as compared with 54 per cent in the 1954 elections. Most of the Independent candidates were eliminated, and the new Assembly met with 27 of the 33 Members of the Opposition belonging either to the N.L.M. or the N.P.P.

On 3 August Dr Nkrumah, in an understandably triumphant but nevertheless statesmanlike and moderate speech, introduced his Motion asking for self-government on the constitutional basis which had been recommended by Sir Frederick Bourne and accepted with only slight modifications by his Party. He was confident that the Secretary of State would honour his pledge, and he asked the Opposition to accept defeat gracefully and to co-operate in the great tasks that lay before the country.

Unfortunately the Opposition was not there to hear him. They boycotted the debate, as they had previously boycotted the conferences held by Sir Frederick. The Motion was therefore passed unanimously. The line taken by the N.L.M. was not to accept defeat gracefully but to maintain that, as the federalist Parties obtained majorities both in Ashanti and the Northern Territories,

and the C.P.P. only in the coastal areas, the desire of the Gold Coast people for a federal form of government had been clearly shown. They proposed to send a delegation to point this out to Mr Lennox-Boyd.

Two questions therefore remain to be answered: will the British Government accept the Motion of the new Assembly, and, if it does, will the N.L.M. abandon its extra-Parliamentary tactics and, biding its time, fulfil its proper role, in alliance with the N.P.P., as a constructive Opposition?

The answer to the second question must remain in doubt. The political leaders of the Ashanti and their Chiefs are well-educated, moderate, and powerful men, and their people, being strong traditionalists, will follow them. True, Ashanti tradition is warlike and the ancient pride is there, but so, fortunately, is, on the one hand, the terrible example of the Southern Sudan, and, on the other, that over-riding commonsense which has hitherto brought the people of the Gold Coast so successfully through all their difficulties. The Northern People's Party are unlikely to take an independent line.

As to the first question, Dr Nkrumah assumes that the British Cabinet will honour the precise terms of its undertaking and that within a year Parliament will give to the Gold Coast people full self-government within the Commonwealth.

Indonesia and the Dutch Debt

ON 4 August the Indonesian Government informed the press in Djakarta that it proposed to repudiate its debts to the Netherlands. These debts consisted of certain obligations of the former Netherlands Indonesian Government which had been accepted by the Republic of the United States of Indonesia under Articles 25, 26, and 27 of the Hague Round-Table Agreements whereby the independence of Indonesia was secured Articles 25 and 27 provided that, after the debts of the Netherlands to Indonesia had been offset, the net Indonesian debt to the Netherlands should be reduced by 2,000 million Netherlands guilders, and that the new Republic should then assume responsibility for the remaining Indonesian debt. This consisted of 3,000 million guilders of internal debt, 871 million guilders of consolidated debt to the Netherlands, and 420 million guilders of debt to other countries.

Since 1949 the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and its successor, the Republic of Indonesia, have, as they were re-

quired to do under Article 26 of the Hague Agreement, assumed responsibility for payment of both interest and amortization of these debts. Indonesia had in fact made these payments until March of this year, when she failed to make payment on one of the pre-war loans; and the consolidated debt to the Netherlands had been reduced by the end of July to some 650 million guilders—about £61 million.

The announcement on 4 August made it clear that the Indonesian Government intended to repudiate the internal debts accepted in 1949, as well as the debt to the Netherlands, but not the debt to other countries. The arguments deployed to justify this repudiation were that the internal debt had been incurred by the Netherlands Indonesian Government in fighting against the original Republic of Indonesia and should therefore be cancelled; that the original sum of 420 million guilders owed to other countries should be deducted from any sum owed to the Netherlands as external debt; and that any residue of debt to the Netherlands, which was left after these calculations had been completed, should be wiped out as some, but only partial, return for the sums that the Republic of Indonesia had had to spend in waging war against the former Netherlands Indonesian Government.

Whatever the merits of the case which lies behind these calculations, it has to be borne in mind that it was presented in this form in 1949 at The Hague, that the agreements then reached, with the participation of the American member of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia, were accepted by Indonesia as part of the settlement, and that successive Indonesian Governments have since accepted their obligation to honour them. Indonesia appears to be in need of foreign capital—she started drawing on a new loan of $55 million from the International Monetary Fund only four days before announcing the repudiation of these debts—and, even ignoring other considerations, it would seem unwise for her so to debase her credit at a time when events elsewhere have not encouraged international confidence.

Soviet Interest in Africa

AN outstanding feature of the past year has been the Soviet Union's entry into Middle Eastern affairs.[1] It aroused a considerable amount of comment and a desire for information on former Russian and contemporary Soviet interest in that part of the world. There is another area where increased Soviet political and economic activity is likely, namely the continent of Africa. Some awareness of this activity and estimate of its implications may be timely.

The year 1955 marked a change in Soviet policy towards nationalism in general, of which the Soviet Middle East activities are themselves a manifestation. The new Soviet leaders have realized that nationalism is a force whose hard core Communism is powerless to break, and thus has come the pragmatic decision that national Governments, even when not Communist-controlled, must be accepted and flattered; that the revilement of nationalist parties (such as that of the Indian Congress during 1948–51, or of Dr Nkrumah's C.P.P. Government in 1952–4) must cease; and that the old Stalinist thesis that only the proletariat can truly represent a people's interest must, temporarily at least, be replaced by the maxim that even ex-colonial peoples can well take more than one road to socialism The ostensible banner of foreign policy towards Asian and African countries, flamboyantly paraded in Khrushchev's and Bulganin's Asian tour of November and December 1955, and repeated in every exchange of courtesies since, is that of co-existence, non-interference, and economic and cultural co-operation.

One reason for the new approach is the general policy of appeasement and co-existence. But there is another factor, which is specific to the new Soviet dealings with ex-colonial countries. The last forty years have shown not only that nationalism is a force at least as strong as Communism but that nationalism has in fact fared better outside the Communist world than inside it. The lot of the Indian Congress leaders, of the C.P.P. politicians, of Hausa Emirs, or even of Dr Jagan or Archbishop Makarios has fallen in a fairer ground than that of Skrypnik (Ukraine), Ikramov (Uzbekistan), Lakoba (Abkhazia), Cherviakov (Bieolorussia), who were all executed in the purges of the 1930s as nationalist deviationists, or of Rajk, Kostov, and others in the 1940s. People in Asia and Africa have gradually become aware of this, and the

[1] See 'Soviet Policy in the Middle East', in *The World Today*, December 1955.

Bandung Conference of April 1955, with its split on the Communist issue and its resolution against 'colonialism in all its forms', was a formal record of this awareness. The presence at Bandung of twenty-eight countries offering a non-Communist alternative to colonialism made nonsense of any proposition that Communism held the solution *par excellence* for peoples who had recently acquired or were on their way to independence. Furthermore, besides the lesson of Bandung, there are indications that a more honest recognition of the problems of plural societies, and a less intransigent attitude towards nationalism within the Soviet Union itself, may be a feature of the withdrawal from Stalinism.

The spurt in Russian interest in Africa is unmistakable: it began in about mid-1953. Active steps have been taken to replace the almost total ignorance of the African continent by acquaintance with its ethnography, language, history, and present political and economic developments. For six or seven years there has existed a small group of Soviet Africanists at the Institute of Ethnography of the Academy of Sciences in Moscow, but until three years ago their writings showed great ignorance of Africa past or present. Africa was simply another name in a list of 'colonial and semi-colonial countries'. It seemed that little original thinking had been done since 1917, Lenin's *Imperialism* remaining the text, with the original Hobson showing through it. Today the change in knowledge is quite striking. The two latest books published by the Institute[1] contain bibliographies of source material, historical records, and modern anthropological, ethnographic, and linguistic works with which it is difficult to quarrel Such omissions as there are occur through policy and not through ignorance. Dictionaries of Swahili, Hausa, and the Bantu languages are being published. School geographies of Libya and Ethiopia and popular pamphlets on other territories have appeared. The developed and activated Institute of Oriental Studies has been made responsible for research work on Egypt and the Magrib, and the Institute of Ethnography for work on Africa South of the Sahara. Some students have recently presented African subjects for doctorate theses.

[1] *Narodi Afriki* (Peoples of Africa), Academy of Sciences, Institute of Ethnography, Moscow, 1954, 700 pp , maps, bibliography, and *Formirovanie Nationalnoi Obshchnosti Yuzhno-Afrikanskikh Bantu* ('The development of a national community of the Southern African Bantu'), by I. I. Potekhin, Academy of Sciences, Institute of Ethnography, Moscow, 1955, 261 pp., maps, bibliography.

What kind of Africa do these studies present? First, the emphasis is on Africa as a continent in its own right, and not as an extension of Europe. Secondly, the peoples of Africa are presented as peoples with histories of their own, and not as willing or unwilling participants in the histories of Western metropolitan Powers. Actually, this merely means that teachers of politics in the U.S.S.R. are doing what anthropologists and ethnographers do here, but the potential consequences of this action may be considerable. The Soviet authors record the Ghana, Mali, and Songhai empires of Western Sudan, the Monomotapa kingdom of Central Africa, along lines similar to those adopted by the Gold Coast author of *African Glory.*[1] They examine the whole of the African continent including Egypt, the Red Sea littoral, and Madagascar. The increased competence and the voluminous material which is marshalled together make it more difficult to see where the picture has been distorted by omission, emphasis, or plain falsification. Thus, in quoting the famous passage from El Bekri describing the Ghana Kingdom, the Soviet author leaves out without omission marks three references to Islam[2] in the original text; in discussing the abolition of the slave trade and postulating the view that the economic necessity for slave labour was at an end, the stirring of public opinion by the humanitarians is dismissed as 'the usual hypocrisy', and the violent opposition to anti-slavery legislation by business interests and the £20 million which Parliament found it necessary to pay in compensation to slave owners are not mentioned at all. But the reader is fascinated to find any mention whatever of El Bekri or the Clapham Sect, and may perhaps therefore unwittingly overlook the distortions.

The argument of the studies is roughly as follows. Neolithic and paleolithic finds show African peoples (outside the tropical forest belt) at similar stages of evolution as elsewhere round the Mediterranean coast. Long periods of time and large areas of territory are blank in historical knowledge. The continuous chronicled history of Egypt shows a high degree of development on African soil by people indigenous to the African continent. During the Middle Ages and later indigenous African societies and kingdoms emerged, flourished under a strong chief or king, subsided, and disappeared. The slave trade, carried on first by Arabs and

[1] *African Glory*, by J. C. DeGraft-Johnson (London, Watts, 1954).
[2] cf. *Africa*, Vol XXIV, No. 3, July 1954, article by R. A Mauny, 'The Question of Ghana', for the relevant El Bekri passage in full.

indigenous rulers, then by Europeans, decimated the manhood o African peoples and disrupted development for over three centuries European penetration began where the ravages of the slave trade left off. Imperial exploitation hindered the normal formation of peoples from tribes and perverted the economy. In the twentieth century national liberation movements arose in all territories and were much heartened by the success of the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. They have gained strength and have wrung concessions from unwilling imperialists everywhere save in the Union of South Africa.

In tracing the emergence of peoples and then of national communities, Soviet ethnographers have singled out the Ewe and the southern Bantu as two peoples in whose case the normal process of forming a nation has been disrupted by imperialism and by the false State and administrative boundaries drawn by the metropolitan Powers. In the case of the former, this has been given political expression by 'repeated' Soviet support in the Trusteeship Council on Ewe petitions. The Bantu problem remains poised: in the Soviet study of the Bantu (December 1955), the author concludes that their best course is to amalgamate their efforts into a single national front and, together with the progressive forces of Anglo-Afrikaners, Indians, and Coloured, to liquidate racial discrimination and obtain political rights equal with those of the Europeans.

Narodi Afriki, published in December 1954, still repeats the Lenin-Stalinist view that the national bourgeoisie is an unreliable element in the national liberation movement because sooner or later it comes to terms with imperialism. Thus, Dr Nkrumah's first C.P.P. Government is described as 'a screen covering up the real domination of English imperialism'—parallel to the 1949 strictures on Mr Nehru: 'Nehru's demagogy assisted Congress to a significant extent to blunt the vigilance of even the more politically sophisticated Indian working class'.[1] In the Bantu study (a year later), the author (who was an important contributor to the previous volume) states that colonial peoples may reach national independence by different routes and clothe it in different forms. He concludes that in the case of the Bantu it is by socialism that salvation must come, but he does so not on *a priori* grounds, but

[1] *Krizis Kolonialnoi Sistemy-Natsionalno-Osvoboditelnaia Borba Narodov Vostochnoi Azii* ('The Struggle for National Liberation among the Peoples of East Asia'), Academy of Sciences, Pacific Institute, Moscow, 1949.

on the ground that in the special economic circumstances of the South African Union a large and comparatively long-established working class has been created, while the indigenous bourgeoisie has on the contrary been kept artificially small.

As stated above, in practical politics, the change of attitude has been manifested in Asia and in the Near East, and, in a modest and exploratory way, in Africa. The most succinct summary of the new tactics was given by Mr Shepilov at the twentieth Party Congress last February. He said:

> Communists on principle oppose sectarian narrowness and limitations. They want to see the efforts of all kinds and all shades of contemporary mass movements join into one anti-imperialist stream. In the struggle against oppression, against colonialism, in the struggle for peace and democracy the great aspirations of all oppressed peoples will find their fulfilment, be they the peoples of Arab, Asian, or Latin-American countries, of all workers, be they Catholics or Protestants, Buddhists or Muslims.

The most spectacular developments of Soviet relations with a country on the African continent have of course been those with Egypt,[1] but a list of the more modest dealings with the other independent states of Africa adds up to a quite impressive total. In Libya diplomatic relations were established in September 1955, and a mission headed by an Oriental expert was set up in Tripoli in January. This was in spite of extremely uncomplimentary comments on King Idris made in 1953 [2] An exchange of personal courtesies between Marshal Bulganin and the Emperor of Ethiopia in February 1956 was followed by the promotion in June of the two legations to the status of Embassies.[3] In the Sudan, prior to independence, Communist activity concentrated for about two years on trying to gain a hold on the trade unions. It then tried to create a national front, and, with the imminence of independence, changed to activity in legal elections. An economic mission in June 1955 brought offers of technical assistance, and when independence was introduced diplomatic relations were established very promptly in January 1956. The Sudan Minister of Trade visited Moscow in May.

In Liberia, a delegation led by the Chairman of the Supreme

[1] See *The World Today*, December 1955

[2] *Imperialisticheskaya Borba za Afriku i Osvoboditelnoe Dvizhenie Narodov* ('The Imperialist Struggle for Africa, and the Liberation Movement of Peoples'), Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1953.

[3] It is noteworthy that the only photograph of a hospital in *Narodi Afriki* is that of the Russian Red Cross hospital in Addis Ababa opened in 1896.

Soviet visited Monrovia in February 1956 on the occasion of the inauguration of President Tubman for his new term of office. This was followed by the establishment of diplomatic relations between the two countries, based on 'equality, non-interference, and non-aggression'. This cordiality again is at variance with the description given in *Sovietskaia Etnografia* in 1953 of the 'True Whig Party' as being entirely undemocratic and maintaining itself by force of arms. In April 1956 official greetings telegrams were sent to the Sultan of Morocco and to the Bey of Tunis on the proclamation of independence, and *Pravda* featured descriptive articles on the two new independent States.

In the Commonwealth territories and in French West and Equatorial Africa the abortive or the merely ineffectual attempts to work through the Communist Parties of the metropolitan countries have given place to activity through the W.F.T.U., fellow-traveller youth and women's organizations, and peace pledges. The W.F.T.U. has had a checkered history in the Magrib, in French West Africa, and in Nigeria and the Gold Coast. One of its objects was to stop indigenous trade unions from succumbing to the 'execrable traditions of English trade unionism', with which the English administration was said to be imbuing them, since 'trade union advisers try to keep the labour and trade union movement away from the struggle for democracy and freedom, and to limit its activities to the struggle for economic reforms.'[1] The W.F.T.U.'s recent 'new look' is to advocate co-operation between all labour organizations on the basis of a struggle for national independence.

The women's and youth organizations concentrate on public relations. Though they share the tendency of nearly all such bodies to make the most of small successes, they nevertheless have a steady trickle of delegates from Africa at conferences and rallies. These are photographed and displayed as illustrations of hearty race relations. On the International Children's Day in Moscow on 1 June 1956 delegates came from the Madagascar Teachers' Union, from the Ivory Coast, and from Senegal. At a mass meeting a delegate stated that children in 'colonial territories' work twelve to fourteen hours a day. A Communist Party proper exists in Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Egypt, and the Sudan, and one existed formerly in the Union of South Africa. When the latter was banned in 1950 it was claimed that many of its members

[1] *Narodi Afriki, op. cit.*

transferred to the Africa National Congress thereby invigorating the latter and checking 'anti-white' nationalism in favour of the partnership of Bantu and European in the struggle for socialism.

What exactly does Mr Shepilov's 'one anti-imperialist stream' mean and what is the object of it? In practice, of late it has meant an unflagging campaign against the Baghdad Pact and against N.A.T.O. bases. Adherence to the Pact, or the toleration of American bases, are represented as returns to colonialism or as the new imperialism. Africa, in power strategy, is regarded on the one hand as the potential weak link in the West's psychological front (reminiscent a little of Imperial Germany's view of Russia in 1917), and on the other as a potential strategic base and source of nuclear raw material for the West. Even a tentative answer is thus bound up with the overall question of peaceful co-existence and of easing tension. There is as yet no sign that the new leaders in the U.S.S.R. wish to assess honestly African problems, that they are prepared to give honour where honour is due, and that they have decided to abandon out-of-date efforts to animate the imperialist bogy. They have certainly changed their tactics and they have very substantially increased their knowledge, both of which are likely to put them into a stronger rather than into a weaker position in anything they may decide to undertake. The story of the Kalmyks, the Chechens, West Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and several other minorities in the U.S.S.R., as well as of the scores of thousands of Bashkirs, Tatars, and Chuvash who were transported merely through the exigencies of Soviet economic planning, will take many years to live down. Bearing such things in mind, it is wise to take notice of a cloud even though it is as yet no bigger than a man's hand.

M. H.

Italy Today

A Political Balance-Sheet

LAST June the Italian Republic, established by popular referendum after the war, celebrated its tenth anniversary. A few weeks later the present coalition Government under Signor Antonio Segni reached the end of its first year in office. These two events

may provide the starting point for some stocktaking of the Italian political scene while the summer pause provides a breathing space from its normal feverish activity.

If the Republic's tenth anniversary celebrations attracted little attention in Italy, this is not necessarily to be taken as a measure of the Republic's success and stability. Italians, indeed, appear by now to take the new form of their State largely as a matter of course. While the Republic arouses no transports of enthusiasm, neither is there much vocal opposition to it. There are still, of course, some who are nostalgic for the old regime: for Fascism a dwindling number, divided among themselves by internal dissensions; for the monarchy a larger proportion, also much divided but to be found among more varied strata of the population. Convinced monarchists, indeed, will tell you that if the referendum of 2 June 1946 were to be taken again today the result would be very different. But there is a good deal of wish-fulfilment about such an opinion which is not borne out by the figures polled in recent elections by the two avowedly monarchist political parties. A hankering for the panoply and prestige associated with monarchy, and a lively interest in the doings of the House of Savoy, is still widespread, especially in the South. But such sentiments afford an outlet for the Italian propensity to criticize the existing regime, whatever it may be; and it is a long and not very probable step from there to taking any positive action towards a restoration of the monarchy. Moreover, ex-King Umberto, now in exile in Portugal, has behaved throughout with great correctness and has given scant encouragement to the hotheads among his followers in Italy.

But criticism of the young Republic is not confined to those who disagree with it on principle. Critics from the Left, proclaiming themselves ardent Republicans, also find plenty to blame in the present regime, if from a quite different angle from that of their fellow-carpers among the monarchists and Fascists. These Left-wing critics declare that the Republic is yet only half-completed, that several important requirements of the 1948 Constitution still remain unfulfilled, and that, far from being truly democratic, the spirit of monopoly is rife in government no less than in industry. They maintain, in effect, that government is becoming an increasingly closed circle, running the country for the benefit of the ruling classes whose personal interests are involved and, while paying lip-service to democracy, doing little for the impoverished masses.

The visitor to Italy certainly does not receive the impression of a country seething with discontent or struggling against overwhelming economic odds. On the contrary, to anyone who recalls the Italy of ten years ago the visible signs of material progress are impressive. War damage has been made good, roads have greatly improved, new blocks of flats are rising everywhere—true, too many of them still of the luxury type, especially in Rome, but also many of the State-aided *case popolari* destined for workers. Leaving aside the magnificent display in certain shops of Rome and Milan which cater mainly for the visitor, the ordinary stores are full of attractive and reasonably-priced goods, cafés and cinemas are crowded, and if a car is still something of a luxury, its junior substitute the motor-scooter is ubiquitous—and scooters, though cheap to run, cost 150,000 lire to buy. True, those hall-marks of prosperity by British standards, the refrigerator, the washing-machine, and the television set, are still comparatively rare. But the first two offer fewer attractions in a country where domestic service is still available to make the habits of home-laundering and daily marketing still practicable; while television, if relatively infrequent in private homes, has invaded the cafés and restaurants and swept the country with the 'lascia o radoppia' (double or quit) craze.

These may seem to be superficial impressions of well-being, drawn from the more prosperous towns or tourist centres of the North. But moving further South the sense of progress and vitality remains the same, even though the point of departure was more primitive and the standards are therefore still much lower. In the past six years, since the Government-sponsored long-term plan for development of the South came into action, a vast programme of public works has been undertaken there which should lay the foundations for a radical improvement of living conditions in this hitherto backward and neglected region. New roads are being constructed and old ones improved, aqueducts and dams are being built, land reform and land improvement are providing smallholdings for the agricultural day-labourer, and new villages are arising where the peasant can be given a good house near his holding instead of living in overcrowded conditions in a township miles away from it.

All this, coupled with the steady improvement in industrial and agricultural production and advances in foreign trade, adds up to no mean achievement. The question then arises, how far are the

criticisms mentioned earlier in this article justified, and to what extent are they confined to extremist circles?

THE SEGNI GOVERNMENT AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY

Criticism of the Government in Italy today means, in practice, criticism of the Christian Democrat party. For although except for two brief periods all the post-war Italian Governments have been coalitions, ever since the eviction of the Left-wing parties in 1947 they have been coalitions built around the predominantly powerful Christian Democrat party. The sharing of governmental responsibility between the Catholic Christian Democrats and the secular democratic forces—represented by the Social Democrats, Liberals, and Republicans—was the cherished ideal of Signor De Gasperi, the statesman who dominated Italian post-war politics until shortly before his death in 1954. But even before that date acute stresses and strains in the four-party combination had become apparent, and some measure of popular disillusionment about the Centre coalition's administration was also shown in its parties' diminished poll in the General Election of 1953.

After that Election some serious stocktaking went on among the coalition parties. At the Christian Democrats' Naples Congress, in particular, the party's left-wing forces made themselves felt much more strongly than hitherto. New stress was laid on the need for social reform—for land reform, better housing, development of the South, and measures to alleviate unemployment—and the trend then established has influenced Christian Democrat policy throughout the intervening years.

After the brief interlude of Signor Pella's single-party Christian Democrat Government in the autumn of 1953, which had to weather the Trieste crisis, the Centre coalition was again revived under Signor Scelba and continued last year under his successor Signor Antonio Segni, the present Prime Minister. The mathematics of the party situation after the 1953 Election made this choice almost inevitable, for the Christian Democrats were still the largest party, yet they no longer commanded a sufficient majority to govern without allies. But by now something of the original conviction about the intrinsic value of such a Catholic-secular collaboration seemed to have evaporated: though some few politicians, adhering to Signor De Gasperi's ideals, still regarded the *quadripartito*—the formula for the four Centre parties—as a worthwhile aim in itself, to many it had come to seem merely a tiresome

necessity to be endured until the next Election should bring some change in the relative positions of the parties.

This dwindling of enthusiasm for collaboration between the country's great Catholic party and its secular associates is in a sense not surprising when one examines the nature of the Christian Democrat party itself. As the one avowedly confessional party, it draws allegiance from the most varied strata of the population, from the reactionary Southern landowner to the progressive-minded Catholic trade unionist or the simplest peasant. However strongly the party may disclaim direct association with the Vatican, this is, inevitably, the party that the Church exhorts its followers to support; and the secular members in any coalition with it must abide by the consequences. Moreover to many Catholic politicians, brought up in the rigid integralist school, genuine collaboration with lay forces still appears well nigh impossible. Their whole training is against it, their approach too different to allow of the necessary compromises. Yet it is from such a background that some of the most socially-minded of the left-wing Christian Democrat politicians have come: men believing profoundly in social reform, yet almost unable to envisage its being carried out under other than Catholic auspices. Such a man was Giuseppe Dossetti, leader some six or seven years ago of the *Cronache Sociali* group, with leanings towards a paternalistic Christian Socialism: he found himself unable to make the compromises required by the party political situation, and withdrew from politics in 1951, to make a brief return in the municipal elections of last June when he unsuccessfully contested for the Christian Democrat cause the traditionally Communist town of Bologna.

Such a man, too, as far as background is concerned, is Signor Amintore Fanfani, since 1954 Secretary of the Christian Democrat party. Signor Fanfani's approach has been a good deal more realistic than Dossetti's, and the improvement in Christian Democrat fortunes, first discernible in the results of the Sicilian Regional elections last year and maintained in this year's municipal elections, is in no small measure due to his untiring energy and drive. Under his aegis much more trouble has been taken to make his party's aims known in out-of-the-way districts, and the quality of the party press has improved. He has been firm in keeping social reform measures to the forefront and in checking the attempts of the party's right wing to soft-pedal them. From time

to time, too, he prolcaims his continued devotion to the *quadripartito* ideal. But if he gives no ground to the Right, neither will he make concessions to the Left. One suspects that he remains at heart a man of his background, still hoping that the day will come for the single-party Christian Democrat Government which he himself failed to bring into being in 1954.

THE 'OPENING TO THE LEFT'

For here we come to the crux of the matter. Probably most of the Christian Democrats would prefer, if they had the requisite majority in Parliament, to govern alone. They are tired of the endless compromises needed to keep together the present coalition; and doubtless their secular allies are just as tired of the constant adjustments and struggles which their partnership with Christian Democracy entails. Yet if the *quadripartito* is thrown overboard, what is the alternative?

With the extreme Right-wing party, the neo-Fascist *Movimento Sociale Italiano*, there has never been any question of collaboration. And the other Right-wing forces, the monarchists, now split into two parties, have been losing strength and at present can offer too little additional support to compensate for the obvious political drawbacks that would attend Christian Democrat collaboration with them. The only remaining possibility therefore appears to be a move towards the Left.

Ever since the Election of 1953 there has been talk of a possible 'opening to the Left'—an *apertura a sinistra*—which would tend towards a *rapprochement* between the Centre parties and the left-wing, or Nenni, Socialist Party.[1] Signor Nenni has repeatedly put out feelers in this direction, without, however, till recently, making any avowal on the all-important question of his party's relationship to the Communist Party, with which it has been in close collaboration for many years. The respective reactions of the Communist and Socialist leaders to the publication of the Khrushchev report,[2] coupled with the dissolution of the Cominform, raised afresh the whole question of this relationship and its implications for other parties. Signor Togliatti spoke of the need for

[1] It will be recalled that since 1947 there have been two separate Socialist parties in Italy: the Left-wing Partito Socialista Italiano, under Signor Nenni, and the Right-wing Social Democrats, or P.S.D.I., under Signor Saragat

[2] See Togliatti's interview published in *Nuovi Argomenti* (May-June 1956) and reproduced in *Unità* (17 June 1956), and Nenni's article in *Mondo Operaio* and *Avanti* (24 June 1956).

'ever-increasing autonomy of judgment' among Communist parties outside Russia. This view Signor Nenni described as 'quite a new factor'. More explicit than Togliatti in deploring his party's past failure to 'condemn certain elements in the Soviet Communist dictatorship', he emphasized the possibility of 'achieving socialism through the agreement of the majority': the Socialist party must show its democratic character 'not so much in declarations of principle as in the practical solutions we offer to specific problems'.

The municipal elections, held throughout the country on 27 May, took place before the two Left-wing leaders had thus publicly made their professions of faith in relation to the Khrushchev report. But they were held under the shadow of the new ferment within the Left-wing parties consequent on the revelations made at the Soviet Communist Party's Twentieth Congress in Moscow. There was a feeling in the air that if control was being relaxed in Moscow this would inevitably have repercussions on the Communist Party in Italy and, perhaps even more important, on the hitherto fellow-travelling Socialist Party. It was known that the Communist Party, leaders and rank and file alike, had been thrown into confusion by the strictures of the Khrushchev report on articles of faith till now held sacrosanct.[1] Might not this confusion, and the possible relaxation of the close bonds between the Italian Communist Party and Moscow, provide the occasion for a loosening of the ties binding Signor Nenni's Socialists to the Communists?

It was thus in a new mood of open-mindedness about the future that Italian voters went to the polls last May—nominally, indeed, to vote merely for provincial and communal administrative bodies, or *Giunte*, but the political aspect of these elections was heightened, not only because they afforded the first trial of strength between the parties since 1953, but also because of the new factors in the international situation.

The results, while they showed no spectacular changes in the party positions since 1953, indicated a slight but definite swing towards the centre-left, stopping short, however, of the Communist Party. The Christian Democrats gained some votes from the Right but at the same time lost some to the Left. The Communists sustained losses, though not heavy ones (amounting to

[1] For a valuable commentary on this subject see 'The Crisis in Italian Communism', by Riccardo Aragno, in *The Listener*, 2 August 1956

0·6 per cent of the total votes in communes of over 10,000 inhabitants). The parties that improved their positions as a result of these losses were the Socialists and the Social Democrats. It is particularly interesting in this connexion to compare the Left-wing parties' polls in the provincial and the communal elections. In the provincial elections the Communist and Socialist parties presented joint lists. They sustained a loss of 1·6 per cent of the total votes, while the Social Democrats gained 2·8 per cent. In the elections in communes of over 10,000 inhabitants, on the other hand, where voting was by the proportional representation method but on independent lists, the Communists lost 0·6 per cent while the Socialists gained 2·3 and the Social Democrats 0·5 per cent. These figures would seem to show that quite a number of people were unwilling to vote for the Socialists when in combination with the Communist Party (as in the provincial elections) and voted instead for the Social Democrats; whereas when the Socialist Party stood alone, in the communal elections, it made appreciable gains at Communist expense and no longer suffered a draining-away of votes to the Social Democrats.

Socialists and Social Democrats alike seized on this improvement in their positions to raise anew the question of Socialist reunification; and the Socialists urged their right to play a greater part in government. It was a commonplace of post-war Italian politics, they argued, that what Italy chiefly lacked was a strong Socialist party. It was the absence of such a party that was rapidly forcing the country to a division between the two major forces of 'clericalism' and Communism. The Socialists proclaimed that the idea of a 'third force' of non-Marxist democratic parties had proved bankrupt; the Social Democrats had been mistaken all along in breaking away in 1947 from the main body of the Socialist Party because of its close association with the Communists and in believing that they, with the Liberals and Republicans, could create such a force. The time had now come to repair the damage. Yet Signor Nenni still made no explicit disavowal of the Communist alliance. True, he went so far as to say that there was 'no sense in raising now the question of the 1946 pact of united action,[1] which, in itself, is merely a document of the history of the working class movement'; but he added that, though the forms of joint policy

[1] This was the post-war pact between the Communists and Socialists providing for co-ordination of joint decisions on all problems and at all levels; it revived an earlier similar pact of 1934, concluded between the parties' leaders in exile.

had differed and would differ from time to time, it was useless 'to ask us to look for artificial motives of polemics or rupture,' or to accept the principle of discrimination *vis-à-vis* the Communist Party.'[1]

Signor Nenni's advances towards his former Socialist comrades in the Social Democrat ranks were, in fact, still hedged around with extreme caution; and he himself, moreover, is believed to be still well in advance of the main body of his party in envisaging the possibility of collaboration between the two Socialist parties. It is therefore not surprising that efforts towards this end once again bore little fruit. On 6 June Signor Nenni and Signor Luzzato met the Social Democrat party Secretary Signor Matteo Matteotti and another Social Democrat representative to discuss the possibility of collaboration between their parties, especially in the post-election formation of local *Giunte*, or administrative bodies. This was the first official meeting between the two factions since the split of 1947; but it reached no conclusion, and the Social Democrat leader Signor Saragat, who happened to be absent from Rome at the time, subsequently deplored the meeting as over-precipitate.

If the Socialist parties were unable to reach a decision even on collaboration in the formation of local *Giunte*, the wider question of how these *Giunte* were to be formed also offered considerable difficulties in many localities. Naturally, where the elections had produced a clear majority for one particular party or group of parties no problem arose; but this was far from being the case in many places, including such important towns as Florence, Turin, Trieste, and Milan. While the Socialists urged their right to increased representation, Signor Fanfani continued to veto Christian Democrat collaboration with the Socialists even on this purely administrative plane, and the search for a compromise solution dragged on throughout the summer in many communes; in Milan the decision even had to be postponed till September.

THE SEGNI GOVERNMENT'S ACHIEVEMENTS

Thus on the political side, though the Christian Democrats have on the whole maintained their position during the past year, it has not been easy going; and though outside circumstances may seem to have created a climate in which an 'opening to the Left' might appear more possible, the internal obstacles to it seem to be as great as ever. And, as has been said, the Christian Democrats

[1] *Avanti*, 8 June 1956.

would have little to gain, and a good deal to lose, from an alliance with the Right. So it looks as if they and their lay allies were destined, after all, to remain in uneasy partnership until the next General Election, which must in any case be held by 1958.

But though the Left accuses Signor Segni's Government, no less than its predecessor, of 'immobilismo', it has in fact gone a long way towards fulfilling its electoral promises during the past year.

One of those promises concerned the still existing gaps in the provisions of the Constitution. The most important of these lacunae was the Constitutional Court, which was to decide on the constitutional character of laws. This body was at last inaugurated in April and has already adjudicated on several cases, while the law establishing the National Council for Economy and Labour, also provided for in the Constitution, has now been passed by the Chamber and will come before the Senate in the autumn.

In internal affairs, a new electoral law was passed before the administrative elections, to take the place of the bitterly criticized 'legge truffa' of 1953. On the economic side, the important and controversial law governing the development of sub-soil deposits, including oil and natural gas, was passed by the Chamber in July and will go to the Senate in the autumn. This law provides for the granting of concessions, on a royalty basis, to foreign companies, while safeguarding the existing rights of the State-controlled company (E.N.I.) in the Po Valley. The significance of this Bill has increased since the discovery of oil sources in the Abruzzi early last year; and its passing will, incidentally, remove the present anomaly between Italian and Sicilian law in this matter—for under Sicilian Regional law oil prospecting and development is now freely permitted and has for some time been successfully carried on by foreign companies. Another recent law improves conditions for foreign investors, making it easier for them to take their profits out of the country.

The Cabinet at its last session before the summer recess decided on further measures to consolidate the development of the South. Following on the preliminary phase of the past six years, with its main emphasis on public works, a new stage is now beginning, with the stress on productive investment. Greater efforts will be made to establish local industries which will provide permanent employment. At the same time, in addition to the continuance of the land reform programme, private owners are to be encouraged

and assisted to carry out improvements on their own land. The life of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, the State fund and organization through which all these works of Southern development are carried out, is to be prolonged from its original twelve years to fifteen (i.e. till 1966), and an additional 590 milliard lire has been voted for this purpose, bringing the fund's total up to 1,870 milliard lire.

This fresh provision in aid of the South goes hand in hand with the intention to launch a part of the Vanoni Plan for the development of national income and employment. This scheme, first announced early last year, had been rather put into cold storage since the unhappy death last February of its originator, the former Budget Minister Signor Ezio Vanoni. Signor Segni now intends its revival to be the keynote of his programme for the coming year. With its aim of raising investment in all sectors of the economy and thus providing 4 million new jobs over the next ten years it can command widespread political support—even Signor Nenni regards it as 'common ground' between his party and the Centre. It tackles one of the most fundamental of Italian problems—that of unemployment; and if Signor Segni's Government can set this plan on the road towards accomplishment it may, indeed, win his party votes, but it should also provide for a much more stable and contented populace in the future.

M. K. G.

The International Student Conference

Six Years of the Free Student Movement

THE new University of Ceylon buildings at Peradeniya will be the scene of a ten-day meeting starting on 11 September, which may well become a 'ten days that shook the world', or at any rate the student world. This sixth International Student Conference will be the first world student conference to be held in Asia and for the first time in student politics the bulk of the representation will be from outside Europe and North America.

The history of the International Student Conference, or I.S.C.

for short, is a relatively brief one, a mere six years. But its growth is epitomized by the growth in the numbers of its supporters. At the first conference in Stockholm just before the Christmas of 1950 there were twenty-one national student unions present. At last year's conference in Birmingham the number had risen to fifty-two national unions. The figure for the Peradeniya Conference is expected to be between fifty-five and sixty unions.

The initial impetus in the formation of the I.S.C. came from dissatisfaction with the increasingly Communist-dominated International Union of Students (I.U.S.), which had been founded in 1946. The second World Student Congress of this organization was held in Prague in August 1950. By that time the political line of the I.U.S. had already driven away most of its non-Communist supporters.[1] The violent anti-Western demonstrations which typified the Prague Congress convinced the main non-Communist national delegations present that the I.U.S. by its very nature was incapable of offering the kind of impartial international student co-operation that was needed.

So, on the init ative of the three Scandinavian national student unions, a five-day meeting was convened in Stockholm in December 1950 to discuss the situation. It was attended by representatives of twenty Western national unions. Those taking part were very clear on one point. They did not want to set up yet another kind of international student union which would merely become an anti-Communist rival of the I.U.S. The belief was held then, as now, that for students at least there can be only one world.

The Stockholm meeting was in many ways little more than a talking shop. There was not much money available. All-night efforts on the part of students (and students' wives) kept a surprisingly efficient translation and documentation service going in English and French. The main result was the launching of a Student Mutual Assistance Plan. For a year or two after this the word 'Smap' was part of the international student glossary. It has dropped out now, but only because it has been overtaken by events Student Mutual Assistance is today a fact, not a scheme for discussion.

At Stockholm a principle was laid down, which is still the main feature today. Since there was no intention to set up a rival inter-

[1] In *The World Today*, August 1951, an article on 'Students in World Politics' discussed the growth and decline of the I.U S. The present article may be considered as a logical continuation of that study

national organization, but simply to provide a platform for practical and non-political student discussions, each conference should be an entity in itself. Its life would end with the closing crash of the chairman's gavel. The ashes of Stockholm were entrusted to the Scottish Union of Students. It was their job to see that the phoenix of a second conference should arise a year later.

The second International Student Conference was held in Edinburgh early in 1952. Some thirty unions turned up this time and, unlike Stockholm, the debates went on into the small hours of the morning. Edinburgh, like Stockholm, delegated various study programmes, and other assignments on such practical matters as student travel, scholarships, books, and co-operation with colonial students, to national unions who volunteered to do the work. As at Stockholm, anything savouring of politics in any shape or form was strictly forbidden. The I.S.C. was only concerned with practical matters and intended to remain so.

By this time the International Student Conference was beginning to become both a costly and a cumbersome apparatus to run by such a diversified method. The Edinburgh Conference, despite all the outside help and the contributions received from delegations, still found the host union £250 in the red. And so ways and means were sought to get more contributions from various sources and to establish some sort of technical co-ordinating administration.

With the help of the Netherlands Student Council a small block of offices was taken over and later in 1952 a very modest Co-ordinating Secretariat of National Unions of Students was set up in the old university town of Leiden. Cosec, as it was immediately christened, established itself there as one of the main international features of Leiden university life. Today it still occupies the same block. It has moved into two or three more rooms and its staff has grown to a dozen from the original three—surely one of the smallest international secretariats known!

The first task of Cosec was to prepare for the third I.S.C. held in Copenhagen in 1953. This was followed by the Istanbul Conference in 1954 and the Birmingham Conference in July 1955. Over the period of these three conferences the character of the I.S.C. went through two major changes.

Previously, the conferences had debated subjects and ideas. Now the emphasis was shifted from mere talking points to actual projects. The first stage was occupied with arguing about the

things that would be done. By a logical development the second stage of doing things came about after the establishment of Cosec. An *Information Bulletin* and a general publications service were established. Support—at times critical—was given to a multi-language news-sheet *Student Mirror*, published in West Berlin and sent to a large number of local and national student organizations all over the world. Whereas the *Bulletin* was strictly official, the *Mirror* was rather less inhibited and more lively. Conferences of student journalists were organized, and other student specialists were brought together either in working conferences or in seminars. This is the pattern that still prevails today.

In addition to these 'continuing' projects, there are others of a more particular kind. In 1954, for instance, an international student delegation toured university and student centres in North, West, and East Africa. The tour lasted three months and the necessary grant came from the Foundation for Youth and Student Affairs. At the end of 1955 a second international goodwill tour spent four months and travelled 45,000 miles going around South-East Asia. In return there have been similar tours of Europe by delegations of student editors from Asia, Africa, and Latin America and more recently by student leaders from African colleges.

Such are the nature of the practical projects laid down by the respective conferences since the formation of Cosec. Before this such schemes would have been impossible for lack of the necessary organization and apparatus.

The second change is the partial abandonment of the original non-political rule. So long as the major supporters of the conference were European in origin, such matters as discrimination usually had no direct bearing. With student unions from Asia, Africa, and Latin America coming along in greater numbers these matters became very important. There was *apartheid* in South Africa, Peronist suppression in Argentina, student imprisonments in Eastern Germany, and general dictatorship in other countries.

So the main task of the Istanbul Conference was to do some re-thinking and to thrash out definite 'principles of co-operation', as the resolution was eventually called. The wording of the resolution, reaffirmed last year by the Birmingham Conference, was very carefully worked out in closed commission and open debate and is probably the most important of all the conference

resolutions, since it governs conference relationships and decisions.

The original principles were laid down at Edinburgh, stating the basis of co-operation to be (*a*) practical, (*b*) voluntary, and (*c*) to exclude all forms of discrimination and be devoid of any kind of partisan policy. To this the Istanbul Conference added the recognition of 'the varying economic, social, and political circumstances in different parts of the world', with the consequent need to base international student co-operation 'on a common understanding of and concern for the problems facing students in all parts of the world'. Furthermore, 'although problems of students in colonial, totalitarian, and newly independent countries are often political problems, they are no less practical for students in these areas and form the chief barriers to the attainment of a full and democratic education.'

Therefore the Conference decided that it should discuss such matters provided they concerned 'students as such', that any decision should be non-partisan, and that 'any problem raised shall not involve conflicts between two sovereign States'. In general such questions could only be considered 'if adequate documentation is made available to the Conference'. Lastly, the implementation of any decisions made by the Conference on such matters 'must generally be made by national unions themselves', with each national union deciding on its own policy and action.

To ensure non-partisan investigation of any cases of discrimination brought before the Conference a Research and Investigation Commission was set up at Istanbul and is selected yearly by a Supervision Committee. This sifts the evidence presented on a particular issue and publishes its findings. On the basis of these findings and further debate the Conference decides on its conclusions and any actions recommended.

At Birmingham, for instance, the Commission reported on South Africa, Eastern Germany, and Argentina. In all these cases the Commission tried to send investigation teams to look into the alleged discriminations. At that time, in 1955, the South African Government refused the necessary visas. The overthrow of the Peronista regime rendered action on Argentina unnecessary, but the I.S.C.'s concern on this issue gave Argentine students a sense of 'belonging' to the world. Today they are among the I.S.C.'s strongest supporters.

Visas were applied for to go to Eastern Germany, but so far there has been no success. This summer, on the other hand, South

African visas were granted, and a Commission report on *apartheid* will be considered at Peradeniya. Also this summer an investigation team has been to Paraguay and Venezuela, two new countries for discussion at the Ceylon Conference.

Since each Conference is only a law unto itself, there is the danger that the Cosec machine and the three main paid officials might control the Conference organization. This possibility is taken care of by the Supervision Committee, elected by each Conference from among its members for the coming year. This Committee meets regularly and keeps a check on the Cosec work.

All in all, the International Student Conferences and their Co-ordinating Secretariat operate with a minimum of committees. Each Conference lasts about ten days and no definite agenda is fixed in advance, other than the normal reports on the past year's work. Each Conference decides on its own agenda and standing orders. Each Conference decides for itself how much of the work it will endorse and carry forward.

Many of the discussions from year to year tend to repeat themselves and to overlap, but it must be remembered that the general student population is a rapidly changing one, with new student generations emerging every three or four years At each Conference there is a nucleus of relative old-timers, but the majority of delegates just make a single appearance and then pass on into the wider world.

Of course, affairs do not always run smoothly. Fine resolutions may be passed, but national and other interests often clash. The question of discrimination in South Africa was a major subject at Birmingham, for instance. But equally thorny was the discrimination exercised by the Union Générale des Etudiants tunisiens (U.G.E.T.), which at the time did not admit French Europeans to its ranks. For this reason it was then refused delegate status. Later the U.G.E.T. charter was amended to remove this discrimination, so there is now no reason why the organization should not be a full delegate at Peradeniya.

The question of representation at the Conferences brings up another important aspect of their character. There is no such status as 'membership' of the International Student Conference or of the Co-ordinating Secretariat. Unions take part in the Conferences, support the various activities, and are 'associated with' Cosec. Unlike the International Union of Students, the I.S.C. does not claim to speak in the name of so many hundred thousand students;

it merely brings together on a common platform fifty or sixty national unions out of a world total of about seventy-five such unions.[1]

Bringing these unions together on a common platform on student co-operation also means that the Conference tends to be supra-political. It is, in effect, a bloc to itself, a student bloc which embraces the Communism of Yugoslavia, the 'capitalism' of Western Europe and America, and the neutralism of Asia.

The 'new boys' expected at Peradeniya include Liberia, Morocco, and Greece, where national unions have been formed recently. The dozen or so countries remaining outside the ranks of the I.S.C. either have no national student unions (as is the case, for example, with Jordan and Iraq) or their unions support the International Union of Students. These latter are mostly from Communist China, the U.S.S.R., and Eastern Europe.

This is not to say that these Communist countries are banned from the I.S.C. On the contrary, the Conference is open to all National Unions of Students which fulfil the Conference requirements.[2] Irrespective of iron or other curtains, invitations are sent out every year by Cosec. It is up to each Conference to decide whether or not delegate status should be given to a union, or to a National Delegation where no national union exists.

In fact, the I.S.C. takes active steps to see that as many as possible turn up. A few weeks ago, for instance, the senior administrative officer of Cosec visited Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary to see if they were prepared to send delegations to Peradeniya, even though they had not accepted previous invitations. Visas to make similar visits to the U.S.S.R. and Rumania were refused by the respective authorities. Any absentees from the Iron Curtain countries are solely due to their own refusals. Yugo-

[1] The present list of 'national unions of students associated with the Co-ordinating Secretariat' covers the following countries Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, East Africa, El Salvador, England, Wales and Northern Ireland, Finland, France, Germany, Gold Coast, Guatemala, Honduras, Hongkong, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Malaya, Malta, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Saar, Scotland, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the U S A , Uruguay, Vietnam, West Indies, and Yugoslavia.

[2] 'A National Union of Students shall be an organization whose membership is composed only of individuals engaged in study at universities and institutes of higher education in any territory . . whose function it is to represent the interests of these individuals and whose executive body is freely elected by the students, provided that such an organization is either the only one . . claiming to exercise the above function or that, if there be more than one, it exercises this function on behalf of the majority of the above individuals '

slavia apart, no Communist country has yet attended an I.S.C. meeting.[1]

What is the International Union of Students doing about this? In the last five years it has lost its major supporters from the non-Communist world, though one or two unions have taken advantage of its offer of a category of semi-membership, which in theory permits of practical activities without accepting any political line. This membership is in fact meaningless, since such a situation has in fact existed since the Prague Congress.

In the past the I.U.S. did all it could to misrepresent the I.S.C. Now it has changed its line and speaks in terms of 'unity' and 'co-operation' between the supporters of the two bodies. So far this talk has led no further, for, after all, the I.S.C. itself now represents co-operation between some three-quarters of the national unions. The I.U.S. now speaks for nothing but a minority rump.

Whether the I.U.S. and its ruling forces will decide to cut their losses and concentrate on infiltration and wrecking the I.S.C. from within remains to be seen. Given the lessons of the recent past, the I.S.C. will not be a willing target for intrigue.

The agenda for the September Conference will open with the discussion on the Credentials Committee Report and the reports of the various other committees. From such formal beginnings there will develop many a heated moment, some on familiar issues, some new. But in addition the International Student Conference will find itself with an important organizational problem that it has not had to face before. Two of the three senior full-time officials helped to start Cosec four years ago. They have worked to build it up over these years. They have been its structural mainstays. Now they feel it is time to retire from the student world. The Peradeniya Conference will have to decide on their successors. And that will be no easy matter, for the administration of international student affairs is a specialized matter—and such experienced specialists are becoming increasingly difficult to find. The future of the International Student Conferences and their Co-ordinating Secretariat will be governed to no small extent by the qualities of the administrative succession.

J. C.

[1] The I.U.S. representatives at an I.S.C.-sponsored Student Press Conference, held in Tunis from 25 to 30 July, said that they did not think representatives from Eastern European countries would attend the Peradeniya Conference because exiled student bodies would be present, because a Birmingham Conference resolution had referred to dictatorships in 'some parts of Europe', and because they might be refused status because of the 'truly-elected' clause.

Education in Malaya

MALAYA presents one of the most remarkable educational problems ever to confront any Government. The essence of the problem is that 50 per cent of the population are under twenty-one and 30 per cent are of school age. Moreover, there is no common language, either of instruction or of the home; and the principal medium of instruction throughout secondary and higher education is one not native to any of the communities.

There are several reasons why there is this multitude of youngsters now growing up in Malaya: the virtual elimination, under British 'colonialism', of endemic diseases; the immense rise in the standard of living which took place during the same period (Malaya now has the highest *per capita* income in the Far East); the flood of immigration from China and South India in the fifteen years before the war; and—in spite of the 'Emergency'—the more settled and hopeful conditions of life which have prevailed in Malaya during the last ten years, with vigorous expansion in agriculture and secondary industries. In any case, both the two major communities, the Malays and the Chinese, are great 'family men', are devoted to their children, and are bent on having as many of them as possible. They are also—especially the Chinese—eager to have as much education as possible for their children.

There are, of course, great differences, both politically and socially, between the two components of Malaya: the island metropolis of Singapore with its naval base and miles of docks, thriving on the entrepôt trade of half the world and nurtured in the swaddling bands of direct Colonial administration; and the wild mountainous peninsula of the Federation girdled with coastal plains of rice and rubber, its nine Malay States under Sultans in treaty with the Crown and its two ex-Colonial Settlements, Penang and Malacca, loosely knit in a common central administration. But there is little to choose between these two component parts in the intensity of the pressures on their educational facilities. Their recent advances towards self-government—cautious, calm, and generally 'on the side of the angels' in the Federation, and in Singapore partially abortive and often turbulent—have in certain ways facilitated solutions of the problems and in others jeopardized their practical achievement.

Both administrations—now Councils of elected Ministers—have this year promulgated new statements of educational policy

which have been debated in their Assemblies and await implementation in legislation. The complete break with the past which both policies represent has undoubtedly been encouraged by the imminence of independence, though the planning of the changes has been the work of officials (mainly British) throughout the 1950s. Public acceptance of the drastic changes (at any rate in the Federation) has been facilitated by the upsurge of forward-moving sentiments, and the arrival of elected Ministers of Education has given fresh impetus to the last stages of the planning; but the real instigators of the changes are the hordes of children clamouring for schooling. The reverse of the picture is the slight uncertainty, accompanying the first steps in independence, as to whether there will be the requisite discipline and self-restraint in budgetary matters to make the implementation of the plans a continuing reality.

There are 1,300,000 children in Malayan schools. There are probably another million who could do with schooling if there were places for them. If all of them were to be given places—and the buildings and the teachers and the books—the Federation would have to spend the whole of its annual revenues for several years to come, and Singapore about two-thirds of its revenues. As it is, the Federation last year spent 15 per cent of its revenues (M$120 million, or £14,125,000) on education and is intending to spend about 20 per cent over the next five years; the corresponding expenditure in Singapore is something like 12 and 18 per cent. These are strikingly high proportions, especially for relatively under-developed territories—and especially, in the case of the Federation, for a small country fighting a bitter war against terrorists in the jungle which has cost it between 25 and 33 per cent of its revenues for the past eight years.

These expenditures will not be nearly enough to provide the schooling which the populations need; but they will be enough, if they are steadily maintained over the next five years, for the structure of the educational systems to be entirely recast and for a framework to be erected within which the necessary expansion can occur.

What is being recast is so complicated as almost to defy analysis, but the crux of the matter is the linguistic complications. There are at present four languages of instruction: English, Malay, Chinese (Kuo-Yu), and Tamil. English is not the native language of any except a very small minority of the children, but it has

hitherto been the first or second language taught in all schools (except certain private Chinese schools), and it has been the sole medium of instruction in a large and much sought-after group of secondary schools, as well as in the Technical Colleges and the University of Malaya.

In future in the Federation, which has decided that Malay is to be the national language, all children will be compulsorily bilingual from the start in Malay and English, and optionally trilingual if their native language is Kuo-Yu[1] or Tamil. In Singapore all children will be taught English and their native language in their primary schools, and a third language optionally at the secondary stage. What this means from the child's point of view is that a Chinese or Indian child will have to be trilingual in the Federation and bilingual in Singapore; a Malay child will have to be bilingual in both.

In the Federation children will in future be taught in two kinds of schools only, in place of a profusion of types: independent or assisted primary, and independent or direct-grant secondary. All schools will have Boards of Governors, appointed by the Local Education Authority in the case of primary schools (which are to be administered by the newly-created L.E.A.s) and by the Minister of Education in consultation with the State Government in the case of secondary schools (which, with post-secondary institutions, are to be administered directly by the Department of Education). All schools, whatever their historical background, will in future be eligible for grants-in-aid from the Government provided they conform to the Government's educational policy. Fees will continue to be charged at all schools, but this source of revenue meets less than 10 per cent of the national cost of education. Possibly about the same proportion will in future be covered by local education rates, the balance being met either by foundation revenues or private subscriptions or by Government grants. An independent School Inspectorate on the lines of the Inspectorate in Britain is to be established, appointed by the High Commissioner (or whoever takes his place) and reporting only to the Minister, not to the Department.

Within this much-simplified structure, two profound changes

[1] Chinese experts will not need to be reminded that Kuo-Yu itself (the 'Mandarin' of public life) is seldom a 'native' language among overseas Chinese. It has to be learned in school almost as a new language by the Cantonese-speaking, the Hokkien, and the Hok-chu-framed tongues of the shopkeepers', the farmers' and rubber-tappers', and the tin-miners' children.

in teaching methods will be carried out. First, the content of syllabuses is to be common to all schools in the Federation, whatever their ownership, history, or communal connexions. The Government's statement introducing its new plans (dated 14 April 1956) said: 'One of the fundamental requirements of educational policy . . . is to orientate schools, primary and secondary, to a Malayan outlook. We consider that the way to do this is to ensure a common content in the syllabuses of all schools.'

A Malayan outlook is indeed the prime requirement of the new nation. Composed of two major racial communities so profoundly different in their social and cultural outlook as the Malays and the Chinese, a stable society can be developed only on the basis of some community of thought and feeling which transcends inherited traditions. British influence in Malaya since the war has been steadily directed towards the promotion of such a Malayan ethos, and the main objective of British policy in regard to education in Malaya has been to draw the leaders of the two communities nearer to accepting it as the predominant cultural inspiration.

It has not been easy to secure that acceptance. Both communities are strongly influenced by their inherited cultures and traditions—as strongly, for example, as the Arabs and the Jews—and both were deeply suspicious of any suggestion of a higher loyalty, particularly as an infusion in the teaching in their schools. The Chinese were the more apprehensive, since the preservation of their 'national' culture is more specifically a function of their traditional education than it is with the Malays, who look rather to the mosque and the Sultan's palace than to the school for the maintenance of their cultural traditions.

The Government in Malaya has declared time and again that it is no part of its policy in any field to undermine the cultural resources of any section of the people, but rather to build them up by bringing them more into contact with those of other people within the wider association of a national ethos.

The same fusion principle inspires the second great change now introduced in the Federation: the establishment of one professional teaching service on a unified national salary scale, with contributory pension rights and freedom of transfer from one employer to another. In future, as the Government report states:[1]

There would not be Government Teachers and non-Government

[1] Malayan Government: *Report of the Education Committee, 1956* (14 April 1956; Government Printer, Kualalumpur).

Teachers; nor would there be English School Teachers, Malay School Teachers, Chinese School Teachers, and Indian School Teachers; nor would there be Education Officers, Graduate Teachers, Normal Trained Teachers, College-Trained Teachers, Certified Teachers etc.—there would only be teachers.

The prime objective of both these major changes is to raise the standard of the 'vernacular' schools (as distinct from the 'English' schools) so that their products can gain access, more easily than they can now, to secondary schools, Technical Institutes, and Universities. ('Vernacular' and 'English' refer solely to the prime language of instruction; in all other respects the schools will be on a common bilingual footing.) The 'professionalizing' of teachers will principally affect the present cadre of vernacular teachers and raise their standards, both of employment and of efficiency, as the necessary pre-condition of raising those of their pupils. Because the greatest need of better teaching is in the Malay-language schools, it has been arranged that for the time being two out of every three teachers trained shall go to Malay schools and help them to achieve the new standards of the common primary school.

The standardizing of syllabuses is accompanied by a recasting of text books. This is to be achieved mainly through the medium of a Literature Agency, which under Government auspices is preparing not only school text books, beginning with Malay books, but also socially-useful magazines and general books. All school texts will pass the scrutiny of the Department of Education's Text Book Board. The infusion of a 'Malayan outlook' into school books and syllabuses is not a process which is susceptible of precise definition; the Government statement says simply that

> priority should be given to the Malayan aspects of each subject, and non-Malayan elements in the syllabus should only be admitted either if they are of international value or if they provide the necessary background material to the study of the Malayan aspects.

This sort of approach, which has such an ominous ring in Western European ears, is in reality unexceptionable in the far less sophisticated political conditions of the Far East, and is in any case sufficiently temperate and broad-minded even to be suspect among the highly authoritarian nationalists of the Far East.

Teacher training is, of course, the crux of the transformation. Malaya is, however, better equipped in this respect than are most under-developed countries. Apart from three training colleges for

men in the country and two for women, there is the remarkable Kirkby College at Liverpool and its new counterpart Brinsford Lodge nearby, to which 600 selected young Malayans of all communities come on Government grants from secondary schools in the Federation for two years of comprehensive training. The most striking thing about Kirkby and Brinsford, perhaps, is that they are the most effective instruments of 'Malayanization'—not, as might be thought, of the inculcation of English ideas and ways of thought. In the surroundings of English life—which, with its calm, practical, unself-centred habits, has great value for young people coming from the unstable environment of an embryonic society—the students are given a better grounding in the new Malayan ethos than they could get anywhere in their own country. Indians, Malays, Singhalese, Eurasians, Chinese, Punjabis—they come back to Malaya thinking and talking remarkably like Malayans; and the prestige of their professional training is, so far at any rate, so high as to silence any suspicions among their more traditionalist or 'nationalistic' communal compatriots.

Singapore has not developed so complete a view of the requirements of education in the new society as has the Federation. The field is tangled and difficult. The difficulties—as with so many of Singapore's problems—are not so complex as in the Federation, but they are more intense.

The privileged position which the 'English' schools held in the past, arising from the high value set on the mastery of English by a predominantly commercial community and from the fact that in the past they alone were aided and directed by Government, has been modified since the war partly by the generous scale of aid offered under the post-war Ten Years' Plan to non-Government schools, and also by the renaissance in 'nationalistic' Chinese culture, which has given the best of the Chinese private schools a high degree of support and encouragement from their sponsors. The favourable economic circumstances which Singapore's trade has enjoyed in the last ten years have also helped Chinese schools to reach a level of prosperity never experienced before, but, except in certain schools, educational standards have not always kept pace with the increase in enrolments. Many of the 'Middle Schools' (private secondary) have now far too many pupils for adequate discipline or instruction, and owing to the four-year gap in education during the Japanese occupation and to the pressure of the abounding post-war birth-rate, large num-

bers of them are over-age. Nor has there ever been a satisfactory organization of the non-Government Chinese teaching profession, too many of whose members are 'piece-rate' workers on too low a salary level.

Chinese educationists in Singapore, as in the Federation, are apt to blame the British for neglect of Chinese schools in the past. But the non-payment of Government grants to Chinese schools before the war was due as much to the unwillingness of the Chinese communities to accept the obligations which the conferment of aid entailed as to a preoccupation among officials with the type of schools which would produce the kind of recruits that Government needed. This suspicion of aid and of the ensuing control is still powerful, in spite of the virtual absence of 'strings' attaching to Government aid since the war, and it militates strongly against the newly-elected administration's endeavours to bring the schools and the teachers of Singapore into a homogeneous Malayan framework.

The Singapore White Paper of March 1956[1] states categorically that 'the main aim of this Government's education policy is to build a Malayan nation' and that 'Government will not support any school which lacks this emphasis on a common Malayan loyalty'. But as yet the administration has not found the courage or the popular support which would enable it to give reality to its announced intentions of standardizing the grants-in-aid and the conditions of eligibility for them, or of initiating a common-content syllabus and a unified professional structure, or of establishing an Inspectorate and of strengthening discipline in the schools. To some extent, educational reform in Singapore hangs fire in the same way—and for much the same reasons—as does the island's advance to independence. There are too many factions and too few recognized leaders in public life armed with the requisite support and confidence of the public.

The world has heard a lot of the danger of Communist infiltration in the Chinese schools of Singapore. It is there—as it is in every assemblage of youth in Asia—and it has been strong enough to cause the Federation to forbid entry into its mainland of parties of more than five Chinese students from Singapore. This may seem a worthless safeguard, but it is the case that, with Malayan youngsters, Communism gets a grip mainly as a mass hysteria, and that

[1] *White Paper on Education Policy* (Singapore Legislative Assembly Sessional Paper, Cd. 15 of 1956).

once separated from the mass, individuals tend to recollect their natural or inherited distaste for anything which militates against family solidarity or commercial advancement. Students in a number of Singapore schools have unquestionably lent themselves to the subversive manœuvres of trouble-makers claiming Communist inspiration. To many observers in Singapore, however, the root of the trouble is not so much Communist corruption of the hearts and minds of the young Chinese as the failure of the private school management committees to maintain discipline over their swollen enrolments of substantially over-age pupils, together with a spirit of unruliness in a community intoxicated by the 'nationalist' achievements of the People's Republic in China and lacking the self-discipline that comes with responsibility in self-government.

Singapore is a 'tough' city, full of wealth and hooliganism. A Malayan ethos as yet means much less there than in the Federation. If the Federation and Singapore could be brought together in a political union, development of that ethos would be easier; but Malay (and to some extent Federation Chinese) opinion will have to move a long way further in 'Malayanization' before such a union is conceivable Singapore is more likely to arrive at a satisfactory integration of its cultural energies and an adequate management of its educational difficulties from a justifiable pride in the historic attainments of the best of its schools, and from the burning desire of its people for good education, than from the conscious pursuit of an ideal, however reputable and politically desirable. The University of Malaya, based in Singapore and now spreading its Faculties into the Federation, has long served the non-communal Malayan ideal by its prestige and its high academic standards. The new Nanyang University, using Kuo-Yu as the medium of instruction and directly serving Chinese cultural needs, is likely to rise above the 'nationalist' obscurantism that has bedevilled and delayed its foundation as soon as the elevating power of organized scholarship and the sheer zeal for education of its staff and students have time to take effect.

A people so passionately devoted to the benefits of education as are the Malayans—and so passionately fond of children—are not likely in the long run to go far wrong in shaping the structure of their educational system or in prescribing its guiding principles.

J. B. P. R.

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Note of the Month

Some Financial Aspects of the Suez Crisis

A QUESTION frequently asked in connection with the Suez crisis is how much extra income Egypt can hope to gain from the seizure of the Canal over and above the benefits which previously accrued to her. The amount usually quoted is of the order of £10–10½ million, which is roughly equivalent to the gross profits distributed by the Suez Canal Company in 1955. The revenue from transit charges amounted in that year to Frs. 32,500 million. The current expenditure involved in operating the Canal was Frs. 9,300 million, and depreciation apparently Frs. 500 million. The gross revenue accruing to Egypt would thus exceed Frs. 22,500 million. Egypt is already receiving in taxes and royalties Frs. 4,400 million a year[1] and the net gain would therefore be about Frs. 18,000 million, on which must be charged the reserves available for capital outlays. The Company's payments to reserve in 1955 were Frs. 5,500 million.

Some confusion seems to prevail as to exactly what has been nationalized. It is the Canal that has been seized by Colonel Nasser, not the Company. If the Company had been nationalized, the Egyptian Government would have become the sole shareholder, the employer of all the staff, the owner of all investments (Frs. 39,000 million apart from pension funds), and would have been subject to all the Company's obligations and liabilities. Apparently the Company is to receive compensation to cover the Canal itself, leaving all other assets and liabilities still with it. Compensation on the basis of the Paris Bourse valuation of the shares on 26 July 1956 (a day before the *coup*) has been estimated at £70 million, being less than four years' purchase of an annual sum of £18 million for twelve years.

That is what the shareholders will lose. What will Egypt gain?

[1] Of this total, Frs 1,090 million represented a royalty of 7 per cent of gross profits in accordance with an agreement of 1947, Frs 1,260 million taxes charged to the Company, and Frs 2,050 million taxes on distributed profits. In 1955 Egypt also received about Frs. 1,900 million to cover arrears.

It is possible that the amount of shipping using the Canal will fall off owing to reduced efficiency and loss of confidence in the management. On the other hand, the Egyptian authorities will want to raise charges to what the traffic will bear, subject to any undertaking they may be prevailed upon to give in this respect to the users. In the past the Company's policy has been to lower the charges progressively. The cost of the development and improvement programme announced by the Company at the end of 1954, and in course of execution at the time of the seizure, was estimated at Frs. 18,000 million spread over five years.[1] The programme was intended to provide for the anticipated growth in the amount of shipping using the Canal. On the assumption that the natural growth does occur, experts maintain that the development expenditure will have to be increased still further.

In 1955 the distributed profits of the Company amounted to about Frs. 8,700 million after deduction of Egyptian taxes. Of this total, 15 per cent went to the Suez Canal Egyptian Government Interest Trust, or 'Société Civil', 2 per cent to the directors, another 2 per cent as bonus to the employees, and the remainder to the shareholders. The 15 per cent share of the Société Civil has been paid out in France since 1880 when the Egyptian Government's right to it was sold by the Khedive of Egypt to the Crédit Foncier de France. Apart from 100,000 founders' shares, to which 10 per cent of gross profits is allotted by statute, there are 378,768 'capital shares' and 421,232 'actions de jouissance', making 800,000 in all. The original capital shares include a debenture or preference element equal to the sum originally subscribed and yielding 5 per cent. This capital element is redeemed by a sinking fund, and the ordinary shares, remaining after redemption and receiving dividends, are called 'actions de jouissance'.

In London the value of the Company's shares fell immediately after the *coup*, but later recovered considerably, and in the United States, where holdings are very small, demand was unexpectedly stimulated by the crisis. The explanation lies in the substantial reserves which have through the years been accumulated by the Company and are for the most part invested outside Egypt. The balance-sheet of the Company shows that at the end of 1955 it held Frs. 3,800 million in cash, etc., Frs. 19,000 million in short-term, and Frs. 16,260 million in long-term investments (making

[1] M. François Charles-Roux, President of the Suez Canal Company, quoted in *Le Monde*, 4 August 1956.

the total of Frs. 39,000 million already referred to). Of the short-term holdings, 68 per cent were in sterling, 22 per cent in French francs, 9 per cent in Egyptian pounds, and 1 per cent in dollars. Of the long-term investments, 59 per cent were held in French securities, another 15 per cent realizable in France or on French account in New York, 16 per cent in sterling, 4 per cent in Belgian francs, and 3 per cent each in dollars and in Egyptian pounds. Compared with the balance-sheet of 1954, cash holdings had fallen by over Frs. 1,000 million, short-term investments increased by Frs. 851 million, and long-term investments by over Frs. 3,000 million. The value of French securities had more than doubled, reaching a total of Frs. 9,580 million. These changes were mainly caused by the establishment in 1955 of the 'Société d'Investissements Mobiliers', a French trust with initial capital of Frs. 7,000 million which was to have handled investments of the Company's funds in Egypt. An agreement, made as recently as June 1956 between the Egyptian Government and the Company, provided for the transfer into Egypt of Company reserve funds to the total value of £21·5 million. The sum of £10¼ million was to be transferred in 1956, a further £3 million in 1957, about £2 million in 1958 and 1959, and thereafter just over £1 million annually until 1964. It would appear that some proportion of the first instalment may have already been transferred before the seizure since, according to press reports, the Company's liquid funds held in Egypt and now confiscated amounted to about £8 million.[1]

[1] *The Daily Telegraph*, 4 August 1956.

Nasserism and Communism

ANY attempt to analyse and assess the attitude of 'Nasserism', the dominant political trend in the Arab world, towards Communism must involve serious difficulties. For at first sight it seems to be well-nigh impossible to find a common denominator. Communism is an all-embracing political philosophy. Nasserism, on the other hand, is not an ideology, but, as a contributor to these pages has recently pointed out, an attitude of mind.[1] On the political level there has not been much contact either, at least as far as the Egyptian domestic scene is concerned, for the Communist movement in Egypt is banned. Yet the issue of relations between these two movements, their collaboration and competition in the struggle for the Middle East, is now one of the most important factors in international affairs, directly affecting the balance of power in the world. For even if Nasserism has not developed a consistent theory as to how to approach economic affairs and to solve social problems, it is nevertheless forced to tackle these questions and provide some response to the challenge of Communism; in particular, it must offer some answer to the Communist recipe for the industrialization and modernization of backward countries. Even if the Communist movement is at present banned in Egypt, it has an indirect impact on Egyptian policy. In addition, the close contacts between Egypt and the Soviet Union, China, and the 'Popular Democracies', which have been established during the past year, have a cumulative political effect.

Nasserism is socialist, according to its own spokesmen—but so, nominally at least, is everybody else in Egypt. Even the two political parties representing the interests of the big landowners and industrialists chose to register as 'socialist' after the eviction of King Farouk in 1952. As a result of indiscriminate usage the very term socialism has in fact become largely meaningless in the Middle East. Both Colonel Nasser and his colleagues have of late shown greater concern about problems of foreign and military policy than about questions of social progress at home; only very infrequently have there been attempts by leading personalities of the regime to clarify their 'Egyptian Socialism'.

One such occasion was when, in an interview with M. Robert Barratt of the French weekly *L'Express*, Colonel Nasser expressed the view that 'We must establish in this country a socialist society.

[1] See 'Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent', in *The World Today*, June 1956

At the conclusion of the transition period, our Government will not be a party Government but a national Government based on occupational groupings, upon the workers and the peasant.' On another occasion when addressing the General Co-operative Conference[1] Colonel Nasser was slightly more explicit: 'In the past the country belonged not to the people but to a small clique of exploiters. The revolution came and declared that it was against the domination of the Government by capital, not against capital itself. Capital had begun to depart from its natural duty. It ought to have directed itself to investment and the increase of production and national income. Instead, corrupt capital sought to dominate the affairs of government. The social philosophy of the revolution must be given a chance to develop. The non-existence of parties does not mean that social thinking or even class thinking is prohibited. It must develop—provided it is based on law and on the Constitution. The ideal is a community in which worker co-operates with proprietor, a community free from monopoly, political despotism, foreign influence, and social injustice. All the sons of the homeland must work in one united national bloc without dissension, not subject to the principle of "divide and rule", but free from envy and hate. The entire homeland must jointly co-operate, all working for the benefit of the community.'

These amplifications hardly betray strong Marxist influences. Whatever ideological inspiration there is seems to have come from the proponents of 'solidarism' who provided the social philosophy of some of the authoritarian and semi-fascist regimes in the 'thirties, and, perhaps, from some Islamic sources. The second chapter of the new Egyptian Constitution says in effect that 'social solidarity is the basis of Egyptian society' and states that 'the family is the basis of Egyptian society'—which seems to be a quotation from Professor Othmar Spann. The 'National Union' which is also referred to in the Constitution and is, in theory at least, scheduled to be the leading force in Egyptian politics has strongly reminded some observers of a similar semi-mythical force, Professor Salazar's 'União Nacional'. The attitude to Marx has been somewhat ambivalent; he has been severely criticized for being the apostle of 'hate, sabotage, and boycott'.[2] Anwar as-

[1] In Cairo on 1 June 1956.

[2] *Al Akhbar*, 25 April 1956 Elsewhere Marx has been praised on occasion; cf., for example, Abdel Fatah Ibrahim, in *Al Tahrir*, 22 August 1956 The author is a well-known Iraqi writer who began his career as a Marxist-Leninist publicist more than twenty years ago.

Sadat, a close collaborator of Colonel Nasser and member of the junta, praises the theories of Mao Tse-tung and Chinese Communism in his recent *History of the Revolution* (Cairo, 1956). He quotes Mao Tse-tung in self-defence against the criticisms of the Egyptian Communists; the Chinese leaders, he says, were first and foremost Chinese, and only then Marxists-Leninists. The Egyptian leaders, he argues, face problems different from those arising in Russia and China. But what is the specific content of the Egyptian revolution or the 'Egyptian way to socialism?' To these questions Colonel Sadat (and other Egyptian spokesmen) reply that the peculiar features of the Egyptian revolution are (*a*) that it was carried out by the army, as the instrument of the people, and (*b*) that it was bloodless, or almost bloodless. This is quite true, and is not devoid of some sociological and historical interest. But it is hardly relevant to the present situation, for it does not clarify at all the policy and aims of Nasserism.

This line of approach to Nasserism, then, is not likely to prove very fruitful because, as has already been pointed out, Nasserism at present lacks a consistent political theory as far as social and economic issues are concerned. This is a source of both strength and weakness for Nasserism. Of strength, because both its 'integral nationalism' and the absence of a clear social programme make it acceptable to a great many people of various backgrounds But in the long run it is a source of weakness, for, other things being equal (and the Communists are now second to none in their nationalism), the movement which has a theory and knows how to tackle social and economic problems is likely to prevail over Nasserism, or to swallow it.

Such a development, however, may yet be years ahead. At present, the dynamic nationalism and vague populism of the movement is sufficiently elastic to make the movement acceptable to people of very different political persuasions. Among them are Marxists-Leninists such as Rashid Barawi, translator of Marx, and now director of the Industrial Bank and a leading economic adviser of the junta, or Ahmed Fuad, one of the directors of the Misr Bank and the main expert of the regime for economic planning. Most of the 'technicians' in the Egyptian cabinet, however—such men as, for example, Dr Mustafa Khalil—received their education and gained most of their experience in the United States and other Western countries, are not Socialists, and would hardly have been appointed by Colonel Nasser if his intention

really was to nationalize Egyptian economy and to establish a socialist society. In between the extremes are various shades of 'reformists', the *ruwad*, or social pioneers.

The economic and social policy of Nasserism has been the result of the contradictory forces at work. Generally speaking, the dynamism of the regime, so palpably felt in the foreign political field, has not been equalled in the domestic sphere. Most of the internal reforms were initiated during the first few months after the *coup d'état* of July 1952, and since then there have been no major new developments. The main task is still to carry out land reform and reclamation projects and to industrialize the country. Any conclusions that may be reached concerning the achievements of Nasserism so far must depend entirely on what aspects of Egyptian economic development are selected as a criterion. Consumption of electrical current, industrial production in various fields, and the savings movement have all increased. But oil production has fallen, and there has been a drop in wheat production and smaller yields per hectare in the cotton crop. Neutral observers have expressed somewhat pessimistic views about Egypt's present economic condition.[1] The land reform carried out by the Egyptian Government was undoubtedly a long overdue step in the right direction. But so far its social and economic effects have been limited, though it has done something to improve conditions among the peasants. It is true that the very largest holdings were broken up and the power of the great landowners in the Egyptian village was broken. But the intention was also to assist the emergence of a broad stratum of small freeholders. In this the regime would so far seem to have failed for the simple reason that the land reform, when completed, will directly benefit only some 8–10 per cent of the agricultural population, as against, for example, about 33 per cent who benefited from the post-war land reforms in Japan.

Land rents have fallen considerably over the last three or four years—but so have prices for agricultural products. In addition,

[1] cf *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 4 September 1956, where attention is drawn to the fact that Egyptian reserves in foreign currency had fallen from £E240 million in the spring of 1955 to £E190 million in the spring of 1956. Subsequently this fall has continued even more rapidly. These trends have also been noted in Moscow. The current issue of *Sovetskoe Vostokovedenie* (No 3, 1956) lists in a special survey the economic achievements of Nasserism But elsewhere in the same issue, in a review of a new book on the crisis of Egyptian economy, different opinions are voiced. This duality is typical of a good deal of Soviet comment on economic developments in the non-Communist countries of Asia and Africa

there have been new taxes. Of the beneficiaries of the land reform many lack the capital needed to buy seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural equipment to till the soil. All in all, there is some truth in the observation of Marxist critics of the Egyptian land reform that its main effects are (*a*) the replacement of the feudal by 'capitalist' forces in the Egyptian village, and (*b*) a larger differentiation, at the lower end of the social pyramid, between landless agricultural labourers and smallholders.

Industrial development has reached a similar impasse. Again, as in agriculture, there are enormous objective difficulties; in view of the abject poverty in the Egyptian village, and the absence of a developed domestic market, it is difficult to see from where the means for Egypt's industrialization should come. Up to the 1952 *coup* most of the great landowners and many banks preferred to invest their money in agriculture rather than industry. It was hoped that the land reform would cause a transfer of capital investment to industry, but these hopes have, by and large, been disappointed. Capital much preferred building (especially the building of luxury houses and flats in areas without rent control) to the uncertain prospects of industry. The junta only succeeded after a long time and with great difficulty, including a newspaper campaign with barely veiled threats against individual 'capitalists', in obtaining some £E25 million for an internal development loan.

In these circumstances hopes have come to centre more and more on some mammoth project which would come to solve all the pressing needs and difficulties of Egypt, both industrial and agricultural. Such a project is the Aswan dam. This is a highly intricate subject with many political and economic ramifications that cannot be entered into here. It can be said, however, that there might have been a chance (though not much more than a chance) for the success of this, or a similar, more modest, project, if Nasserism had decided to concentrate all its energies on the domestic front, if the necessary foreign aid had been enlisted, and if the regime had been able to transform the present patriotic upsurge (mass demonstrations, voluntary military training, etc.) into a sustained constructive effort—in other words, into more and better work over a long time. At present all these assumptions appear highly unrealistic. An ambitious, 'dynamic' foreign policy such as is envisaged by Colonel Nasser involves heavy expenditure on arms and cannot possibly be combined with a simultaneous unprecedented economic effort on the home front.

All this has caused some optimism among Egyptian Communists and *progressistes* (both within the regime and outside it), as can be seen from their publications and conversations with foreign visitors.[1] They argue that although the present Government is basically 'lower middle class' and is trying to introduce (State) capitalism in Egypt, it nevertheless 'objectively' fulfills a progressive role. By the very logic of events it is compelled more and more to intervene in State economy, to control, to plan, and eventually to take over. Here and there army officers have already been appointed to act as managers of leading industrial concerns. In the long run these will need something more than the help of relatives appointed to other key positions; such guidance they will not find (it is believed in these circles) in capitalism, even State capitalism, but only in Communist textbooks. In addition, they predict a growing dependence of Egypt's economy on the Soviet orbit, a trend which is indeed borne out by recent statistics. Such dependence need not automatically be of great political importance. But if it is coupled with a general pro-Soviet climate of opinion in the press and among the public it may well prove decisive. These circles assume, in short, that Nasserism will either fail in the not too distant future in view of its inability to solve the most pressing economic and social problems, or it will have to adopt the policies outlined by the Communists, thus gradually emerging as a Middle Eastern 'Popular Democracy' of a new pattern.

The political significance of Egyptian Communism and of the even more numerous *progressistes* should by no means be underrated. They have no political power at present, but they have unlimited confidence that the tide (with Nasserism temporarily on the crest of the wave) is running in their direction. A close and sympathetic observer of the Egyptian scene reports that every second Egyptian student (out of a total of 40,000) and every third 'intellectual' is either a member of, or is in sympathy with, the Communist movement in Egypt.[2] The attitude of Egyptian Communism to Colonel Nasser and his regime has changed several times since July 1952, and there continue to be differences of opinion between several factions at the present time.

[1] cf the leaflet of the United Egyptian Communist Party about the High Dam, reported in *New York Herald Tribune*, 3 April 1956; and M. Gilles Martinet in *L'Observateur* (Paris), 2 August 1956.

[2] Jean Lacouture in *Esprit* (Paris), No 7–8, 1956 Communist influence is palpably felt in the Egyptian press. But the figure of 100,000 Communist sympathizers among the workers, mentioned by the author, is probably an exaggeration.

During the first few weeks after the *coup d'état* of July 1952 most Communist factions (and especially the strongest among them, the 'Democratic Movement for National Liberation') supported General Naguib and Colonel Nasser. They announced in their publications that about a third of the members of the Free Officers' Movement were Communist sympathizers. Subsequently one member of the junta (Yusef Sadeq) was arrested and another (Khaled Mohieddin) was ousted and temporarily exiled. The Communists performed a volte-face and went into strong opposition to the regime in the autumn of 1952. They attacked Colonel Nasser and the other leaders as 'fascist hangmen' and 'mad reactionaries'. The junta retaliated with mass arrests and the persecution of all illegal Communist activity.[1]

The Communist attitude to Colonel Nasser began to change only in the late spring of 1955, with the gradual rapprochement of the Egyptian Government towards the Soviet bloc. Since then one part of the Egyptian Communist movement has collaborated with the regime, and has in effect become the 'left wing' of Nasserism. Other groups have remained outside and have adopted a more or less benevolent attitude towards the regime. This is not a unique and unprecedented phenomenon; it will be remembered that under Colonel Perón there were two Communist parties in the Argentine, one collaborating with the regime and the other in loyal opposition. It is difficult to know whether in Egypt it is a pre-arranged division of labour; in view of the many splits and internal dissensions in Egyptian Communism over many years it may well be a natural development

Be that as it may, the results must be somewhat confusing for the Party membership M. Yusef Hilmi, former secretary of the Egyptian 'Partisans of Peace', now writes from his European exile articles in favour of peace with Israel. On the other hand his former colleague M. Fathi er-Ramle, who has been the leading literary exponent of the theory of Leninism-Stalinism in Egypt (and who has remained in Cairo) has come to specialize in the production of anti-Jewish pamphlets published by the official publishing houses of Cairo. The influential weekly *Rose al Yusef*, which is the mouthpiece of 'left-wing Nasserism', combines attacks against the West, based on religious and racial motives, with straight

[1] The last such trial, against sixty-nine members of an organization called the 'Egyptian Communist Party', was concluded only last June (*Al Ahram*, 28 June 1956). The ten main defendants were given seven years' hard labour each, while twenty-nine others were acquitted.

Communist propaganda. It says, for instance, that 'our difference with the West is an essential and primary one, going back in the past to the Crusades. It will not end except with one of two solutions that allow of no compromise, namely, our defeat, or the defeat of the West.'[1] This is, of course, somewhat strange language for Marxists, who are supposed to believe in proletarian internationalism. But the same paper explains, for instance, the evacuation of Suez by the British as 'the result of the progress of the socialist world market and the gradual shrinking of the influence of monopoly capitalism'[2]—which will strike more familiar chords among connoisseurs of Communist prose.

Many more such examples could be given, and they all point to the fact that Communists in Egypt believe that agreement with Nasserism is possible on the basis of some form of State capitalism in which there is no class struggle (apart from the 'revolution from above' carried out by the State) and which is not internationalist. Such a development is perfectly possible, and indeed likely, inasmuch as the 'dynamic' Egyptian foreign policy will bring the regime into conflict with the West, not with the Eastern bloc. It is interesting to note in this context that Communists and fellow-travellers both inside and outside Egypt (with such exceptions as a few splinter groups in Cairo, and Signor Nenni in Italy) have shown no particular concern about some of the pronouncedly fascist features of Nasserism. Their argument is that such traits are the inevitable concomitant of military dictatorships (especially if the leaders happen to be of lower middle class origin), but that these are transient phenomena. There is no particular danger involved: even if Nasserism should prevail in large parts of Africa and the Middle East, it would be a colossus with feet of clay, for it would still have its basic economic problems to solve and be unable to do so. It may be a danger to Britain and France, but not to the Soviet Union and China.

These developments have been viewed by many Western observers with disappointment and regret, for there was nothing inevitable about them. Up to as recently as eighteen months ago, it still appeared that there might be a chance that Colonel Nasser would be able to do for Egypt what Kemal did for Turkey. It is only since then that the preoccupation with foreign political affairs and the idea of a liberatory mission in Africa and the Middle East have become obsessive, and a point of no return has apparently

[1] *Rose al Yusef*, No. 1457, July 1956. [2] *ibid.*, 17 June 1956.

been reached. Conditions conducive to a Kemalist development in Egypt in 1952–5 were admittedly less favourable than they were in Turkey after the first World War, and future historians may not find it difficult to adduce various reasons which will make the course taken by Nasserism appear inevitable, *post factum*. And yet, lastly, one has to admit that one does not know the reasons which caused the patriotic energies of Turkey (or of the countries of South-East Asia after the second World War) to be channelled into efforts so much more constructive than has been the case in Egypt—just as one does not know the precise reasons which put German nationalism for many decades into a category apart from other European nationalisms, being so much more aggressive and intractable.

Nasserism may yet reap important victories in the foreign political field. Large parts of Africa and the Middle East still remain to be 'liberated', and the international constellation is highly propitious. And yet it seems to have missed its chance to carry out basic social and economic reforms, which could have made of this movement something more than an interesting interlude in the annals of the struggle for the Middle East. For in the competition between Communism and Nasserism as things are at present, all the eventual odds are on the former, which has everything that Nasserism has, plus a precise and practical social and economic programme.

W. Z. L.

Regionalism in Franco's Spain

A SPANIARD of world fame, who for obvious reasons must remain anonymous, once told the author that 'every problem that a dictatorship proclaims solved is, in reality, merely repressed.' Regionalism is certainly one of such problems, as far as Spain is concerned. Officially, it no longer exists. One of the few books on the subject that were permitted to appear by the Franco regime[1] calls it, on its dust jacket, 'a political phenomenon that has become obsolete thanks to the Caudillo and the national sacrifice'.

[1] Maximiano Garcia Venero, *Historia del Nacionalismo Catalan*, Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1944

This book and its sister book on Basque nationalism[1] not only stop at 1936; they do not carry the story much beyond 1918. They saw the light of day only because the author was a prominent Falangist—he was head of the Barcelona Falange in 1936—who has his books published by one of the Falange's publishing houses. Others have to be much more careful: when Vicente Risco published a post-civil-war edition of his history of Galicia[2] he took the story only as far as the eighteen-nineties.

And yet there can be no question that regionalism in Spain has not only survived the repressions and suppressions that followed General Franco's triumph in the Spanish Civil War, but that it is now as strong and probably more solidly grounded than it ever was before. No consideration of Spain's future can be complete without an attempt to estimate its strength. Such an appraisal is not easy to make. There is hardly any published material. The subject is taboo for the Spanish press; nor has it made, so far, any international headlines—and for good reasons. Regionalism is at work in parts of Spain where no foreign correspondents reside and it has not challenged the regime openly. But any foreign visitor who has more than a passing contact with the people of Bilbao or Valencia, Barcelona or Santiago de Compostela soon becomes aware that regionalism there is a reality.

Regionalism had two major strongholds in pre-Franco Spain, and one minor one. Catalonia and the Basque country produced political movements strong enough to obtain from the Spanish Republic a considerable measure of regional autonomy. But in Galicia, although 70 per cent of the voters expressed themselves in a plebiscite as being in favour of such a status, the political pressure was not strong enough to obtain such autonomy. Elsewhere in Spain regionalism was, for all practical purposes, a dead letter.

The situation in 1956 is rather different. Regionalism has spread to parts of Spain where it did not exist before: e.g., the Canary Islands, where a group of regionalist intellectuals centres round the University of La Laguna. Sometimes this regionalism goes to ridiculous extremes that need not be taken seriously. Thus the Granada police in 1954 uncovered a 'separatist' plot headed by a certain Infante, which was said to have aimed at nothing less than

[1] Maximiano García Venero, *Historia del Nacionalismo Vasco 1793–1936*, Madrid, Editora Nacional, 1945

[2] Vicente Risco, *Historia de Galicia*, Vigo, Galaxia, 1952.

detaching Andalusia from Spain and attaching it to an independent Morocco. This, as was said on another occasion, is not policy but lunacy. But the word 'separatist', with its implications of high treason, is applied indiscriminately in Franco Spain to anything ranging from crazy schemes à la Infante to very serious and realistic attempts at satisfying the legitimate aspirations of Spanish regions within the framework of national unity.

VALENCIA

There is, for example, nothing crazy or even exalted about the regionalism of Valencia, which did not exist as a political force until General Franco brought it into being through his policy of uncompromising centralism. Valencia has a local dialect related to Catalan and to the *langue d'oc* of southern France. But in Valencia, unlike Catalonia, the nineteenth century did not produce a cultural renaissance and a political movement in defence of the local speech—for the very good reason that nobody attacked it. But the present regime, by trying to force Castilian on the Valencians, drove them into speaking it with pride, organizing clubs to teach it, and writing books in it on a scale unknown since the Middle Ages.

But the Valencian dialect is menaced not only by Government action. It is threatened even more effectively by the great immigration of strangers from other parts of the country with which Valencia, like all the other prosperous parts of Spain, is particularly favoured. This influx of poverty-stricken men and women produces a serious economic dislocation and some resentment on the part of the local population. The newcomers are said 'to work for nothing' (if they are Aragonese) or 'to be too lazy to work' (if they happen to come from Murcia or Andalusia). Valencia has for centuries been a Mecca for thrifty Aragonese; but the present immigration is on a scale hitherto unknown. The uniform linguistic pattern of the province has been broken. Today the city of Valencia is practically all Castilian-speaking—to hear Valencian one must go to the industrial suburb of Grao. In the villages of the Valencian *huerta*, too, the local dialect is yielding ground. Valencian regionalism has set itself the task of assimilating the new arrivals, taking the achievements of Catalonia in this sphere as a useful model.

But the Valencian, for all his regionalism, remains as Spanish as any Castilian. His reaction to the influx of strangers has been

typically Spanish: to bear resentment and blame the Government. As one regionalist leader put it: 'Imagine that a volcano has suddenly arisen in the neighbourhood of our town. The Government could hardly be held responsible for this phenomenon; but it should be blamed for doing absolutely nothing to arrest its damaging effects.' And the Government is, in fact, responsible for at least one aspect of the migration. It deliberately sends Valencian civil servants to other parts of Spain and floods Valencia with 'Castilian' members of its swollen bureaucracy. ('Castilian' means in the parlance of Valencia, as in that of Barcelona, a man from any other part of Spain, not necessarily from Castile.) And so anti-Government jokes in Valencia tend to acquire a bitterly regionalist tinge. The provincial office of the Ministry of Information and Tourism is called 'Delegation of Inquisition and Tourism', and the office of the captain general, the officer commanding the Valencia military region, is known as 'The Office of the High Commissioner of Spain in Valencia'.

Local resentment of the 'foreign' bureaucrats has found a way of expressing itself through the local custom of the *fallas*—monumental constructions of wood and paper exhibited with great ceremony and even greater noise on Saint Joseph's Day (19 May) and then burned. The *fallas* have always exhibited the Valencian's traditional disrespect for all authority (Valencian anarchists once paraded through the town with a banner inscribed *Abajo todo*—'Down with everything!'). In 1955, one of the most prominent *fallas* consisted of an enormous donkey with a stork's bill and wings hovering over the Miguelete (the cathedral tower which is the emblem of Valencia) and dropping a shower of little donkeys on top of it. This was a play on the words *burro*, donkey, and *burócrata*, bureaucrat. The censors, who were 'Castilians', passed the *falla* because they could not see the joke. But their local 'assessors' explained it to them, and the censors, in their superior wisdom, ruled that the *falla* be permitted to appear but that a 'typical' Cordobese hat be placed on the Miguelete so as to deprive the joke of its regionalist significance.

But Valencian regionalism does not confine itself to jokes: it has become an elaborate political platform. The regionalists stand for co-operation with Catalonia and the Baleares in defence of common interests. This has not been an easy decision to make. Valencia's feelings towards Catalonia are ambivalent: admiration for Catalan achievement is mingled with a certain amount of

jealousy. But Valencian regionalists have been moved by the very realistic consideration that Valencia is not strong enough by itself to exercise an effective pressure on the Government of Spain. But united with Catalonia and the Baleares (where the regionalist movement is still in its infancy and is mostly confined to Majorca) it would be a power to be reckoned with. And so the Valencian leaders have established contacts with Barcelona and, as a gesture of goodwill, decided to call the local dialect not 'Valencian' but Catalan, presumably with a future merger in view. Some Valencian regionalists aim at a still wider union that would include Aragon. This would be a revival of the mediaeval kingdom of Aragon which survived, in some aspects, until 1714 and which still has a powerful emotional appeal. King James the Conqueror of Aragon, who finally took the city from the Moors, is still Valencia's great hero, and the flag which he gave it has been adopted as a regionalist emblem. On such occasions as the *fallas* it decorates many houses, under the tolerant eye of the local police—visiting Catelans note, not without envy, that such goings-on would not be permitted in Barcelona.

GALICIA

At the other end of Spain lies Galicia, which might well be called the Spanish Ireland Both are green, and Galicia is almost an island, distinct from the rest of Spain in its landscape, its language (Galician is the mother tongue of Portuguese), and many characteristics of its population. And yet Galicia is a region of Spain, not a separate country, partly because Galicians suffer from a strange political incapacity, which made all the mediaeval attempts to set up an independent Galician state a complete failure

This political incapacity has also dogged the Galician regionalist movement ever since its beginnings in the late nineteenth century. Its founders were literary men who were content to leave the political destinies of Galicia in the hands of *caciques*, or local political bosses. The Galician *caciques* were no mean hands at the game of politics and often rose to national prominence. But, unlike their Basque and Catalan colleagues who were very much concerned with defending in Madrid the economic interests of their region, the Galicians were concerned only with lining their own pockets. They did not even have the saving grace of spending Galician money in Galicia—they preferred the fleshpots of Madrid and Paris.

The regionalists displayed the same lack of concern for Galicia's interests, though in a different way. Mere facts of politics or economics were beneath their notice, for their heads were very much in the clouds. In an attempt to discover some distinct Galician features on which to base their ideology, they hit upon Celticism. Galicia was proclaimed by them the Celtic region of Spain, and the regionalist anthem described her as one of the 'seven daughters of Breogan' (*Breogan was the legendary ancestor of the Irish who sailed to Ireland from the Tower of Hercules in La Coruña*). *Galician delegates attended Pan-Celtic* congresses and talked about establishing a Celtic museum (it still remains to be established), while Galicia was becoming an over-populated rural slum.

The Spanish Civil War had a sobering effect on Galicia and made the regionalists realize at last the damage done by their Celtic 'rebellion against facts'. While there was little actual fighting in Galicia, the region was subject to violent repressions and summary executions. One of the victims was the young regionalist leader Alejandro Boveda, who was shot after an exceedingly brief and unsatisfactory trial. The execution of Boveda, a man whose talents and integrity had won the respect of his political opponents, had a shattering effect on many Galicians and turned many minds towards regionalism. Another force working in this direction was resentment at the great loss of life among Galicians conscripted into General Franco's army. The regionalism which emerged in Galicia since the war bears very little resemblance to that of its romantic founders.

For one thing, there is a new emphasis on economics. The regionalists have analysed the economy of Galicia, and their conclusions are none too cheerful. Galicia's economy is a sick one It is still based on fishing and agriculture, and there is very little industry on modern lines except for canning plants and shipyards. Galicia is over-populated; unemployment is more serious there than in most other parts of Spain; and beggars crowd the streets of its towns as much as they do in the tourist haunts of Andalusia. Emigration, both overseas and to the rest of Spain, drains the region of its young, healthy, and enterprising people—some fifty thousand leave every year.

Moreover, the regionalists bitterly note that although General Franco is a Galician by birth, his native region has reaped, so far, hardly any benefit from his policy of industrialization.True, many

of the new electricity plants are located in Galicia—but the power is sent to central Spain. Nor is the water in the storage dams used for an intelligent hydraulic policy, so that crops are often lost when Galicia's traditionally rainy summer does not run true to type and produces a drought instead. American economic aid has gone to more favoured regions.

The cultural policy of the regime is another source of resentment. The prohibitions on publication in the local dialect are enforced more rigidly than in Valencia. *Noche*, a newspaper published in the Galician university town of Santiago de Compostela, tried to publish a page in Galician and, later on, a Galician poetry feature. Both had to be discontinued on orders from Madrid When the Madrid literary magazine *Insula* prepared a special Galician number—in Castilian, of course—the censorship kept it on ice, on instructions from Juan Aparicio, the chief press censor At the Unesco congress at Montevideo some Latin-American delegates, prompted by Galicians, publicly questioned the then Spanish Minister of Education, Señor Ruíz Gimenez, about this special Galician issue and made charges of discrimination. When the Minister returned to Spain he made it known that he favoured the appearance of the Galician number. But the press censor had the last word. he gave permission for publication but on condition that the issue be distributed only outside Spain. Since this would be, for financial reasons, impracticable, the matter rests there.

There are some signs of late that the regime is relaxing its attitude A chair of Galician literature and culture has been established at Madrid University. The Father Sarmiento Institute at Santiago acts as a centre of Galician studies The Vigo publishers, Galaxia, evade the ban on periodical publications in Galician by issuing their bi-lingual *Grial* series at irregular intervals. The magazine *Vide Gallega* (Galician Life) has been permitted to resume publication once more after an interval of almost twenty years.

Partly as a response to this and partly because of a general sobering of minds, Galician regionalism has set itself against any 'wild' separatism. As one of its leaders put it to the author, 'Much as we are opposed to the present state of affairs, if we had to choose between the *status quo* and separation from Spain we would unhesitatingly choose the former. Only *cuatro locos*—a handful of lunatics—are out for an independent Galicia.'

THE BASQUE PROVINCES

Unlike the Galicians, the Basques did not need a civil war to teach them sobriety. But the post-war picture of the Basque provinces was pretty grim. The cities and the countryside were devastated. Reprisals by the victors took a heavy toll. The victorious Falange was determined to root out Basque 'separatism'; moreover, its economic policy of pitting the State socialism of the National Institute of Industry against liberal free enterprise endangered the two mainstays of the Basque economy—the steel industry and banking.

And so the first lesson the Basques learned from the war and its aftermath was that of unity. Basque regionalism, unlike its Catalan counterpart, did not suffer from internal splits. No splinter party could compete with the Basque Nationalist Party, led by José Maria de Aguirre (who now heads the Basque Government in exile) and—again unlike Catalonia—of a definite clerical inspiration. But whereas the Catalans, for all their political splits, were united in opposing the centralizing policies of Madrid, the Basques were deeply divided between regionalists and unitarians. Basque unitarianism has deep historical roots dating from the days when the Basque provinces voluntarily submitted to the mediaeval kings of Castile. In our own time, Basque unitarians have been as fanatical as Basque regionalists.

But now the Basques have closed ranks. The split may not be entirely healed; but even unitarians have not taken kindly to such Government measures as the ban on preaching in the Basque language, which makes sermons incomprehensible to many people in the villages, or the refusal to have any Basques appointed bishops in Basque dioceses. (During the recent strikes, the non-Basque bishops of Bilbao and Guipuzcoa came into open conflict with some of the Basque clergy, who backed the workers. Nine priests were deported for their action.) Moreover, in the all-important matter of economics, the Basques have learned the Catalan lesson. There is now enough solidarity between regionalists and unitarians for the Basque local authorities to use the spectre of Basque nationalism as political blackmail to wring concessions from a reluctant Madrid.

Also, the Basques have remained in close contact with their compatriots outside Spain. The newspaper of the Basque Government in exile, *Eusko Deya* (The Basque Voice), has a wide clandestine circulation in the Basque country, and Radio Euzkadi not

only has many listeners but manages to keep in touch with them The Basque Nationalist Party maintains an underground organization which holds regular meetings and does not seem to suffer from lack of funds; a good deal of money is spent in helping members in distress and in bribing the authorities.

The position of the Basque language is not very bright. It takes a long time to die, especially in the villages, but it is steadily losing ground. The cities of Bilbao and San Sebastian are entirely lost to it: the only people who speak Basque in them are the peasant women who bring in milk from the villages every morning. Moreover Basque has never, for all the regionalist prodding, produced any literature to be compared with the Galician or Catalan. The best Basque writers, from Loyola to Unamuno, use Castilian or Latin. The regime permits Basque linguistic and cultural studies by a number of institutions and sponsors an annual Basque week at San Sebastian; but, as usual, it frowns on all unofficial cultural manifestations. The Basque underground tries to arrest the decline of the language, and at least one of its operations is nothing if not imaginative: it pays peasants from the mountains to come down to San Sebastian during the tourist season to talk Basque ostentatiously in front of foreign visitors.

CATALONIA

There is no need to resort to such stratagems in Catalonia Catalan can be heard freely spoken not only in mountain villages but anywhere in Barcelona. The linguistic policy of the regime in Catalonia can be reduced to a triple ban: on periodical publications, on technical and scientific books, and on translations. The idea is, or so the Catalanists say, to kill the language at the sources of its renewal and to condemn it to sterility. But these restrictions are not insurmountable. A book called *Geography of Catalonia* was banned by the censors; they permitted it to be published under the title of *The Lands of Catalonia*. The two greatest living poets of Catalonia, José María Segarra and Carlos Riba, were permitted to publish their Catalan translations of Dante and Homer—in luxury editions, because the present regime still believes in the maxim of the late General Primo de Rivera: 'No book is dangerous if its price is over 15 pesetas.' (This was in 1925; today the limit would be 100 pesetas.) The ban on periodical publications is the stiffest; but a Catalan magazine called *Ariel* was published for several months in a printing works near Barcelona by a group of

young Catalanists who took the precaution of putting 'Printed in France' on the front page. Among the subscribers was the Barcelona provincial delegate of the Ministry of Information, i.e. the local chief censor. Publication ceased only after a rival printer denounced it to the police.

No recent visitor to Barcelona can have any doubts as to the reality of the Catalanist revival. The bookshops and the open-air bookstalls on the Ramblas are filled with Catalan books: novels, biographies, and poetry. Segarra's latest play has recently conquered Madrid after playing in Barcelona's Catalan theatre for years. Advertisements of *coblas* and *sardanas* (Catalan regional songs and dances) cover the walls. A statue of the Catalan Renaissance humanist Luis Vives standing in the main hall of Barcelona University had an extra 'L' added to it by a student so as to give the name its Catalan form. But the students no longer have need for such subterfuges. A recent student manifesto openly proclaims that 'The university of Barcelona must be, above everything else, an instrument for the promotion of Catalan culture.'

The economic roots of Catalanism have been strengthened, not weakened, by the economic policies of General Franco's regime. The Catalanists complain that the Government ignores certain 'differential facts' (better business sense, greater working capacity, and so on) and discriminates against Catalan industries. They bitterly joke that the official motto of 'Spain, one, great, and free' should be replaced by 'Equality through misery'. The official thesis is that Catalan capital indulges in 'abstentionism', i.e. refusal to invest in enterprises useful to the nation but not in Catalonia. The Catalanists also blame the regime for the great post-war influx of non-Catalan workers from Murcia and Andalusia. Contrary to the situation in Valencia, this is merely the continuation of a pre-war trend; but here, too, the new proportions are important. According to a recent semi-official survey, the population of Barcelona is more than 60 per cent non-Catalan in origin. Catalanists complain that 'the Government is sending these people here to drown us!' But those of them who have a better historical perspective recall that the descendants of these Murcianos, as they are called, often become the staunchest and toughest defendants of Catalonia.

One or two new political trends deserve to be noted. One is that the local Falange has been affected by the regionalist atmosphere. Even before the Civil War, the Barcelona Falange was the only

one in Spain to make a serious attempt to enlist workers in its ranks. At present, Falangist officials assume the role of defenders of Catalan industry against Madrid policies of centralism. The delegation which, towards the end of 1954, presented Catalonia's economic grievances to the civil governor of Barcelona, Señor Acedo Colunga, for transmission to the Caudillo was composed of very high-ranking Falangists. They claimed to have acted within the age-old Catalan tradition of presenting 'memorials of grievances' to the rulers of Barcelona. The governor, who duly transmitted their petition to General Franco, was labelled 'separatist'.

Another important trend is the increased role played by the Catalanist clergy. Catalanism has always had strongholds in such religious institutions as the Benedictine monastery of Montserrat, and no history of Catalanism would be complete without the names of many priests and friars But in the years before the civil war anti-clerical rather than clerical tendencies came to the fore. It is a sign of changed times that the centralists now talk of 'Catholic separatists' instead of 'Red separatists'. On the eve of the Barcelona Eucharistic Congress a number of these 'Catholic separatists', including several priests, were arrested by the police in order to prevent them from establishing contacts with foreign visitors. And it was a priest who organized the Catalanist youth organization called *Els Minyons de la Muntanya* (The Boys of the Mountains) in defiance of the Falangist monopoly on such organizations. The *Minyons* devote their time to cultural studies as well as mountain climbing and they have on several occasions been the object of Falangist attacks.

But perhaps the most interesting change is the eclipse of the wild and romantic kind of Catalanism associated with the late Colonel Maciá, whose boundary line with 'separatism' was, indeed, not very clear. The spokesman of the new generation is Professor J. Vicens Vives of the University of Barcelona, a distinguished historian very much respected by his students. His thesis is that Catalonia needs Castile for the social discipline that Catalans often lack; while Catalonia, in turn, should serve as a channel for the Europeanization of the rest of Spain There is nothing fundamentally new in this: Professor Vicens Vives is the first to admit that he is following in the footsteps of Catalonia's greatest modern political brain, Enrique Prat de la Riba, who said much the same thing in 1901. But it is certainly significant that it is said again in 1956.

I. A. L.

The Political Aspect of East-West Trade

The Soviet Approach

COMMUNIST propagandists, as well as those business men who tend to look at trade relations with the Soviet bloc countries as a purely economic proposition, to be assessed solely in terms of the profit motive, usually express strong disagreement with the view that the Communist approach to foreign trade is largely political. While Communist leaders cannot really be blamed for at times concealing their true beliefs, Western business men and others would do well to acquaint themselves with the Communist approach to foreign trade, and not merely to base their long-term assessments of the Soviet bloc market on *ad hoc* pronouncements. Is it really true, as was suggested recently, that Communist Governments try to keep their trade separate from politics? And, even assuming they were in earnest about this, are they really in a position to do so, since all economic activity in a Communist country is dependent in the final analysis upon political considerations as conceived by Marxist-Leninist ideology? And is it not the basic tenet of such teaching that capitalism will perish, through its inherent contradictions, its final downfall having been hastened by all possible steps on the part of the Communist countries?

It is the purpose of this paper to outline the Communist view, especially with reference to the renewed interest in trade with 'capitalist' countries as from 1952, and to discuss briefly the question whether the present trading methods of these countries are such as to enable them to obtain the greatest possible benefit from their economic relations with the Soviet bloc

As so often, the Communist view put out for foreign consumption differs from, or even contradicts, both the Party doctrine and the practical measures at home. A typical example of this technique is to be found in the statements made by Nesterov, Chairman of the U S S.R. Chamber of Commerce, who is the leading Communist spokesman in the field of East-West trade propaganda. In August 1953 he wrote in *New Times*, a Soviet periodical which has a number of foreign language editions, that the U.S.S.R. favoured, as it had always done, the 'normalization of international trade', and that it was only due to Western policy that trade relations between East and West had deteriorated to such an extent. But in March of the same year *Kommunist*, the authoritative ideo-

logical journal of the Soviet Communist Party, had insisted that 'The countries of the socialist camp are no longer dependent on the importing of machines and equipment from the capitalist countries.' This, of course, reflected the view expressed by Stalin in his *Economic Principles of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.* He stated that China and the European satellites had 'broken away' from the capitalist system to form jointly with the Soviet Union a 'united and powerful socialist camp confronting the camp of capitalism'. As a result of the determination to 'help each other and to achieve together a general economic development' it could be foretold 'with certainty' that, given the present great speed of industrial development in all Soviet bloc countries, 'we shall soon reach a stage when these countries will not only have no need to import goods from the capitalist countries but will themselves express the need to dispose of the surplus of their production'.

Two months after Nesterov had assured the readers of *New Times* that the deterioration of East-West trade was entirely the result of Western policy, and several months after Stalin's death, another article appeared in the same journal. It was written by Mechvedev, a prominent Soviet economist, and it rather deflated Nesterov's insistence on the U.S.S.R.'s willingness to 'normalize' trade. Under the revealing title 'East-West trade a potent weapon for peace' he maintained: 'The People's Democracies which, with the U.S.S.R., form the new world market, find in that market all goods required for their development, as well as steady customers for their own goods.'

Soviet policy in this respect has always been directed towards achieving self-sufficiency, taking into account, of course, the dictates of temporary expediency. In the U.S.S.R., as well as in all other Communist States, foreign trade is concentrated in the hands of the State. This foreign trade monopoly, Stalin said in 1925, is a 'shield and bulwark of our young socialist industry'. And he added that as long as the Soviet regime existed 'the monopoly of foreign trade will live and prosper regardless of anything'. With the setting up of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe after the war and the steadily increasing integration of the satellite countries into the Soviet economy, it became necessary to adapt this doctrine. Anastas Mikoyan[1] said in 1949: 'The functions of the foreign trade monopoly have undergone a change in respect of relations with the People's Democracies. In this case the monopoly does not

[1] For many years an influential figure in Soviet foreign trade.

perform the functions of protecting the Soviet economy but is a means of planned linking together of the economy of the Soviet Union with that of the countries of the People's Democracies.'

And a satellite country, Czechoslovakia, described thus the three main aims of its foreign trade activities: expanding Czechoslovak productive forces; linking the Czechoslovak economic system with the economic systems of the Soviet Union and the other People's Democracies; and developing trade with countries that have other economic systems 'in so far as such trade is beneficial for the building up of socialism in Czechoslovakia'. A Polish foreign trade expert stressed this last point in 1952. The most effective way of rendering the planned Polish economy independent of the 'disorganizing impact of cyclical fluctuations in capitalist countries' was 'the greatest possible intensification of trade with the Soviet Union and the satellites'. (This, it should be noted, was said at a time when Polish coal exports to the West had reached their highest level and represented the biggest foreign exchange earner for the Soviet bloc.) *Kommunist*, in the issue referred to above, also stated that this foreign trade had as its aim to 'facilitate the fulfilment of the plans of socialist industrialization. . .' And the essence of the policy of industrialization is to 'ensure the economic independence of each country surrounded by capitalist States and protect it from being transformed into an appendage of world capitalism'. It is worth bearing in mind that, while talking in general terms about the need to improve trade relations, Malenkov at the end of his speech of 8 August 1953, which appeared to promise the consumer a new deal, stressed the fact that the People's Democracies 'have struck out on a new path and will never turn aside'. Behind these words there lies the determination to push ahead with economic developments as prescribed by Communist ideology irrespective of tactical moves about East-West trade.

Stalin, in *Economic Principles of Socialism in the U.S S R*, said that the 'capitalist world market' would deteriorate and that its industries would increasingly operate below capacity. This particular part of Stalin's analysis was disowned by Mikoyan at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party last February because it did not fit in with the concept of competitive co-existence in which 'trade should play a big part in extending the basis for businesslike co-operation'. But, declared Khrushchev on the same occasion, 'our supreme international duty is tirelessly to develop

and strengthen the fraternal relations between the countries of the socialist camp in the interest of our great common cause—socialism.' The development of these countries, he said, was 'distinguished by their complete independence, both political and economic'—a formulation which is remarkably similar to that used by Mechvedev.

These statements indicate that the basic concept of economic relations with other countries has remained unchanged. And the intensification of the drive to integrate the economies of the Soviet orbit which has been noticeable in recent months certainly provides ample evidence in support of this view. Nesterov, of course, has adapted himself to the new line, and he now maintains[1] that 'the Soviet Government attaches tremendous significance to Anglo-Soviet trade' and that 'an increase in trade (between Britain and the U.S S R.) would have a favourable effect upon the economic development of the two countries' The change in tone is striking indeed, but it is prompted solely by political considerations. No Soviet spokesman has ever suggested that Britain today is a better trading partner than she was in 1953!

The speech with which Rau, the Minister of Foreign Trade and one of the Vice-Premiers in Eastern Germany, opened the autumn session of the Leipzig Fair, the 'shop window of East-West trade', on 1 September 1956 showed that doubts as to a real change of policy on trade with 'capitalist' countries were fully justified. 'We note with satisfaction,' Rau told his audience, which included business men from Western Germany and other countries of Western Europe and the Middle and Far East, 'that more and more business men of the capitalist countries advocate the expansion of East-West trade. This is evidence that such trade has become a *compelling* (author's italics) economic necessity '[2] And again, 'the highly industrialized capitalist countries in the West are about to intensify growing sales difficulties by attempting to bring pressure to bear upon the independent national States (of the Middle and Far East).' Words like these may sound odd on an occasion which is meant to further the promotion of trade. Yet they are quite in keeping with the Communist view of economic development in 'capitalist' countries And not too much should be read into the fact that they seemingly conflict with Khrushchev's

[1] *Soviet News*, 5 July 1956

[2] *Neues Deutschland*, 2 September 1956 In August 1953 Nesterov also blandly assured his English-speaking readers that 'doubtless' the capitalist countries would be 'compelled' to trade with the U.S.S.R.

condemnation of a similar view expressed by Stalin. Rau merely provides evidence, not for the first time, of the purely tactical significance of ideological adjustments of this kind.

The Moscow Economic Conference of April 1952, organized by the Communist-controlled World Peace Council acting through the medium of an Initiating Committee, provided some useful illustration of the exceedingly short-term significance of Communist pronouncements on foreign trade. The Soviet bloc countries declared that it would be possible for them to export annually to Western countries between 1953 and 1955 twice and three times as much as previously. One example may suffice to show that the view expressed at the time by Western observers, that these large-scale offers of food and other goods were made, in the main, for propaganda reasons, was fully justified. The Hungarian delegation stated that, beginning in 1953, Hungary would be able to supply the West with 300,000 tons of grain a year. This figure represented half of Hungary's pre-war grain exports. Yet by the end of 1952 the Hungarian Government had to admit that crops had fallen far short of the planned targets. Food exports were slashed, but even this did not prevent a serious bread shortage. Subsequent harvests have been better, but no grain exports on any scale have been made. In the spring of this year Hungary, once the 'bread basket' of Europe, in common with other Soviet bloc countries bought considerable quantities of grain in the Canadian market. Obviously, no Government can be blamed for unfavourable weather leading to lower yields. But the low level of productivity, especially of the collective farms, and the shortage of fertilizers were facts that had for some time been known to and admitted by Ministers and Party leaders. There was thus no justification, other than propaganda, for the promises of vast deliveries made at the conference.

The position was similar as far as promises of orders for Western exports were concerned At the time of the conference Britain was going through a mild recession in the textile industry, and the prospect of large-scale purchases of clothing was therefore emphasized. A spokesman of the British delegation was confident that the value of orders would exceed £1 million. In fact, no such orders emanated from the conference. When it came to putting orders in their final form requests for consumer goods disappeared completely, leaving only a hard core of capital goods among the items asked for.

While, consequently, almost no hard business resulted from the

conference, it nevertheless did lead to an increase of propagand
through the Councils for the Promotion of International Trad
which were then set up in various countries that had attended i
Today little is heard of these bodies. But in 1952 and 1953 the
spokesmen maintained that their main task was to act as an inter
mediary and to help business men in establishing contacts wit
Soviet bloc countries and in providing market research. Th
British Council for the Promotion of International Trade pub
lished a *Study of the Markets for British Engineering Product*
in February 1953 which purported to give factual informatio
about conditions in Soviet bloc countries. While practically n
detailed information is to be found in this pamphlet, two quotation
may suffice to indicate its degree of objectivity. The reader is tol
(p 11) that in the countries with a planned economy, as a result c
industrialization, 'the scope for foreign trade today is on a
immensely larger scale (author's italics) than before the war.' An
on p. 23 one learns that the 'Eastern countries represent a *limitles*
market (author's italics) for British engineering products and ar
capable of supplying this country with essential and non-dolla
fodder, foodstuffs, and raw materials.' The economic realities c
East-West trade have more than refuted statements of this sort
This year the language used is of a different kind A representativ
of the same organization told *Neues Deutschland* (6 May 1956) tha
'neither exaggerated hopes nor pessimism must be permitted
(He was referring to trade between Britain and East Germany
It was necessary that both sides should state clearly what the
actually needed and were able to offer Such a basis for trade woul
have to be created, and both sides should work patiently an
jointly towards this end This is sober language indeed, and i
reflects realism But it lends further credence to the suppositio
that the sweeping publicity of 1952 and 1953 was not trade pro
motion, as commonly understood, but part of the propagand
directed by the peace movement.

The real purpose of this Council was described by *Trud*, th
organ of the Soviet Trade Unions, on 7 March 1956, in thes
words: 'The initiators of the creation of the Council regarded a
the main aim of its activity the struggle to annul or possibl
diminish the lists of so-called strategic goods imposed on Britis
foreign trade firms from without.' The political purpose of suc
trade 'promotion' could hardly be put more succinctly an
authoritatively. Why then should trade promotion concentrate o

political rather than economic action? Because, as Mr Khrushchev told five visiting U.S. Senators in Moscow on 12 September 1955,[1] the Soviet Union valued trade least for economic and most for political purposes, as a means of promoting 'better relations'. Just in case people should be wondering whether there had been any change in Mr Khrushchev's politics, he went out of his way a few days later to reassure the world in quite unequivocal terms that if anyone believed that his and Mr Bulganin's attitude at Geneva meant the abandonment of Marx and Lenin they would have to wait 'until a shrimp learned to whistle'.

It is against this background of the use of foreign trade as a means of increasing economic self-sufficiency and promoting political ends that present and future trade relations with the Soviet bloc countries must be viewed. It is this approach to foreign trade which makes it of but marginal significance to the Communist economy, and it explains why the Soviet Union's trade in relation to world trade is small and irregular. A comparison between the foreign trade situation in Tsarist Russia in 1913, and in the Soviet Union in 1930–2, is revealing. Russian exports in 1913, the last normal year of the Tsarist regime, were about 4 per cent of world exports. In 1930–2, so far the best years for foreign trade under the Soviet regime, exports never represented more than about half the contribution of Tsarist Russia to world trade. Bearing in mind the steady rise in the volume of world trade since then, the U.S.S.R.'s impact either as buyer or as seller seems insignificant.

But, as the world is becoming increasingly aware, the Soviet Union and the satellite countries have replaced normal trading by a policy of selective trading, aimed at politically vulnerable countries, which promotes better relations as envisaged by Marxists-Leninists For this political trade, of a relatively limited size, the Soviet bloc countries are able to allocate the resources required, whereas they are not in a position to become large-scale exporters in the conventional sense. The U.S S.R had followed a similar course in the early 1930s. Although famine was then raging at home, large grain exports were made available to pay for imports of machinery and equipment for the first Five-Year Plan At that time the aim was to assist in the industrialization drive which in turn was to strengthen the Communist base. Today it is to promote ideological and thereby political expansion. But even the

[1] *New York Times*, 13 September 1955.

very fact that the U.S.S.R. and the other Soviet bloc countries do not have a greater share in world trade today is, in the final analysis, the result of their political view of foreign trade. Looking at the problem in purely economic terms it would be correct to say that the cause is the scarcity of export goods. But the availability of such goods is the result of a political decision. If the Communist countries were less autarky-minded they could increase their imports, and this in turn would necessitate a greater allocation of resources for the production of exports. Instead, we are witnessing a situation in which the lists of desired imports of machinery and industrial equipment are obviously carefully chosen to get the best possible result, in terms of future autarky, out of available export surpluses. It is surely remarkable, and should provide food for thought, that the bulk of exports from the U.S.S.R., the second most powerful industrial country in the world today, consists largely of the same agricultural and forestry products which were the traditional exports of Tsarist Russia.

It is, of course, quite true that, if the present rate of industrialization in the Soviet bloc countries is not to be slowed down, much of the heavy and precision machinery they require can be supplied only by the West.[1] This might provide additional openings for East-West trade for some time; but in that case much greater efficiency in trading is called for on the Western side There is something almost ludicrous, and from a political point of view really harmful, about the present situation, when powerful foreign trade monopolies play off one business man against another and one country against another, to obtain lower prices and quicker delivery. If the Communist countries value trade most for political purposes, the West should form its own monopoly. It should in fact form a Trading Corporation through which all trade with Soviet bloc countries would be channelled. The Organization for European Economic Co-operation provides the framework within which such a corporation could function Profits, which might be considerable in the case of commodities and equipment whose scarcity value is great in Soviet bloc countries, in so far as they were not needed to offset losses deliberately incurred, could be used for the benefit of under-developed countries. Such a plan was ventilated by the Council of Europe in

[1] This, of course, raises the question of the West's present embargo policy in relation to trade with the Soviet bloc countries and China. This would, however, require an article itself; it is hoped to discuss this question at a later date.

1954. It is based on the assumption that the conduct of East-West trade should be considered part of the general policy of the West towards the Soviet bloc countries. The political effect should be taken into account in addition to any economic advantages. It will no doubt be argued that such a scheme smacks of 'planning'. But is it not true that common action of this kind is the most effective way of preserving, in the long run, the freedom to engage in such trade, and in the short run of increasing its profitability to the Western world as a whole? And would it not remove the element of propaganda which at present distorts the true significance of many deals between Soviet bloc countries and those of the Middle and Far East, at the expense of the West, by combating more successfully than hitherto economic penetration and increasing the volume of funds available for investment in under-developed countries?

S. E. S.

Iraqi Kurdistan

A Little-Known Region

Of the regions and peoples of the Near East that have been relatively ignored by both scholars and popularizers of area studies, Kurdistan and the Kurds are examples. No satisfactory history, geography, or social study of the Kurds as a whole, or as a part of a modern State, has been published. Educated Kurds are sometimes aware of these lacunae and often complain of the bias of recorded history as it affects their people. Even were an objective history of the region attempted, it would necessarily depend for most of its sources on non-Kurdish accounts, from Xenophon to whose Ten Thousand retreating Greeks the Carduchi formed a savage barrier, to Roman, Arab, Persian, and Turkish sources to whom Kurdistan was a frontier province, unruly and hazardous to penetrate or traverse. During the years immediately preceding the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Kurdistan was visited and described by a number of Western travellers and missionaries.

Some of them thought they saw in Kurdistan the components of a nation; but, as with the Armenian enclave further north, the post-war settlement wrote history otherwise, and the Kurds found themselves, in the order of numbers, in Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and a few in Syria. Thereafter, events in Kurdistan continue to form chapters of the histories of non-Kurdish States. Only on rare occasions, such as the episode of the Kurdish Republic of Mahabad in 1946, have events occurred that have brought together several parts in a larger and abortive experiment. Thus political and geographical realities cause this review of the contemporary scene to be concerned only with the Kurdish area of Iraq. In such a brief discussion, events described must be illustrative of the changing scene rather than part of a comprehensive history of the period.

SOME STATISTICS AND DEFINITIONS

There are approximately 800,000 Kurds in Iraq, who represent between 15 and 20 per cent of the total population of the country. Though the Kurds are often described as one of the 'minorities of the Arab World', it is more accurate to note that, unlike the other minorities, the Kurds involve a case in which the political boundaries of an Arab state extend beyond the 'Arab World'; for the Kurds are quite homogeneous within the sizeable area they occupy. To avoid arguments regarding ethnic origins, only those peoples who identify themselves as Kurds will be called such, thus eliminating the Yezidis, Kakais, and certain Christian elements that are largely Kurdish by race.

The Kurds are an Irano-Afghani people, and the language they invariably speak among themselves is a member of the Iranian branch of the Indo-European family of languages. If a person describes himself as a Kurd, it follows that he is a Muslim, and, with a few exceptions, of the Sunni sect. The largest non-Kurdish elements within Iraqi Kurdistan are some 15,000 Assyrian (Nestorian) Christians, and several thousands of Armenian, Chaldean, and Jacobite Christians.

ASPECTS OF THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

Not having been able to satisfy Kurdish nationalist aspirations in the peace settlement following World War I, the British administration in Iraq took upon itself the responsibility of 'protecting' the Kurdish population and endowing it with certain attributes of local autonomy. It was not always easy to satisfy even limited Kurdish aspirations while also protecting the Assyrian Christians and preparing an Arab Government to assume authority in Baghdad. Such a dilemma of conflicting interests would face any outside Power, the U.S.S.R. included, that might commit itself to an active 'pro-Kurdish policy'. The British attempt to strike a fair balance found Major E. B. Soane as political officer in Sulaimaniya encouraging the development of the Kurdish language and culture; while on several occasions during the following years the R.A.F. was called upon to subdue Shaikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniya and his followers whose ambitions exceeded the limits of autonomy compatible with Iraqi nationhood.

At most, Shaikh Mahmud's sphere of influence did not extend far beyond the present limits of the Sulaimaniya Liwa, and even within the Liwa a majority of the large Jaf tribe resisted his

pretentions to the title of 'King of Kurdistan'. The negative attitude of neighbouring tribes allowed the central Government to bring local balancing forces into play against Shaikh Mahmud. This involved, not for the first or last time, the fine art of tribal politics which is often more effective and economical than employing punitive national armed forces. Thus, attempts to unify the whole or large sections of Kurdistan under local leaders have been frustrated by local divisive features of geography and social organization as well as by the application of outside force. However, the appeal to tribal loyalties by the central Government is on the decline. Although improved communications within the area and a lessening of tribal exclusiveness would appear to bring the Kurds more closely together, the same factors have made it possible for national security forces to bring their vast military superiority to bear in these once remote regions, and to render obsolete the dependence upon local factions formerly used to maintain governmental authority.

Illustrative of specific changes during the inter-war period that have affected the balance of power in Iraqi Kurdistan are: (i) the opening and pacification of the Ruwanduz frontier route; (ii) the defeat on several occasions of Shaikh Mahmud's forces in Sulaimaniya; (iii) the decline of the fighting potentialities of the large tribes of the Arbil plains, the Girdi and the Dizai; and (iv) the gradual decline of the fighting *élan* of a number of less remote mountain tribes, such as the Hamawand on the Kirkuk-Sulaimaniya route, and the Khoshnao on the Arbil-Ruwanduz route Though the list could be continued, it would perhaps be more revealing to describe briefly the contemporary scene, according to geographic areas.

CONTEMPORARY ROUND-UP

For the sake of exposition, the area can be divided into four sections (as numbered on the accompanying map): (i) the mountainous area north of Mosul; (ii) the Ruwanduz area; (iii) the Sulaimaniya Liwa; and (iv) the Arbil plains region.

The population of Mosul town is predominantly Arab. North of Mosul, beyond the Christian and Yezidi villages, are Kurdish highlands that are often ignored when Kurdish problems are being discussed, for the good reason that no serious problems have recently arisen there. These are northern Kurds whose dialect differs from that of Sulaimaniya almost to the point of non-

intelligibility. Male dress differs from the straight, wide-bottomed trousers of the north to the baggy-seated, pegged-at-ankle style of Sulaimaniya. Here in the north are the Kurds of the Turkish orbit, as opposed to those within the Persian orbit south and east. Though inter-tribal feuds and differences with their Yezidi neighbours are common enough, these tribes have caused the Iraqi Government no serious security problem. Among the reasons for this are the strong repressive measures taken by the Turkish Government across the frontier, the fact that no large towns exist as potential centres of Kurdish nationalism, and the non-homogeneity of the area caused by the presence of Christian and Yezidi minorities. Here as yet there are no large-scale development projects, but the electrification of villages and similar small-scale but widespread changes are keeping pace with other rural areas in Iraq.

The Ruwanduz area contains elements of both the northern and southern Kurds and, as such, is a linguistic and cultural middle ground. Here in the strategic area near the intersection of the frontiers of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq is the traditional centre of 'tribal politicking' that in the past involved the rivalries of the Ottoman and Persian empires. Just before the collapse of the Ottoman Empire this region was a target of Tsarist penetration, and during World War I it was the route of Russian invasion forces striking toward Baghdad. North of Ruwanduz town live those remnants of the followers of the Shaikhs of Barzan who were released from internment camps in 1953 to return to their remote valleys where they look now to Muhammad Agha of Mergasor village for leadership, their shaikhs still being held by the Government of Iraq or residing in the U.S.S.R. Here are the wild valleys of the Baradost, accessible only to pack animals. Here is 'Hal Gurd', the highest point in Iraq, and Gali Ali Beg, traditional scene of ambushes and narrow path of the only road to Iran north of Khanikin that is passable for ordinary motor vehicles. Through this region treks the great Herki tribe on its annual migration to Iranian summer pastures, still having much in common with a swarm of locusts though its chief, Fattah Agha, is a gentleman and Member of Parliament. Here live the sons of Sayid Taha in the line of the Shaikhs of Shemsdinan (Turkey), and many other personalities too numerous to list, but each of whom is a force in his own territory. Although these remote regions encourage tribal independence, they do not nurture the same modern brand

of Kurdish nationalism that is found in the Sulaimaniya Liwa, especially its capital. As more motor roads are built connecting with the Ruwanduz frontier route, it will be only a matter of time until most of the valleys and their products are accessible to civilization and markets.

Sulaimaniya, with some 35,000 inhabitants, is the largest purely Kurdish town in Iraq. Sulaimaniya produces most of what Kurdish literature is published, a majority of Kurdish school teachers and civil servants, and a majority of Kurdish lawyers and Kurdish nationalists. Though its pride as the capital of Kurdistan is often considered presumptuous in other Kurdish regions, it has earned a distinctive place that is usually recognized in Baghdad. For the last hundred years Sulaimaniya has been large enough and economically stagnant enough to hold a big semi-employed population, which in the Near East usually means a population easily led to political demonstrations. Quite another, but sometimes related, phenomenon in Sulaimaniya has been the influence of the last three generations of Barzinja Shaikhs who are now represented by Shaikh Mahmud and his sons, who control scores of villages in the area In the past this concentration of power has sometimes threatened the authority of the Iraq Government, but in the future it is more likely that agrarian problems connected with these and similar large holdings of the Jaf Begs, Pizhdar Aghas, and other chiefs will present more serious issues. It is for the new generation of the landed class, men such as Shaikh Mahmud's son, Baba Ali, and the younger Jafs who have been educated in Baghdad and Western universities, to try to solve some of these problems. Fortunately, the depressed economy of Sulaimaniya is beginning to be stimulated by the large sums being spent on development projects by the Iraqi Government.

The fourth region in this arbitrary division of Iraqi Kurdistan is the plains area that has been open to motor transport since World War I and has not since then constituted a threat to the security of the central Government. Here is the grain land, the Kirkuk oil field, the town of Arbil, about the size of Sulaimaniya, but with a Turkoman minority, and Kirkuk, fourth city of Iraq and rapidly growing. Here, quite naturally, the influence of Baghdad is stronger than in the mountains, and the Arabic language is almost universally understood by the male population. Here the tribal and feudal relationships have changed most profoundly and the agrarian inequities of absentee land tenure are most obvious.

Here in Arbil and Kirkuk the school systems exist that breed modern nationalism, but the mixture of ethnic groups causes the result to be less pure than the Sulaimaniya variety. Kirkuk, with its dominant Turkoman element, is a law-abiding urban centre with a strong Ottoman flavour. The nearby installations of the Iraq Petroleum Company have greatly stimulated the economy of the region and are providing employment for a steady influx of excess population from rural areas.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIPS

It is a common fallacy to suppose that rural Kurdistan is composed entirely of tribes that are all organized in the same way. This supposition ignores the influence of key personalities who are not tribal leaders, as well as some basic differences of internal tribal relationship. Three basic types of social and economic organization are most often encountered in Iraqi Kurdistan. These are: (i) the traditional tribal organization with its various sections (Kurdish = *tira*). All members of the tribe usually claim common ancestry, the chief being the leader of the most powerful section. Examples are the Ako, Balik, Girdi, Siyan, and Surchi. Their chiefs are usually called Aghas. (ii) The tribe whose chiefs form a separate 'nobility', not related to the rest of the tribe. It might be more accurate to describe this relationship as feudal rather than tribal. Examples are the Dizai, whose ruling aghas entered the region in the eighteenth century, the Khoshnao tribe and its Begs, and the Jaf and their Bagzadeh. A different variety of this type is found in the Hamawand tribal villages where a much larger proportion of the tribe belongs to the 'noble' class, but does not necessarily own land or possess other wealth. (iii) The Sayyids and Shaikhs whose temporal power was originally acquired through an ancestor's often charismatic religious authority. The shaikh and his followers occupy an area and exert an influence similar to that of the tribes. The authority of the shaikh, based as it is on religion, can sometimes cut across tribal lines. It is interesting to note that most attempts to carve out autonomous Kurdish states during the past hundred years have involved such personalities. Among the most important of these families are the Barzinja Shaikhs of Sulaimaniya, the Shaikhs of Barzan, the Sayyids of Shemsdinan, the Khanakah family (Sayyids) of Kirkuk, and the Naqshabandi Shaikhs north of Mosul. There are also numerous lesser shaikhs, most of whom exert their influence in remote and inaccessible

regions, and many of whom still perform religious functions as leaders of derwish brotherhoods, usually of the Naqshabandi *Tariqa*. Examples are Shaikhs Ala ud-Din and Ubaidullah on the frontier of Iran near Rayat, the Biara Shaikhs in the Avroman mountains near Halabja, Shaikh Husain of Boskin near Rania, and the Sargalu Shaikhs west of Sulaimaniya.

The vast majority of the rural Kurds live the entire year in their small villages, in which they keep their cattle and some of their sheep, and from which they tend the crops. Nomadism has declined steadily during the last three generations so that now only about 5 per cent of the rural Kurds move to high summer pastures on, or just over, the Iranian frontier. The remaining nomads include the whole of the great Herki tribe and small sections of the Jaf and Ako. During the past fifty years the total rural population has probably increased very little, the towns having absorbed most of the growth of population during that time. Although some individual peasant land holdings exist, the greater part of the land is controlled, with or without complete legal title, by the Aghas, Begs, and Shaikhs Though the mud-walled or uncut stone houses of the villages are usually the property of those who live in them, one speaks of the village as a whole as belonging to a particular chief. Most aghas own from one to five villages, and as their sons come to maturity allot a village or two to each The point is being reached in many regions where there are not enough villages to go round. Except in particularly fertile areas, a unit smaller than one village and the land that goes with it will not support an agha and his family in the style that befits them. Since in most such cases the young agha lacks the education needed to join the urban professional class, he is more apt to turn to commerce or contracting, or simply to remain in his father's village where his family will be fed and clothed.

The landowner's share of crops usually varies between a quarter and an eighth of non-irrigated cereal crops and reaches as high as a half in the case of irrigated cash crops such as rice and tobacco. His villagers will usually own some sheep of their own, but the largest flock will be the agha's. Until recently there was seldom any question of treating land as a commodity that could be bought and sold, and won or lost in a poker game. The opening of the area to modern capitalist practices and the continuing registration of land titles have tended to change the old relationships in varying degrees and have thus produced new and serious agrarian problems.

AGRARIAN CHANGES AND PROBLEMS

The old feudal and tribal relationships which governed Kurdistan for centuries, and still survive to a certain extent, served many useful social functions that have been replaced in part by the arrival of *de facto* governmental authority. Under the old dispensation the chiefs and their families lived much as did their villagers, except that they owned better horses, larger houses, and more plentiful food supplies. Excess wealth was usually spent on rifles and horses that were assigned or given outright to the tribesmen. This system satisfied the chiefs by enhancing their power and prestige which they shared with their men, who also received leadership and security. There are still regions, especially the more remote ones, where the prestige of the chief can be measured in terms of rifles and armed retainers. However, first on the plains, and gradually in the highlands as well, the rifle has lost much of its value to the chief, and motor transport has replaced the horse. Among the reasons for the changed standard of values are that (i) irregular armed forces cannot in the long run still prove a match for the national army and police; (ii) national security forces can guarantee a large measure of inter-tribal security; and (iii) many chiefs can no longer be sure that their men will follow their leadership and use the arms as commanded. Since the prestige of the rifle has not declined as rapidly as its actual usefulness, nearly every household owns one, and every male would like to own one if he does not already. And though only a few Kurdish leaders can send important armed forces out on personal missions, there are still many thousands of rifles ready to defend family and property.

During the period in which the relative military power of the chiefs is diminishing, the material gulf between them and their men is increasing. Excess wealth is now turned to personal consumption of items such as vacations in the Lebanon, luxury purchases, and cars for the aghas rather than horses for all. The mental gulf is also widening as the young begs and aghas find higher education and sophistication in the cities. Thus the feudal and tribal patterns are being replaced by a simple landowner-tenant relationship which in many instances provides only a bare subsistence level of existence for the labourer without the peace of mind that knowing and respecting his place in the old order used to give him.

It is not surprising that the changes in agrarian relationships

have been accompanied by the introduction into the area of demands for agrarian reform or even revolution. Such ideas have been spread both by sincere idealists and by political opportunists, including the Communists and their allies, as is illustrated by the fact that an airing of economic grievances is sometimes accompanied by Communist slogans against 'imperialism' and for 'peace'. Nationalist slogans have also been mixed into agrarian politics, so that some of the sons of the landowners themselves have at one time been infected with leftist economic doctrine. In the three or four years (1950–4) during which it was being organized, the agrarian stirring affected only a part of the plains area; but there are indications that it was spreading to parts of the Sulaimaniya Liwa as well. In practice the theories and slogans usually took the form of a disobedience campaign directed against certain of the aghas. Since the autumn of 1954 the Iraqi Government has effectively suppressed the violent and unlawful aspects of the movement, such as holding back the landowners' shares of crops, and resort to arson and the use of firearms. Ideas have been let loose, however, that may not now threaten security, but that have already soured the old relationship and indicated some serious problems for the future. While maintaining order and protecting the rights of the landowners, the central Government is distributing to smallholders some of the land that is now being surveyed. The Government is also protecting the villagers from arbitrary expulsion by the landowners and has curbed some of the traditional rights of the landowners that were derived from the tribal-feudal relationship, such as the agha's claim of a share of bride-prices paid in his villages and the exacting of free labour for his personal use.

Though land distribution is not by itself a solution of the agrarian problem, it is certain to remain an issue, readily exploited by groups opposing the *status quo*. It is not to be expected that a conservative government will enact and enforce revolutionary agrarian legislation. Nevertheless, the increasingly paternalistic function of the Government, making use of its oil revenues, can do much towards alleviating the extreme hardships that periodically burden the rural population.

VARIETIES OF KURDISH NATIONALISM

Although it is safe as a generalization to note that the Kurds of Iraq feel a distinctness from their non-Kurdish neighbours that

causes them to desire a measure of local autonomy, it is not possible to find any single political grouping that would receive their undivided support, nor a single concept of the goal toward which they should work. Among the rural Kurds there are loyalties, family and tribal for instance, that form barriers between the individual and a possible Kurdish nationalist loyalty. In the half-dozen larger towns there is something like a modern nationalist sentiment that has at times been partly organized. The means to defy the central authority, however, have existed not in the towns but in the more remote tribal areas where political nationalism has hardly penetrated. Thus, when the followers of the Shaikhs of Barzan rose against the Government in 1943 and 1945, to cite the most recent experience of the kind, they were not fighting for a Kurdish nation but were contesting the encroachment of authority, in the form of police posts, on the tribal territory in which the word of their shaikhs had been *fiat* for several generations. Their initial success against units of the Iraqi army and police could not have been duplicated by urban nationalists because it depended on the fanatical loyalty of the men to their shaikhs, the universal possession of firearms, and the tactical superiority of mountain positions—all advantages that are rarely found in large towns.

The Barzani revolts were classical examples of the tribal uprising One of the reasons why such phenomena have become rare, aside from the ultimate superiority of Government forces, is the fact that it is increasingly difficult for tribal leaders to take their men into hazardous operations from which they are apt to lose much and have little to gain. The story of the Barzanis is worth following as an example of the hazards of such ill-conceived undertakings and the international complications that can ensue. When the Soviet-encouraged Republic of Kurdistan was proclaimed in Mahabad, Iran, in 1945, Mulla Mustafa led his Barzanis, then in revolt against Iraq, across the frontier to provide an army for the new Republic. When the Mahabad Government collapsed with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Azerbaijan in 1946, about five hundred of the Barzanis and their allies followed Mulla Mustafa north, divided into small groups and keeping close to the Turkish frontier, into Soviet Armenia. The remainder returned to Iraq where they were interned with the women and children of the Barzani tribes. The flight of these simple and intensely religious men was in the Kurdish tradition of evading national armies by retiring to sanctuary in a foreign State. Just

how the independent Barzanis have adapted themselves to life in the U.S.S.R. is an interesting subject for conjecture. Mulla Mustafa was occasionally heard broadcasting Soviet propaganda on a 'Radio Free Kurdistan' until 1953, since when he has been silent as far as Iraqi Kurdistan is concerned. Except for the Shaikhs themselves, the Barzanis remaining in Iraq were released from internment camps in the south in 1953 and were returned to their destroyed villages with grain to support them for a while and start a new crop. They are now rebuilding their houses and terraces, poor in material goods, but respected by their neighbours for the force they once represented and for their romantic and impractical gesture of lawless defiance.

The more sophisticated urban nationalism has undergone a number of changes since the war. Originally a purely nationalist movement, supported mainly by the sons of the Kurdish ruling classes, it has gradually taken on a more middle-class professional character with leftist and sometimes Communist tendencies. Organized urban nationalism has since the war usually meant the 'Parti Democrat Kurd', or Democrat Party of Kurdistan, as it is sometimes called, which traces its supposed authority to the short-lived Mahabad Republic in Iran. Since its overt activities must depend on the acquiescence of the Government in Baghdad, its organization has been for the most part clandestine. The 'Parti' might have kept the sympathy of many leading Kurdish personalities had it not become so closely associated with the Communist Party. As a leftist as well as nationalist party, it has been most successful in proselytizing in secondary schools in Kurdish areas and among Kurdish students in the Baghdad colleges. Because of the clandestine nature of Kurdish Nationalist as well as Communist politics, it is not easy to determine the real extent of Communist influence in the area. The Communists are apt to receive credit for more than is due to them. Nevertheless, in the several years before 1954 during which both Communist and Kurdish Nationalist activities were possible in a covert but real sense, the success of the Communists in gaining sympathy for a number of their economic and nearly all of their international goals was clearly demonstrated. The capture of the nationalist 'Parti' by the Left, however, alienated the landed classes whose control of the resources of Kurdistan endows them with a more enduring authority than that of the middle-class politicians. The narrow resources of the 'Parti' were demonstrated when the Government

of Nuri Sa'id came to power in the autumn of 1954 and quickly suppressed both the Communist and nationalist movements by arresting a few key lawyers and students. It would have been a far more serious matter if the suppression of the nationalist party had required the arrest of prominent tribal or urban leaders.

Thus, Kurdish nationalism in its contemporary form has never been able to organize more than a fraction of its potential support. Unlike Shaikh Mahmud in the 1920s or the Shaikhs of Barzan in the 1930s and 1940s, the nationalist movement has never been in a position either to challenge the Government, or to negotiate with the Government concerning its grievances. Instead, the Kurdish position has been represented by those men whose commanding positions have won them seats in Parliament and who have attained high office in the civil service.

KURDS AND THE GOVERNMENT

If the Kurds do not occupy the 15–20 per cent of Government posts to which they would be entitled proportionally, they are not far below that mark. In Parliament they represent normal constituencies. The Ministry of the Interior is headed by an able Kurd from Sulaimaniya, Sa'id Qazzaz. A Kurd, Rashid Najib, is Mutasarrif of the Mosul Liwa. Though governorships of Liwas in Kurdistan are sometimes filled by non-Kurds, nearly all Qaimaqams and Mudir Nahiyas, as well as other administrative officials in the area, are Kurds, if for no other reason than because a knowledge of the Kurdish language is almost essential for such posts. Kurds have attained high rank in the Army, though their chances for advancement might be less good than that of Arabs or Turkomans; but this is not without reason, for several promising Kurdish officers went over to the Mahabad Government during the Barzani uprising in 1945. The schools of Kurdistan are for the most part staffed by Kurds, although the Arabic language is used after the first primary grades.

Complaints are sometimes heard from educated Kurds that their careers in government are restricted. Whatever the basis for this assertion, it is not an issue that concerns the mass of the Kurdish population Although numerous Kurdish officials have worked hard for their own people as well as for Iraq as a whole, there is always a large element ready to listen to charges by self-appointed patriots that such able civil servants have 'sold out' to Baghdad. There have been instances, however, when the paternalistic good

works of the Government have been obvious to, and appreciated by, the ordinary citizen. This has been the case in Sulaimaniya since late in 1954 when Brigadier Omar Ali, a tough and efficient career officer from a Kirkuk Turkoman family, was appointed Acting Mutasarrif following a period during which leftist and Communist-inspired riots had undermined the Government's authority and prestige. With a firm hand his administration has restored order, rounded up a gang of outlaws who had several hundred murders to their credit, built fifty new village primary schools and a much needed technical school, encouraged municipal public works, and given the Government a reputation for fairness in dealing with agrarian problems. Independent of the efforts of any one individual are the large-scale projects into which the Development Board is putting 70 per cent of Iraq's oil revenues. Flood control and irrigation both have high priorities, and both require dams in the Kurdish mountains to control the flow of the Greater and Lesser Zabs and the Diyala, the most important tributaries of the Tigris. Kurdistan finds her economy stimulated by the projects themselves, by ancillary works such as the new cement factory at Sulaimaniya, and, potentially most of all, by the effect of modern highways that in a few years will connect Baghdad with Kirkuk, Kirkuk with Sulaimaniya and the Dokan Dam, and the Halabja region and the Derbendi Khan Dam direct with Baghdad.

In addition to the economic bases of change is the very profound effect produced in the area by the expansion of education through new schools and universal military service. Both of these offer controlled means of imbuing Iraqi youth with a sense of patriotism and loyalty to the ruling dynasty. Since education by itself can open visions beyond the means of a government to fulfil immediately, it would seem that changes beneficial to Kurdistan, while increasing its dependence on the rest of Iraq, can be effected in an atmosphere most free from strife if the components of the process are kept under control, that is, if a strong central government preserves order while the necessarily slow processes of change are at work.

REVIEW AND CONCLUSIONS

During centuries of relative economic and social stagnation and remoteness from the centres of Persian and Ottoman authority, Kurdistan never formed a united political entity. A varying degree of local autonomy did exist, however, which depended on tribal

ɪd feudal organization for many of the attributes of government. ɪnce the creation of modern political boundaries following World 'ar II there has been an increasingly effective extension of ɪthority over the areas held by Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. Just at a ne in history when nationalism was sweeping the Near East, at popular movement was ignored so far as the treatment of urdistan was concerned. Whether or not the bases of a viable urdish state existed then, or exist now, a variety of nationalist ntiments have created an emotional condition that must be ckoned with in the area. This condition is apparent in demands r the formation of a Kurdish state, in desires for varying degrees local autonomy, and, in its most benign form, in a spirit of gionalism in national politics.

Social and economic changes are naturally influencing political nsiderations. The social trend is away from the old tribal and ɪdal pattern, at the same time that educational facilities are being tended and the urban population is growing. The economic end is toward increased activity, stimulated by the Government's e of its oil revenues. Social and economic dynamics together are eating agrarian problems that involve, among other things, the sillusionment of many rural labourers about an obsolete feudal-bal system. The Kurdish areas, like the rest of Iraq, are still gely dominated by personalities who control the landed wealth the region. Eager to share this influence is an emerging urban ofessional class that is apt to embrace leftist doctrines as well as urdish nationalism as a means towards achieving its goals.

Because the destiny of Iraqi Kurdistan and its inhabitants pends to a great extent on decisions and events outside the ımediate region, predictions regarding the future must be highly eculative. A solution of the problems inherent in the existing ttern of land tenure that would satisfy all parties is probably not ssible and certainly not likely. Nor is social adjustment to the entieth century apt to be smooth at all times. But these are oblems common to most of the Near East. The problems arising ɔm the Kurdish feeling of separateness from their neighbours, ʼwever, are peculiar to those States that share the Kurdish oples.

Republican Turkey has tried a policy based on assimilation, nying that the Kurds are other than 'mountain Turks'. Modern ın has treated her Kurds, who have more in common with other rsians than with either Arabs or Turks, as part of a larger tribal

problem, which has usually allowed the Kurds less local autonomy than they have enjoyed in Iraq. The Government of Iraq thus far has found it possible to be relatively tolerant of non-political Kurdish particularist feelings, partly as a legacy from the British administration of the area prior to 1932. This policy has not satisfied the Kurds completely, but neither has it driven them beyond the pale. It is to be hoped that the present policy will be developed and extended into the future with intelligence and flexibility Granted that the problem defies a perfect solution, a policy could be considered successful that would allow the Kurds of Iraq to retain the best features of their own culture and that would encourage them to contribute their abilities and resources to the State within whose frontiers political and geographic reality has destined they should live.

W. L. E.

CORRIGENDUM

In the article on 'Spain in Morocco', in *The World Today*, August 1956, p 315, 12 lines from bottom, the date of the Anual disaster was wrongly given as 1923; it should be 1921.

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Notes of the Month

The European Free-Trade Area and Customs Union Proposals

THE idea of a free-trade area of Western Europe is traceable to the Havana Charter, the articles of which have survived in the G.A.T.T., though the Charter itself, with the International Trade Organization, failed of ratification by the United States.

The Charter, in conformity with American opinion, required a general adoption of the most-favoured-nation clause, precluding any discrimination by way of tariff preferences. Existing preferences were to continue subject to certain conditions, and an exception was also made in favour of customs unions. Subsequently, an arrangement a little looser than a customs union was introduced under the designation of a free-trade area, by way of another exception. The members of a free-trade area would levy no duties on trade with one another, but instead of a uniform system of import duties against outside countries, each member would be free to have its own scale of duties (see *The World Today*, Vol. V, No. 4, April 1949, p. 180). This proposal, under which Great Britain might adhere to a free-trade area in Western Europe, and at the same time discriminate in the duties imposed on imports from outside countries between the Commonwealth and the rest, has been revived, in consequence of the Spaak Committee's Report, and has, for the most part, been favourably received by public opinion, including the two principal political parties.

If Great Britain remains outside either a customs union or a free-trade area formed by an important group of countries, then in every member of the group British exporters will have to pay duty on goods which can be imported duty-free from other members. In fact, a free-trade area is not a step towards free trade: it is a redeployment of protection.

A protective tariff is primarily a measure for the diversification of industry. Free trade favours the concentration in each country of the lines of industry for which it is best suited. Protection favours industries for which the country concerned is not so well

suited by discriminating against foreign competitors: it gains the advantages of diversification but loses some of the advantages of an international division of labour. A Western European customs union is advocated in order to secure these advantages from a wide market for mass-producing industries.

Cobden hoped that free trade would put an end to war by making countries inextricably dependent on one another's production. Protection makes them less dependent, and those forming a customs union, and abandoning protection against one another, are likely to become specially dependent on one another. A customs union, entailing the creation of a central authority to be responsible for commercial policy and treaties and to administer customs revenues, is a step towards a federation. A free-trade area needs no such central authority.

The present proposal is for a customs union (except in respect of agricultural products) of the six members of the European Coal and Steel Community. The question of the adherence of other Western European countries was committed by the O.E.E.C Council in July 1956 to a study group, which has reported in favour of other countries joining on the footing of a free-trade area.

Preference could, indeed, be continued as between the Commonwealth and foreign countries outside the Western European free-trade area, but preference would lose most of its charm if the members of the free-trade area were supplying duty-free goods on which imports from Commonwealth countries paid duty, even at preferential rates. The most important preferences, it is true, are on agricultural products, which are not to be covered by the free-trade-area scheme. But still, there are manufactured imports (especially from Canada) which would be exposed to European competition. The efficacy of preference as a political bond of the Commonwealth would be impaired.

Moreover, the free-trade area is an expedient of doubtful practicability. Where a product is subject to a duty of 30 per cent when imported into the United Kingdom and only 15 per cent when imported into the customs union, there is likely to be a corresponding price difference for the product. Imports into the United Kingdom from outside countries would not be allowed to evade the higher duty by passing through the customs union, and certificates of origin would be required. But if a supply were produced by members of the customs union, it would be attracted

into the United Kingdom by the price difference. Imposition of a duty equal to the price difference on importation from the customs union would be a negation of the very principle of the free-trade area, and would be one of those preferences forbidden by G.A.T.T. It is likely that any considerable differences among the rates of import duty levied would be undermined in this way, and that they would soon be eliminated, so that the free-trade area would eventually evolve after all into a customs union.

The adoption of a customs union or a free-trade area exposes certain of the producers within it to new sources of competition, and the transfer of the supply of a product from one country to another may involve heavy losses, even though the transition be spread over twelve or fifteen years. There is, therefore, a presumption against *any* change in the protective tariff system, a presumption only to be upset if there are very substantial benefits to compensate for the transitional dislocation and loss. The customs union, in the eyes of many of its advocates, is valued as a step towards a federal union. To Great Britain this is no recommendation—rather the contrary. At the same time, the detriment to be feared if the customs union or free-trade area is formed and the United Kingdom remains outside is serious.

It is possible, however, that the countries concerned, when they come to close quarters with the project, will find the difficulties unsurmountable and will be compelled to drop it.

The Weimar Meeting of East and West German Politicians

FROM 4 to 6 October talks took place in Weimar in Eastern Germany between three representatives of the Free Democrat Party of the Federal Republic and of the Liberal Democrat Party in the German Democratic Republic respectively. The Western representatives were Dr Mende, Deputy Chairman of the F.D.P.; Dr Doring, Party Chairman in North Rhine Westphalia and a manager of the Federal Party's election committee; and Herr Scheel, a member of the Federal Committee. Those of the L.D.P. were Herr Gerlach, Secretary-General of the party; Herr Agsten, Party Chairman in the *Volkskammer*; and Herr Wertheim, a member of the Party Committee.

Dr Mende has described his party's purpose in seeking the talks as follows: 'We must try to start practical discussions in the field of Soviet politics and also listen to people "from the other side". . . Talks with the S.E.D. or official circles of the Soviet

zone are definitely out of the question.' Dr Mende pointed out that it was natural for the F.D.P. to want to talk to members of the L.D.P., since until 1947 strong links had existed between the L.D.P. and the F.D.P. He continued:

> It goes without saying that the leaders of the L.D P. have been subject to present equalizing trends in East Germany. But we cannot believe that this process has also engulfed the lower ranks or the majority of the members of this party. Our aim is to be given a chance to talk with them. Our German compatriots in East Germany feel that we have lost all interest in them since this fateful 17th of June 1953, and we must help them overcome their depression.
>
> If a genuine popular movement is created on both sides of the iron curtain, the four powers will no longer be able to evade their political duties; they will have to help reunify our country.[1]

Dr Döring was also reported as emphasizing that 'none of us contemplates negotiations with the Government of the D.D.R.', but that reunification could never be achieved without internal political discussion. At the close of the talks the East German Agency published a communiqué which said that they had concentrated on the question of Germany's peaceful reunification and on the possibilities for collaboration between the two parties with a view to achieving unity and thus ending Germany's unhappy division. 'Despite strongly diverging views on matters relating to the spiritual and political foundation of the two parties, a number of common ideas emerged concerning practical means of advance towards reunification.' The limitation of armed forces and armaments in both parts of Germany were said to have been discussed and 'in this connexion the representatives of both parties agreed to support public exchanges of opinion between both parts of Germany concerning the domestic prerequisites of reunification ... to continue the talks and to report to the respective party executives'.[2]

In the Federal Republic there has been more adverse comment than support for the talks. Only one other West German political party, the B.H.E. or All-German Bloc, welcomed the F.D.P. initiative; in its view the West Germans should co-operate in order to make it clear that reunification and all-German questions are above party. The other Federal parties and the Federation of Trade Unions are sceptical, or actively opposed, in varying

[1] *deutsche korrespondenz*, no 40, 6 October 1956, p 2.
[2] B.B C, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part IIA, No 767, 11 October 1956, p 49.

degrees. The sharpest criticism has, not unnaturally, come from the Free People's Party (which split off from the F.D.P. earlier this year), whose Berlin chairman said that the talks had set the F D.P. on the road which Moscow wants, while another Berlin committee member said that the chairman, Dr Dehler, had received no permission for the talks from the party committee. Leaders of the Christian Democrats have commented that the talks are a disturbing indication of the measure of success for Eastern propaganda, although they would be hopeless from the start since the L.D.P. is entirely dependent on the Socialist Unity Party. There is perhaps, however, some justification, in view of the forthcoming general election in 1957, for believing that 'all political parties and groups will follow the flight of this F.D.P. "kite" with careful attention'.[1]

This aspect of the matter is touched on in a Soviet comment on the Weimar meetings. While the F.D.P. is said to have 'correctly evaluated the desire of wide sections of the people of Western Germany for closer contacts with various organizations in the D.D.R. (hitherto suppressed by ruling circles in Bonn)', some members of it are described as merely hoping to 'enhance its capital for the forthcoming elections', but even those who thus joined the discussion 'in an opportunist spirit will not dare to retreat for fear of losing the trust of the masses.' The fact that two parties, diverse in political and ideological foundations, have found a common opinion on the question of reunification shows, it is argued, that, given a will to a peaceful settlement of the German problem, such talks will continue to be fruitful. Despite the fact that some West German papers supporting the official line are trying to minimize the impression made on public opinion by the Weimar talks, 'it can be affirmed with certainty that the idea of discussion between East and West will succeed in establishing itself firmly'.[2]

CORRIGENDUM

The 'Societé d'Investissements Mobiliers', referred to in the Note on 'Some Financial Aspects of the Suez Crisis', *The World Today*, October 1956, p. 389, was established as a French subsidiary of the Canal Company to handle investments in Europe, and not, as stated in the Note, to handle investments in Egypt.

[1] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 4 October 1956. [2] *Pravda*, 11 October 1956.

Japan and the Moscow Negotiations with the Soviet Union

DURING the past few months the peace-treaty negotiations with the Soviet Union have occupied the centre of interest in Japan on both the foreign and the domestic fronts, far overshadowing the Suez Canal crisis, let alone such questions as Japan's relations with China and South-East Asia. Their outcome is likely to remain for some time the major political issue in this country, and will almost certainly determine the fate of the present Government. The negotiations, and particularly the domestic politics surrounding them, have by now become so involved that it is impossible to give any thorough description in the course of a short article. Furthermore, with Mr Hatoyama's much-mooted visit to Moscow not yet begun,[1] it would be unwise to make any detailed predictions. Instead a brief factual outline will be given of the course of the negotiations to date, followed by a few general observations on the recent Moscow talks and on their domestic repercussions.

The history of the present negotiations began in January 1955 when Mr Domnitsky, the former head of the unofficial Soviet mission in Tokyo, called on the Prime Minister, Mr Hatoyama, and delivered a letter stating that the Soviet Union was ready to negotiate on the adjustment of relations with Japan. This overture was quickly accepted by the Government of Mr Hatoyama, whose main election promise had been the 'normalization' of relations with the U.S.S R. After preliminary arrangements in New York, official talks began in London the following June between Mr Matsumoto and Mr Malik, the Soviet Ambassador.[2] Agreement was reached on most major points, but the talks broke down in September over the territorial issue (Russia refusing to return to Japan any territory other than the Habomai Islands and Shikotan), and went into a long recess Negotiations were resumed in January, but, no further progress having been made, were suspended *sine die* on 20 March. On the following day, the Soviet Union saw fit to impose severe restrictions on Japan's north-sea fishing; and a month later Mr Kono, the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, proceeded to Moscow to conduct fisheries negotiations. The

[1] Mr Hatoyama arrived in Moscow on 12 October, but at the time this issue goes to press the negotiations had not yet been completed

[2] See 'Soviet-Japanese Peace Treaty Talks', *The World Today*, August 1955, in which are outlined the major issues at stake in the negotiations.

Soviet Union signed a fisheries pact on 15 May, but stipulated the condition that peace talks must be resumed by the end of July. The Foreign Minister, Mr Shigemitsu, accordingly left for Moscow with Mr Matsumoto on 26 July, and talks began on the last day before the deadline. Within a fortnight they were broken off for a third time, the territorial issue having once more proved to be the stumbling-block. Mr Shigemitsu returned to Tokyo by way of London, where he attended the Suez Canal Conference and also had talks with Mr Shepilov and Mr Dulles. It was agreed that Soviet-Japanese negotiations would be resumed in October.

Meanwhile, the situation was being complicated by intense political activity in Tokyo, as a result of which the dominant faction of the Government party (the conservative Liberal-Democrats) agreed that, instead of Mr Shigemitsu's returning to the fray, Mr Hatoyama himself should go to Moscow to show how he could succeed where the Foreign Minister had, as they suggested, failed. In view of the adamant Russian stand on the territorial issue, Mr Hatoyama proposed, in a letter to Mr Bulganin, a peace with Russia on the 'Adenauer formula'. This was to involve the resumption of diplomatic relations on an interim basis, specifically leaving the terms of a formal peace treaty (and the return of territory to Japan) for future settlement; but stipulating that the Soviet Union would release all Japanese detainees still held (they number some 11,000); would unconditionally support Japan's entry into the United Nations, and would confirm the fisheries agreement. Widespread and vociferous opposition followed Mr Hatoyama's announcement of his visit to Moscow, but at the time of writing the Prime Minister does not appear to have weakened in his intention of carrying out the next stage of the negotiations in person. To pave his way, Mr Matsumoto left for Moscow on 20 September. Mr Hatoyama was due to follow a fortnight later.

POINTS AT ISSUE

Among the general points which continue to strike the impartial observer of these negotiations is Japan's apparent over-estimation of her bargaining strength. The fact is that almost every important issue at stake affects Japanese interests far more than it does those of the Soviet Union. In almost every case Japan is in the position of asking for some concession or, to use the more familiar wording, of demanding some right, for which she has little to offer in return.

Thus it is Japan who (most understandably) wants her P.O.W.s to be released after eleven years of detention; it is Japan who wants to be admitted to the United Nations; it is Japan who requires a long-term agreement from Russia if her fisheries are not to be curtailed; most important, it is Japan who wishes to recover territories that have traditionally belonged to her. As against all this, what changes in the *status quo* are the Russians asking of Japan? First, that they be allowed to establish an official Embassy in Tokyo. This would undoubtedly have advantages for purposes of propaganda, but none that would seem to justify any important concessions at the moment. Secondly, that Japan restrict the passage of warships through the Soya, Nemuro, Notsuke, and Goyamai straits to countries bordering on the Japan Sea. This (like the Russian demand that Japan should not take part in any military alliance aimed at countries which participated against her in the last war) would seem to have been introduced into the London talks last year more as a bargaining point than anything else, for it was manifestly a demand that no Japanese government other than one of the extreme left could possibly accept. It was reportedly withdrawn at Mr Matsumoto's request, and although it was repeated in Moscow this August, the Russians clearly indicated that they had no intention of pressing it.

Thirdly, the Soviet Union wants Japan to recognize her *de jure* sovereignty over Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, including the two relatively large southern islands of Kunashiri and Etorofu, which are especially claimed by Japan, and which in fact became the specific stumbling-block during the recent Moscow talks. Here again, in view of the fact that Russia has for the past eleven years been exercising *de facto* sovereignty over all these territories, her bargaining position is very much stronger than Japan's. If, in the end, no agreement is reached, it will be Russia, not Japan, who is in effective occupation of the disputed territories.

Since these two islands constitute the crux of the present disagreement, and may in fact become the issue on which the entire negotiations collapse, a more detailed discussion of their status may be attempted. Apart from the very pertinent facts that the Soviet Union occupies these islands and is not noted for its alacrity in relinquishing territory once acquired, Japan's legal, as opposed to moral, claims to Kunashiri and Etorofu are far from being indisputable. In the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Japan unconditionally relinquished sovereignty over the Kurile Islands

and Southern Sakhalin; no disposition was made in the Treaty for the future of these territories (as was done, for instance, in the cases of Korea and Okinawa), and Mr Dulles, the principal author of the Treaty, himself specified that Japan should settle the ownership of the renounced territories 'by invoking international solvents other than this Treaty'[1] at a later date. There cannot be the slightest doubt that, so far as the Treaty was concerned, Kunashiri and Etorofu constituted part of the Kurile Islands; otherwise they would clearly have been excluded from the scope of the territory renounced by Japan.[2] It would appear to follow from the above facts that Japan has renounced her sovereignty over Kunashiri and Etorofu, and that these islands are not hers to cede to the Soviet Union or to any other country; nor would her recognition of them as Soviet territory *per se* determine their legal position. The present *de jure* status of these islands is a question for international lawyers, but it would seem that they have technically been *terra nullius* since 1952 when the Peace Treaty came into effect.

The moral argument concerning the territorial question is far simpler. This is the argument which is constantly being voiced in Japan, often under the guise of a legal argument, and which underlies the recent U S. *aide-mémoire* on the negotiations. It is based on the premise that territory which is traditionally Japanese, and which has never prior to 1945 belonged to any other country, should be recognized as Japanese Such territory is considered to include the Habomai Islands, Shikotan, Kunashiri and Etorofu, all of which, according to the U.S. State Department, 'should in justice be acknowledged as under Japanese sovereignty'.[3]

In the last analysis, it has been on this moral argument that Japan has been obliged to rest her case; and, not surprisingly, it has failed to carry much weight with the Russian negotiators. From the above discussion, it would appear that in the present diplomatic negotiations Japan has only one effective trump card, namely, her power to allow the Russians to establish an Embassy in Tokyo. Should this advantage be surrendered in some 'Aden-

[1] Statement by Mr John Foster Dulles, 5 September 1951, at San Francisco; *Dept of State Bulletin*, 17 September 1951

[2] In a recent article, Mr Okazaki, the former Foreign Minister, observed that there was a move at the time of the San Francisco negotiations to exclude the Southern Kuriles, but that this was abandoned for certain practical reasons.

[3] U.S State Department Note to Japanese Government, 8 September 1956, published 12 September 1956 (see *Manchester Guardian*, 13 September 1956). The Russians, however, contend that, prior to 1855, Kunashiri and Etorofu were in fact Russian territory

auer-type' agreement, her bargaining position in any future negotiations with the Soviet Union will be feeble indeed.

The Japanese attitude to the Moscow talks this year, as to the London talks last year, has been marked by initial optimism, followed by surprise and pique when the inflexibility of the Russian stand, specifically on the territorial question, became evident. In each case the Japanese apparently failed to take careful stock and to assess the strength of their bargaining position *vis-à-vis* the Russians. As it became clear that the Russians were unwilling to return any territory other than the Habomai Islands and Shikotan (and these only on condition that all other territorial questions were solved), Mr Shigemitsu was reported to have described the Soviet stand as the 'sheer enforcement of power above reason'. There were frequent references in the Japanese press to Russia's violation in August 1945 of the non-aggression pact with Japan, and accusations that by their 'grab of Japanese land' the Russians were violating the Atlantic Charter and blatantly practising power politics in an age when legal and moral considerations should have become paramount. Here again, the outside observer cannot help feeling that a more realistic attitude from the outset would, quite apart from improving Japan's stand in the negotiations, have avoided this type of disillusionment

INFLUENCE OF INTERNAL POLITICS

A second general aspect of the current negotiations is that they have increasingly been handled from the point of view of Japanese domestic politics. As the Moscow talks approached an impasse towards the middle of August, the centre of activity shifted to Tokyo, and the impression soon arose that the primary motive for this activity lay in personal ambitions and rivalries, rather than in any consistent beliefs or disagreements concerning the diplomatic issues at stake. The main source of disunity was not, as one would normally expect, criticism from the opposition Socialist Party or from groups of the extreme left and right, but bitter disputes between the different factions within the Government party itself. The most damaging feud was that between Mr Kono, head of the so-called 'main-stream faction' of the Liberal-Democratic Party, and Mr Shigemitsu, the Foreign Minister and chief Japanese negotiator. This produced the rather unedifying picture of a Government at loggerheads with its own representative at the very height of important international negotiations. For

instance, Mr Shigemitsu bitterly complained from Moscow that, having left home on the condition that final decision would rest with his own judgement, the Government and the ruling party had criticized his negotiations although he had asked for no instructions. In Tokyo, however, the Government claimed that he was authorized only to negotiate, not to make a final decision.

Another major feud which has emerged in the politics surrounding the negotiations is that between Mr Hatoyama and the 'Yoshida faction' of the Government party. The latter, which was from the beginning opposed on principle to the present negotiations, has been particularly vociferous in its objections to Mr Hatoyama's intended visit to Moscow, and has described it as presaging 'unconditional surrender' to Russia. Mr Yoshida himself went so far as to write an open letter to Mr Hatoyama, ending with these rather severe strictures: 'Inexperienced and ailing Prime Minister, for what purpose are you personally going to Russia and taking the rash action of inviting the Red menace? For the sake of the nation and the people, I sincerely hope that you will give up the idea of the Moscow trip.'[1] In the acerbity of the recent attacks, observers are inclined to see a continuation of the long-established feud between Mr Hatoyama and Mr Yoshida and their respective followers (a feud which last year's unification of the two parties has done little to heal), rather than consistent disagreement as to the best methods of pursuing the negotiations.

Not only has there been continuing disagreement within the Government party concerning the conduct of the negotiations, but the basis for this disagreement has itself appeared to be inconsistent. Mr Shigemitsu, who, on his departure for Moscow, was believed to advocate a cautious policy in the forthcoming talks, was reported less than a fortnight later to be favouring an early settlement in which Japan 'needs to bear what is unbearable'; on returning to Tokyo, however, Mr Shigemitsu once more seemed to favour a 'go-slow' policy. Conversely, Mr Hatoyama and Mr Kono, though at first in favour of an early settlement, effectively prevented Mr Shigemitsu from signing an agreement in Moscow on the only terms which he could then obtain, but have now returned to their original support for a rapid solution. This too has contributed to the widespread impression that considerations of domestic politics have played a more important part than any consistent diplomacy.

[1] *Asahi Shimbun*, 12 September.

One effect of the 'political' handling of the negotiations is that there has been very little adequate preparation. It has been pointed out that, following his formal appointment as chief delegate, Mr Shigemitsu had only one brief meeting with the Prime Minister before leaving for Moscow, while Mr Matsumoto met him separately on the following day. There were no discussions between Mr Shigemitsu and Mr Kono, who had been conducting negotiations in Moscow three months earlier, and only one brief meeting was held between the delegates and the party leaders. This lack of careful co-ordination inevitably aggravated the subsequent disunity surrounding the negotiations.

POPULAR REACTIONS

It might be expected that the tough Russian stand during the Moscow talks—far tougher, incidentally, than that adopted last year in London—would have resulted in widespread popular resentment and an upsurge of anti-Soviet feeling The consensus of opinion, however, is that, despite the indignation of the press and the vociferations of certain nationalistically inclined groups, there has been very little in the way of aroused public sentiment A poll taken by the *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper at the end of August (well after the suspension of the Moscow talks) suggested that 45 per cent of the people had no definite views regarding the talks, although the majority disapproved in principle of the Russian terms, 34 per cent (as against 32 per cent) favoured Mr Shigemitsu's reported conclusion that it would be best to sign a treaty on these terms, since otherwise Japan would not even recover the Habomai Islands and Shikotan.

Many reasons have been given for this lack of popular indignation—among them, the respect for Russia's post-war prestige and power; neutralist sentiment; Government propaganda in favour of the conclusion of a treaty, and the fact that economic conditions are favourable and that there is little fear of the Communists. One further reason may well be that much of the indignation that might have been directed against the Russians has been turned increasingly on the Government for its handling of the negotiations. By indulging in the luxury of intra-party politics, the Government has failed to make this the unifying national issue that it might otherwise have become. The opinion was widely expressed in leading articles that the failure of the negotiations could not all be blamed on the uncompromising Soviet attitude, but was due in large

measure to the lack of unity at home. It was emphasized that the task of adjusting relations with the Soviet Union was hard enough already, and that there was certainly no need to complicate it further by continuing internal factional feuds. Commenting on Mr Hatoyama's proposed trip, the *Japan Times* described it as 'political grandstand play', and wrote, 'It is quite apparent that everything today must become a political football for the nation's power-hungry politicians.'[1] Similarly, referring to the suspension of the talks, the *Asahi Shimbun* commented, 'This is the third time that the Soviet-Japanese negotiations have been suspended. One of the reasons here is that the Government's preparations were obviously inadequate; even towards the end, every faction had a different opinion, so that it was next to impossible to fix the minimum terms the Government was prepared to accept. . . Surely no previous government was ever guilty of such ineptitude.'

The Government has also been taken to task for refusing to agree to a special session of the Diet prior to Mr Hatoyama's departure; and it has been alleged that the political leaders are reluctant to let the full truth behind the negotiations come to light. 'Important negotiations on matters so decisive to the fate of the nation,' writes one commentator, 'take on their true meaning and are given a chance to succeed only if they get the backing of the people. Politics are for the people and not for the politicians alone.'[2] There has been a number of recent instances (for example, Mr Bulganin's statement to Mr Kono in Moscow, Mr Dulles' remarks to Mr Shigemitsu in London, and Mr Bulganin's recent reply to Mr Hatoyama's letter) in which the public has been given contradictory or ambiguous reports about what was actually said or agreed. While these may not in themselves have been too important, their cumulative effect has certainly been to weaken popular confidence in the Government's efficiency and integrity. The recent handling of public relations has, to say the least, been defective.

Leading business circles, who had earlier given their powerful support to Mr Hatoyama in his intention to restore normal relations with Russia, were also highly critical of the Government for letting domestic political rivalries endanger the outcome of the negotiations. At the beginning of September, the president of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry stated that Mr Hatoyama

[1] *Japan Times*, Tokyo, 23 August 1956
[2] Nomura Hideo, quoted in *Asahi Shimbun*, 21 September.

should retire from office at the earliest possible opportunity, and that peace talks should not be continued under the present chaotic political situation. Later, in an unprecedented move, representatives of Japan's leading business groups publicly called on 'the ailing Prime Minister' to resign at once. Although a Party leader lost no time in dismissing the demands as 'meddlesome and impertinent', it can be imagined that strictures from this source would be particularly unwelcome. As a result of its handling of the Soviet negotiations, the prestige of the present Government and also of the Liberal-Democratic Party as a whole is now at a low ebb, and it is doubtful whether even Mr Hatoyama's retirement will readily retrieve the situation. For one thing, the Government has, as the former Foreign Minister Mr Okazaki recently pointed out, placed all its eggs in one basket 'Indeed,' says the *Japan Times*, 'the impression has been given that Japan has no other problem to discuss and to solve aside from the adjustment of relations with the Russians.'[1] Whether or not the main motive for all this interest lies, as suggested, in 'selfish ambitions', it has undoubtedly created a type of political vacuum in which other pressing foreign and domestic affairs are being neglected, and in which failure in the negotiations may well prove fatal to the present Government and even to the future cohesion of the Liberal-Democratic Party as a whole.

One interesting aspect of the present negotiations, which may be very briefly mentioned, is their bearing on the question of Okinawa. Although historically and legally the Ryukyus and the Southern Kuriles are, of course, in entirely different positions, there is an emotional parallel between the two issues which cannot be overlooked. This parallel was drawn rather pointedly by Mr Sata Tadataka, a Socialist member of the House of Councillors and head of the International Affairs Bureau of the Socialist Party, in his comments[2] on the recent American *aide-mémoire*: 'The United States says that the return of the Southern Kuriles by the Soviets would contribute to the reduction of tension in the Far East. We should have liked to have the United States add to this statement its intention of returning Okinawa and the Bonin islands to Japan.' This general line of argument may be logically weak, in view of the fact *inter alia* that the United States recognizes Japan's 'residual sovereignty' over Okinawa; but the analogy

[1] *Japan Times*, Tokyo, 21 September 1956.
[2] *Japan Times*, Tokyo, 13 September.

undoubtedly has a popular emotional appeal and it is perhaps surprising that the Russians have not exploited it more vigorously.

The time has not yet come to venture on any final conclusions concerning the negotiations. It may certainly be said, however, that from the Japanese point of view they have, so far, been carried out under technically poor conditions. In a recent article, Professor Royama Masamichi stipulates three fundamental conditions for conducting successful international negotiations: a firmly established foreign policy, a rough balance of power, and a careful choice of negotiators. To these one might tentatively add, as a fourth condition, a strong legal case. In studying the negotiations to date, one is impressed by how deficient Japan has been in most of these respects. It is to be hoped that in the next round of the talks her position will be improved—especially in so far as the first of the above conditions is concerned, for this will surely be the *sine qua non* of even limited success. I. I. M.

The Turco-Egyptian Flirtation of Autumn 1954

THE increasingly intransigent behaviour of the Egyptian military dictatorship during 1955, with the Suez Canal crisis of the summer of 1956 as its latest manifestation, has obscured for most of us the fact that, after the initialing in July 1954 of the heads of agreement for the British evacuation of the Canal Zone on certain conditions, there was a period of *rapprochement* between the Egyptian 'Revolutionary Council' and the Western Governments. Thus, in a public speech on 21 August 1954 to two thousand leaders of the 'National Liberation Rally' (an organization created by the Revolutionary Council to transmit its views and orders to the general public), Colonel Gamal 'Abd un-Nasir[1] not only said that

[1] To abbreviate the Colonel's name to 'Nasser', as is now common form, is as great a barbarism as to give the style of 'Roy' to the late Mr Speaker Fitzroy. 'Abd un-Nāsir cannot be abbreviated, for it is a single personal name meaning 'Slave of [God] the giver of victory' Furthermore, the doubling of the *s*, though phonetically desirable in a French transliteration, obscures for English readers the lengthening of the *a*. Similarly, the French transliteration 'Neguib', for the more satisfactory Nagīb, was an earlier source of phonetic confusion for English readers.

N.B. The following abbreviations of the names of newspapers and periodicals

Egypt would welcome military and economic aid from the U.S.A. and Britain, provided that Egyptian sovereignty was not affected, but defended (though not without ambiguity) the Revolutionary Council's new undertaking to re-admit British troops to the Canal bases if Soviet forces attacked Turkey;[1] and in attacking the Egyptian Communists as a 'corrupting force' he actually accused them of having 'taken advantage of the national struggle on the Canal to burn Cairo',[2] an obvious reference to the 'Black Saturday' of January 1952.

It is true that in the same speech Egypt's Prime Minister[3] stated that Egypt would not engage in mutual defence pacts with the West; and he had during the previous week despatched Major Salah Salim to Iraq to confer with Prime Minister Nuri as-Sa'id and the young King. Earlier in the year all the forces of the Egyptian propaganda machine throughout the Arab world had been unleashed against the Iraqi Government, because of their acceptance of American military aid and of the reports that they might join the Turco-Pakistani Pact of April 1954, which had received American encouragement.[4] Now Major Salim stated that

are used in this paper *Bourse* for *Bourse Egyptienne*, *C S M* for *Christian Science Monitor*, *N Y T* for *New York Times*; *Cahiers* for *Cahiers de l'Orient Contemporain*, *O M* for *Oriente Moderno*

[1] 'Our acceptance of the inclusion of Turkey as one of the conditions of a British return to the Canal base was given only in order to ensure a complete evacuation As a soldier I am not being over-optimistic in saying that the British will not return, for the next world war is far away and will not happen in the next seven years [the legal duration of the new Anglo-Egyptian agreement] Who would attack Turkey? Naturally the U S S R , in the course of a world war The objective of the aggressor? To reach the oilfields of Abadan, Mosul, and Dhahran, and to reach Egypt on account of her strategic position which is of capital importance for Africa and the Mediterranean In case of a world war should I wait for my house to be set on fire, or should I think of having the enemy stopped at a distance from my country? Logically the second solution is to be preferred As for neutrality, only the strong can ensure it for themselves' (*Bourse*, 23 August 1954)

[2] *Ibid*

[3] Col 'Abd un-Nasir, it may be recalled, appropriated the title of President of the Republic only on the deposition of General Muhammad Nagib in November 1954 The title was ratified in June 1956 by an organized plebiscite with no alternative candidate before it

[4] This Pact had its roots in Mr John Foster Dulles's tour of the Middle East in the spring of 1953, following his appointment as U S. Secretary of State in the new Republican administration On his return to Washington Mr Dulles had stated: 'While awaiting the formal creation of a security association, the U.S can usefully help and strengthen the inter-related defence of those countries which want strength . In general, the northern tier of [Middle Eastern] nations shows awareness of the danger [of "Soviet Communism"].' (*Department of State Bulletin*, 15 June 1953, p 835, see also James W. Spain; 'Middle East Defense, a New Approach', *Middle East Journal* (Washington), vol. 8 (Summer 1954), esp. p. 258.)

it was necessary to give a realistic character to the Arab League collective security pact of 1950 ('at present mere ink on paper'); and he appears to have urged that Iraq should not join the Turco-Pakistani Pact which had 'no place in Arab affairs at present . . . until we are strong enough ourselves'.[1] His further statement to a press conference that Egypt would not, on these conditions, object to the Iraqi Premier's old plan of union between Iraq, Syria, and Jordan, provided that it were based on the wish of their peoples, apparently provoked a protest from the King of Sa'udi Arabia and certainly led to a transient crisis within the Egyptian Revolutionary Council itself.

This seemed, however, only a passing cloud. On 2 September the Revolutionary Council issued to the foreign press a communiqué which explained that Egypt, although she was not hostile to the West, could not, after seventy-two years of British occupation, enter into a defence pact which would be considered 'a submission to Western pressures':

Only after a period of complete independence during which mutual confidence would be established between Egypt and the West could the Egyptians regard without suspicion any closer association with the Western Powers. . . There seems no doubt that Egypt today holds in all respects to the side of the West. Her culture, her commerce, and her economic life are bound to the West.[2] Ideologically she is definitely opposed to Communism. Militarily she considers that the only danger capable of threatening the Middle East is a Soviet invasion. . . She recognizes that the U.S. will never invade the Arab world and neither will Britain. The United Kingdom need never have abandoned the Suez Canal, had its intention been one of conquest and aggression. . . With time the masses will be convinced that the West is no longer engaged in trying to conquer the Arabs. . . Co-operation based on trust and friendship, even though it is not specified by any written agreement, is better than a treaty that is regarded suspiciously by the average Egyptian.[3]

On the previous day a *New York Times* editorial had proclaimed

[1] *Bourse*, 20 August, *Manchester Guardian*, 26 August; *Daily Telegraph*, 20 August 1954, all from Baghdad

[2] At the height of the anti-Iraq agitation in the spring, however, the Egyptian Government had concluded a trade-and-payments agreement with the U S S.R , arranged for the mutual raising of their respective legations to embassies, and welcomed an East German trade exhibition to Cairo.

[3] *Cahiers*, 2ème semestre 1954, pp. 124–5, § 339, quoting *L'Orient* (Beirut), 3 September 1954, *N. Y. T* , 3 September, from Cairo. Previous Egyptian Governments in their dealings with the British in 1945 and 1950 had similarly expressed a preference for vague 'trust and friendship' over 'written agreements' see Peter Calvocoressi *Survey of International Affairs*, 1951 (London, Royal Institute of International Affairs), p. 262 with n.5.

that 'there has been a remarkable and happy change in Egyptian affairs. The Government headed by Premier Nasser and President Naguib is the most promising that has come up in decades;'[1] but, as the Cairo correspondent of *The Times* remarked (3 September), 'This presentation of Egyptian policy would be more effective if it were publicly made, but its very nature debars this;' and, on the very day that this more cautious note was sounded in London, the controlled Cairo press actually printed an official denial that such a foreign policy statement had been issued. Privately, however, an official holding a responsible position in the Revolutionary Council insisted that 'this denial was directed entirely at the Egyptian public, which was deemed to be unprepared to accept a statement so outspokenly pro-Western and anti-Soviet'.[2]

On 9 September the Ankara correspondent of *The Hindu* reported that Western and Turkish diplomatic sources there were predicting that Egypt might soon enter a joint plan with the U.S., Turkey, and Pakistan for the defence of the Middle East, and that the Turkish Foreign Ministry had instructed leading Turkish newspaper editors to be more moderate in handling Egyptian affairs than had been customary since the Egyptian expulsion of the Turkish Ambassador from Cairo in the previous January.[3] The Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, afterwards stated[4] that at the beginning of September his Government had sent to 'Abd un-Nasir

> a long oral message expressing our confidence in, and sympathy with, our Egyptian sister-nation. We expressed in all deference and sympathy

[1] Jefferson Caffery, U S. Ambassador in Cairo since 1949, went further 'They have done more for Egypt in two years than all their predecessors put together did before them' (quoted approvingly by Kenneth Love, *N Y T*, 21 November 1954, from Cairo)

[2] *N Y T*, 4 September, and cf Harry B Ellis, *C S M*, 4 September, remarking on 'this extraordinary turn of events in which a government tells the outside world what it dares not tell its own people' A leading article in *C S M*, 16 September 1954, commented 'This may come as a surprise to many Americans who may have expected warmer friendship from Egypt for having helped to bring about the agreement which meant British withdrawal. It may also help in part to explain why Britain moved so slowly '

[3] The Ambassador, incensed by the expropriation of the considerable property owned in Egypt by his wife, a descendant of the former Egyptian royal family, had made a number of undiplomatic remarks in public to members of the Revolutionary Council, one of which was prophetic enough to merit verbatim quotation 'Ne soyez pas infatués de vous-mêmes Regardez Napoléon et ce que fut sa fin quand il eut atteint le sommet Par cette révolution vous ruinerez votre pays' (*Bourse*, 5 January 1954)

[4] *Journal d'Orient* (Istanbul), 22 January 1955, quoting a statement made by Menderes to the official Turkish *Anadolu Ajansı*

the prayer that a meeting of our respective Prime Ministers might be arranged at a time and place to suit Colonel 'Abd un-Nasir. In reply to our repeated solicitations we were at length told that Egyptian public opinion was not favourable to a close contact, and that time would be needed for preparing the ground; meanwhile, there might be various exchanges of delegations. We adapted ourselves to the wishes of the Egyptian Government and were told at first that it would be convenient if I were to visit Cairo, possibly in November. . .

Before any such meeting could be held, however, Nuri as-Sa'id, having consolidated his power in Iraq by a general election in preparation for which he had systematically hamstrung the Opposition, had visited Cairo in mid-September *en route* to London, and had had a three-day exchange of views with the Egyptian Government without apparently reaching full agreement on their respective objectives and methods.[1] There was a pause during October while the final details of the Anglo-Egyptian evacuation agreement were being concluded and the treaty itself formally ratified in Cairo on 19 October. Meanwhile, the Chief of the Egyptian General Staff had officially visited the U.S.A. on a visit which ended on 7 October; but an Egyptian Government spokesman was reported to have stated on 26 September that Egypt had refused a U S. offer of military aid because of certain conditions attached to the offer.[2] The acceptance of conditions on which Britain might re-occupy the Canal bases in the event of external aggression upon the Middle East during the next seven years had, in fact, ranged against the Revolutionary Council not only the extreme Left in Egypt, but also the doctrinaire Muslim Brotherhood (*al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*), whom 'Abd un-Nasir had coupled with the Communists as trouble-makers in his speech of 21 August to the National Liberation Rally. This opposition to the Revolutionary Council culminated on 26 October in an attempt by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood to shoot 'Abd un-Nasir[3] for which he and five more prominent members of the movement were hanged on 7 December, while General Nagib was deposed from the Presidency of the Republic and consigned to *résidence forcée* in his suburban villa. The Revolutionary Council used the

[1] Muhammad Hasanain Haikal, reporting in *Akhir Sa'a* an interview with Nuri (whom he described as 'the old Iraqi fox'), and quoted by *Bourse*, 22 September 1954

[2] *Manchester Guardian*, 27 September 1954

[3] The *N Y.T* Cairo correspondent, 28 October 1954, described it as 'the act of a single individual and a singularly inept one at that The assassin had fired upward at an awkward angle from a position in which he was certain to be captured at once.'

shooting incident with suspicious promptness to rally popular enthusiasm behind its leader.

Meanwhile, President Bayar of Turkey, opening the autumn session of the National Assembly on 1 November, had stated that he was particularly hopeful for the 'rapid development of those fraternal relations' that had been established between the Egyptian and Turkish Governments, and praised the desire of the Middle Eastern States to ensure 'the organization of defence and maintenance of peace in this region'. The visits to Turkey in October of Nuri as-Sa'id and the young King Husain of Jordan had, he said, 'prepared the ground in excellent fashion for future developments'.[1] It was noted that the speech made no mention of Israel, with whom Turkey had in recent years had a flourishing trade; and later in the month Turkey's diplomatic representatives joined those of the Arab States in protesting to the U.S. and Britain against those Governments' implicit recognition of the move of the Israeli seat of government from Tel Aviv to the Jewish part of Jerusalem.[2] The newly-appointed Egyptian Ambassador to Turkey was reported by the *Anadolu Ajansı*[3] to have said:

> Turkey and Egypt are preparing to lay the solid foundations of a close collaboration Official contacts on this subject will begin very soon. . A political, military, economic, and cultural alliance would be profitable for both countries . I would emphasize that an alliance between Turkey and Egypt will see the establishment of an imposing force of 50 million persons in the Middle East

The Cairo correspondent of *The Times*, however, in announcing forthcoming visits of the Governors of Ankara and Istanbul to Egypt at the invitation of the Government and in preparation for the projected visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, stated (11 November):

> Egypt has resisted all suggestions for enlarging the Turco-Pakistan pact and it is understood that Iraq will, at least for the present, refrain from moves in that direction. At the same time . . . Egypt has been cautiously allowing the new relationship with Turkey to become evident to the public

The Arab News Agency (which is headed by an Englishman)

[1] Welles Hangen, *N Y T*, 2 November 1954, from Ankara

[2] *N.Y T* and *Bourse*, 24 November 1954 For Turco-Israeli commercial relations at this time see Norman Bentwich, in *Middle Eastern Affairs*, February 1955, pp 47–8, and *Egyptian Economic and Political Review*, March 1955, p 10

[3] *Zafer*, 2 November, quoted by *Le Monde*, 6 November; Welles Hangen, *N.Y.T.*, 6 November, from Ankara, *Cahiers*, 2ème semestre 1954, p 125, § 341.

added from Cairo that 'by strengthening themselves by arms from the West, the Arab States will eventually get the substance of regional defence in relations with the Western Powers and can leave its formalization to the time when national public opinion has become sufficiently attuned to it.'[1]

At the beginning of December a book on the subject of Egypto-Turkish relations was published in Cairo with a preface in which 'Abd un-Nasir himself wrote:

> Whatever the past events which have set Egypt and Turkey against one another, the Egyptians and Turks today are what they were in the past—brothers and kinsmen; and their ancestors have been closely associated in the evolution of Middle Eastern history, fighting side by side for centuries and cherishing the same ideals.
>
> Our position towards Turkey today is what it was in the past: we are members of the same family, separated for a time by certain circumstances but remaining nevertheless partners in the same heritage. Our sea is the Turks' sea. This Mediterranean, on which there are friends and enemies of Egypt and of Turkey, is, like our countries, an integral part of the Middle East. If Turkey is safe, so are we Egyptians; and if we are strong enough to keep the enemy at bay, then Turkey will be safe. For we are, in effect, a protective armour for Turkey, just as Turkey is a protective armour for us. The Turkish people has never denied these facts, which for the Arabs constitute an article of faith. How then could an enemy hope to undermine the confidence of our two peoples?[2]

Early in December, however, the Foreign Ministers of the States of the Arab League met in Cairo, and were apparently told by 'Abd un-Nasir that Egypt would enter into no military alliances or joint defence agreements other than the League's collective security pact, which must be forged into a more effective defence organization but should remain the only defensive system in the Arab Middle East. It was reported that in London political circles it had never been doubted that such a system, underwritten by the Western Powers, would 'undoubtedly accord with British views . . . especially so if Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan could be included'; the initiative would be left to Nuri as-Sa'id of Iraq.[3]

When a Turkish press delegation left on an official visit to Egypt on 18 December, the Egyptian Ambassador said as he saw them off:

[1] *Mideast Mirror*, 13 November 1954, pp 2–3

[2] Text in *Cahiers*, 1er semestre, 1955, p. 18, § 30, quoting *L'Orient* (Beirut), 2 December 1954, *Dawn* (Karachi), 15 December, Mario Rossi, *C.S M*, 24 December 1954

[3] *Mideast Mirror*, 11 December, p. 11, 18 December 1954, pp. 3–4.

I believe that the policy which Prime Minister Menderes has inaugurated with President 'Abd un-Nasir is in perfect agreement with the wishes of our two peoples, and that it is the natural expression of the innermost thoughts and the mutual esteem in the heart of each individual Turk and Egyptian. That is why this *rapprochement* has received a total blessing from children, women, and men alike.[1]

It was left to Major Salah Salim to shatter this idyll by telling the Turkish journalists on the following day that

the question of Egyptian participation in the Turco-Pakistan pact was not for Egypt alone to decide, but for the Arab countries as a whole. He dwelt at length on the necessity of creating confidence between the Arabs and the West as a prelude for Arab co-operation with the West on defence matters. This confidence was at present lacking and 'will never be regained unless the Palestinians are repatriated in accordance with the U.N. resolutions. Without gaining this confidence no leader in Egypt or any other Arab country will be prepared to agree to any alliance with the West. . . The Russian threat may or may not become a reality. How then can the Arabs disregard a danger at the very centre of their existence, in order to contemplate another danger . . . which . . . has not yet made itself felt?'

When a Turkish journalist asked whether Egypt could not make an alliance with Turkey which could be joined later by some of the other Arab countries, Major Salim replied:

Our people remember the four-Power Middle East Defence Organization proposals submitted to Egypt in 1951. The circumstances of that offer were bad, as they did not permit any government to accept an alliance. We should not disregard the psychology of the people, and you can remember that Turkey participated in 1951 with Britain, France, and the U.S.A. in the proposal for an alliance. You all know France's attitude towards the Arabs and its occupation of North Africa. You must also be aware that Britain occupies several areas of the Arab world, and can recall its attitude in Palestine after the Balfour Declaration in 1917. . . The Arab world considers America to be mainly responsible for rendering the Palestine Arabs homeless. Turkey's name has been linked with the alliance, and Arab public opinion abhors the idea of being bound by such alliances. Why does not the West assist the Arab alliance by supplying arms and economic aid so that they may be able to check any aggression? Such a step would remove many of the complications which have arisen between the Arabs and the West [2]

This demagogic harangue, whose anti-Israeli obsession reflected

[1] *Bourse*, 25 December 1954

[2] *Mideast Mirror*, 25 December 1954, p. 8; *Cahiers*, 1er semestre 1955, pp. 18–19.

the detention in Cairo at this time of a number of Jews charged with espionage on behalf of Israel,[1] was followed by a significantly negative statement to the Turkish journalists by the Egyptian Foreign Minister on 24 December, in which he spoke of the 'economic, cultural, and political relations between their two countries, and . . . particularly their cultural relations in the fields of radio, art, the theatre, tourism, and university contacts'.[2] This, as Menderes clearly implied in a statement two days later, was far from being Turkey's first concern 'in the face of the common danger threatening Turkey and the Arab world'.[3] The Ankara correspondent of the *New York Times* commented that Turkish determination to obtain a precise defence commitment from Egypt, Iraq, and as many other Arab states as possible was 'strongly supported by the U.S., which has told the Arabs the military aid they receive will depend on the extent of their participation in an effective regional system'.[4]

As a result of the Egyptian procrastination on the date of Menderes's visit to Cairo, he had decided that more was to be gained by going to Iraq first. When he and Nuri as-Sa'id on 6 January 1955 drove through the streets of Baghdad 'lined by silent crowds', the Baghdad correspondents of the leading U.S. and British newspapers agreed that nothing in the nature of a pact was immediately likely, in view of Egypt's opposition; but during the visit Nuri's self-confidence seems to have strengthened, and the joint communiqué issued at the end of their talks on 12 January announced that the two Governments had 'decided to conclude a treaty as soon as possible'. The first reaction from Cairo came from *al-Gumhuriya*, controlled by one of the most extreme members of the Revolutionary Council, Colonel Anwar Sa'dat, who had been imprisoned during the Second World War for his pro-Nazi attitude. *al-Gumhuriya* declared that the Iraqi Government's action was 'in complete contradiction with the spirit of the Arab League charter and collective security pact', and alleged that Turkey had concluded a non-aggression pact with Israel, an

[1] The trial is probably to be regarded as a political counterpart to the trial and execution of the Muslim Brotherhood members One member of the alleged spy-ring committed suicide in prison and two were hanged early in 1955.

[2] *Cumhuriyet* (Istanbul), 26 December 1954, quoted *O M* , 1955, p. 14.

[3] *Cumhuriyet*, 27 December 1954, quoted *O M* 1955, pp 2–3

[4] *N.Y T.*, 28 December 1954. The Ankara correspondent of the Paris *Combat*, 22 December, stating that Egypt had asked for a year's delay to prepare Egyptian public opinion, remarked, 'At Ankara as at Washington it is thought that such a delay would be too long '

allegation formally denied by the Turkish Embassy in Cairo.[1] On the following day *al-Gumhuriya* indulged in a full-blooded vituperation of Nuri as-Sa'id; and though the *Observer's* Cairo correspondent (reflecting his newspaper's recent policy of moderation towards current manifestations of Afro-Asian nationalism) reported hopefully,[2] the Egyptian passions were aroused. While the Cairo correspondent of *The Times* remarked that there was 'something' in all the arguments put forward by the Egyptian Government in its diplomatic contacts concerning the need for time to re-educate Arab public opinion out of its prolonged and virulent anti-Western indoctrination, and that Nuri's initiative was therefore untimely, he echoed more discreetly the blunt assertion of his *New York Times* colleague that 'cynics' among the diplomatic observers added that 'Iraq's principal sin was to have taken the initiative away from Egypt.'[3]

It was still against Nuri that the Egyptian fury was primarily directed Menderes accordingly repeated his request to the Egyptian Government to receive him on an official visit to explain the Pact, but 'Abd un-Nasir replied through the Turkish Ambassador that he was unable to receive him 'owing to the unusual pressure of work'.[4] He had, in fact, summoned an extraordinary meeting of the Prime Ministers of the Arab states in a vain attempt to coerce Nuri into abandoning the pact with Turkey.[5] The meeting was presented with a detailed memorandum prepared by the Egyptian Foreign Ministry to show that Turkey was the best supporter of Israel in the Middle East.[6] Menderes replied with his account to the press of the Egyptian Government's continual procrastinations concerning their projected meeting.

[1] *al-Gumhuriya*, 14 January, quoted by *Bourse*, 14 January, and by *Cahiers*, 1er semestre 1955, p 23, § 30

[2] 'Egypt is unlikely to mount a full-scale campaign against Iraq . She is evidently concerned with her prestige and position regarding the other Arab states What Egypt cannot do, however, is to reverse the broad trend towards closer relations with the Western Powers which is being quietly pursued' (*Observer*, 16 January 1955)

[3] *The Times*, 21 January, *N Y T*, 23 January 1955

[4] *Manchester Guardian* diplomatic correspondent, and *N.Y T*, 21 January 1955

[5] Nuri's Foreign Minister Musa Shahbandar, who at the Arab League meeting in December had subscribed to the Egyptian thesis that there should be no committal to pacts other than the Arab League collective security pact, resigned his office, but Egyptian press assertions that Nuri's Government had been overthrown were disappointed, and the violence of the Egyptian campaign against Iraq actually rallied to Nuri leading Iraqi politicians, such as Salih Jabr, with whom his relations had been strained The nationalist Istiqlal and the left wing were hostile but impotent

[6] *Combat*, 24 January 1955.

The flirtation was at an end. The Egyptian military junta's sensitivity in matters of prestige had been gravely hurt by Nuri's initiative; and, two months before Britain's new agreement with Iraq in the Baghdad Pact,[1] Egyptian policy plunged headlong down the slope which has led successively to the hanging of two of the alleged Israeli spies; the sending of 'commandos' from the Gaza strip into Israel and the usual heavy-handed Israeli reprisals; the arms-deal with Communist Czechoslovakia when requests to the West for arms were not fully met; the American and British offer of Danegeld in the shape of finance for the High Dam, and the Egyptian attempt to secure a still better bid from the U S.S.R.; the recognition of Communist China, a provocation to the United States; the apparent disappointment with Mr Shepilov's visit; the consequent attempt to put responsibility upon the Western Powers for failure to give assistance to Egypt,[2] followed by the massive rebuff from Mr Dulles and the refusal to finance the Aswan Dam; and finally to the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

G. E. K.

A Soviet 'Statistical Event'

Publication of New Handbook on the National Economy

WHEN queues formed in the bookshops of Russian cities early last June, the thirst for factual information that had remained so long frustrated was satisfied, at least in part, for the first time in twenty years. The event might well have been greeted as the end of the period of Russian history in which the statistician and economist were threatened with long terms of imprisonment for the disclosure of information which is readily available in Western countries in

[1] For the arguments immediately presented for and against the Pact, see *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, fifth series, vol. 539, cols 834–903, 4 April 1955

[2] 'All the decisions now are up to Washington and London We have decided what we wish to do, to take assistance from the West It now depends on them' (the Egyptian Ambassador to Washington, reported by *The Times*, 18 July 1956).

yearbooks, abstracts, and monthly bulletins. As the statistical handbook now issued by the Central Statistical Administration[1] had been printed in 100,000 copies only, many students of Soviet economic affairs must have been unable to obtain a copy of their own. Outside Russia, knowledge about Soviet economic data must remain limited until a foreign edition is made publicly available.

During the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikoyan took it upon himself to review the state of statistical work in his country.[2] He claimed that the Soviet Union was 'richer now in statistics than at any time or than any other country'. The result of twenty years of work without access to official statistical data he described in these words: 'Economists have no chance of using them and are doomed to the role of dogmatists and purveyors of old formulae and old data; this is one of the reasons why there has been no efficient work on the part of our economists.' All this is now to be put right.

Before assessing the value of this latest addition to the library of Soviet economic reference books, it is worth recording that the last official collection of Soviet statistics[3] was published in 1936, at a time when an agrarian policy that was 'dizzy with success' had left its lasting mark on Soviet society and the first phase of trial and error in industrial planning had been concluded. Since then the Soviet Union, after recovering from the most devastating of wars, has become the second industrial power in the world. How well is the Soviet citizen now provided with factual data to assess this new role of his country?

A comparison with the corresponding performance of, say, Great Britain and the United States may help to answer this question. The new Soviet yearbook contains 225 pages of sparsely printed tables, many of which are mere replicas of other tables expressed in the form of indices of different bases. The *Annual Abstract of Statistics* for the United Kingdom[4] gives almost 300 pages of closely printed tables in quarto, that is, twice the size of the

[1] Central Statistical Administration, *Narodnoe Khozyaistvo SSSR Statisticheskу Sbornik* ('The National Economy of the U S S R A Statistical Handbook') Moscow, 1956, 262 pp

[2] Speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (*Pravda*, 18 February 1956).

[3] Central Statistical Administration of the Gosplan, *Sotsialisticheskoe Stroitel'stvo SSSR* ('Socialist Construction of the U.S S R '), Moscow, 1936, 719 pp

[4] *Great Britain Annual Abstract of Statistics, No 92, 1955* London, H M S.O. 1955.

Soviet yearbook. The United States Abstract,[1] printed in octavo, contains close on 1,000 pages of statistics reproduced in small type. It is worth adding that these reference books are supplemented in the United Kingdom by statistical and economic sources which have no counterpart in the Soviet Union, such as the *Monthly Digest of Statistics* and white papers and blue books on such subjects as National Income and Expenditure, the Balance of Payments, and the Economic Survey; while in the United States there are the annual reports to the President and other documents.

If a quantitative comparison tends to cast some doubt on the validity of Mikoyan's claim that the Soviet Union is now richer in statistics than any other country, an analysis of their contents reveals the scale of values underlying these works of reference The British and American yearbooks devote, respectively, a fifth and a quarter of their space to the state of industry and agriculture; in the Soviet yearbook these subjects take up 50 per cent of the tables and almost 60 per cent of the pages containing statistical data. Against this, matters concerning population, social conditions, and prices are treated rather lightly in the Soviet source. For each page giving vital statistics in the Soviet yearbook, the *Annual Abstract* for the U.K. has five and that of the U.S. has ten pages; the ratio is similar for price data. For every page of the Soviet source dealing with social conditions, the British and American yearbooks devote three and eight pages respectively to the corresponding set of data.

The Soviet preoccupation with matters of domestic production is overwhelmingly established by this first book of reference published after twenty years of silence, secrecy, and distortion, and is further confirmed by its omissions. There is nothing in the yearbook about nominal wages, retail prices, or the cost of living. Although the existence of unemployment has been admitted in some countries of the Soviet orbit, the Soviet Statistical Yearbook has no place for this subject in its section on employment. Nor is anything revealed about the pattern of private consumption or spending. Family budgets are conspicuous by their absence. They were last published before the first Five-Year Plan was put into effect in 1928. All these and many other data are regarded as essential parts of the statistical services in Western countries, irrespective of whether they cherish the concept of the Welfare State or that of private enterprise free from Government control.

[1] U.S A., Bureau of the Census: *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1955.* Washington, 1955.

TREATMENT OF CONTENTS

The contents of the Soviet Statistical Yearbook may be summarized as follows:[1]

I. GENERAL SECTION. (Pages 17–38) (Tables 1–24)
Population, area;
indices of national economic development;
rate of industrial growth, productivity;
rates of growth of real wages and farm incomes.

II. INDUSTRY. (Pages 41–93) (Tables 25–95)
Structure of industry, industrial employment;
rates of growth of gross production;
industrial output in physical units.

III. AGRICULTURE. (Pages 97–154) (Tables 96–142)
Structure of agriculture, agricultural labour productivity,
rates of growth of agricultural production;
acreage of farm crops, numbers of livestock,
collectives, State farms, and machine tractor stations;
mechanization, agricultural specialists.

IV. CAPITAL CONSTRUCTION. (Pages 157–169) (Tables 143–157)
Capital investment;
housing, hospitals;
employment, labour productivity, cost of construction.

V. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS. (Pages 173–184) (Tables 158–179)
Passenger transport, freight;
rail, river, maritime transport,
motor, air transport;
communications.

VI. EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING. (Pages 187–198) (Tables 180–193)
Employment in branches of economy;
female workers, specialists, training.

VII. COMMODITY TURNOVER. (Pages 201–217) (Tables 194–215)
Structure and turnover of retail trade;
retail price indices;
workers in retail trade, distribution costs;
structure of foreign trade.

VIII. CULTURE. (Pages 221–240) (Tables 216–239)
Educational and scientific institutions;
teachers, students, scientists;
libraries, cinemas, publications.

IX. PUBLIC HEALTH. (Pages 243–248) (Tables 240–246)
Vital statistics;
employment in health services;
doctors and hospital beds.

X. INTERNATIONAL SECTION. (Pages 251–262) (Tables 247–248)
Area and population.

[1] Tables are not numbered in the original.

The statistical treatment varies from table to table. In some instances detailed information is given for 1913 and for several years preceding and following the Second World War. Absolute data are frequently supplemented by indices based on 1913, 1940, and 1950. In some cases the regional distribution of the national totals is given. In other instances where statistical coverage is known to be no less complete, the scantiest of information is provided; sometimes for a single year only, occasionally in the form of an index of unknown base and frequently without regional breakdown. The reader is left to guess the reasons for such variations in statistical treatment.

Any serious analysis of Soviet economic developments requires information on the distribution of the national income, the balance of payments, the Government's revenue and expenditure. None of these subjects is covered. Nor are there absolute data on agricultural production and on the composition of foreign trade. The authors promise to furnish further statistical compilations, but as long as these are not released, Russian economists and students of Soviet affairs will have to rely to a large extent on information scattered throughout political speeches and professional journals. Whether the new publication is the first of a series of annual abstracts remains to be seen.

The omission of information about important sectors of the economy is serious enough, but even more disturbing is the continued publication of indices of gross industrial output in so-called 'unchanged 1926–7 prices' which Soviet writers such as Turetsky[1] and Joffe[2] have criticized as exaggerated. They admitted that, in the calculation of production and national income indices, 'adjusted' and unadjusted current prices were used in place of constant prices wherever a new product or a new type of an existing product came into production. An analysis of Soviet statistical methods made by the Economic Commission for Europe[3] came to the conclusion that: 'the output in each branch (of industry) is computed on a gross basis with the result that the relative contribution of the higher stages of production such as engineering tends to be overstated in relation to that of the basic industries'. The index of industrial production is still officially claimed to have risen between 1928

[1] S. Turetsky, *Vnutripromyshlennoe Nakoplenie v SSSR* ('Inter-industrial accumulation in the U S S R'). Moscow, 1948, pp 375–6.

[2] Ya. Joffe, *Planirovanie Promyshlennogo Proizvodstva* ('Planning of Industrial Production') Moscow, 1948, pp. 91–2

[3] E.C.E., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1951*, Geneva, 1952, p. 729.

and 1950 to more than 1,100 (1928=100), but estimates by American scholars[1] put it below 500. Yet, in spite of Western and Soviet criticism, the 1956 yearbook reproduces the exaggerated index and links it, without adjustment, to a new, improved index of industrial production introduced in 1951. In this way the appearance of a trend of industrial growth—and labour productivity—is given which is known to be far removed from reality

A compilation which falls so obviously short of minimum requirements of coverage and accuracy must clearly be classified as a most imperfect source of reference, all the more so since its predecessor of 1936, though far from accurate and honest in all instances, covered a considerably wider field. The pre-war volume contained as many as 750 pages of statistics displayed in about 600 tables and including, in considerable detail, such items as public finance and foreign trade which have been almost entirely omitted in the new edition. The disappointment is not limited to Western observers. Some Soviet reviewers have also expressed their dissatisfaction. *Pravda*[2] criticized the authors of the yearbook for the omission of financial figures and urged more extensive publication of statistical information. *Izvestiya*[3] criticized 'the incomplete nature of the statistics on the output of agricultural produce', and stressed 'the need for the publication of statistical reference books devoted to such important problems as expenditure in production and circulation, questions of labour, finance, and foreign and internal trade'.

NEW LIGHT THROWN ON SOVIET ECONOMY

Nevertheless, in spite of its many shortcomings, this official publication of economic data represents a marked improvement over the past, when statistical information was scattered throughout the Soviet press, and when private estimates could often not be distinguished from officially accepted data. Moreover, some information has been published for the first time, in particular on the role played by the various Republics in the economic performance of the Soviet Union as a whole. Western scholars have been engaged in gathering and analysing available Soviet data for so long that no sensational surprises were expected from the release

[1] N. Jasny, *The Soviet Economy During the Plan Era*, Stanford, 1950. G Grossman and D B. Shimkin, *Mineral Consumption and Economic Development*, Supplement to D. B. Shimkin, *Minerals—A Key to Soviet Power*, Cambridge, Mass., 1953

[2] *Pravda*, 7 June 1956. [3] *Izvestiya*, 28 June 1956

of the statistical yearbook. But certain views held previously will now have to be revised. This applies in particular to the size of the total population and to the agricultural labour force. These are features of the Soviet setting of sufficient importance to command an interest outside the small circle of professional students of Soviet affairs.

The population is officially estimated at 200 2 million in April 1956, i.e., little more than what it must have been within the present territory of the U.S.S.R. at the outbreak of the last war, and some 15 million less than had been estimated in the West. The implications of this in any assessment of the Soviet Union's manpower for military and non-military purposes are obvious. Whilst doubts had been voiced for some time as to the correctness of Western estimates of approximately 215 million, the magnitude of the apparent error was something of a surprise. As long as no population census is taken in the Soviet Union, the official estimate will have to be accepted as a working basis. However, it seems worth bearing in mind that even censuses taken in countries with well-developed statistical services tend to understate population data. In the United States the error is believed to be of the order of 2·5 per cent. Assuming no higher margin of error, the population of the Soviet Union may well amount to 205 million people.

The difference is of more than academic interest. Farm population and the agricultural labour force are by necessity estimated as residuals. Any error in estimating the total population tends to aggravate the position in the rural areas which is grave enough even if full allowance is made for possible statistical errors. If one is to accept the official estimate of the total, the farm population must have lost, since the outbreak of the last war, more than 15 million people. The shift from rural areas to urban centres must have been of even greater magnitude. The process of urbanization and industrialization was accompanied by a declining rate of growth of the population. Contrary to customary population patterns, however, the net rate of growth was smaller in the villages than in the towns.

If the official estimate of population can be trusted, kolkhoz farming is run by some 27 million kolkhozniks working in approximately 20 million households. This means an average labour force of 1·3 workers per kolkhoz household. Although neither age nor sex composition is revealed in the statistical yearbook, it can be

assumed that two in three kolkhoz families are without a working man in the household. The decline by more than 50 per cent in the number of children attending the first four classes of village schools holds out no promise, in the foreseeable future, of any sizable flow of workers into the collectives. Birth and death rates are not revealed for the war years, but the obvious decline of the net birthrate may well reduce the growth of the labour force sufficiently to jeopardize the fulfilment of the sixth Five-Year Plan. It is bound, in particular, to hamper the planners of Soviet farming. This will certainly be the case in the traditional farming areas, if the trek to the east, so strongly urged by Khrushchev, gains further momentum.

It is noteworthy in this connexion that the Ukraine and Bielorussia lost approximately 1·5 million people during the last fifteen years, whilst the Asian Republics increased their population during the same period by more than 4 million. No substantial relief of the labour situation can be expected from the recruitment of women. Their share in the country's economic efforts is high by any standards. Throughout the 'national economy' nine out of every twenty workers are women. Recent large-scale transfers of kolkhozniks to the staff of machine tractor stations and improvements in the supply of farm requisites are to make up for the loss of manpower caused by the exodus from the villages.

Agricultural achievements must be assumed to have been meagre in the past. Otherwise the yearbook would not have remained silent on crop and livestock yields and on overall results Almost 60 pages of statistics on agriculture do not reveal a single absolute figure on the size of the Soviet harvest Inflated claims, expressed in terms of biological yields, were discredited by Malenkov when he was Prime Minister. The shock which the release of true crop yields would cause must be thought too severe to justify their publication at this stage. From circumstantial evidence[1] last year's grain harvest can be estimated to have yielded a barn crop of approximately 103 million tons (not 129 million tons, as the Economic Commission for Europe[2] and the F.A.O.[3] have erroneously reported). If this year's crop proves as

[1] E Chekmenev, 'Pyatiletka Krutogo Podyema Selskogo Khozyaistva', *Planovoe Khozyaistvo* ('The Five-Year Plan for a Sharp Increase in Agriculture', *Planned Economy*), No 2, Moscow, 1956, p. 47 See also N Jasny, 'More Soviet Grain Statistics', *International Affairs*, Vol 32, No 4, October 1956

[2] E.C E., *Economic Survey of Europe in 1955* Geneva, 1956, p 192

[3] *Monthly Bulletin of Agricultural Economics and Statistics*, Vol V, No. 6, Rome, June 1956, p 6

satisfactory as preliminary reports suggest, the moment may be thought opportune for the release of harvest data.

By all accounts the industrial performance of the Soviet Union is high. The publication of almost a hundred series of industrial production data, including a table showing the output of 'cultural and consumer durables', confirms this impressive record. Little is added, however, to what was already known from public pronouncements on the fifth and sixth Five-Year Plans. While figures on the output of some commodities are now available by Republics, a marked gap is noticeable with regard to anything that might be of any military significance, such as the output of aluminium and other non-ferrous metals or that of sulphuric acid and other chemicals. But secrecy veils not only matters of national defence. Information on income levels and living standards is treated as if the readers of the statistical yearbook were inland revenue officials rather than planners, economists, and statisticians.

Since the industrial record is impressive, it is all the more difficult to comprehend why the indices of gross industrial production and national income are still reproduced, for the years prior to 1950, in terms of the unrealistic 1926–7 prices. Distortions of this kind can but discredit the value of a publication which in some respects is perhaps less suspect than other Soviet sources of statistical information. The yearbook confirms what is known about the manner in which industrial progress was brought about, namely by neglecting farming and housing and the consumer sector of industry. The phase when the output of consumer goods increased at a somewhat faster rate than that of producer goods was terminated even before the end of the breathing space of the 'next two or three years' which Malenkov had prescribed as a remedy against disproportionate developments. By now the old pattern of industrial priorities has been pretty well restored.

The record of housing bears witness to the maladjustment of the Soviet economy. Contrary to previous practice, housing data now include non-residential space. The average housing space available to urban dwellers, though not specifically given in the statistical yearbook, is less than it was before the last war, before the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan, and before the Revolution. In terms of dwelling space, that is excluding kitchen, corridor, etc., it is less than 5 sq. metres (53 sq. feet), compared with the traditional sanitary minimum standard of 9 sq. metres

(97 sq. feet) per person. The supply of radio equipment in the home is equally unworthy of a highly developed industrial nation. Whereas 26·5 million people are recorded as regular listeners, only 6·5 million seem to have a radio set of their own. The majority are dependent on the relay of radio programmes over the State-controlled network of loudspeakers.

In an economy which is heavily biased in favour of producer goods, little attention is paid to matters of personal consumption, income, wages, and prices. Whilst some of these items are ignored altogether in the new statistical yearbook, others are represented in series of data which are unintelligible without further explanation, and some must be regarded as downright erroneous. The wage income of workers is still a secret. The turnover in the kolkhoz market, previously reported at 41,200 million rubles, now appears to be calculated at approximately 29,000 million rubles. The index of retail prices cannot be reconciled with that of kolkhoz market prices, and the index of real wages does not tally with that of retail prices. The index of construction costs is so unsatisfactory in its component parts that *Pravda*[1] has called it 'meaningless'.

The addition of a set of data on capital investment deserves special mention, all the more so as it is presented in terms of constant prices of July 1955. Figures of this kind were first given by Bulganin[2] during the Twentieth Congress, but they have been revised in the meantime. Unfortunately they are unlikely to be correct. It is improbable that the volume of fixed investment increased eleven-fold from 1929 to 1950. The fallacy of the index is evident from the claim that investment in collectives, notoriously neglected until 1953, increased even more than investment in industry, i.e. sixteen-fold, between 1929 and 1950. In converting data from a current to a fixed price basis, insufficient allowance has obviously been made for the steep inflationary increase, prior to the last war, of prices for capital goods. In this way an impressive rate of growth is presented which is as unjustified as that shown by the indices of industrial production and national income based on the discredited 'constant' 1926–7 prices. As Soviet statisticians may well be in the process of recalculating some of their outdated indices, it is important to be aware of the new element of distortion that is apparently being introduced into certain volume indices.

[1] *Pravda*, 7 June 1956

[2] Speech at the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (*Pravda*, 22 February 1956).

A statistical yearbook is an anonymous document; but its contents and presentation tend to reveal something of the spirit in which it is prepared. The new publication, though welcome, still tends to give preference to data that tell a story of success rather than giving a complete account of the truth. The selection of certain base years for various indices seems more than accidental. Unexplained revisions of substantial magnitude are equally disturbing.

SOME SOVIET STATISTICIANS

Little is known of those in charge of Soviet statistical work, but if men such as V. N. Starovsky still determine the work of the Central Statistical Administration, it is worth recalling that he was one of the convenors of the Methodology Conference in 1950. The tenor of that Conference may be gauged from the summary record published in the organ of the Central Statistical Administration. 'Soviet statisticians', it stated, 'must be educated in a spirit of unlimited devotion to the Communist Party headed by the great Stalin.'[1] At the Conference Starovsky sided with those who accused some of their colleagues, such as Pisarev and Nemchinov, of anti-Marxist distortions and harmful bourgeois influences. The main crimes of those criticized seem to have been the acceptance of statistics as a universal science suitable for the study of society as well as nature, and of the law of large numbers as a basis for their work. As the controversy progressed it stepped from the plane of science to the pedestal of dogma.

This is not to say that Russia has never bred statisticians of the Western type. On the contrary, Russian statisticians have in the past ranked among those of the highest repute. But few of them survived the purges of the 'thirties. The end of the New Economic Policy saw the beginning of restrictive practices in statistics as in other spheres. In 1929 Molotov attacked the statisticians for falsifying the Soviet crop returns.[2] The following two years saw the arrest of many leading economists and statisticians. Among them were Professor Kondratyev, the head of the Institute of Economic Research in Moscow; Groman, Bazarov, and Weinstein, prominent scholars who had analysed business cycles; Ginsburg, the author of a well-known book on the economy of industry; Kafenhaus, an expert in industrial statistics; Minz, a specialist in

[1] *Vestnik Statistiki* ('Statistical Herald'), No 1, Moscow, 1950.
[2] *Pravda*, 20 September 1929.

labour statistics; and the three prominent agronomists Makarov, Chayanov, and Chelintsev.

Simultaneously statistical journals of long standing ceased to appear. Among them were the *Economic Review*, the *Monthly Statistical Bulletin*, *Socialist Economy*, the *Statistical Review*, *Labour Statistics*, *Trade Questions*, the *Financial Herald*, and *Path of Agricultural Economy*.[1] The *Statistical Herald*,[2] which also ceased publication in 1930, reappeared, a shadow of its former self, in 1950 as the official organ of the Central Statistical Administration. In the course of the purge this Administration had lost its independence and it has never regained it. At first it was reduced to a branch of Gosplan. After a chequered history, it eventually severed its relations with the planning authorities in 1948 and was subordinated to the Council of Ministers.

In spite of its many setbacks the Soviet Union's statistical service has succeeded in becoming an organization of truly formidable dimensions. Apart from the officials working at the centre and responsible to the Council of Ministers, statisticians are employed in large numbers in Government Departments and in industrial enterprises, in the Republican, provincial, county, and city administrations, and in State farms and collectives Of the 300,000 economists, statisticians, and accountants of higher and secondary education working in the Soviet Union most are concerned directly or indirectly with operations of an official character and many are in the direct pay of the Central Statistical Administration and its departmental and regional organs.

While the size of the service is impressive and the volume of statistical data collected as formidable as might be expected in a highly centralized planned economy, its quality often leaves much to be desired. As far as can be judged from such journals as the *Statistical Herald*, theoretical discussions on the development of statistical methods are rare nowadays. Moreover, below the academic level, statisticians are often untroubled by conscience Over- and under-statement, concealment, and padding are frequently branded in the professional press. The need for improvement is revealed in reminders such as that by S. Kunin, a member of the Central Statistical Administration, that 'it is a most important duty of each worker of the statistical agencies to struggle

[1] Russian titles are *Economisheskoe Obozrenie, Yezhemesyachny Statistickesky Bulletin, Sotsialisticheskoe Khozyaistvo, Statisticheskoe Obozrenie, Statistika Truda, Voprosy Torgovli, Vestnik Finansov, Puti Selskogo Khozvaistva*

[2] Russian title is *Vestnik Statistiki*

resolutely with those responsible for "throwing dust into the eyes" (*ochkovtiratel' stvo*)'.[1] Evidence is lacking to show whether or not statistical accuracy and professional honesty have improved since this appeal was directed by a Soviet statistician to his fellow workers in the Central Statistical Administration.

The new statistical yearbook may represent the beginning of a return to scientific standards, but this will not be known until the controversy that took place under the shadow of Stalin is revived in a spirit of unfettered frankness. In the meantime it would seem wise to judge Soviet economic data by internationally accepted standards. Stalin, though apparently no longer acceptable in the Soviet Union, held views about the Western approach to statistical work that still seem worth recalling. 'In bourgeois States,' he said, 'a statistician has a certain minimum amount of professional honour. He cannot lie. He can be of any political conviction and inclination. But wherever facts and figures are concerned he will submit to torture, but he will not tell a lie.'[2]

W. K.

The September 1956 Congress of the Chinese Communist Party

THE Eighth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, the first since 1945, took place in Peking between 15 and 27 September this year. The previous Congress had met in Yenan, at a time when the Chinese Communists were not yet in control of the country, when the war against Japan had not yet been won, and when the final phase in the protracted fight with the Kuomintang was yet to come. The situation at this last Congress was very different—it was a gathering of delegates representing a party which, at long last, had emerged from the hardships and anxieties of civil war and underground struggle to rule a country of more than 600 million people. At one time it had been so weak in China that its 1928

[1] *Vestnik Statistiki* ('Statistical Herald'), No 5, Moscow, 1951

[2] Report to the Thirteenth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party (1924), Stalin's *Works* (Moscow, 1947), vol. 6, p. 215.

Congress had to meet in Moscow. Twenty years later, Chiang Kai-shek was in Formosa and the Chinese People's Republic was proclaimed. It was with this knowledge that the 1,026 delegates met to hear about the progress made since the last Congress, and particularly since the establishment of Communist rule, and about plans for the future.

INDUSTRY

The main economic report was presented by Prime Minister Chou En-lai,[1] who told the Congress that the First Five-Year Plan, due to end in 1957, would be successfully fulfilled, and that some of the results already achieved exceeded the planners' expectations. Chou thought that by the end of the current Five-Year Plan total capital investment would amount to 110 per cent of the Plan. More than that: since the Plan was launched, the total value of industrial output (at 1952 prices) has regularly exceeded the target. By the end of next year, the annual production of steel will be 5,500,000 tons, electricity 18,000 million kilowatt hours, and coal 120 million tons. Among the industrial products manufactured for the first time in China, he listed jet aircraft, motor vehicles, machine tools and equipment for the mining and power industries, though without an indication of the quantities produced.

No one will dispute the fact that China has made great strides in her industrialization programme. Starting practically from scratch, and helped by the U.S.S.R. and the East European People's Democracies, she was bound to increase her industrial production But the fact that plans are being over-fulfilled at so early a stage presupposes that the original targets were set too low. The difficulties were admitted by Vice-Premier Li Fu-chun, who is also Chairman of the Planning Commission. He said that the basis for planning was really not adequate when the current Plan was drawn up, because 'China is economically backward'; she is a largely agricultural country, 'where industry is underdeveloped and the basis for heavy industry is very weak'.

'The extreme backwardness' of Chinese industry was also admitted by Chou En-lai, who advanced the extension of the country's heavy industrial base as the only possible solution. Both he and Liu Shao-chi, who delivered the main political report, stressed

[1] All quotations and summaries of speeches and Congress reports are based on official versions published in *Jenmin Jih Pao* (Peking), 16 September 1956 *et seq.* and in *Pravda* (Moscow) 16 September 1956 *et seq*

that the 'industrialization of China is based on the development of heavy industry', thus conforming to classic Marxist theory.

China's new industrial base is being developed in the interior of the country, close to raw material sources and away from the vulnerable coastal areas. To quote Chou En-lai again: 'To attain a rational distribution of our production forces, to advance the economic development of all regions and to adapt the distribution of our industries to the circumstances arising from our resources and from national defence, we must build new industrial bases in the interior.' However, the existing industrial potential is not being abandoned, for Chou also said: 'We must make full use of the existing industries near the coast. The equipment, personnel, and funds required to build up the industries in the interior must all be based on the industrial cities near the coast.'

Although the First Five-Year Plan has still more than a year to run, the Central Committee submitted to the Eighth Party Congress its draft of the Second Five-Year Plan for 1958–62. During this period capital investment will be roughly twice the total for the First Five-Year Plan. By 1962, the planned annual production of steel will be 10½ to 12 million tons, electricity 40–43,000 million kilowatt hours, and coal 190 to 210 million tons. The total value of industrial output will be double that originally planned for 1957.

Like all other Communist countries, China is suffering from a shortage of good-quality consumer goods and from an inadequate and badly organized distribution network. During the Second Five-Year Plan, the output of light industries will be increased by 60 per cent, and a free market will be allowed to supplement the State market. Yet Li Hsien-nien, the Finance Minister, argued that, despite an increase in the people's purchasing power, a black market in industrial consumer goods was practically non-existent, and that runs on the market were almost unknown.

China's economic planners do not claim infallibility. Chou En-lai admitted that labour productivity in industry had outstripped increases in wages. In 1955, labour productivity was roughly 10 per cent greater than in 1954, although the average industrial wage had only increased by just one-half per cent. This spring, however, the wage system throughout the country was reformed, the average wage of workers and employees being fixed at some 13 per cent above that of the preceding year. Nevertheless, it emerges from his report that although the average wage in 1956 will be 33·5 per cent higher than in 1952, labour productivity in

State-owned enterprises, for instance, will have risen by 70·4 per cent over the same period of time.

Although many delegates spoke of uninterrupted progress in the future on the basis of past and present achievements, Chou said quite openly: '. . . in China, with its backward economy and vast population, there will be frequent shortages for many years to come, while any surplus will be of temporary nature.'

AGRICULTURE

To the Chinese Communists, who control the world's largest peasant population, the worker-peasant alliance, the Marxist prerequisite for a socialist society, is more than an empty slogan. Today, peasants compose 69·1 per cent of the Chinese Communist Party membership. At the Congress, Vice-Premier Teng Tzu-hui said that the peasantry was the main force of the Chinese Revolution. He also pointed out that, in order to maintain the worker-peasant alliance and to increase agricultural production, it was imperative to meet the growing rural demand for consumer goods. Like all Communist countries, China aims at complete agricultural collectivization, which it expects to attain by 1957, except in some areas inhabited by national minorities. An unprecedented collectivization drive was launched in the spring of 1955, and the rate at which co-operative farms have been founded is amazing. Indeed, its precipitate character will, no doubt, leave its mark on Chinese agriculture for many years to come. In the summer of 1954 there were only 114,000 co-operatives.[1] According to Chou En-lai's Congress report, in June of this year there were 992,000 farming co-operatives, incorporating 91·7 per cent of all peasant households. In the past, the collectivization campaign has been based on both coercion and persuasion. At present, all coercive methods are strongly condemned, and former kulaks are even allowed to join co-operatives under certain conditions. Similar steps have had to be taken in Eastern Europe for the same reasons: to tone down the class struggle in the villages, and to raise agricultural production by making use of the expert knowledge of the bigger peasants. Much was made at the Chinese Party Congress of the leniency shown to the formerly wealthy peasants, but there was no mention of the vast loss of life which accompanied land reform and the subsequent collectivization drive.

[1] 1954 Statistical Report, issued by the State Statistical Bureau, Peking, September 1956.

Chou En-lai told the Congress that this year the total output of grain and cotton would reach the targets originally set for the end of 1957, despite floods and other natural calamities. He added, however, that there was little hope of harvesting the planned total of some industrial crops, such as jute, soya beans, and groundnuts, and that a number of livestock-production targets would remain unfulfilled. The draft for the Second Five-Year Plan (1958–62) envisages a 35 per cent increase in the total value of agricultural production. But the delegates were warned that, because of China's industrial backwardness, the State would not be able to provide sufficient aid for agriculture. It was estimated that by the end of the Second Five-Year Plan only one-tenth of the country's total acreage would be cultivated by machines. Co-operatives were told that the shortage of artificial fertilizers would continue, and were advised to breed as many pigs and sheep as possible to overcome this problem. While the Government is pledged to press on with large-scale water conservation projects, Chou En-lai urged co-operatives to build their own irrigation and drainage schemes.

Irrespective of any industrial progress which China may make in the next ten years or so, it will still remain a predominantly agrarian country, with agriculture making increased demands on industry. It is also obvious that China's industrial potential will, for a long time, continue to lag behind even the minimum demands of the collectivization and industrialization programmes, as well as the needs of the armed forces. This factor must exert considerable influence on Peking's relations with Moscow.

THE PARTY

The Chinese Communist Party has, so far, avoided the ideological storm and stress which affected other Communist Parties after Stalin's death, and particularly since the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. The Chinese Communist leaders now claim that they have always 'co-ordinated the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Chinese Revolution', as Lui Shao-chi said at the Congress. The classic Leninist concept of the worker-peasant alliance is regarded as the foundation of Communist rule in China, but acceptance of the national bourgeoisie (i.e. big, middle, and small capitalists and bourgeois intellectuals in Liu's definition) as ally of the working class shows how far the Chinese Communists have gone in adapting doctrine to reality. Even Mao Tse-tung, in his opening speech,

said: 'In China, the allies of the working class are not only the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie of the towns, but also the national bourgeoisie.' In the economic sphere, the Communists still say that one aspect of capitalist industry and commerce benefits the people. In his big political report, Liu Shao-chi said: 'The State has therefore adopted a policy of using, restricting, and transforming capitalist industry and commerce. The working class has established an economic alliance with the national bourgeoisie, in which the State sector of the economy controls the capitalist sector, and which transforms the capitalist system into socialist ownership by various forms of State capitalism.' Joint ownership of some enterprises by the State and individual capitalists is one of these forms.

At the same time there is no doubt that the final aim is to remould and re-educate the national bourgeoisie, and to fight it while uniting with it for some specific purposes. At the Congress the importance of the so-called democratic parties and non-party personalities in contributing to this re-education was also acknowledged. The Congress laid down a policy of long-term co-existence between the Communists and the so-called democratic parties, and even demanded that they should mutually supervise each other. This is another instance of how the doctrine of the class struggle is being modified in China, at least on paper.

Of course, these concessions were not granted until all danger of a successful counter-revolution had been ruthlessly stamped out. Today, in the words of Lo Jui-ching, the Minister of Public Security, 'it has become entirely impossible for the counter-revolutionaries to make a come-back'. He said that the period of fierce class struggle was over, adding however that the struggle between the revolution and counter-revolution still continued. Liu Shao-chi, in his report, echoed the general Communist reversal of Stalin's class-war theory by saying that there were no grounds to believe that Chinese counter-revolutionaries were becoming more active. Vigilance is still the order of the day, but, in characteristic Chinese fashion, the slogans 'strictness with care' and 'punishment with leniency' are now being put forward.

The problem of the personality cult, which has been exercising the minds of Communists everywhere for some time now, was used by the Chinese comrades to illustrate their own blamelessness in this respect. Teng Hsiao-ping, Chief Secretary of the Party's Central Committee, claimed that, as early as 1948, the Central

Committee had taken steps to consolidate the principle of collective leadership within the Party—a principle which, he alleged, had been in existence for a very long time. Without mincing his words, but not mentioning any names, he said that infractions of the collective leadership principle still occurred. He singled out the practice of personal *diktat* and a predilection for lengthy and unnecessary meetings as defects. On the other hand, he spoke of the important role played by the leaders of the Party, and contrasted love for the leaders with deification of the individual. In particular, he underlined the part played by Mao Tse-tung himself, as long ago as 1949, in preventing the glorification of Party leaders by prohibiting the naming of places and enterprises after them.

Nevertheless, many speakers referred to Mao's leadership of the Central Committee and called for a profound study of his writings. Teng Hsiao-ping himself said: 'Our Party owes its victories to the leading personnel at all levels, particularly to the leader of the Party, Comrade Mao Tse-tung.' And Marshal Peng Teh-huai paid tribute to Mao's contribution to the victory of the Chinese People's Army in glowing terms. The fact remains that Mao Tse-tung's position in China is equalled by no Communist leader within the Soviet orbit. The names of the newly elected Central Committee members were read out to the Congress in order of votes received by each candidate; and, of course, Mao topped the poll. After the first meeting of this Central Committee, he emerged as Chairman of the Central Committee and headed the list of the seventeen-member Politburo and its standing committee of six—the effective ruling body. It must not be forgotten that he is also the more-than-titular head of the Chinese State.

Generally speaking, most Congress delegates expressed satisfaction with the state of the Party. It was claimed that, since the elimination of left-wing deviation in 1935, no major issues had threatened the ideological unity of the Party, though it was not till last year that the conflict with the Kao Kang group was resolved. Teng Hsiao-ping alleged, however, that there were no ideological foundations for the struggle against Kao Kang and Jao Shu-shih, who were merely out to seize personal power.

Although the general Party line was adjudged correct by the Congress, there was a considerable amount of criticism of the working methods of Party cadres. Teng Hsiao-ping said: 'Some Party members become conceited over the smallest success and tend to despise others, the masses, and non-Party personalities. . .

Some order the masses about and are reluctant to consult them. This is a tendency towards narrow sectarianism; it is a dangerous tendency which leads to the most serious isolation from the masses.' This is indeed a grave defect, for constant lip service was paid at the Congress to the so-called mass line. Teng argued that the Chinese Communist Party could only fulfil its mission by keeping in close contact with the masses at all times. At the Congress attention was also drawn to tension between the Chinese race and the national minority groups. Delegates were warned against great-Hanism, the Chinese equivalent of what is known in the U.S.S.R. as 'great-Russian chauvinism'. In their desire to establish amicable relations with the minorities, the Chinese Communists are, at the moment, quite prepared to allow local temporal and religious leaders to retain their wealth and some of their positions, in the hope that they will induce their people to collaborate with the Peking regime. What is happening in Tibet today is an example of the application of this policy.

The relationship between Party and people is all the more important because only 1·7 per cent of the population are Communists. Furthermore, the majority of Party members are concentrated in administrative and industrial centres, so that the remainder is very thinly spread throughout China's vast countryside.[1] In effect, according to Teng Hsiao-ping, China is governed by a Party elite of some 300,000 key officials. It is these people who, as he said, have 'a greater responsibility than rank and file members . . . and who, more than others, must never become isolated from the masses, must never be complacent, and must always be prepared to accept criticism from below'.

One of the tasks of the Congress was to adopt a new Party statute. The most significant change was the decision to elect the membership of the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party for a term of five years, and to have annual meetings of this Congress. This provision places the Congress on a quasi-parliamentary basis, thus departing from standard Communist practice elsewhere, which consists of electing a body of delegates for each Party Congress. Chinese Party Congresses will also meet more frequently than similar bodies in other Communist Parties.

[1] Party membership increased from 1,210,000 in 1945 to 10,734,384 in June 1956 Of this, 14 per cent are workers, 69 1 per cent peasants, 11 7 per cent intellectuals, and 5 2 per cent others Women form about 10 per cent of the Party's membership

DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICY

Defence matters were reviewed by the Minister of Defence, Marshal Peng Teh-huai, who said that the major task of the Chinese army was 'defence against imperialist aggression and the safeguarding of China's development'. Regardless of Korea, he asserted that China had 'never considered and will never consider the invasion of other nations'. Peng traced the development of the Chinese People's Army from its guerrilla stage to its present comparatively modern state, and promised that the process of modernization would continue. In this connexion, he thanked the U.S.S.R. for supplying China with 'military equipment and help in the development of the defence industry'. He said: 'To learn all the advanced experience of the Soviet Army is a short cut towards the modernization of our Army' He added that the military science of the capitalist countries must not be ignored.

From the purely technical point of view, the development of the Chinese Army seems to be following a predictable pattern. Peng's discussion of the military and political leadership of the armed forces was of more interest. It would appear that the Chinese army is facing problems similar to those the Red Army had to solve in the 'twenties. Except in emergencies, decisions on all important matters must be taken at Party Committee meetings, but Peng stressed that their implementation must be left to the military commanders or political commissars. He maintained that the Army must be based on 'strict revolutionary discipline combined with a high level of democracy'. As an illustration he mentioned that, whenever possible, a forthcoming engagement was to be thoroughly discussed by all the officers and men concerned, who should appraise the results achieved afterwards. Going even further, Marshal Peng Teh-huai told officers that they must 'listen modestly' to any just criticism by the rank and file.

The Congress saw no inconsistency between Peng's assertion that Communist China nursed no aggressive intention against anybody and the generally accepted aim of 'liberating' Formosa. Chu Teh, for example, pointed out that every possible measure short of war, should be taken to this end, but he added: 'Irrespective of the methods to be used, the liberation of Taiwan is certain.'

In the field of foreign affairs, the Chinese Communists fully subscribe to the policy of peaceful co-existence currently put forward by all Communist countries. Vice-Premier Chen Yi stressed China's need for a peaceful international atmosphere. Even though

he repeated the perennial complaints about the American imperialists and monopolists, he said: 'our policy of peaceful co-existence excludes no one, not even the U.S.A.' Naturally his main preoccupation was with China's relations with the Asian and African countries, and particularly with her neighbours. Broadly speaking, the 'five principles of peaceful co-existence' are the foundation of Chinese foreign policy, at least according to Chen Yi. He stressed the fact that the nations of the East constitute the majority of the world's population, and expressed the belief that they were China's natural allies. He also pledged his country's support for all those still fighting imperialism and colonialism, and, with reference to Suez, he warned the West that a gunboat policy could not be pursued in the middle of the twentieth century.

China is no satellite, but is conscious of the 'indestructible and fraternal friendship', as Chou En-lai put it, linking her to the U.S.S.R. and the People's Democracies. It was made repeatedly clear at the Congress that these ties are not only based on political and ideological considerations, but also on economic needs. As long as Communist China remains in her state of comparative isolation from the West, she has no option but to maintain and extend her present relationship with the U.S.S.R. At the same time, Peking is making great efforts to exert an influence of its own on other Asian and African countries. The Bandung policy is being developed on an increasing scale; and, by establishing diplomatic relations and economic contacts with many Arab countries, China is laying the foundations of a future Middle East policy. The stronger China grows economically, the greater will be her political influence, particularly in the Afro-Asian area. Today, Russia claims the leadership of what are described as the anti-colonial forces. But the Russians are not an Asian or African race and they have a camouflaged colonial empire of their own. The Chinese are potentially the strongest coloured power on earth, and thus it is logical that ultimately Peking will want to head the renaissance of Asia and Africa. At present China has to depend on Soviet economic aid, just as Moscow cannot afford to deny it. The Congress has shown that the programme of industrialization is feasible and will be vigorously pursued. The time will come, albeit not soon, when China will stand entirely on her own feet. Long before that Moscow will have to reappraise its policy towards Peking.

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Hungary and the Middle East

A Chronology of Events, 19 October–6 November 1956

19 Oct.—Poland. Opening of eighth Plenum of Polish Communist Party Central Committee in Warsaw. Arrival by air of Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovic, Koniev (C.-in-C. Warsaw Pact Forces), and a staff of generals.

20 Oct.—Poland. Soviet delegates left Warsaw at 6.40 a.m.[1]

New Central Committee announced: Gomulka First Secretary of the Party; General Election promised for 16 December.

21 Oct.—Poland. Result of elections for new Central Committee announced; Rokossowski not re-elected.

Bitter attacks in *Pravda* on the Polish press. Russian press gave news of Soviet visit to Warsaw but no information on events in Poland.

Hungary. Open-air meetings in Gyor 'during the week-end' reported to have demanded withdrawal of Soviet troops and the release of Cardinal Mindszenty. (*New York Times*, 22 Oct.)

22 Oct.—Hungary. Students demanded return of Nagy, and expressed sympathy with Polish fight for sovereignty and liberation.

23 Oct.—Poland. Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz invited to Moscow.

Hungary. Demonstrations by Hungarian students, and later by workers. Clashes with Hungarian secret police (AVH) and troops; shots fired by AVH.

Recall of French Ambassador from Cairo. French Foreign Minister, M. Pineau, visited London.

24 Oct.—Hungary. During night of 23–24 October Nagy invited to become Prime Minister, and re-elected to Politbureau. Radio announcement at 7.15 a.m. confirming his appointment, and that of Gero as First Secretary of the Central Committee.

7.45 a.m. State of emergency proclaimed.

8 a.m. Announcement that Government had invoked the Treaty of Warsaw and appealed for support of Soviet troops to help restore order.

11 a.m. Government proclamation granting exemption from summary jurisdiction for all those laying down arms before 13.00 hours.

13.30. Time limit for the surrender of arms extended until 17.00 hours.

[1] Times are GMT throughout unless otherwise stated.

Fighting spread to other parts of Hungary. Soviet troops, including tanks, reported to be in action in Budapest.

Poland. Gomulka announced postponement of General Election from 16 December to 20 January.

25 Oct.—Hungary. Soviet troops stationed in Budapest threw cordon round the city.

Reported that Mikoyan, Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister, and Suslov, expert on East European affairs, arrived in Budapest and left at noon.

Gerö dismissed as First Secretary of Hungarian Workers' Party and replaced by Kadar.

In the afternoon, Kadar broadcast promise that, after restoration of order, the Government would open conversations with the Soviet Government. Later, Nagy announced that Soviet troops would be withdrawn immediately after the restoration of order.

Middle East. Agreement on the establishment of a joint Egypt–Jordan–Syria military command, headed by Egyptian C.-in-C., in event of major hostilities with Israel.

26 Oct.—Hungary. Special session of Central Committee of Hungarian Workers' Party in Budapest.

Fighting between Hungarians and Soviet army continued in Budapest. Reports confirmed of Soviet tanks firing in the city.

Reported moves by U.S., British, French, and other Governments on advisability of taking Hungarian situation to U.N.

27 Oct.—Hungary. Budapest radio announced formation of a new Government under leadership of Nagy, to include non-Communists (Tildy and Kovacs, former members of Small Landowners' party).

28 Oct.—Poland. Marshal Rokossowski reported to have 'gone on leave'.

Cardinal Wyszinski released.

Hungary. Soviet forces reported to have begun evacuation of Budapest.

Nagy promised general amnesty, withdrawal of Soviet troops, and early negotiations with the Soviet Government for general withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and a new relationship based on independence.

Hungarian Note to U.N. Secretary-General protesting that 'events which took place on 22 October and thereafter are exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of the Hungarian People's Republic.'

Security Council. U.K., France, and U.S. sought to indict U.S.S.R for violently repressing rights of Hungarian people by military action Motion to put this item on agenda adopted by 9 votes to 1 (U.S.S.R), Yugoslavia abstaining. British delegate reported that two very strong Soviet armoured units had crossed into Hungary 'early today' and were moving fast towards Budapest.

Middle East. President Eisenhower appealed to Israeli Prime Minister to avoid doing anything that would endanger peace, and announced that he had ordered talks with U.K. and France on Middle East situation.

Israel ordered partial mobilization.

29 Oct.—Hungary. Insurgents' committee in West Hungary at Györ delivered an ultimatum to Nagy asking for a democracy of the Western type and the free formation of political parties.

Kadar became leader of Central Committee of Hungarian Workers' Party; Nagy still a member.

Middle East. Israeli forces invaded Sinai peninsula.

British parachute troops brought back to Nicosia from operations against terrorists in West Cyprus.

British ships sailed from Malta.

U.S. Government announced that it would take Middle East crisis to Security Council on 30 October. Dulles met representatives of the U.K. and France and discussed application of Tripartite Declaration to present situation.

Israeli Government assured British Ambassador in Tel Aviv that Israel would not attack Jordan.

30 Oct.—Middle East. Security Council met at 4 p.m. GMT (i e 11 a.m. U.S. Eastern Standard Time). U.S. resolution introduced calling on Israel to withdraw armed forces behind established armistice lines and urging all members of U.N. to refrain from use of force or threat of force in the area in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of U.N. and to refrain from giving assistance to Israel so long as she did not comply. U.K. and France voted against this resolution (i.e. used the veto), Australia and Belgium abstained.

Russian resolution introduced in similar terms but omitting call to all members to refrain from giving military and other aid to Israel. U.K. and France voted against; U.S. and Belgium abstained.

Iraqi Government assured Egyptian Government that Iraq would send any aid asked for as a result of Israel's attack.

4.30 p.m. Prime Minister told House of Commons that U.K. Government had sent an ultimatum to Egypt and to Israel, to be answered within twelve hours, calling on them to stop all warlike action and withdraw forces to distance of ten miles from the Suez Canal, and had asked Egyptian Government to agree that Anglo-French forces should move temporarily into key positions in Port Said, Ismailia, and Suez. He stated: 'Our action under the Tripartite Declaration in relation to Egypt must, surely, be governed by the fact that Egypt has taken as her stand that she will not accept the implications of the Tripartite Declaration . . . her position under the Tripartite Declaration is not the same as that of other countries, notably Israel.'[1]

Similar statement by M. Mollet, French Prime Minister, in National Assembly approved by 390 votes to 191.

Rejection of British and French ultimatum by Col. Nasser conveyed

[1] The following answer was given to a question in the House of Commons on 19 November: 'There has been no change in H M G.'s policy in this regard [i.e. H.M.G 's present policy in relation to the Tripartite Declaration], so far as Israel, Jordan, the Lebanon, and Syria are concerned. As the Prime Minister stated in the House on 30 October, the position of Egypt is not the same as that of other countries as Egypt has taken as her stand that she will not accept the implications of the Tripartite Declaration.'

to British Ambassador in Cairo before expiry time of British ultimatum.

Israel replied accepting conditions of British and French ultimatum provided Egypt also accepted.

French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister in London.

Hungary. Budapest radio said that withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest began at 4 p.m.

Nagy promised free elections and return to multi-party system Announced intention to form an interim five-party Cabinet while elections were being prepared.

Moscow radio broadcast a Soviet Government declaration stating readiness to discuss with satellites the question of troops stationed in their territories: Soviet units were in Hungary and Rumania under the Warsaw Treaty, and in Poland under the Warsaw Treaty and Potsdam Agreement; there were no military units in the other People's Democracies. Statement admitted 'downright mistakes' in relations with these States, and 'violations and mistakes which infringe the principles of equality between sovereign States'. The Soviet Government had given orders to the C.-in-C. to withdraw troops from Budapest as soon as Hungarian Government desired it, and was ready to start discussions with Hungarian Government on general position of Soviet troops in Hungary. The Soviet Government and the whole Soviet people expressed their regret that events in Hungary had led to bloodshed.

Cardinal Mindszenty released.

31 Oct.—Middle East. British bombers attacked four Egyptian airfields and British cruiser sank Egyptian frigate.

President Eisenhower declared that in his view British and French attack on Egypt had been 'launched in error'.

Security Council. Proposal by Yugoslavia that General Assembly be summoned to make recommendations on Middle East crisis Adopted 7 for, 2 against (U.K. and France), Australia and Belgium abstaining.

Debate in House of Commons on British action in Egypt.

Establishment of Anglo-French Command in Cyprus announced.

Hungary. Nagy stated that Soviet troops had withdrawn from Budapest to their bases in Hungary (confirmed by press reports). Said Hungary might have the same sort of neutrality now enjoyed by Austria

Reported that parties had been reconstituted and new Cabinet was in process of formation. Dudas, chairman of the Revolutionary Council in Budapest, demanded that the Cabinet must be put on a broader basis and must contain no Communists or collaborators.

1 Nov.—Middle East. U.N. General Assembly met in emergency session at 10 p.m.

In vote of confidence in House of Commons, Government obtained a majority of 67 (320 votes to 253). Prime Minister said that there had been no declaration of war but 'we are in a state of armed conflict.'

Telegram from Indian Prime Minister (Mr Nehru) to U.N. Secretary-General strongly condemning Anglo-French invasion of Egypt.

Russia called for second Bandung Conference to demand withdrawal of British, French, and Israeli troops from Egypt.

Israeli claim that opposition in Sinai had collapsed.

Reported that Syrian troops had entered Jordan.

Foreign Office confirmed that Egypt had broken off diplomatic relations with U.K.

Hungary. Hungarian Government renounced Warsaw Pact, declared Hungary's neutrality, and asked for guarantee from the Four Powers.

Nagy sent telegram to U.N. Secretary-General asking him to place question of Hungary on agenda of General Assembly.

Reported that 'this afternoon' Soviet troops of all arms were pouring across the frontier.

Opposition Government set up at Gyor called on Nagy to resign.

Kadar reported to have gone to Soviet Embassy and failed to return.

2 Nov.—Middle East. At emergency session of U.N. General Assembly, U.S. resolution urged: (i) all parties involved in hostilities in Middle East should agree to an immediate cease-fire and halt movement of military forces and arms into the area; (ii) Israel and Egypt should withdraw their forces behind the armistice lines; (iii) all members should refrain from introducing military goods into the area of hostilities; (iv) upon cease-fire becoming effective steps should be taken to re-open the Suez Canal and restore secure freedom of navigation. Adopted by 64 votes to 5, with 6 abstentions. Mr Lester Pearson (Canada) put forward idea of a U.N. force to keep Arab–Israeli borders at peace while political settlement could be worked out.

Fall of Gaza. Israeli Government announced operations practically completed.

Egyptian delegate to U.N. announced that Egypt would accept cease-fire resolution if 'attacking armies cease their aggression'.

Israeli Ambassador in London said Israel would not go back to *status quo ante* so far as her vital security was concerned, and would never agree that her troops should go back.

British Ambassador in Beirut told Lebanon that the British Government intended that 'Israel should withdraw her forces from their present positions as soon as that can be satisfactorily arranged.'

Syria broke off diplomatic relations with U.K. and France.

Indian Prime Minister described Sir Anthony Eden's explanation of Anglo-French action as 'totally unconvincing and unsatisfactory'.

French Foreign Secretary arrived in London.

Hungary. Reports estimated that between six and eight Russian divisions were in Hungary. Spokesman of Hungarian Revolutionary Military Council said that approximately 700 Soviet armoured vehicles including tanks had crossed into Hungary during previous thirty hours. Russians controlled all main railways, roads, and airports. The Russian move had not been resisted because 'if there is to be a war we want them to start it.'

Nagy appealed again to U.N. to guarantee Hungary's neutrality and to bring her case before General Assembly.

Nagy made three oral protests to Soviet Ambassador in Budapest concerning Russian reinforcements still pouring across frontier.

Cardinal Mindszenty appealed to Western Powers for help.

Security Council. British, French, and U.S. request to Security

Council to consider critical situation in Hungary vetoed by U.S.S.R. Yugoslavia voted to discuss the Hungarian crisis. Discussion in U.N. as to whether Hungarian representative was qualified to represent his country.

Soviet delegate to U.N. stated that reports of Soviet tanks and armoured cars moving back into Hungary were 'utterly unfounded'.

3 Nov.—**Middle East.** U.K. and France replied to U.N. Secretary-General on resolution of 2 November: they maintained view that police action must be carried through urgently to stop the hostilities which were threatening the Suez Canal, to prevent a resumption of these hostilities, and to pave the way for a definitive settlement of the Arab–Israeli war which threatened the legitimate interests of so many countries. They would most willingly stop military action as soon as the following conditions could be satisfied: both the Egyptian and the Israeli Governments should agree to accept a U.N. force to keep the peace; the U.N. should decide to constitute and maintain such a force until an Arab–Israeli peace settlement could be reached and until satisfactory arrangements had been agreed in regard to the Suez Canal, both agreements to be guaranteed by the U.N.; meanwhile, until the U.N. force should be constituted, both combatants should agree to accept forthwith limited detachments of Anglo-French troops to be stationed between them.

Prime Minister broadcast to the British people. He gave an assurance that 'once British and French forces have occupied key positions on the Canal, the British Government will ensure that the Israeli forces will withdraw from Egyptian territory.'

Israeli delegate to U.N. offered to negotiate with Egypt.

Entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan confirmed.

Hungary. Nagy Government negotiated with four Russian generals on technical aspects of withdrawal of Soviet troops. Military leaders of the revolt, General Maleter and General Kovacs, seized and held by Russians when they went to sign the agreement at Soviet military headquarters.

Cardinal Mindszenty said in broadcast: 'We want a classless society and a State where law prevails, a country developing democratic achievements, based on private ownership correctly restricted by the interests of society and justice. This is what the Hungarian people wants.'

Indian Government dispatched Note to U.S.S.R. expressing 'concern and distress at recent developments'. [This may in part have referred to events in the Middle East.]

4 Nov.—**Middle East.** 2 a.m. U.N. General Assembly passed Canadian resolution requesting Secretary-General to produce within forty-eight hours a plan for setting up, with consent of nations concerned, an emergency international U.N. force to secure and supervise cessation of hostilities in accordance with Assembly's previous resolution urging immediate cease-fire. Resolution carried by 57 for, none against; 19 abstained, including U.K., France, Israel, and Egypt. British explanation was that resolution went too far in some respects and not far enough in others.

Egyptian Government later accepted above resolution and stated readiness to cease military operations by 20.00 hours.

A resolution introduced by nineteen Afro-Asian nations urged compliance within twelve hours with resolution of 2 November regarding cease-fire and withdrawal behind the armistice lines. Adopted by 59 for, 5 against; 12 abstained.

U.N. Secretary-General extended time limit by nine hours.

A resolution introduced by Canada, Colombia, and Norway, establishing a U.N. command for an emergency international force and appointing Major-General E. L. M. Burns as its Chief, was adopted by 57 for, none against; 19 abstained.

Israeli Foreign Office official stated that the Israeli-Egyptian armistice was dead. Israel wanted direct and immediate talks with Egypt. Until such negotiations she intended to stand on what she had taken. She would only fight other Arab States if they attacked her. The moving of Syrian and Iraqi troops into Jordan would not be used as excuse for Israeli attack on Arabs.

Israel claimed complete victory in Sinai.

Three oil pumping stations in Syria seriously damaged.

French Foreign Secretary flew to London.

Hungary. Nagy broadcast at 4.15 a m. that Russian forces were attacking Budapest. He was almost immediately displaced as Prime Minister by Kadar, who at 5 a m. announced formation of a new Government. Nagy took refuge in Yugoslav Embassy.

Reported that a 7 a.m. ultimatum was delivered by Russians stating that Budapest would be bombed if no capitulation received by 11 a.m.

Personal message from President Eisenhower to Mr Bulganin urged withdrawal of Russian troops from Hungary.

United Nations. Soviet veto used to prevent discussion on Hungary in Security Council.

General Assembly adopted by 50 votes to 8, with 15 abstentions, U.S. resolution calling on Russia to withdraw all her forces from Hungary.

5 **Nov.—Middle East.** British and French paratroops landed at Port Said.

Prime Minister told House of Commons that the Governor and Military Commander of Port Said were discussing surrender terms with British Commander.

Allied Headquarters said surrender terms had been agreed and Egyptian troops in Port Said had laid down their arms. Later announced that Egypt had rejected surrender terms

Telegram from Israeli Government to U.N. Secretary-General accepted cease-fire appeal and stated that since 'this morning' all fighting ceased between Egyptian and Israeli forces on land, sea, and air.

Soviet Government, in message from Bulganin to Eden and Mollet delivered to British and French Ambassadors, warned the two countries that it was determined to crush aggression and establish peace in the Middle East with other members of U.N. The war might spread to other countries and become a third world war. The Soviet Union had

approached the U.N. and President Eisenhower with proposal to use naval and air forces, together with other U.N. members, to stop war in Egypt and to restrain aggression, and alluded to possible use of rockets for this purpose.

A letter to Israeli Prime Minister said that the Soviet Ambassador in Tel Aviv was being recalled as a warning.

In letter to President Eisenhower, Mr Bulganin proposed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union should combine in an effort to control Anglo-French aggression in Egypt.

U.S. Government announced it would oppose any effort of Soviet or other military forces to enter the Middle East area. Proposal that U.S. and Soviet forces should intervene to restore peace in the Middle East was 'unthinkable'.

A U.S. statement called on all parties concerned in current Middle East strife to accept 'promptly and in good faith' resolutions of U.N. calling for a cease-fire and withdrawal of foreign forces.

In reply to a telegram from six members of British Labour Party, Israeli Prime Minister gave assurances that Israel was ready to make peace with Egypt.

Foreign Office published text of British reply to U.N. resolution of 4 November welcoming idea which seemed to underlie the resolution that an international police force should be interpolated as a shield between Israel and Egypt pending a Palestine settlement and the settlement of the question of the Suez Canal.

French Government replied in identical terms.

Hungary. Russian army proclamation broadcast from Budapest said Soviet soldiers, themselves workers and peasants, had not come as conquerors but as friends to help to crush a fascist and criminal revolution.

The Soviet High Command, in statement on similar lines, urged Hungarian army to co-operate in putting down revolution, and added 'Nagy's Government was wrong: there is no neutrality.'

Kadar Government outlined in general terms programme of economic concessions within Communist framework and without mentioning free elections.

Frontier between Austria and Hungary stated to be completely closed.

6 Nov.—U.S.A. Presidential Election took place. Mr Eisenhower re-elected.

Poland. It was announced that three more Russian generals had been dropped from Polish army, making total of thirty-two Russian officers 'recalled' and replaced by Poles.

The Polish Minister of Justice reported to have given instructions that all outstanding indictments arising from Poznan riots be annulled

Hungary. Fighting continued in Budapest and in some parts of the country between Hungarians and Soviet armed forces.

Government of Pakistan decided to sponsor a U.N. resolution urging cease-fire and withdrawal of all foreign forces from Hungary, raising of a U.N. police force, and the holding of general elections under U.N. auspices.

Middle East. 1 a.m. GMT (i.e. 8 p.m. 5 November, U.S. Eastern Standard Time). Russia summoned Security Council to endorse joint U.S.–Soviet military force in Middle East unless Anglo-French forces halted within twelve hours. Council rejected motion to debate proposal: 3 votes for; 4 against; 4 abstentions.

Saudi Arabian Government announced intention to break off diplomatic relations with U.K.

Swiss Government proposed conference in Geneva between representatives of U.S., France, U.K., Russia, and India.

Press Attaché of U.N. truce supervision organization reported that Israel had told General Burns that she had ceased to implement the Israeli–Egyptian armistice agreement and asked for withdrawal of all U.N. truce observers from the Gaza area.

Moscow radio reported appeal by Egyptians for help through volunteers, arms, or by any other means from all those who still respected human dignity and law in international relations.

U.N. Secretary-General circulated his proposals for an international police force.

In House of Commons at 6 p.m. Prime Minister gave H M. Government's reply to the U.N. Secretary-General's communication (received during night of 5–6 November) stating that Israel and Egypt had accepted the unconditional cease-fire and requesting information on attitude of British and French Governments to an international police force. Reply stated that if H.M. Government received confirmation from the Secretary-General that Egypt and Israel had accepted an unconditional cease-fire and that the international force to be set up would be competent to secure and supervise objectives set out in 2 November resolution of General Assembly, H M.G. would 'agree to stop further military operations'. H.M G proposed that technicians accompanying the Franco–British force should at once begin work of clearing obstructions in Suez Canal and its approaches 'Pending the confirmation of the above, H.M.G. are ordering their forces to cease fire at midnight tonight unless they are attacked.'

The Prime Minister gave the text of H.M G's reply to a personal message from Bulganin. The reply reiterated that 'the essential aim of the action taken by the British and French Governments was to stop the fighting between Israel and Egypt and to separate the combatants' and added, 'This aim has now been virtually achieved.' H M.G fully approved the principle of an international U.N. force, which they had themselves suggested.

British and French troops in Egypt ceased fire at 12 midnight

Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and Eastern Europe

RECENT events in Poland and Hungary have provided a striking demonstration that the power of national feeling had not become atrophied during the years of Stalinist oppression and regimentation in Eastern Europe. That these feelings eventually crystallized in the form they did was due in large measure to the example set by Yugoslavia in 1948. Her expulsion from the Cominform in that year, though expressed in ideological terms, was the result of Marshal Tito's insistence that Yugoslavia should manage her own affairs without interference by the Soviet Union. Other Communist statesmen in Eastern Europe—Gomulka in Poland, Rajk in Hungary, and Kostov in Bulgaria—believed with Tito that the method of attaining Communism should reflect the individual characteristics of each nation. Unlike Tito, they were crushed by Stalin. Yet so long as Yugoslavia remained defiant, national feeling in the satellite States, however suppressed, had a rallying point. Stalin realized the danger, but his attempts to intimidate his opponent by means of economic pressure and virulent propaganda were unsuccessful and merely caused Yugoslavia to turn to the West for support.

After Stalin's death Soviet tactics towards Yugoslavia changed A gradual process of normalization of relations took place throughout 1953 and 1954, culminating in the unexpectedly sudden Soviet acceptance on 13 October 1954 of the solution to the Trieste problem which had been achieved by the London agreement earlier in the month. For the Yugoslavs this seemed proof of the sincerity of the Soviet desire for friendlier relations, though they made it plain that this would not affect their policy of non-entanglement in either of the great-Power blocs.

THE RAPPROCHEMENT OF 1955

The Soviet overtures to Yugoslavia were taken an important stage further when a Soviet Government delegation led by Khrushchev, Bulganin, and Mikoyan visited Belgrade from 27 May to 3 June 1955. Khrushchev made it clear that the Soviet aim was not only the normalization of inter-governmental relations but also the re-establishment of the links between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Communist Party.

Though he urged the importance of these links for the future of working-class solidarity, Tito would not agree. The final declaration of 2 June, signed for the Soviet Government by Bulganin and not by Khrushchev, the Party leader, did not mention party relations.

Tito, for his part, gained several concessions, *inter alia* a condemnation of the policy of military blocs and an undertaking that hostile propaganda and 'misinformation' should stop. The most substantial gain, however, was the statement that 'questions of internal organization, of different social systems, and of different forms of Socialist development are solely the concern of individual countries.'

Its importance lay in the fact that since the 1948 break with the Cominform Yugoslavia's political and social system had developed differently from that of the Soviet Union. Yugoslav theorists claimed that they had freed themselves from the imperfections which had poisoned the Soviet system under Stalin (e.g. bureaucratization, the all-pervading secret police, and the paralysing uniformity of Soviet national life). They insisted that theirs was a purer form of Marxism-Leninism. To some extent this claim was justified by Yugoslavia's internal achievements, notably the introduction of workers' councils for factory management (June 1950), the relaxation of agricultural collectivization, the decrease in the activities of the secret police, the reduction of federal control envisaged in the Government reorganization of April 1951 and in subsequent measures of decentralization contained in the Social Plan of 1952, and the Federal Constitution adopted at the beginning of 1953. Yugoslavia had moved some way towards humanizing the Communist form of government and thus constituted a formidable ideological opponent of Moscow. The Belgrade Declaration, however, set the seal of orthodoxy on what had formerly been in Soviet eyes a heretical deviation.

THE TWENTIETH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.

The thesis of the differing roads to socialism was further amplified at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956 to include the parliamentary method of altering the social system. Khrushchev declared that:

> . . . it is quite likely that the form of transition to socialism will become even more varied . . . in this connection, the question arises of the possibility of using also parliamentary means for the transition to

socialism . . . this institution [Parliament] may become an organ of true democracy, of democracy for the working people.

While this thesis had the advantage of impressing opinion in the uncommitted areas of the world, its main target was undoubtedly the social democratic parties in the West. Khrushchev's efforts to establish closer ties with non-Communist left-wing parties, which had begun in November 1955 with overtures to the Norwegian Labour Party, provided a pressing reason for exhibiting Communist policies in a more acceptable framework. The insistence on the new thesis must therefore have appeared to the Soviet leaders a sound move but, as events were to show, they had entirely misjudged the scope of its repercussions within their own bloc.

Undoubtedly the sharpest break with the past at the C.P.S.U. Congress—and the one most fraught with dangerous consequences for the Soviet hegemony—was the bitter condemnation of Stalin contained in Khrushchev's report to a closed session of the Congress on 25 February. Great bewilderment was caused in Communist Party ranks throughout the world, and doubts arose not only on the score of the dead leader's policies but also regarding the character and ability of the present leadership. It was widely wondered what guarantee there was against a recrudescence of the Stalinist tyranny. The C.P.S.U., once above and beyond all criticism in the eyes of foreign Communist Parties, now found that its ideological infallibility had become tarnished.

Further confusion arose from the fact that foreign Communist Parties learnt of the contents of Khrushchev's speech only when the U S. State Department published the text on 4 June. The C.P.S.U.'s handling of the whole policy of de-Stalinization aroused widespread criticism and caused certain Communist commentators to reaffirm the necessity for each State to follow its own path to socialism rather than slavishly to follow the Soviet model. The most authoritative critic was Signor Togliatti, leader of the Italian Communist Party (the largest outside the Soviet bloc). In an interview published in the periodical *Nuovi Argomenti* on 16 June he declared:

I do not believe it will be possible for all this [i.e. the denunciation of Stalin] to lead to a diminution of the mutual trust and solidarity among the various parties of the Communist movement. However, undoubtedly not only the need but also the desire for increasingly greater autonomy in judgements will come out of this; and this cannot help but benefit

our movement. . . Today, the front of socialist construction in countries where the Communists are the leading party has been so broadened (amounting to a third of the human race) that even for this part the Soviet model cannot and must not any longer be obligatory. . . The whole system becomes polycentric, and even in the Communist movement itself we cannot speak of a single guide but rather of a progress which is achieved by following paths which are often different.

Togliatti's statement was a complete vindication of the Yugoslav struggle against Stalinism and was undoubtedly influenced by his talks with President Tito in Belgrade at the end of May. It was widely noted by the Communist Parties in Eastern Europe.

PRESIDENT TITO'S VISIT TO MOSCOW

The revelations of the Twentieth Congress were cordially welcomed by the Yugoslavs, who were of the opinion that the attack on Stalin 'removed obstacles that have kept the fighters for socialism apart'. It was felt in Belgrade that the more relaxed political atmosphere which was becoming evident in the U.S.S.R. and the satellite countries needed to be given every encouragement. President Tito's warm letter to the Twentieth Congress with its reference to the Soviet Union as a 'great socialist country' was indicative of this trend. At the same time economic relations between the two countries had become closer. Since the autumn of 1955 the U.S.S.R. had granted Yugoslavia substantial loans and credits on highly favourable terms. Further overtures to Yugoslavia were the dissolution of the Cominform, announced on 18 April 1956, and the retirement of Marshal Tito's old adversary Molotov from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the eve of the Yugoslav leader's visit to Moscow in June 1956.

At the conclusion of his state visit to the Soviet capital President Tito and his hosts signed two declarations. The first dealt with political and economic affairs and recorded Yugoslav support for many aspects of Soviet foreign policy in return for Soviet promises of further economic aid. The second document re-established formal relations between the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Parties on the basis of 'complete freedom, equality of rights, friendly criticism, and an amicable exchange of opinions on questions in dispute between them'. Thus, though Khrushchev finally gained what he had sought in June 1955, he had to pay the price of recognizing the equality of status of the two parties and of condemning any attempt to impose a particular path to socialism. In addition, the statement that 'mutual co-operation and exchange

of views in the field of socialist scientific thought' would be encouraged was an admission by the C.P.S.U. that it could profit by the socialist experience of other countries.

DE-STALINIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

Meanwhile, the reactions in the satellite States to Khrushchev's secret speech were complex. The East Berlin riots of June 1953 had shown what happens when a totalitarian Government decides upon even a modest relaxation of its policies. For this reason, and because as 'Stalinists' their own position was threatened, the satellite leaders proceeded with great caution in their handling of the de-Stalinization issue. They were, however, under great pressure from three directions. The first was the impact of the U.S.S.R.'s internal reforms which included a reduction in the powers of the secret police, measures of administrative decentralization, and improved labour conditions. The second was the example of Yugoslavia which since June 1955 had gradually developed direct ties with the Eastern-bloc States, delegations or contacts having already been exchanged with Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and China. Lastly, the increasing ferment of liberal ideas amongst the intelligentsia, particularly in Poland and Hungary, was evolving something approaching an articulate public opinion, muted at first but gathering confidence as the months went by.

Polish opinion had already been jolted by the revelation of former Soviet perfidy contained in a joint statement of the Central Committees of the Soviet, Italian, Bulgarian, and Finnish Communist Parties on 19 February. This referred to the summary dissolution in 1938 of the Polish Communist Party and the liquidation of most of its members then in Moscow—a by-product of the era of the purges in the U.S.S.R. The evidence on which the Executive Committee of the Communist International had acted was now said to have been based on 'material forged by provocateurs who were later unmasked'—a formula reminiscent of that used by Khrushchev at the Belgrade talks in June 1955 when he blamed information supplied by Beria for the 1948 break with Yugoslavia.

Yet another break with the Stalin era occurred on 12 March with the death in Moscow of Boleslaw Bierut, First Secretary of the Polish Communist Party. Long one of Stalin's most faithful henchmen, Bierut was the epitome of a satellite leader and the willing instrument of Soviet policy. The new First Secretary,

Edward Ochab, who was appointed a few days later, was also known as a staunch follower of the Moscow line, and his promotion was interpreted both in Poland and elsewhere as meaning that there would be no radical changes in Polish policy, internal or external. The Government was, however, forced to meet the rising tide of popular discussion and criticism by announcing a far-reaching amnesty for political prisoners and by absolving Wladyslaw Gomulka, formerly Secretary of the Polish Communist Party, of the charge of 'diversionary activities' upon which he had been imprisoned in 1951. On the other hand, it still continued to condemn his support for 'national Communism' as an 'opportunistic deviation'.

A situation similar to that obtaining in Poland was also to be observed in Hungary. Bela Kun, the founder of the short-lived Hungarian Soviet Republic in 1919, who was executed in 1937, reportedly on Stalin's orders, as a 'Trotskyist-Bukharinist traitor', was rehabilitated in March. The rehabilitation of László Rajk, executed in 1949 for Titoist sympathies, and the release of those imprisoned at the same time were also announced in March and were seen as a further move to discredit Stalinism. The position of Rákosi, the First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, was increasingly precarious. An inveterate Stalinist and a bitter opponent of Tito, he had had to tread warily since the Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in 1955. He issued a careful endorsement of the Khrushchev attack on Stalin, at the same time suggesting that only with the passage of time would it be possible to form a complete judgement. Despite lip-service to the principle of collective leadership he managed for the time being to maintain his position and to parry the mounting attacks made on him at public meetings for his refusal to adopt a more liberal policy. Public opinion increasingly supported his old rival Dr Nagy, Prime Minister of Hungary from June 1953 to March 1955, whose name was closely connected with the Malenkov 'New Course' of favouring the development of light industry and consumer-production.[1]

POZNAN AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

So far the wave of popular criticism unleashed by the break with Stalinism in Poland and Hungary had been kept within manageable limits by the Governments concerned. The first

[1] See 'The "New Line" in Hungary', in *The World Today*, January 1955

indication that the latter might be lagging behind the changes in the political atmosphere was provided by the riots in Poznan on 28 June. The most disturbing aspect of these events from the Communist point of view was that they were instigated by the workers, the very class on which the Communist Party claimed to base its power. The causes of the uprising were mainly economic—resentment at the low standard of living, which was kept artificially depressed by the policy of forced industrialization, and dissatisfaction with the inequalities of the wage system. After a vain attempt to blame the 'imperialists and reactionaries', the Polish authorities admitted that economic conditions were responsible.

Alarmed by the events in Poland and by the implications of Togliatti's thesis of 'polycentrism', the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. published on 2 July a long decree 'On Overcoming the Cult of Personality and its Consequences'. The aim of this decree was to remove the confusion in the various national Communist Parties and to rally them round the Soviet standard in the name of proletarian internationalism. It defended the policy of de-Stalinization as a necessary stage in the return to the Leninist system of collective leadership. Stalinism was not a symptom of any fundamental failure of the socialist system, which had emerged triumphant through countless ordeals. Soviet successes had ensured the establishment of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the transformation of the Italian and French Parties into mass movements (the plain implication being that they were now showing rank ingratitude by criticizing the C.P.S.U.).

Unconvincing though this document was with its mixture of apology and braggadocio, the satellite regimes hastened to express their agreement with the views it contained. The Yugoslavs published it but made no comment. In the two countries where the internal situation was showing signs of greatest change—Poland and Hungary—it appeared to carry little weight. In both of these countries on 18 July the Central Committee of the Communist Party met in plenary session. The Polish Plenum was naturally much concerned to reassure public opinion after the Poznan riots. An intensive programme, aiming at the removal of the most serious of the workers' grievances, was promised for the year 1956–7; it included the raising of the lowest wage scales, the cessation of the practice of unjustified increases in work norms, and a correction of abuses in marketing practices. No basic changes, however, were made in the targets for the new Five-Year Plan (1956–60)

which might ensure a more rapid improvement of the standard of living. The Hungarian Plenum was also somewhat niggardly in its economic concessions, and the replacement of Rákosi by Gerö did not help to increase the regime's popularity. As thoroughly Stalinist as his predecessor, a ruthless promoter of agricultural collectivization, and in his day an uncompromising opponent of Tito, the new First Secretary had little to recommend him in the existing circumstances. His appointment was probably meant as a compromise between the Yugoslav insistence that Rákosi should go and the Soviet Union's reluctance to relax her control over the satellites too far.

As we have seen, Tito had little reason to welcome the appointment of Gero. But if the changes in Hungary were for the moment disappointing, those in Poland were not. On 4 August Gomulka was readmitted to the Polish Communist Party. Even before Tito's expulsion from the Cominform, Gomulka had been an advocate of a specifically Polish road to socialism. Since Poland's experience and historical developments were quite different from those of Russia, Gomulka had claimed that it would be wrong for her to follow slavishly the Soviet model. His complete rehabilitation reflected the state of mind of Polish intellectual and political circles and could only be viewed with misgivings in Moscow as a warning that Titoism was gaining ground in the largest of the satellite States.

SOVIET-YUGOSLAV DIFFICULTIES

On 3 September the Central Committee of the C P S.U. circulated a letter to the satellite Communist Parties in an endeavour to retrieve the situation. The full text has not been published, but an unofficial text, which in the light of East European conditions is credible enough, appeared in the *Washington Post* of 17 October. In effect, it was an appeal for Eastern-bloc solidarity The overriding importance of close ties with the C.P S.U. and of the need for Communist unity in the face of modern capitalism were stressed. Socialism could only be built under the banner of internationalism in close liaison with the socialist countries, and not under the banner of nationalism without liaison with the socialist countries. Each Communist Party was judged in the light of its relations with the C.P.S.U., the evolution of which 'could not be considered as an individual and distinct phenomenon'. This phraseology was pointed enough, but the Yugoslav leaders were

particularly annoyed by a specific warning (which may have been given in an addendum or possibly in a separate letter) concerning the inadvisability of following the Yugoslav example too closely. Marshal Tito probably felt that this was proof that the U.S.S.R. was proposing to default on the June Agreements.

Further evidence of a decrease in cordiality between the Yugoslav and Soviet Party leaders was given in *Pravda* of 31 August, which reported briefly the sentencing to eight and five years' imprisonment respectively of two former 'Cominformists', Rajković and Prodanović. These opponents of Tito had been in exile since 1948 in Prague where they had worked on the anti-Tito paper *Nova Borba*. They had returned to Yugoslavia voluntarily at the beginning of 1956. Though *Pravda* made no comment, the publication of such a report at this juncture implied disapproval of the Yugoslav lack of leniency. Belgrade's reaction as expressed in the party newspaper *Borba* was one of sharp annoyance.

There was a dramatic turn in the course of events when on 17 September Khrushchev unexpectedly flew to Belgrade. The reasons for the trip and for the subsequent shifting of the venue to Yalta in the Crimea have not been fully elucidated by either side Belgrade did however admit on 29 September that they were concerned with 'differences of views' between the two statesmen on questions of inter-State and inter-Party relations. There appeared to be two possible interpretations. The first was that Khrushchev, anxious about the effect of Yugoslav policies and the doctrine of the differing roads to socialism on the attitude of the satellites, had himself decided to attempt to exercise some restraint on Tito's plans for closer Yugoslav ties with the countries of Eastern Europe. The alternative interpretation, in some ways more probable, was that Khrushchev was forced to open negotiations with Tito by the more cautious and Stalinist section of the Presidium of the C.P.S.U. Central Committee, possibly headed by Molotov and Kaganovich, which insisted that the Yugoslavs should be prevailed upon to modify their ideas on 'national Communism' and to recognize the leading role of the U.S.S.R. in ideological matters. It may be that Khrushchev saw a threat to his own position within the U.S.S.R. if the Yugoslav rapprochement, with which his name has been so closely linked, should turn out to have been instrumental in loosening the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe too far. For his part, Tito would presumably not wish to

see Khrushchev removed from power. A change in the Soviet leadership might well undo much of the general relaxation of Communist authoritarianism which had taken place over the past year. For these reasons Tito had to be circumspect in his dealings with the Soviet hierarchy. Nonetheless, the bald and uninformative statement issued on 5 October at the end of his stay in the U.S.S.R. suggested that both sides had maintained their positions. The visits paid to Belgrade shortly afterwards by delegations from the Hungarian, Rumanian, and Bulgarian Parties appeared to confirm that the Yugoslavs were continuing their policy of closer ties with the satellite States despite the misgivings of some, if not all, of the Soviet leaders.

The upheavals in Poland and Hungary during October, while too recent for detailed assessment here, must nevertheless be mentioned, since in a sense they form the climax to this account. Gomulka's return to power in the teeth of initial Soviet opposition, expressed by the presence in Warsaw of Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov, and Kaganovich and by the ominous movement of Soviet troops, was the most considerable victory for Titoism so far. Courage allied to restraint appears to have given the Poles a good chance of consolidating the freedom they have won. In Hungary the Communist authorities proved unable to adapt themselves to the challenge of an alerted and powerful public opinion, and the result was revolution. Not only was national independence demanded but the very existence of the Communist regime placed in doubt. The implications of this development were apparently as unwelcome to Belgrade as they were to Moscow.

CONCLUSION

In undertaking the rapprochement with Tito's Yugoslavia eighteen months ago, Khrushchev attempted to restore the ideological unity of the Communist world. It is supremely ironical that his policy has up to now succeeded only in weakening that unity. Having set his sights on the target of world-wide working-class solidarity and of influencing opinion in the uncommitted countries, he seriously miscalculated the effects of the thesis of the differing roads to socialism on the client States of Eastern Europe. In addition, the defects of the Soviet political system so glaringly revealed by the attack on Stalin have gravely prejudiced the doctrinal infallibility which was one of the pillars of the Soviet hegemony.

Khrushchev's calculations were further upset by the tenacity of the other main protagonist in the drama, President Tito. The Yugoslav leader has assiduously promoted the idea of 'national Communism' and has insisted on the complete ideological equality of all Communist Parties, with the C.P.S.U. no longer the compulsory guide and example for the rest. Moreover, he has striven to undo by careful diplomacy the effects of the anti-Titoist purges of 1948 and 1949 in Eastern Europe, so far with notable success.

Tito could not have foreseen, however, the magnitude of popular reaction in Poland and Hungary to the measures of liberalization undertaken by the authorities. What he may have envisaged was the gradual transformation of the closely integrated satellite bloc into a system of genuinely independent Communist States bound together by ideological ties alone. (His attitude towards Hungary showed that he is not prepared to approve of any retreat from Communism.) Within such a system Yugoslavia could hope to occupy an influential position, and it is possible that President Tito has not forgotten the plans he had prior to 1948 for a South Slav federation Be that as it may, what is certain is that his adroit policy has inspired trends in Eastern Europe which will continue to present the Soviet Union with complicated political and ideological problems.

A. R.

The Presidential Election and After

Changing Political Patterns in the United States

THE American voters have once again confounded the experts. Except during a short period at the end of September, it was always clear that President Eisenhower would be re-elected this year. Nor was there ever much doubt that the Congress would remain Democratic—provided only that Mr Eisenhower was not swept back to Washington by an electoral landslide which would carry his Republican followers home with him. There was such a landslide on 6 November; yet both Houses of the new Congress will be controlled by the Democrats.

Mr Eisenhower won more states than he did in 1952—forty-one now, as against thirty-nine then—and was given about a million more votes than the record 34 million he obtained in 1952. His opponent on both occasions, Mr Stevenson, received only a little over 25 million votes this year, compared with more than 27 million in 1952. Never since 1848, before the modern party system developed, had a President been elected without his party also gaining a congressional majority, although the Opposition has frequently won the mid-term elections which fall in the years in which there is no presidential contest; the Democrats achieved this in 1954 as the Republicans had done in 1946 In the Eighty-fifth Congress which meets at the beginning of January there will be forty-nine Democratic Senators to forty-seven Republicans, as there were after the last election in 1954 In the House of Representatives the Democrats have increased their majority slightly; they will probably have 236 seats to the Republicans' 199. The Democrats also ended up with a couple more State Governorships; they expect to have twenty-nine, compared with nineteen held by the Republicans.

Within these totals there were numerous changes, states and seats were won and lost by both Republicans and Democrats. From these results and those in the various other elections for state legislatures and local offices which took place at the same time—and on the same ballot—it is clear that the voters were exercising an unprecedented amount of discrimination this year. It is not easy to pick and choose between perhaps fifty or sixty names for a score of offices; it is much simpler to vote the 'straight ticket' for all the candidates of one party, including its presidential nominee. But there is plentiful evidence that this was not done in November: for example, in Idaho, basically a Republican state, a young Democrat beat an unpopular Republican Senator; Massachusetts gave a good majority to Mr Eisenhower but a much better one to the Democratic candidate for Governor; in Ohio, once Senator Taft's fortress, the invincible Democratic Governor, Mr Lausche, ran for the Senate and defeated the Republican incumbent, while a Republican candidate won the Governorship vacated by Mr Lausche.

What obviously mattered to the voters—or at least to many of them—was not party but personality. This certainly accounts for the President's heavy majority against a Democratic trend. This election was the consummation of what has been called the

American people's 'love affair' with Mr Eisenhower. In the last few days of the campaign world events threatened to make a mockery of what had been his main claim to popularity—that he had brought peace to the United States. Yet the international crisis only seems to have made his victory greater than it might otherwise have been. The growing danger abroad merely confirmed the faith of the voters in the experienced General and their lack of confidence in the indecisive Mr Stevenson. They turned a deaf ear to his criticisms of the President's failures in foreign affairs, even though events appeared to be justifying the complaint.

But on domestic questions the Democratic criticism of the Republicans did have some effect, although even here the Eisenhower prosperity counted for more than Mr Stevenson's imaginative plans for meeting the future problems of America's growth. Mr Eisenhower obtained almost fantastically high majorities in the eastern states, partly at least because there people are more concerned about international developments than elsewhere in the country. In the middle and far west his majorities were frequently lower than they had been in 1952, and he lost Missouri altogether. All the Republican gains in the House of Representatives were east of the Mississippi River, while almost all the Democratic gains were west of it. This is where people blame the Administration for the farmers' failure to share fully in the national well-being (although the farm revolt did not reach anything like the dimensions which the Democrats had hoped for) and for the coming shortages of electricity because of the Republican Government's lack of enthusiasm for hydro-electric development. These and other specific issues, such as the overcrowding in the schools, the prohibitive cost of medical care, and the scarcity of credit, counted for much more locally than they did nationally—that is to say, they affected the congressional results more than they did the presidential.

Another reason for Mr Eisenhower's success in the east was the extent to which urban voters favoured him. Town dwellers, as they become more and more prosperous, also become more and more Republican, and the labour vote has never been as solidly Democratic as some trade-union leaders like to pretend. No longer can the Democrats count on the cities which used to be their strongholds. Nor can they now count on the once solid South, the group of states where Republicans were to all intents and purposes non-

existent. This year Mr Eisenhower held the Southern states he won in 1952—Florida, Texas, and Virginia—and added Louisiana and two border states—Kentucky and West Virginia. These are the two states in which the Republicans made three out of their four Senate gains, and they also held their handful of congressional seats in the South. The new hope of at last developing a real two-party system there will be much in Republican minds from now on.

The swing to the Republicans in both the cities and the South is in part explained by another swing to the Republicans—that of the Negro voters. The extent of this, and the reasons for it, are not easy to assess, but it must arise in part from the belief that no Democratic President, and still more no Democratic Congress, can ever overcome the party's solid core of Southern opposition to racial equality and give to the Negroes in practice the rights which the Constitution guarantees to them in theory.

To prove that this belief is wrong will be one of the aims of liberal Democrats in the coming session of Congress. For the sake of unity during the election campaign, they made concessions to the conservative Southern leaders on this question of civil rights—and so did Mr Stevenson. He was the compromise candidate, the man whom both wings of the party could accept—and he failed completely to appeal to the mass of the voters. The guidance of the Democratic party now devolves even more than it did in the years between 1952 and 1956 on its leaders in Congress. These are the middle-roaders—such as Senator Lyndon Johnson and Mr Rayburn—whose prestige has been much strengthened by the Democratic successes in the congressional elections—their particular responsibility; the voters have endorsed their past willingness to co-operate with President Eisenhower on the legislative programme which many of his Republican supporters disliked. The difficulties of Mr Johnson and Mr Rayburn will be accentuated by the changing political pattern which emerges from the election results. They underline for the Democrats what was already a burning question: would they not do better nationally, and particularly in the Northern cities, if they wrote off the South entirely and refused to make any more concessions to its reactionary prejudices—which even the South itself is beginning to outgrow? The 1956 election has made a split in the Democratic Party a real possibility.

It is permissible to wonder how much longer it will be true to say that the majority of the voters are basically Democrats. But

that this is still true today poses the great question for the Republican Party organizers. They realize that it was not they, but Mr Eisenhower, who won this year's election. In 1960 they will no longer have him, for since 1951 a third presidential term has been unconstitutional. How then can they win without him? His personal victory, and the failures of many of his party's candidates, strengthen the case for the Eisenhower brand of 'modern Republicanism'. It was avowedly in order to finish the task of remodelling the Republican Party that Mr Eisenhower sought office for a second term. Now it is up to him to do the job—and to see that Republicans in Congress back him up by voting for the progressive domestic programme which he has always advocated on such matters as financial aid for schools, health insurance, civil rights, immigration, and so on. It is at home even more than abroad that President Eisenhower has in the past shown that failure in leadership on which Mr Stevenson centred his attack. In his first term Mr Eisenhower could plead lack of political and congressional experience, and perhaps also an exaggerated respect for the constitutional division of powers. Now these excuses can no longer hold good: he has a mandate from the people to do what he wants, and the conservative Republicans in Congress will ignore it not only at their own but at their party's peril.

On the other hand, in another way the President's authority in his party is less than it was, for he is inevitably on the way out as a leader since he cannot stand for the Presidency again. From now on the party intrigues will concentrate on who is to be his successor At the moment the favourite is Mr Nixon. By refusing to consider anyone else as their vice-presidential candidate this year, when all honest men had to admit that there was a strong possibility that the Vice-President might succeed to the Presidency before the new four-year term was over, the Republicans in effect nominated Mr Nixon as Mr Eisenhower's heir. The President will be able, if he wishes, to say who is to succeed him, and he also seems to favour Mr Nixon Nor is there much evidence that voters turned against the Republican Party, as had been forecast, because Mr Nixon was one of its candidates. He certainly fought a restrained, responsible, and able campaign. But he remains a controversial figure, mainly because no one can define what he has stood for in the past. He has, it is argued, been guided by expediency rather than principle. But even if this view is accepted, the Eisenhower line would seem to be the expedient one for any ambitious young

man in the party today and there is therefore no real reason to suppose that Mr Nixon will fail to develop as a 'modern Republican'.

In this year's American election there were no basic points at issue; most of the debates were only over differences in approach and method. It is not surprising that the voters as a whole decided that there was no reason for making a change, either in President or Congress. Nor is it surprising that Mr Stevenson found it so difficult to attack effectively. Casting around for inspiring arguments to use against the President, he had already turned to international affairs, against the advice of some of his advisers, criticizing both conscription and the continued testing of hydrogen bombs, when the Suez crisis seemed to give him a much more telling case against the Administration. His outspoken condemnation of the President and his Secretary of State for having failed to look at the Middle Eastern situation constructively might have killed off bipartisan co-operation on foreign policy entirely. Fortunately, however, the anxiety of the Democratic leaders in Congress to dissociate themselves from Mr Stevenson's defeat has made them very ready, perhaps too ready, to repudiate his stand on these matters. Already they are welcoming the President's offers of consultation and have pledged themselves to continue along the bipartisan road abroad It now only remains for Mr Eisenhower to give them—and the world—some clear indication of where that road is going and how it is to get there.

N B.

Political and Social Trends in Sweden

In April 1954 the tercentenary of the signing of the first British-Swedish treaty of friendship and commerce was celebrated in both Sweden and Great Britain, and at the end of the month a British-Swedish Chamber of Commerce, with headquarters in Stockholm, was formally inaugurated, following an earlier constituent meeting of British founder subscribers in London. Two months later King Gustaf VI Adolf and Queen Louise of Sweden paid a State visit to Great Britain, the first official visit by a reigning monarch

since the accession of Queen Elizabeth II. The Royal couple were warmly welcomed by the people of London, to whom they were no strangers, since the Swedish monarch and his British-born consort are regular visitors to the British capital. In June 1956 Queen Elizabeth and the Duke of Edinburgh paid a return visit to Stockholm and after its conclusion remained privately to watch the equestrian contests of the Olympic Games. Their visit gave rise to great rejoicing and, in the words of the Government paper *Morgontidningen*, 'touched the hearts of the Swedish people in a way which goes far deeper than all outward show and mere curiosity to see a great spectacle'. The cordial relations between the two Royal houses and between the Swedish and the British peoples were thus further consolidated. On 9 June an Anglo-Swedish convention was signed under which equal rights were granted to Swedish citizens domiciled in Great Britain and to British citizens living in Sweden, to enjoy the health services and all other welfare amenities in operation in both countries. This agreement, incidentally, also applies to tourists.

POLITICS AND THE GENERAL ELECTION

Three months later, on Sunday, 16 September, the Swedish people went to the polls to elect a new Riksdag. The previous elections, in 1952, had produced some small but significant changes in the general composition of the Second Chamber, the lower House. The two Chambers have equal powers. The parties forming the coalition Government,[1] the Social Democrats and the Farmers' Party, had lost two and four seats respectively, while the Conservatives had regained seven of the sixteen seats they had lost in the 1948 elections.

During the weeks preceding this year's elections it was impossible to induce even the most well-informed citizen to venture a guess as to their results. As a whole, however, the impression was gained that the Social Democrats were perhaps over-anxious to emphasize that they were likely to regain the ground lost in the two previous elections, while the Farmers seemed gloomy: the Conservatives, on the other hand, seemed mildly optimistic. The Liberals were plainly doubtful that they would retain the substantial gains—thirty-one seats—which they had achieved in 1948 and increased by a further seat in 1952.

When the results were announced, they came as a surprise to the

[1] See 'Politics and Industry in Sweden', in *The World Today*, December 1951

most optimistic of the Right wing and the most pessimistic among the Government parties. Not only had the Conservatives gained a further eleven seats and thus more than regained the ground lost in 1948: the Liberals had also fully maintained their position as the second strongest party in the Riksdag. The Government parties, on the other hand, had lost a total of eleven seats. Thus when the new Riksdag is opened on 1 January 1957 the position will be as follows:[1]

	1956	1952	1948
Social Democrats	106	110	112
Farmers' Party	19	26	30
Conservative Party	42	31	23
Liberal Party	58	58	57
Communists	6	5	8

The results of these elections should give the Swedish people seriously to think; but they should also be of interest outside Sweden, since the regression in the fortunes of the two Government parties has occurred in a country which can be described as one of the leading 'Welfare States' in Europe When considering the present composition of the Riksdag, it must be borne in mind that some of the Conservative gains were rather marginal and may not be maintained at the next elections, in 1960, unless the Conservatives succeed in consolidating their position still further, a task which should not be impossible to a party with so dynamic a leader as their present Chairman, Mr Hjalmarsson. But while there may be some doubt about the fortunes of the Conservative Party, it certainly seems as though the Liberal Party, under its able leader Professor Ohlin, may rely on its supporters. Of the Government parties, on the other hand, the Farmers' Party is steadily losing favour, a fact which seems largely due to the disapproval felt by its supporters concerning the coalition with the Social Democrats. This contention is borne out not only by the losses the Farmers have sustained ever since they entered the present coalition in the winter of 1951; for the coalition which existed between the two parties prior to the 1939-45 war was equally unpopular, and would have led to a serious defeat of the coalition parties then if the outbreak of war had not brought about the formation of a coalition of all the main parties. The leader of the Farmers' Party, Dr Hedlund, in an interview attributed his party's losses in the recent elections to the continued immigration

[1] The new Riksdag will consist of 231 instead of 230 members Under Swedish constitutional law the old Riksdag remains in office until the end of the year.

from country to town, and this is in fact probably another, though minor, cause of their defeat at the polls. The losses of the Social Democrats are less easily explained, and may be caused partly by a certain lassitude among their supporters, who appear to feel that the Welfare State has given them everything they need and that there is nothing further to fight for. Another reason put forward to account for the reduced Social Democrat vote is the fact that some of their former supporters have moved into the class of the 'white collar workers' and feel that they ought now to support a bourgeois party—for class-consciousness is unusually strong in Sweden. To the onlooker it may seem rather unjust and short-sighted that the Social Democrat Party should be made to suffer because of the prosperity which its policy has produced for its supporters, but it certainly appears as though an economic depression might strengthen the hand of the Social Democrat leaders.

LABOUR, TRADE UNIONS, AND IMMIGRATION

While the Government parties have thus experienced a rather substantial set-back, it would be a mistake to assume that the strength of the Social Democrat Party is seriously declining. Not only, as can be seen, is it still by far the largest single party in the Second Chamber, but also in the First Chamber it still retains an overall majority, and as this Chamber changes more slowly—one eighth of its members are elected each year by indirect ballot—this position is likely to continue for some time. Furthermore, the Social Democrats are loyally backed by the Trade Union Federation (*Landsorganistionen*), a body which is more powerful than its British counterpart, and some of the resolutions passed at its conference last September will strengthen the Government's position. One of the most important, which was unanimously approved, laid down that the consolidated wages policy introduced last year should be continued, but it is a condition of this continuation that the Government shall maintain economic stability. The Trade Union Executive reported that co-operation within the whole trade-union movement had proved advantageous and should be maintained but that a more elastic form of co-ordination, which would grant greater latitude to individual unions, should be sought for the future. At the same time the conference welcomed the Government's proposal to introduce a forty-five-hour working week.

So far only about 10 per cent of wage earners, among them miners and workers on shift-work, are entitled under their collective agreements to a working week of less than forty-eight hours, but inquiries have shown that the majority would prefer a shorter working week to a still larger income. The ultimate aim of the Swedish trade-union movement is the forty-hour week. It may be argued that this desire for greater leisure can only be fulfilled without reducing production if automation is introduced on a large scale. This in fact seems to be the view of the new head of the Swedish trade-union movement, Arne Geijer, until recently the President of the Metal Workers' Union. Mr Geijer rightly contends that automation is nothing new, but merely a new term for an improvement in industrial production which has been aimed at ever since the industrial revolution. He also strengthened the Government's hand at the trade-union conference, first by suggesting that the current wage agreements should be prolonged until 1 December, by which time it might be expected that a clearer picture of the economic position would have emerged, and secondly by stating that wage increases would in any case have to be kept within very narrow limits because this year's increase in national production amounted to only 2 per cent as compared with 4 per cent in 1955.

The trade union movement in Sweden, and even in the other Scandinavian countries too, is, as has already been mentioned, more powerful than its counterpart in Great Britain This may at first sight seem to be a controversial statement, but two reasons can be advanced in explanation. First, each Swedish industry is represented by a single union, not by several, and this gives each union greater power when negotiating with the employers; and secondly, the labour courts which were set up by the Government years ago have the power, if not to prevent, at least to render unofficial strikes so costly for the participants that they occur much more rarely than in Great Britain These labour courts are composed of two trade unionists, two members of the Employers' Association, and three civil servant legal experts. To cite only one recent example of the power held by these courts or similar bodies, in the spring of this year the Danish Seamen's Union was fined Kr.1 million (about £50,000) for continuing a strike after it had been declared illegal.

Sweden is generally regarded as one of the leading Welfare States of Europe. The Swedish way of life is an experiment

evolved to banish poverty and provide a decent standard of living for all. The Social Democrats rightly claim a great deal of the credit for the satisfactory position in which the working classes find themselves today, but the welfare system as it is now in operation is no longer a party matter. Whichever party may come to power in the future, none could or would try to deprive the people of the many social advantages to which they have grown accustomed in the course of the last four decades. That the position of Swedish workers is the envy of Europe is proved by the fact that during the last twenty-five years Sweden has changed from an emigration to an immigration country, the surplus of immigrants over emigrants having risen from 5,419 in 1931 to 17,394 in 1955. These immigration figures have, however, fluctuated a great deal during that period, reaching 24,948 in 1947 and dropping to 1,695 in 1953; but at no time has the number of emigrants exceeded that of immigrants. During and immediately after the war a large proportion of the immigrants were refugees from Central Europe, the Baltic States, and Sweden's sister countries; since then, however, Sweden's shortage of labour has forced her to stimulate on principle the immigration of able-bodied workers. In consequence, at the ASEA works in Vasterås, for example, a small proportion of the workmen in some of the big industries are foreigners who have settled in Sweden with their families. At Vasterås it is not at all unusual to meet a fair-headed small boy speaking Italian and a dark-eyed little girl shouting in Swedish, and the writer was told by many a long-suffering but smiling mother that at times she had some difficulty in understanding her own offspring who seemed to have adopted the language of their playmates. The distribution of registered foreign workers in Sweden in 1955 and 1956 showed the following picture:[1]

	Danes	*Norwegians*	*Finns*	*Balts*	*Germans*	*Italians*	*Total*[2]
1955	17,879	10,786	39,756	8,968	17,507	1,973	109,844
1956	21,620	12,189	46,661	8,313	19,138	2,522	124,328

When studying these figures it must be remembered that the common Scandinavian labour market greatly facilitates immigration to Sweden of Danish, Norwegian, and Finnish workers, and also that many foreign workers, especially Balts, but also Finns, Germans, and Austrians, apply in due course for Swedish citizenship.

[1] Cf. 'Sverige som immigrationsland', by Karin Kock (offprint of Presentation Address to Foreign Minister Östen Undén, 25 August 1956).

[2] The total includes immigrants from other countries as well.

SOCIAL SERVICES

In view of the fact that the Swedish Government has always tried to improve the lot of the workers it is interesting to note that compulsory health insurance was not introduced into the country till the beginning of 1955 (and thus considerably later than in Great Britain), largely because the Social Democrats met with a great deal of opposition to it. On the other hand, it may well be that as a result of this delay the Swedes benefited by British experience, and possibly too by a study of the system which was in operation in Germany some time before the war. Thus the Swedish health insurance system is not completely free, as it is in Britain. One-quarter of the medical fees has to be borne by the patient and there is a fee for medicine used outside hospitals; there is also a small daily charge for hospitalization, although this is later refunded. In the Swedish view these provisions have acted as a brake and prevented misuse of the service But certain flaws in the system noticeable in Britain can also be observed in Sweden. Thus there is far too long a waiting period before hospital beds become available, public clinics are overcrowded, and there is a grave shortage of nursing staff. Nevertheless the advantages are as obvious as they are in Britain. Some 40 per cent of the population who hitherto, either through lack of means or owing to indifference, were not insured are now included in the system and enjoy medical care to an extent till now unknown to them The nation as a whole has accepted the changeover from voluntary to compulsory health insurance with some reserve. The Swedes are by nature sturdily independent-minded, and many resent the higher taxation which is the price of the benefits derived from the new system.

The general advantages of the welfare services in Sweden are open to all as a right of citizenship and not as a charity, and they cover the citizen's whole life from the cradle—or rather even before his birth—to the grave, for they include both benefits for the expectant mother and help with funeral expenses. The main aim of the programme is claimed to be the maintenance of a certain minimum standard of living to ensure a healthy, simple life free from want until death. Nobody is to be forced to lower his living standard because he has children; the expenses involved in their upbringing should be borne by the nation as a collective responsibility. In the Swedish Budget only defence expenditure rivals the expenditure on social services.

The present Government claims that Sweden no longer has any slums, a statement which must arouse the envy of every British citizen. However, while this may be true in substance, there is still a great deal of overcrowding in the homes. For the housing shortage has not yet been overcome; indeed during the last twelve months it has grown worse, a fact that reflects no credit on the Swedish people, especially if it is realized that in their sister country Finland, which has experienced two wars since 1939, new houses are springing up everywhere (in greater Helsinki alone the increase in houses amounts to 40 per cent since the war).

Whether the many facilities and benefits available to the Swedish people through their social services are really an unmixed blessing is difficult to say. As was mentioned earlier, they appear to have produced a certain amount of complacency, a feeling that life is so secure that personal effort or initiative is no longer needed.

FOREIGN RELATIONS AND DEFENCE

While Anglo-Swedish relations are growing more and more cordial, relations with the Soviet Union have in recent years been subject to a good deal of strain, mainly owing to various cases of extensive espionage, in the latest of which, last summer, some members of the Russian Embassy in Stockholm were found to be involved. It may be a consequence of the constant irritation which these discoveries have aroused that the Swedish Government and people are inclined to view the various signs of a 'change of heart' in Russian foreign policy with a good deal of reserve. Nevertheless, all Russian advances during recent years have been courteously received, and numerous exchanges of visits between Swedish and Russian political and private bodies and individuals have taken place, one of the most valuable being the exchange of electric power experts which proved of such interest to both parties that the delegations extended the period of their visits. But it should be added that in view of the present international situation the Swedish Prime Minister stated in the Riksdag on 8 November that the Government did not intend to confirm the invitation previously extended to Mr Bulganin and Mr Khrushchev to visit Sweden in the spring of 1957.

As far as Sweden's relations with the rest of the world are concerned, she tries to play her part in the work of the United Nations and its sister organizations while preserving her status as a country with a non-alliance policy. As a rule M. Undén, the Foreign

Minister, follows a rather cautious line, but in the case of the Suez Canal question he roundly condemned the Egyptian attitude, and he served on the Committee appointed by the eighteen-Power majority at the first Suez Conference to present to Colonel Nasser the plan for the canal agreed upon by them. Subsequently, the Government, though with some misgivings, joined the Suez Canal Users' Association.

Sweden's non-alliance policy makes heavy demands on the country's exchequer, and defence expenditure at present approximates to Kr.2,100 million per annum (about £150 million), or about 5 per cent of the gross national income. It is not proposed here to give particulars about the Swedish defence forces, but a brief outline of the country's civil defence system may be of interest. Service in civil defence is compulsory for all able-bodied citizens of both sexes between the ages of sixteen and sixty-five, and they must contribute sixty hours per annum to it, while their officers voluntarily serve for a longer period The Royal Board of Civil Defence is directly under the Government, while regional administration in each province is in the hands of the Provincial Councils. Civil defence connected with the State-owned railways, power stations, telegraph service, canals, civil airfields, and military establishments comes under the direction of the respective board of a corresponding authority. There are two main divisions: General Civil Defence, for the protection of society as a whole, and Special Civil Defence, for the protection of special plant or buildings. These two main divisions are in their turn divided into different branches. Annual expenditure for civil defence amounts to about Kr.42 million (c. £3 million). The main part of the cost for general defence is borne by the Government, but the owners of buildings or plant have to bear the bulk of the financial responsibility for their defence. In connection with civil defence against atom bombs two large air-raid shelters have recently been completed in Stockholm, one of them to shelter 10,000, the other 20,000 persons, and they demonstrate effectively how a rockbound land like Sweden has particular advantages over other countries when constructing such shelters. The natural-rock roof of the two now completed varies between 15 and 20 metres (48 to 60 feet). They cost Kr.8 million and Kr.14 million respectively, one-quarter of the cost being borne by contracting firms who use them as garages in peace time, an arrangement which to a certain extent also relieves Stockholm's traffic congestion.

A. H. H.

Presidential Policy in the Philippines

Magsaysay's Record

THE election of Ramon Magsaysay to the presidency of the Philippines in November 1953 brought to power one of the most dynamic leaders in South-East Asia. After almost three years in office, Magsaysay remains by far the most popular person in the Philippines. In fact, it has been debated in Manila whether or not any prominent politician would want to risk his political future by running against the President in November 1957. Yet the record of the Magsaysay administration will be carefully scrutinized during the election year.

The basic philosophy of the Philippine President was emphasized in his 'State of the Nation' address to a joint session of Congress on 23 January 1956.[1] 'Let me emphasize at this point,' he said, 'that my concern for the common man is not merely sentimental or emotional. It is a hard fact that a nation cannot survive without the safe foundation of a prosperous and contented majority of its citizens. . . We have anchored our national destiny to the common man.' In his statement Magsaysay was not indulging in empty platitudes, but was expressing his own heartfelt conviction.

AIMS OF THE MAGSAYSAY ADMINISTRATION

The President proceeded to ask Congress to keep ten aims in view—attainment of self-sufficiency in primary foodstuffs, acceleration of land reform, establishment of effective administrative machinery for community development, fuller utilization of natural resources in economic development, adoption of educational reforms to meet the needs of economic and scientific progress, the need for scientific research as a basis for social and economic development, redefinition of the incentives for private enterprise, stabilization of the financial position of the country, and increased efficiency in public administration.

These goals reflect the areas to which Magsaysay has directed his attention. Economic matters are stressed; domestic rather than foreign policy occupies the centre of interest, thus demonstrating

[1] *Address on the State of the Nation* by Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines, to the 3rd Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, 3rd Session, 23 January 1956 (Manila, 1956).

that the chief executive is realistic in approaching the problems of the Philippines. At the same time, Magsaysay is fully aware of the fact that major changes in the economy of the country will take years.

The President is especially concerned over the plight of the more than 1,600,000 farmers who produce all or part of the food, shelter, and clothing of the some 22 million Filipinos. The farmers have been facing difficult times: the productivity of the land is low; almost half of the farmers are tenants; the shortage of capital is serious, and moneylenders often charge excessive rates of interest; the farms are too small, with half of the cultivators having less than two hectares of land; partial farm employment is widespread; most of the farm families, averaging six people, receive an income of less than 600 *pesos* (two *pesos* equal one dollar) a year; and it is estimated that the average head of a farm family has had only a little more than two years of formal schooling.

Previous Philippine Presidents, during the Commonwealth and the first years of the Republic, have attempted to better the status of the farmers, but Magsaysay has convinced them that they can really hope for more favourable conditions now that he is in Malacañang.[1] The Government is acquiring landed estates on a limited scale for redistribution to the tenants, families are being resettled on public lands, and titles issued at a faster rate, the law regulating the distribution of the rice crop between the landlord and the tenant is more often respected, loan facilities for the farmers have improved; scientific efforts are being pushed to increase the productivity of the soil; irrigation schemes and rural highways are being constructed, and marketing associations are developing on an extensive scale. In addition, community education is receiving considerable emphasis, and new *barrio*[2] schools are appearing; health conditions in the rural areas are improving, especially through the construction of artesian wells, one of the President's favourite projects

The Magsaysay administration carefully cites figures to prove its interest in rural improvement. For instance, NARRA (the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration) in 1955 distributed homesteads to 8,800 families in twenty-two settlement projects. The Bureau of Lands in the same year approved 33,075 patents; landless applicants received 23,578 agricultural lots; and

[1] The Presidential Palace of the Philippines
[2] Probably best translated as 'township' or rural district,

401,425 hectares of land were surveyed. In an effort to improve transportation, 565 kilometres of new roads were opened in 1955, and eighty-three bridge projects, amounting to 2,890 lineal metres, were completed. Loans from ACCFA (the Agricultural Credit and Co-operative Financing Administration) to farmers amounted to 38,400,000 *pesos*, enabling members of FACOMAS (Farmers' Co-operative and Marketing Associations) to buy farm equipment, supplies, and *carabaos* (water buffalo). By the end of 1955, it was asserted that 319 FACOMAS with a membership of 188,000 farmers were operating in 7,759 *barrios*, with paid-up capital of almost 3 million *pesos*. In the same year, 1,610 artesian wells were built, making a total of 2,826 for 1954 and 1955. Over a thousand mobile health units were operating in the Republic, and the eradication of malaria was within sight. In the field of education, 4,676 school buildings were under construction. The national production rose by almost 4 per cent in 1955 over that of 1954, to an estimated amount of 8,800 million *pesos*, while agricultural production increased by 57,400 metric tons.

A fundamental factor influencing economic progress in the Philippines is the rapid growth of population. In 1940, the population figure in round numbers was 16,500,000; in 1956, it was estimated to be 22 million. The rate of increase is around 1 9 per cent each year. Although the island republic could, under favourable circumstances, support to advantage a much larger population, at its present stage of economic development this rate of increase is causing difficulties. The number of unemployed is high, and authorities in Manila are urging people from the provinces not to move to the capital and thus further to aggravate conditions. The greater utilization of existing natural resources in present and future industries is essential.

OBSTACLES FACING MAGSAYSAY

President Magsaysay is faced with serious difficulties in the implementation of his programme. Questions of congressional relations and public administration are involved, since Congress must enact the legislation necessary to achieve basic reforms. As the greater number of congressmen own land or are associated in one way or another with landlords, Congress hesitates to make laws that will have the effect of weakening vested interests. Even when a measure is passed, it may contain legal loopholes that prevent full implementation. President Magsaysay has discovered that Nacion-

alistas[1] can be elected to Congress under his banner, but that they do not necessarily support him in his legislative programme. Considerable pressure has been exerted from Malacañang to get Congress to pass effective legislation in the wide field of agrarian reform.

The administration of Government projects requires skill, industry, and honesty from civil servants. Although efforts are being made to train competent personnel both in the United States and the Philippines, the task is heavy and results are slow. Moreover, since independence, politics have come to play an increasingly important part in appointments to Government posts, even at lower levels.

Nevertheless, the Magsaysay administration has strengthened the faith of the Filipinos in their Government, and has given it stability. Although instances of graft and corruption are reported, the President has set high standards of honesty for the nation. During his frequent trips to the provinces, and through the machinery set up in Malacañang, Magsaysay personally checks complaints coming from Filipinos in all walks of life. The problem of 'anomalies and irregularities' does not, of course, lend itself to rapid solution. The long years of Japanese occupation during the second world war, and the struggle against the Communist-led Hukbalahap rebels (or Huks) following it, have weakened the moral fabric of the nation. But the President has conscientiously sought to make his administration an example of honesty in government.

In the fight against the Huks, the President has reduced to relative impotency a serious military threat to constitutional government. Utilizing his experience as Secretary of National Defence in the cabinet of former President Elpidio Quirino, Magsaysay as chief executive has not only used military force against the Huks in the mountains, jungles, and swamps but has also tried to remove the popular support they once had, especially in central Luzon. In 1949 and 1950, the Huks were estimated to have an armed force of 20,000 and mass support of more than 100,000; by the summer of 1956 they were believed to have only about 660 men under arms, with perhaps 400 active supporters and some 21,000 sympathizers.

In accordance with general Communist policy in Asia, the Huks were trying, in 1956, to negotiate favourable surrender terms with

[1] For a brief discussion of Philippine politics, see below.

the Philippine authorities, and to infiltrate various Government agencies and influential bodies. Their programme also aimed at acquiring power within labour unions, peasant movements, and youth organizations, while at the same time fostering nationalism and xenophobia among the middle classes. President Magsaysay demanded the unconditional surrender of the rebels and their trial for crimes that they might have committed, while the Huk leader, Jesus Lava, and the commander-in-chief, Casto Alejandrino, wanted surrender terms that would enable their organization to maintain its identity.

The struggle against the Philippine Communists reached a legal climax in 1956, when the Supreme Court of the nation granted bail to Amado V. Hernandez, a former Manila councillor and prominent labour leader, who had been sentenced to life imprisonment by the Manila Court of First Instance for 'rebellion complexed with murder as well as arson'. The Supreme Court ruled that no such crime as 'rebellion complex' existed Amado V. Hernandez left Muntinglupa Prison, and the possibility loomed that other prominent Communists in gaol, some of whom had held politburo rank when arrested, would be freed. The implications of the Supreme Court decision were thus profound. The administration wanted it to be reconsidered by the highest tribunal An urgent bill was also sent to Congress making rebellion a capital crime, but the bill was not passed. High-ranking officers of the armed forces believed that the Court's decision, if it stood, would nullify the military effort to cope with the Communists. There was even talk of resignations in the high command, which many members of Congress interpreted as a form of pressure from the military branch of the Government.

POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE SECOND TERM

Throughout his term of office, Magsaysay has naturally had to take an active part in politics. It is significant that in the Philippines, as in the United States, the Chief of State is a partisan, around whom the tides of political battle rage. Moreover, the importance of politics in the island republic should not be underestimated; many Filipinos frankly admit that it is the 'national pastime'.

As presidential nominee of the Nacionalista Party in 1953, Magsaysay was supported by the 'old guard' of the Nacionalistas, Senators José P. Laurel and Claro M. Recto, who believed that he

was the best man to defeat the Liberal Party incumbent, Presider Elpidio Quirino. Magsaysay, it should be stressed, was a relativ newcomer to the higher circles of the Nacionalista Party. Hı election to the presidency, however, was due not only to th support of the Nacionalistas but also to his own vote-winnin capacity. An example of this was the MPM (Magsaysay-foı President Movement), set up in Manıla, whıch quickly sprea down into the provınces and *barrios* of the Republic.

After his electıon, Magsaysay no longer needed to depend fc support on the old guard of the Nacionalistas. On the other hanc ın order to implement hıs legıslative programme he requıred : least the acquiescence of Laurel and Recto in Congress. For whıle, in his desıre to obtaın the co-operatıon of key polıtıcıans (the Nacionalıstas, the Presıdent was prepared to refrain froı capitalizing on hıs tremendous popularıty among the people of th natıon. The conflıct between Magsaysay and Recto over foreig polıcy finally led to the Presıdent's refusal to have Recto on th Nacionalısta tıcket for the Senate in the ıntermedıate electıon (November 1955. Recto then ran as a 'guest candidate' of th Liberals, but only succeeded by a narrow majorıty ın keepıng h seat. The Nacıonalıstas defeated all the regular Lıberal candidate

Since Magsaysay has decided to seek a second term in Malac: ñang, he should be ın a posıtıon to exercise even greater contr over the Nacıonalistas. Nevertheless, sınce party dıscıplıne Phılıppıne polıtıcs ıs not strong, opposıtıon to the President m: arise even within the Nacıonalısta Party ıtself. A combınatıon the Nacıonalista dıssıdents and the temporarıly powerless Lıbera mıght be the pattern of the future, as ıs, ındeed, shown by tl example of Senator Recto ın becomıng the candıdate of tl opposition party ın the 1955 electıon. It thus seems clear that Magsaysay ıs to control the Nacionalısta Party machınery ın : effective way, he will have to use his personal popularity to get h own candıdates for the House of Representatıves and the Sena nominated and elected in 1957, although it ıs reasonably certa that most politicıans running for office ın that year wıll prefer be on the Magsaysay bandwagon.

Although a decade of independence ıs not long ın the annals oi nation, it does provide an opportunıty for new forces to emerge for old forces to regroup themselves. The arousing of the *barı* people to greater political consciousness than ever before is a resı of the personality, tactics, and programme of Ramon Magsaysa

It would be a mistake to assume that popular interest extends to all levels of Philippine government, but it certainly embraces the office of the chief executive. Significantly, President Magsaysay told Congress in his address on 23 January 1956:[1] 'In our striving for fulfilment as a people, we believe in working from the ground up—in the factories, in the *sitios*,[2] in the *barrios*, in the towns of our rural areas—in the conviction that genuine democracy moves upward and not downward.' This expression of political philosophy stands in marked contrast with the former concept of Manila as the Rome of the Philippines.

Recently, too, the Catholic Church has begun to exert greater political influence in elections, and played an important part in those of 1953 and 1955. In 1953 it came out strongly for free and honest elections, in comparison with the 1949 voting, which worked to the advantage of Ramon Magsaysay. In 1955 Senator Recto accused the Church of trying to smear him in his bid for re-election to the Senate, and during the recent debate in Congress over the Rizal Bill, which raised the question of whether the works of the Philippine national hero, Dr José Rizal, should be read in schools, the attitude of the Church provoked considerable anti-clericalism.

NATIONALISM AND FOREIGN POLICY

Another significant development in Philippine politics is the increase of nationalism in the nation. Nationalism during the American regime quite naturally took the form of seeking independence from the United States. With the establishment of the Commonwealth in 1935 and the achievement of independence in 1946, Philippine nationalism was forced to change its orientation. Magsaysay has sought to cultivate what he calls 'positive nationalism'. In fact, in his tenth anniversary address on 4 July 1956,[3] he significantly asserted that he saw 'no real patriotic or constructive contribution from those who resurrect buried enemies or revive dead issues', or 'from those who try to imprison us behind a wall of suspicion, distrust, and hatred of the outside world'. He called for 'honest and fearless criticism . . . presented soberly, based upon evidence, and accompanied by a constructive alternative'. The President may or may not be reflecting the current tide of Asian nationalism, but he has set high standards for his part of the world.

[1] *op cit.* [2] A group of houses in a remote area
[3] Philippine Government press release, 4 July 1956.

In its approach to foreign policy, the Magsaysay administration has sought to maintain Philippine ties with the United States, while cultivating the friendship of Asian countries outside the Communist bloc. The President has opposed the idea of neutrality as a national policy in the conflict between the Communist and the 'free' world. He is concerned at the Chinese Communist threat to Taiwan, north of Luzon, and to the Republic of Viet Nam across the South China Sea, and watches developments in Indonesia to the south. The adherence of the Philippines to the Manila Pact has weakened the position of the Republic with reference to the uncommitted States of Asia. The opposition to SEATO of countries in South-East Asia like Indonesia, Cambodia, and Burma has been a factor in widening the gulf between Manila, on the one hand, and Djakarta, Phnom Penh, and Rangoon on the other. At the same time, the Philippines participated in the Bandung Conference of April 1955, and expressed sympathy with basic Asian aspirations. In the early days of the Magsaysay administration a number of officials laid definite stress on a policy of Asia for the Asians, but the President prevented this emphasis from developing into a movement that might threaten Philippine-American relations Indeed, after the controversy over the 'Asia for the Asians' policy had developed he began to take a definite hand in guiding foreign policy.

The President remains a staunch defender of the United States in the Philippines. His policy stems from a conviction that the security of the Republic is tied to the power and friendship of the United States. The Manila Government looks upon the Mutual Defence Treaty of 1951 between the two countries as being much more significant for the Republic than the South-East Asia Collective Defence Treaty There is a widespread conviction in Manila that SEATO is lacking in 'teeth'.

Two basic issues in the relations between the Philippines and the United States have come to a head during Magsaysay's presidency. The first concerned the revision of the Philippine Trade Act of 1946, and the second, the modification of the Military Bases Agreement of 1947. The Laurel-Langley trade accord, reached in December 1954, led to the revision of trade relations between the two countries along lines favourably received in the Philippines. At the beginning of 1956, free trade with the United States came to an end, and new graduated duties were placed on American imports. The Philippine Government now

has the power to devaluate the *peso* as it sees fit, and the citizens of either country have reciprocal parity rights in the territory of the other. The new agreement on trade relations, though complicated, is in line with the growing nationalism of the Philippines and pays due regard to the sovereignty of the Republic. Meanwhile the share of the United States in the total foreign trade of the island nation has declined from 84 per cent in 1941 to 63 per cent in 1955.

The controversy over the bases has seriously affected relations between the Manila and Washington Governments. In 1947, the Philippines granted the United States 'the right to retain the use of a number of bases in the islands, and to activate certain others when needed, during a period of ninety-nine years. It is significant that the Philippine Government has not called for an end to the bases, in line with general policy in the new States of Asia, but has merely sought a redefinition of their scope. Earlier, the American Attorney General, Herbert Brownell, Jr, had indicated in a brief that the United States could claim ownership over the bases on legal grounds, an opinion strongly opposed in the Philippines especially by Senator Claro M. Recto.

A number of incidents occurred aggravating the situation. In the Olongapo reservation, some of the resident Filipinos complained about the policies of the American naval authorities. The complaint received considerable publicity, and an investigation followed. As a result of the conciliatory attitude of both parties, the matter was not allowed to reach major proportions. Later, at Clark Field Air Base, an incident arose over the Philippine mining of mineral resources in the area. President Magsaysay personally intervened to forestall a serious crisis. In the middle of 1956, trouble between American military personnel and Philippine authorities in Angeles, near Clark Field, led to the city's being placed out-of-bounds to American military personnel for a number of weeks.

On 3 July a joint statement by President Magsaysay and Vice-President Richard Nixon indicated, *inter alia*, that the United States fully recognized Philippine sovereignty over the base. The statement helped to pave the way for the formal opening of negotiations, in August, between an American and a Philippine panel on the base situation. Meanwhile, the United States sent to Manila, for transfer to the Philippine Government, the title papers and title claims of the bases.

Other causes of friction in Philippine-American relations i 1956 were the problems arising from the wages of Filipino labou ers in Guam and Wake, the importation of American Virginia le tobacco, the salaries of Filipino workers in American businesses i the archipelago, the question of an American increase in tl Philippine sugar quota, and charges that United States econom aid was aimed at keeping an agricultural economy in the Phili pines, and that the United States was favouring Japan by givir her more help than was granted the island republic to the sout Here it should be noted that American aid to the Philippines sin the war, both direct and indirect, has amounted to around $2,5 million.

The signing of the Philippine-Japanese Reparations Agreeme on 9 May 1956 was a significant development in the foreign poli of the Magsaysay administration. Under its terms, Japan will p the Philippines $500 million in capital goods, $30 million services, and $20 million in cash, within a maximum period twenty years. Japan will also undertake to make available Philippine enterprise long-term, non-governmental developme loans amounting to $250 million The establishment of norm relations between these two Asian neighbours followed on tl approval by the Philippine Senate of the Reparations Agreeme and also of the Treaty of Peace with Japan which had been sign at San Francisco in 1951.

Although the total of Japanese reparations is not large, it shou contribute to the further industrialization of the Philippines, a to more rapid growth of trade between the island republic a Japan and other States. Some American business circles have be fearful that an increase in Japanese-Philippine trade would furth reduce trade between the United States and the Philippines, nc that the Laurel-Langley agreement is in effect. It is certain that t American share in the Philippine import market will decrease as fraction of the whole, but rising prosperity and rapid econom growth in the islands should increase the absolute value American trade.

On the other hand, with the Reparations Agreement in for many Filipinos are concerned lest the way may now be open f Japanese economic penetration, which could lead to the politi dependence of their country on Nippon. There is still much an Japanese sentiment in the Philippines, a heritage of the war-ti occupation. Despite the facts that the reparations settleme

certainly opens up new ties between Filipino and Japanese business men, and that the economies of the two island nations are complementary, the question of the Philippines becoming a vassal of Japan will remain academic for some time.

In the case of Taiwan, President Magsaysay's support of the United States during the height of the crisis in the Formosa Strait early in 1955 was based upon the conviction that Taiwan is an important factor in the security of the Philippines. On 3 February, the President issued a statement,[1] in which he hoped that the American policy of 'firmness' on the 'Formosa question' would deter 'further acts of Communist aggression' in the area, and in which he also placed the Philippines 'squarely behind the United States' in the controversy Magsaysay's position brought severe criticism from Senator Recto, who believed the administration was asking for trouble.

The Philippines have been particularly concerned with developments on the mainland of China since the Communists took over the country. The Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai-shek is still recognized by the Philippine Government. At the same time, there are some Filipinos who wonder if their country can continue to ignore the People's Republic of China. A change in the attitude of the United States on the question of recognizing the Peking Government would probably result in similar action by the Philippines.

The Chinese minority in the archipelago further complicates Philippine policy toward China. It is estimated that 150,000 to 300,000 Chinese are living in the islands, who reportedly constitute the Chinese minority in South-East Asia most sympathetic to Chiang Kai-shek. But there is also a small but active Chinese Communist movement in the Philippines, and it must be recognized that the movement may receive some impetus from the nationalistic policies pursued by the Manila Government toward 'aliens', by which is usually meant the Chinese. The fall of Taiwan to the forces of Mao Tse-tung would further strengthen those Chinese in the islands who are friendly to the Communist world.

Since the overall record of President Magsaysay is impressive, the Opposition is finding difficulty in challenging it. One way of attacking the President, in view of his pro-Americanism, is to criticize the United States, thus involving the fundamental question of the foreign policy of the Philippines in a divided world.

[1] Press Release No 2-3-1, Press Secretary, Malacañang, 3 February 1955.

Another means of attacking Magsaysay is to assert that his reform programme is not, from a practical viewpoint, really getting down to the masses. Only time can give a final answer to this criticism, but the evidence indicates that progress is being made. Many critics of the President believe that he is too much influenced by the military and by their approach in dealing with problems. Others accuse him of pampering the press and running a popularity contest. But, after all is said and done, Ramon Magsaysay remains the man of the hour and the man of the people in the Philippines.

R. H. F.